KING

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

SHAWN KING, )

)

) Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00484

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Christy Criswell Wiegand

SUPERINTENDENT TINA WALKER, ) United States District Judge

)

SCI FAYETTE SUPERINTENDENT;

)

KEITH MATIYASIC, UNIT )

MANAGER; RHONDA HOUSE, )

FACILITY GRIEVANCE ) Christopher B. Brown

COORDINATOR; KRISTINA ) ) United States Magistrate Judge

HALUSKA, LIBRARIAN; DOCTOR )

LAUREL HARRY, SECRETARY PA )

DOC; JOSEPH RUSNAK, SECURITY )

)

CAPTAIN; OFFICER BURKHOLDER, )

SERGEANT DEPASQUALE, )

)

OFFICER HOLLOWAY OR

)

HOLLYWOOD, OFFICER DIX, )

BRITTANY KIMMEL, EDUCATION )

PRINCIPAL; SANDRA CALLOWAY, )

)

ACCOUNTING SUPERVISOR; )

ASHLEY TRAFFICANTE, )

MAILROOM SUPERVISOR; )

)

SERGEANT PEARCE, LISA

)

DUNCAN, PSYCHOLOGY )

MANAGER; JAMES BRIGHT, )

MEDICAL SUPERVISOR; OFFICER )

)

REGINA; “DOE”, CEO PSYCHOLOGY )

CORPORATE ENTITY COMPANY; )

AND JANE OR JOHN DOE, CEO )

)

WELLPATH, INC. MEDICAL

)

PROVIDER, )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, ECF NO.

104, AND MOTION FOR SPOLIATION SANCTIONS, ECF NO. 118

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff, Shawn King (“King”), proceeding pro se, is a state prisoner in the

custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). He brings this

case against DOC officials, corrections officers, and other DOC employees

concerning his incarceration at SCI-Fayette. ECF No. 87.

On February 20, 2025, King filed a sprawling 52-page handwritten Third

Amended Complaint (“TAC”), comprised of over 300 paragraphs. Id. He raises a

myriad of claims spanning a three-year time frame from 2022 through 2025.

Pending is the Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC, with brief

in support, ECF Nos. 104 and 105, to which King has filed a response and attached

45 pages of exhibits, ECF Nos. 113 and 113-1. In addition, King has filed a motion

for spoliation sanctions, ECF No. 118, to which the Corrections Defendants have

responded. ECF No. 124. Both motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.1

After reviewing the motion to dismiss and the opposition to it, as well as

relevant case law, it is respectfully recommended the motion be granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Claims Sought To Be Against Recommendation

Dismissed

Official Capacity All Corrections Defendants Motion to dismiss be

Claims granted and § 1983 official

capacity claims for money

damages be dismissed

with prejudice as such

claims are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. It

is further recommended

that leave to amend be

denied.

Personal Involvement Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Motion to dismiss be

of Several Corrections and Pearce granted as to Defendants

Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak,

and Pearce as the TAC is

void of specific factual

allegations. It is

recommended TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

_________________________ _________________________

Holloway, Regina, Motion to dismiss be

Burkholder, and Dix granted as to Defendants

Holloway, Regina,

Burkholder, and Dix as

the TAC is void of specific

factual allegations. It is

recommended TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

_________________________ _________________________

Walker Motion to dismiss be

granted to the extent King

is attempting to hold

Superintendent Walker

liable as a supervisor. It

is recommended the TAC

be dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

_________________________ _______________________

Motion to dismiss be

Kimmel and House denied.

First Amendment Haluska, Depasquale, Motion to dismiss be

Claims – Right of Calloway, and Holloway granted as King has failed

Access to Courts to plead Defendants’

conduct prevented him

from pursuing a non-

frivolous or arguable

claim. It is recommended

the TAC be dismissed

without prejudice and

King be granted leave to

amend.

First Amendment Kimmel and House Motion to dismiss be

Claims - Retaliation denied as King has

implicated Kimmel and

House denied his

grievances in retaliation

for his protected activity.

_________________________ ________________________

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, The motion to dismiss be

and Pearce granted as the TAC fails

to include any allegations

identifying the specific

adverse actions taken by

these Defendants against

King. It is recommended

the TAC be dismissed

without prejudice and

King be granted leave to

amend.

_________________________ ________________________

Holloway, Regina, The motion to dismiss be

Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, granted as the TAC fails

and Trafficante to include any allegations

showing a causal link

between King’s protected

activity and these

Defendants’ knowledge of

his protected activity. It is

recommended the TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

Fourth Amendment Sgt. DePasquale The motion to dismiss be

Claims granted and King’s Fourth

Amendment claims be

dismissed with prejudice

and leave to amend be

denied as futile.

Eighth Amendment – All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be

Conditions of granted as the TAC lacks

Confinement Claims the requisite specificity to

meet minimum pleading

requirements to allege

Eighth Amendment

conditions of confinement

claims. It is recommended

the TAC be dismissed

without prejudice and

King be granted leave to

amend.

Eighth Amendment – Dix, Burkholder, Regina, The motion to dismiss be

Failure to Protect and unnamed Corrections granted as the TAC does

Claims Defendants not allege facts to support

a finding that Dix,

Burkholder, or Regina, or

any other Corrections

Defendant, were aware of

any threats to King or

disregarded a substantial

risk to his safety. It is

recommended the TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

______________________ _________________________ _________________________

Fourteenth All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be

Amendment Due granted and King’s

Process Claims Fourteenth Amendment

due process claims be

with prejudice under the

single source rule. It is

further recommended

leave to amend be denied

as futile.

In sum, it is recommended King be granted leave to file a Fourth Amended

Complaint that meets the standards of Federal Rule of Procedure 8 and cures the

pleading deficiencies as noted in this Report and Recommendation. King should be

instructed he cannot include any claim in his Fourth Amended Complaint that has

been dismissed with prejudice.

Additionally, it is recommended the motion for spoliation sanctions be denied

as King has not met his burden with respect to his request for spoliation sanctions.

II. Report

A. Factual Background and Procedural History

On March 31, 2022, King was transferred from SCI-Houtzdale to SCI-

Fayette. ECF No. 87, ¶ 26. He contends the Corrections Defendants violated a

number of his constitutional rights, including engaging in a “pattern of retaliation”

in response to his constitutionally protected activity.

King initiated this prisoner civil rights case on March 29, 2024, by submitting

to the Clerk’s Office a 26-page complaint, naming approximately 25 DOC officials

and various employees as defendants. ECF Nos. 1, 9. At the time King commenced

this lawsuit, he was incarcerated at SCI-Fayette.2

The Complaint was “lodged” as it did not come with the filing fee or a motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP motion”). About a month later, on April

29, 2024, King filed an IFP motion, ECF 2, which was granted on May 7, 2024, ECF

No. 7, and the Complaint filed. ECF No. 8. Before the Court received service

documents from King, he filed two supplements to the Complaint. ECF Nos. 9 and

18. In August 2024, he then sought leave to file another supplement to his

complaint, ECF No. 38. That request was denied and King was directed to file one

stand-alone Amended Complaint. ECF No. 39.

On September 11, 2024, King filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 44, and

simultaneously filed a motion for leave to file a “final supplement.” ECF No. 45.

The motion for leave to file a “final supplement” was denied, but King was granted

leave to file one stand-alone Second Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 48 and 56. On

February 28, 2025, King filed his Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 59.

2 In February 2026, King notified the Court he had been transferred from SCI-Fayette to SCI-

Phoenix. ECF No. 141.

About two months later, on May 6, 2024, before service was effectuated, King

filed a Motion to Amend Parties. ECF No. 71. The motion was denied without

prejudice as it was unclear whether King was seeking to add new defendants or

terminate existing defendants. ECF No. 72. King was advised to the extent he was

seeking to terminate a previously named defendant, he should file a motion

requesting that party be dismissed from the lawsuit and to the extent he wished to

add new defendants or substitute previously named defendants, he was granted

leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 72 and 82.

On July 1, 2025, King filed a TAC, which is far from a model of clarity. It

spans 52 single-spaced handwritten pages and contains over 300 paragraphs. ECF

No. 87. The TAC remains King’s operative complaint.3 In it, seventeen individuals

are named as defendants: FCI Fayette Superintendent Tina Walker, DOC

Secretary Doctor Laurel Henry, Security Captain Joseph Rusnak, Unit Manager

Keith Matiyasic, Facility Grievance Coordinator Rhonda House, Education

Principal Brittany Kimmel, Accounting Supervisor Sandra Calloway, Mailroom

Supervisor Ashley Trafficante, Sergeant DePasquale, Sergeant Pearce, Psychology

Manager Lisa Duncan, Medical Supervisor James Bright, Officer Holloway, Officer

Regina, Librarian Kristina Haluska, Officer Burkholder, and Officer Dix

(collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”), and two Doe Defendants: CEO

Psychology Corporate Entity Company (“Doe”) and CEO Wellpath Inc. Medical

3 “In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original

pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most

recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Id.

Provider: Jane or John Doe. ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 9-27. Each defendant is sued in their

individual and official capacities. Id. at 3.

As noted above, the TAC is long and in parts confusing, if not

incomprehensible. For example, factual allegations are dispersed throughout the

document, often the claims are against “the Defendants” and discrete defendants or

the actions taken by an individual defendant are not identified, and the causes of

action are not set forth in separate paragraphs or sections. As far as the

undersigned can discern, the allegations in the TAC are intended to make out

causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As self-described by King, the TAC,

details and alleges Defendants pattern of retaliation for

his participation in protected conduct, numerous

instances of spoliation, censorship, illegal seizures,

withholding of PA DOC authorized outside purchases,

interference with privileged communications,

substandard medical and psychiatric care. The conditions

of confinement component of constant high intensity, cold

air, even during winter months, and the customary

disregard for PA DOC policies and the abdication of

responsibilities and dereliction of duties by SCI-Fayette

prison officials, including refusal to protect inmate and

denial of separations from inmates who pose a substantial

imminent threat to plaintiffs safety and life.

ECF No. 113 at 4. According to King, he raises six claims in his TAC:

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ECF No. 113 at 19. As relief, King seeks declaratory judgment, preliminary, and

permanent injunction ordering the SCI Fayette prison officials to cease their threats

toward him, compensatory and punitive damages, recovery of costs of suit, and any

other appropriate relief. ECF No. 87 at 45; ECF No. 113 at 21.

The Corrections Defendants filed the instant motion arguing there is no

substance to the TAC and move to dismiss under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 104. King filed a response in opposition, ECF

No. 113, and the matter is now ripe for disposition.

The Court has federal question jurisdiction as King’s claims are brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Standard of Review — Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well

settled. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

10

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and can be

dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint

must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

The Court conducts a three-step inquiry in evaluating a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), as

amended (June 6, 2011). First, the Court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, the Court accepts all the

plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and “construe[s] the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d

Cir. 2008)). But the Court disregards “legal conclusions and recitals of the elements

of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.” Davis v. Wells

Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016). Third, the Court considers “whether the

facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a

‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

When a plaintiff, like King here, is proceeding pro se, the complaint is “to be

liberally construed,” and “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93-94 (2007). That said, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in

their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.

1996)). And, “[w]hile a litigant's pro se status requires a court to construe the

allegations in the complaint liberally, . . . a litigant is not absolved from complying

with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds

pro se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App'x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Judging

the sufficiency of a pleading “is a context-dependent exercise.” Garrett v. Wexford

Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc.

v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)). At a minimum, however, the pleading

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, a complaint must identify “discrete defendants and the actions taken

by these defendants[.]” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). Dismissal under

Rule 8(a) is appropriate when the “complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or

otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”

Muhammad v. U.S. States Bd. of Governors Postal Sys., 574 F. App'x 74, 74 (3d Cir.

2014) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).

C. Analysis

1. The TAC Violates Rule 8(a)(2)

The Corrections Defendants initially move to dismiss the TAC on the grounds

it fails to meet the pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. As

noted above, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Put lightly, the TAC is nowhere near a

“short and plain statement.”

The TAC is unwieldy with over 300 paragraphs spread out over 52 pages and

has only grown more so in its third iteration since King’s original pleading. But

striking the TAC will only delay resolution as the undersigned recognizes striking

the TAC for a Rule 8 violation and then directing King, a pro se plaintiff, to file

again would only serve to “unnecessarily proliferate the pleading stage and

postpone a trial on the merits[.]” 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure Civ. § 1281 (4th ed.). While King’s TAC is unnecessarily complicated and

verbose, dismissal is not recommended on this basis. Rather, the undersigned will

wade through the TAC to evaluate the sufficiency of the allegations.

2. The Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), ECF No. 104

Corrections Defendants next argue the TAC should be dismissed on various

grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims against a Corrections

Defendant in their official capacity; (2) the TAC fails to adequately allege personal

involvement of several Corrections Defendants; (3) the TAC fails to state a First

Amendment claim for a violation of the right to access the courts; (4) the TAC fails

to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against several Corrections

Defendants; (5) the TAC fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim; (6) the TAC fails

to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim; (7) the TAC fails to

state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim; and (8) the TAC fails to state a

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. ECF No. 105.4 Each of these

arguments is addressed in order.

a. Eleventh Amendment: Official Capacity Claims

The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss claims against them in so far as

they are made against them in their official capacities. ECF No. 105, at 8. The

undersigned agrees with the Corrections Defendants and recommends all claims

against defendants in their official capacities be dismissed.

Official-capacity suits are “only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent[.]” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978). In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which

the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 166 (1985). As such, claims against state officials in their official capacities for

damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013).

4 King’s claims for substandard medical /psychiatric care are raised against the Doe

defendants, which remain unidentified and unserved.

King acknowledges the Eleventh Amendment “disallows monetary damages

against Defendants in their official capacity,” but he argues the Eleventh

Amendment does not preclude his claims because is seeking “injunctive relief to

force the State or State Agency for whom they officials work to obey the

Constitution.” ECF No. 113 at 21. The claims in the TAC arise from King’s

incarceration at SCI-Fayette. A prisoner’s transfer or release from the facility

complained of, as is the case here with King transferred to SCI-Phoenix, generally

moots equitable and declaratory claims. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d

Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003). Such claims are not mooted when a

challenged action is (1) too short in duration to be fully litigated before its cessation

or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that the same complaining

party would be subject to the same action again. Id.

The record reflects King was transferred to SCI-Phoenix in February 2026,

after briefing on this motion concluded. ECF No. 141. There is no indication in the

record King is reasonably likely to be transferred back to SCI-Fayette. Therefore, it

is recommended the motion to dismiss be granted with prejudice and all claims

against the Corrections Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed and

leave to amend be denied. See Sutton, 323 F.3d at 249 (holding equitable and

declaratory claims were moot where prisoners who challenged a policy on access to

religious materials were no longer confined at the facility).

b. The TAC Fails to Adequately Allege Personal

Involvement of Several Corrections Defendants5

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove a defendant, acting

under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.

1988). Liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's “personal involvement” in the

deprivation of a constitutional right. Gould v. Wetzel, 547 F. App'x 129 (3d Cir.

2013). “Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction

or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d

Cir. 2020) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Absent specific allegations that a

defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal

is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa.

2013) (dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiffs failed to set forth

sufficient facts to establish certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the

alleged Eighth Amendment violation).

The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Defendants

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Pearce, Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Walker,

Kimmel, and House for lack of personal involvement. ECF No. 105 at 12-13. The

arguments are addressed in turn.

5 The Corrections Defendants are not at this time asserting a lack of personal involvement

argument for Corrections Defendants Trafficante, Calloway, Matiyasic, Depasquale, and Haluska.

See ECF No. 105, n. 2.

i. Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce

While Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce are named in the

caption of the TAC, the TAC is void of any specific factual allegations against these

four defendants. Thus, it is recommended King’s claims against Defendants Bright,

Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce be dismissed without prejudice and King be granted

leave to amend.

ii. Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, and

Dix

The TAC alleges Defendant Holloway violated King’s “First Amendment

rights by removing and discarding [King’s] initial 1983 complaint and exhibits,”

ECF No. 87 at 35, and King suffered “[i]ncalculable mental loss . . . by exposing him

to and being subjected to fear, uncertainty, threats from prison officials Officers

Dix, Burkholder, and Regina[.]” Id. at 43. Such conclusory statements without any

specificity is not sufficient to establish personal liability. Thus, it is recommended

King’s claims against Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, and Dix be

dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

iii. Defendant Walker

King describes Walker as the “Superintendent and serves as the ‘Facility

Manager” of SCI-Fayette. ECF No. 87 at 2. According to King, Superintendent

Walker was dismissive of his numerous grievances and questioned whether he was

working with his unit staff. Id., ¶¶ 135-143. According to King,

Defendant Walker is largely disinterested and

unconcerned with the behavior and actions of underlings;

believing they (staff) can do no wrong and do not do so.

Ms. Walker defends subordinate prison officials

regardless of allegations without investigation and does

not discipline them.

ECF No. 87, at 15, ¶¶ 142-43.

To the extent King is attempting to hold Superintendent Walker liable as a

supervisor, his allegations fail. Liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a

respondeat superior theory. See Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d

210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100, at

*2 (3d Cir. 2022) (per curiam). Additionally, the mere fact that a defendant is a

“supervisor” or has supervisory authority, standing alone, cannot support liability

under § 1983. See Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified two general

instances in which the conduct of a supervisor or the policies/procedures of a

supervisor may constitute personal involvement, thus warranting a finding of

individual supervisory liability for a constitutional tort. First, “a supervisor may be

personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of

and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.

v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v.

Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Second, supervisors may be

liable if they, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and

maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional

harm.” Coulston v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 651 F. App'x 139, 143 (3d Cir.

2016) (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 373 F.3d at 586).

Here, the TAC has no allegations indicating Defendant Walker participated

in violating King’s rights, directed others to violate his rights, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional

conduct. Nor are there any allegations Superintendent Walker established or

maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused King constitutional

harm.

Thus, it is recommended King’s claims against Defendant Walker be

dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

iv. Defendants Kimmel and House

The TAC describes Defendant Kimmel as the Education Principal and

Defendant House as the Facility Grievance Coordinator. ECF No. 87 at 3, ¶¶ 13, 14.

It appears the allegations against Defendants Kimmel and House are based on their

involvement and denial of King’s many grievances. Id., ¶¶ 95, 173, 285.

The Corrections Defendants argue Defendants Kimmel and House should be

dismissed because “the fact that an official receives and reviews a letter or request

slip is insufficient to establish personal involvement.” ECF No. 105 at 13. See

Mearin, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (“the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show

the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in

the alleged unlawful conduct.”); see also Longo v. Trostle, No. 24-1981, 2024 WL

4579250, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2024). However, King repeatedly alleges retaliation

by the Corrections Defendants, including the allegation his grievances were denied

in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. Since King has implicated

Defendants Kimmel and House in his retaliation claims, it is recommended the

motion to dismiss Defendants Kimmel and House for lack of personal involvement

be denied.

c. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State A Plausible

First Amendment Access to Courts Claim

The right of access to the courts derives from the First Amendment's right to

petition and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.6

“It is well-established that prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right of

access to the courts.” Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), superseded by statute as stated in Brown v.

Sage, 941 F.3d 655 (3d Cir. 2019)).

To establish a denial of access to courts claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) “they

suffered an ‘actual injury’ in that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or

‘arguable’ underlying claim”; and (2) they have “no other ‘remedy that may be

awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access

suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Christopher v.

6 The right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition. See

McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). Also, “[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of

law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to

challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.”

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401

(1989)).

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). The complaint must “describe the underlying

arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must

describe the ‘lost remedy.’” Id. (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).

According to the TAC, Defendant Haluska violated King’s First Amendment

access-to-courts rights by (1) denying him use of the library and (2) terminating his

use of the library copying machine. ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 66-69, 90. He asserts

Defendants Depasquale and Adams7 violated his First Amendment access-to-courts

rights by seizing, discarding, and removing discovery documents. Id., p. 35. And

that Defendant Calloway violated his First Amendment access-to-courts rights by

not timely submitting documents to the Court and delaying civil action, and

Defendants Calloway and Holloway removed and discarded his initial Section 1983

complaint exhibits. Id.

King does not allege he lost a chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable

underlying claim as a result of Defendants’ actions. As a result, he has failed to

plausibly plead the conduct of Defendants Haluska, Depasquale, Calloway, or

Holloway prevented him from pursuing a non-frivolous or arguable underlying

7 The Court notes the caption of the TAC does not include any individual named “Adams” and

“Adams” is not identified as a party in the TAC. See ECF No. 87 at 2-3. Similarly, the TAC also

states Security Department Officials John Does #1, #2, #3, and #4, Ms. Schaup, and Captain

DiSilva violated King’s First Amendment rights. Id. Yet the caption of the TAC does not include

any individuals identified as Security Department Officials John Does #1, #2, #3, and #4, Ms.

Schaup, or Captain Silva, and none of these individuals are identified as parties in the TAC. Id.

Under Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the

parties[.]”

claim. Accordingly, it is recommended King’s denial of access to the courts claim be

dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

d. The First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Although not explicitly stated, it appears King is attempting to bring a First

Amendment retaliation claim against certain Corrections Defendants, including

Kimmel, House, Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Pearce, Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix,

Halusak, and Trafficante. See ECF No. 87. To the extent King may also be

asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim against Corrections Defendants

Matiyasic and Depasquale, the Corrections Defendants are not challenging such

claims at this juncture. ECF No. 105, n. 3.

To state a § 1983 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) the conduct

which led to the retaliation was constitutionally protected, (2) plaintiff was subject

to adverse actions by a state actor, and (3) the protected activity was a substantial

motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take the adverse action. See Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also Alexander

v. Fritch, 396 F. App’x 867, 871 (3d Cir. 2010).

King asserts the TAC “details and alleges Defendants pattern of retaliation

for his participation in protected conduct, numerous instances of spoilation,

censorship, illegal seizures, withholding Pa DOC authorized outside purchases,

interference with privileged communications, substandard medical and psychiatric

care.” ECF No. 113 at 4. The Correction Defendants do not contest the TAC

adequately pleads King engaged in protected conduct. What the Corrections

Defendants do contest though, is that the TAC fails to state plausible retaliation

claims because there often are no allegations identifying the adverse actions taken

by a discrete defendant or that King’s protected activity was a substantial

motivating factor in a Corrections Defendant’s alleged decision to take adverse

action. ECF No. 105 at 17-20. In particular, the Corrections Defendants argue King

has failed to state a plausible claim for retaliation against Corrections Defendants

Kimmel, House, Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Pearce, Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix,

Halusak, and Trafficante. Id. These arguments are addressed in turn.

i. Defendants Kimmel and House

The Corrections Defendants argue King has failed to sufficiently plead a

claim of retaliation against Defendants Kimmel and House because “a retaliation

claim generally cannot be based off a grievance or lawsuit filed against another

person.” ECF No. 105 at 19. But as noted above, King alleges Defendants Kimmel

and House denied his grievances in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity.

It is well settled “[g]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the

Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial

part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”

Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). Since King has implicated

Defendants Kimmel and House in his retaliation claims, it is recommended the

motion to dismiss the retaliation claims against Defendants Kimmel and House be

denied.

ii. Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce

As to Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce, the undersigned agrees

with the Corrections Defendants that the TAC fails to include any allegations

identifying the specific adverse actions these Defendants took against King. As

such, King has failed to plead a plausible claim for retaliation against Defendants

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce. Accordingly, it is recommended King’s

retaliation claims against Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce claim be

dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

iii. Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix,

Haluska, and Trafficante

As to Corrections Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Haluska,

and Trafficante, the TAC contains allegations these Defendants retaliated against

King in a number of ways;8 however, as the Corrections Defendants correctly note

the TAC is void of any allegation showing a causal link between King’s protected

activity and each of these Defendant’s knowledge of his protected activity. ECF No.

105 at 19-20. As such, King has failed to plead a plausible claim for retaliation

against Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, and Trafficante.

Accordingly, it is recommended King’s retaliation claims against Defendants

8 For example, King asserts Defendant Holloway removed and discarded his initial federal

complaint; Defendants Regina, Burkholder, and Dix refused to protect him from known threats by

fellow prisoners; Defendant Haluska denied him access to the library and terminated his copier

usage, and Defendant Trafficante confiscated a book King had ordered. See ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 67-69,

90-94; 184-185.

Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, and Trafficante be dismissed without

prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

e. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State a Claim for A

Fourth Amendment Violation

The TAC states Defendants Depasquale and Adams9 “violated multiple

Constitutional Rights of plaintiff by seizing, discarding and removing ‘Discovery’

documents numbering several hundred without Due Process, also violating his

FIRST and FOURTH AMENDMENT protections.” ECF No. 87 at 35.

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches

and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants, shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The undersigned understands King to be raising a Fourth Amendment claim

based on the seizure of his documents. Still, he has not stated a plausible claim

under the Fourth Amendment because “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of

privacy and [ ] the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches [and

seizures] does not apply in prisoner cells.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);

see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The defendants correctly

9 Again, the Court notes the caption of the TAC does not include any individual named

“Adams” and “Adams” is not identified as a party in the TAC. See ECF No. 87 at 2-3.

assert that prisoners do not have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in their

cells.” (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529).

As King’s claim fails to state a constitutional claim, it is recommended King’s

Fourth Amendment claim be dismissed with prejudice and leave to amend be

denied as futile.

f. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State Plausible

Eighth Amendment Claims for Conditions of Confinement

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation for conditions of confinement,

“an inmate must allege both an objective element – that the deprivation was

sufficiently serious – and a subjective element – that a prison official acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Nami v. Fauver, 82

F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir.

1992) (describing deliberate indifference as occurring when an official knows or

should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate) (superseded by

statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir.

2000).

Throughout the TAC, King alleges he was routinely subjected to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Page 42 of the TAC summarizes his

conditions of confinement claims as follows:

The conditions oN cont \nement melude Yeor

fro ound. sschrenmely cole call fencpercduves ) lack. on

clean —urenlotks y 4 oy 3 the. erclhaust verbs o& the. cells

□□□ net Ce akgely 2 lemvedk -8 ater, Hake Lionel S@iratngs

aun, Rood syroeep retpresentoli ors are vet nach, Stk ounces

yrtce5 Xs reby FRAT PU Ts serveds orca. adler} sefeneees

Soto heals are. Ser ved. mash oat, usdely three oy

Can nek, andim heasy Yas) otions and wdben Q □ Dust

is pre Bicded “4 1S on rippenediand takes olsout Murda. te

Arack of sonitelion: the T3SUe wred boy

ait Mau “gar / DeWrdhauat Yet Makiy erste v1 retol odien

Plank a Spray bottle | ushieh oll Ww robes wALeife_ permitted

Vie per coll +o Seantes ond regularly rrccinkor A iri va She

Panderic - fs eovs, SCL- Foxy ett. & heusi va anit collected

then. wn ~S late 75 ZoZt."p lari St repechedly coq te thed cud

Wles each th ne dovied, eVe2_/) subecthe b oa Grievance in

wth iel, Uni trlouayer /Dehendaat Feclacr Secperot Sort

ples “kK ODS TFinsr Ameadme et aad Spiel probed ov ci ats

cuembin ied, the Dieledkion ‘tn har Lelvemee. ni Lied Re Rew Repetic

by oppranincsbely comoth er Gorky Cire dors, at ushiel Hnce!

Plaanii dhs Acgpest\ of Gricueuce. to Fexcalaty teneqev wes GRANTED

iw pack conch. nod, Mat your lc ORBERZD *o provide. “plan ot a

Spray battle. tt TePASans the sole mstavce , to the best 0

peantitts MERMOES 5 thet □□□ of ‘he S taky + ove Wileds arictade

at SCT- Fayette. Cal demed) hes 2Jev ceversed GH only en part)

ak the Feuck Why Manager level ov Appeal conc viever won Fine □□□

ECF No. 87 at 42. While each of the concerns expressed by King in the TAC are

included in the Eighth Amendment’s protections, his conditions of confinement

claims suffer from the same infirmities as his retaliation claims. As the Corrections

27

Defendants correctly point out, King’s allegations lack the requisite specificity to

meet minimum pleading requirements. ECF No. 105 at 21. There are no factual

allegations “setting forth particularized descriptions of actions” taken by discrete

defendants responsible for the conditions of which he complains or which

defendants were aware of the conditions and chose to ignore them. See Garrett, 938

F.3d at 94. For example, King contends he

repeatedly informed RHU officers that the toilet in his cell

L-C 1009 had low water pressure insufficient to flush the

waste and toilet tissue[,] he continued advising RHU

staff for the next four days that the commode was backing

up; waste and excrement flowing into the toilet and . . .

was at risk of overflowing . . . on April 4, 2022, Plaintiff

was relocated to Cell L-C 2012.

ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 45-51. Such broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient as

they are made against unnamed RHU officers and RHU staff and not against any

one defendant. As a result, King’s allegations lack specificity and he has thus failed

to state a plausible claim for relief.

As to the allegation Defendant Matiyasic denied him a spray bottle to

sanitize his cell, King has not alleged how this condition created a substantial risk

or serious harm or that any such alleged deliberate indifference by Defendant

Matiyasic caused him any harm.

For all these reasons, it is recommended King’s Eighth Amendment

conditions of confinement claims be dismissed without prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

g. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State a Plausible

Eighth Amendment Claim for Failure to Protect

A prisoner has a “right to be protected from constant threats of violence and

sexual assault from other inmates[.]” Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir.

1985). To state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison

official, the prisoner must allege facts that plausibly support “(1) he was

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the

official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety,

and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696

F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Fisher v.

Hollingsworth, 115 F.3d 352, 371 (3d. Cir. 2012).

King contends upon his arrival at SCI-Fayette, he immediately informed

prison officials that prior to his transfer he had signed a “Protective Custody Unit

Acknowledgement.” ECF No. 87, ¶ 27. And despite signing such an

acknowledgement, he was informed upon his arrival at SCI-Fayette there was no

such unit at that institution and King was instead placed in the RHU for

approximately seven weeks while the Security Department determined whether it

was safe for him to be released into general population. Id., ¶¶ 27-29. He also

contends he “repeatedly, for nearly four years, periodically requested ‘separations’

from inmates which were each time denied or went unanswered.” ECF No. 113 at

7. King alleges “Defendants” acted with deliberate indifference in “deciding not to

issue ‘separations.’” ECF No. 113 at 5.

The TAC does not explicitly state King is asserting a failure-to-protect claim.

But construing the allegations of the TAC liberally, in light of Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.. 519 (1972), it can be construed he is asserting a failure-to-protect claim against

Corrections Defendants Dix, Burkholder, and Regina, for failing to protect him from

known threats posed by fellow prisoners. ECF No. 87 at 43, ¶ 4.10 However, the

TAC does not allege facts to support a finding that Defendants Dix, Burkholder,

Regina, or any other Corrections Defendant were aware of any threats made to

King or that they disregarded a substantial risk to his safety. His conclusory

allegations of risk and knowledge are insufficient to state a plausible failure to

protect claim against Corrections Defendants Dix, Burkholder, and Regina.

Similarly, King’s assertions the Corrections Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his safety by failing to impose a separation order similarly fails to

support a plausible failure-to-protect claim. See ECF No. 113 at 5 (“prison officials

conduct; their acts and omissions in deciding not to issue ‘separations’ with

deliberate indifference.”). Once again, King fails to identify discrete defendants

responsible for issuing separation orders or which defendants failed to exercise

necessary care to protect his safety.

10 King contends he was “concerned and afraid” inmates [names omitted by Court] and/or

others may at some point, transfer to SCI-Fayette, inmates whom had repeatedly made threats to

harm or kill him because they were family members of the ‘victim’ in the case responsible for his

incarceration currently.” ECF No. 87 at 50, ¶ 28. He contends he saw a family member of the victim

working in SCI-Fayette Barber Shop. Id., ¶ 31. King reported his concerns to Lt. Burgess, the

Security Captain, who is not a defendant here. Id., ¶¶ 29–37.

Thus, it is recommended the failure to protect claims be dismissed without

prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

h. King’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim is Barred

by the Single Source Rule

It is unclear what claims King is attempting to bring under the Fourteenth

Amendment due process clause. There is a reference to “deprivation of property,”

but it is unclear if this relates to the “seizing, discarding, and removing of discovery

documents” by Corrections Defendant Depasquale, ECF No. 87 at 35, or the denial

of commissary paid-for items and outside publications, id., ¶¶ 183-198.

To the extent any due process claim “is covered by a specific constitutional

provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed

under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d

Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Thus, to

the extent King’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims arise from the same

factual allegations underlying his First Amendment retaliation claims, he does not

have standalone claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is thus recommended

King’s Fourteenth Amendment claims be dismissed without prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.11

11 King may also be attempting to bring a First Amendment censorship claim based on the

denial of his mail and certain publications. See ECF No. 113 at 8-9. It is recommended King be

granted leave to develop this claim in a Fourth Amended Complaint.

3. The Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, ECF No. 108

Lastly, King also filed a motion for spoliation sanctions alleging Defendants

failed to preserve evidence relevant to this case during a cell search outside his

presence. He asserts,

Prisoner officials, fully aware of their legal affirmative

Duty-to-Preserve and of active litigation in two separate

matters, proceeded in conducting cell searches and

leaving every document plaintiff has been permitted to

process in a heap on the concrete floor. Agents of the Pa

DOC CERT team and SCI-Fayette personnel dumped out

the contends of thirty-two manila envelopes, fifteen

folders, work product previously on the cell’s desk and the

steel top bunk without a mattress. All book marks inside

the legal reference books were removed. The

approximately fifty plastic Sheet Protectors also were

emptied. Absent is the two sided, Court provided THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT and several pages of

Defendants’ Brief in Support and Motion to Dismiss.

ECF No. 118 at 4.12 Notably, King also states while he had legal property

exemption authorizations in two separate pending cases, for a total of three boxes,

“[a]n exemption for this case was denied by [Unit Manager] Ms. Luster.” Id. at 2

(emphasis added). As sanctions he seeks (1) the dismissal of Defendants’ motion to

dismiss in its entirety; (2) appointment of counsel; (3) leave to amend complaint, (4)

bar any motion for summary judgment from Defendants, and (5) additional relief

the Court deems appropriate. Id. at 7. While the Corrections Defendants deny all

12 King does not indicate when this event occurred other than stating it occurred “when his cell

was searched outside his presence, while detained in the R&D strip cage, five hours after filing a

PREA notification on Defendant Officer Regina[.]” ECF No. 118 at 3.

King’s allegations, ECF No. 124, n.1, they argue the motion should be dismissed as

premature as “a complete factual record does not exist[.]” Id. at 3.

“Spoliation occurs where: the evidence was in the party's control; the evidence

is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression

or withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably

foreseeable to the party.” Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir.

2012). Whether to impose sanctions is within the Court’s sound discretion. Bozic v.

City of Washington, Pa., 912 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 (W.D. Pa. 2012). If it is

determined that spoliation of evidence has occurred, the Court must determine an

appropriate sanction. GN Netcom, Inc. v Plantronics, Inc., 930 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir.

2019) (quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994);

see also Bull, 665 F.3d at 74 n. 5 (quoting Schmid).

The undersigned concludes a finding of spoliation is not warranted and

recommends the motion for spoliation sanctions be denied. First, it is not clear

King’s documents in this case were actually destroyed. According to King, his

documents were taken out of envelopes and folders and dumped onto his cell floor

and bookmarks were removed from legal reference books, but he does not contend

his documents were actually destroyed.13 ECF No. 118 at 3. Further, while King

13 King does contend initial discovery documents produced in a separate lawsuit by the Office of

the Attorney General were thrown in the toilet by the Security Department prison officials and then

“the entire contends of one Legal Property Exemption box was discarded by a Supervisor level SCI-

Fayette prison official, defendant Sgt. Pasquale and a subordinate.” ECF No. 118 at 3. King does

not state when this event occurred.

contends his TAC and several pages of the Corrections Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and brief were “absent,” id. at 4, he does not dispute the Corrections

Defendants remailed him those documents. ECF No. 124 at 4.14 King cannot show

the conduct of any Defendant in this action resulted in an actual injury to him in

this case.

Nor is there evidence the Corrections Defendants acted in bad faith. In

determining bad faith, courts look to circumstantial evidence to determine intent,

including “the timing of the destruction, whether there was selective preservation,

and what preservation policies the party had in place.” Donofrio v. Ikea US Retail,

LLC, Civil Action Nos. 18-599, 2024 WL 1998094, at *28 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2024).

The documents were discovered during a cell search and, by King’s own admission,

he did not have an exemption for this material to be maintained in his cell.

Because there is no evidence of bad faith or prejudice, it is recommended

King’s motion for spoliation sanctions be denied.

14 King responded to the motion to dismiss on 12/22/2025, seven days before he filed the instant

motion for spoliation sanctions. ECF No. 118.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended the motion to dismiss

be granted in part and denied in part as most of King’s constitutional claims fail to

state a claim:

Claims Sought To Be Against Recommendation

Dismissed

Official Capacity All Corrections Defendants Motion to dismiss be

Claims granted and § 1983 official

capacity claims for money

damages be dismissed

with prejudice as such

claims are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. It

is further recommended

that leave to amend be

denied.

Personal Involvement Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Motion to dismiss be

of Several Corrections and Pearce granted as to Defendants

Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak,

and Pearce as the TAC is

void of specific factual

allegations. It is

recommended TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

_________________________

_________________________

Motion to dismiss be

Holloway, Regina, granted as to Defendants

Burkholder, and Dix Holloway, Regina,

Burkholder, and Dix as

the TAC is void of specific

factual allegations. It is

recommended TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

_________________________

_________________________

Motion to dismiss be

Walker granted to the extent King

is attempting to hold

Superintendent Walker

liable as a supervisor. It

is recommended the TAC

be dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

_______________________

_________________________

Motion to dismiss be

Kimmel and House denied.

First Amendment Haluska, Depasquale, Motion to dismiss be

Claims – Right of Calloway, and Holloway granted as King has failed

Access to Courts to plead Defendants’

conduct prevented him

from pursuing a non-

frivolous or arguable

claim. It is recommended

the TAC be dismissed

without prejudice and

King be granted leave to

amend.

First Amendment Kimmel and House Motion to dismiss be

Claims - Retaliation denied as King has

implicated Kimmel and

House denied his

grievances in retaliation

for his protected activity.

_________________________ ________________________

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, The motion to dismiss be

and Pearce granted as the TAC fails

to include any allegations

identifying the specific

adverse actions taken by

these Defendants against

King. It is recommended

the TAC be dismissed

without prejudice and

King be granted leave to

amend.

_________________________ ________________________

Holloway, Regina, The motion to dismiss be

Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, granted as the TAC fails

and Trafficante to include any allegations

showing a causal link

between King’s protected

activity and these

Defendants’ knowledge of

his protected activity. It is

recommended the TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

Fourth Amendment Sgt. DePasquale The motion to dismiss be

Claims granted and King’s Fourth

Amendment claims be

dismissed with prejudice

and leave to amend be

denied as futile.

Eighth Amendment – All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be

Conditions of granted as the TAC lacks

Confinement Claims the requisite specificity to

meet minimum pleading

requirements to allege

Eighth Amendment

conditions of confinement

claims. It is recommended

the TAC be dismissed

without prejudice and

King be granted leave to

amend.

Eighth Amendment – Dix, Burkholder, Regina, The motion to dismiss be

Failure to Protect and unnamed Corrections granted as the TAC does

Claims Defendants not allege facts to support

a finding that Dix,

Burkholder, or Regina, or

any other Corrections

Defendant, were aware of

any threats to King or

disregarded a substantial

risk to his safety. It is

recommended the TAC be

dismissed without

prejudice and King be

granted leave to amend.

______________________ _________________________ _________________________

Fourteenth All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be

Amendment Due granted and King’s

Process Claims Fourteenth Amendment

due process claims be

with prejudice under the

single source rule. It is

further recommended

leave to amend be denied

as futile.

Giving deference to the allegations in King’s pro se Third Amended

Complaint, it is recommended King be granted leave to file a Fourth Amended

Complaint that meets the standards of Federal Rule of Procedure 8 and cures the

pleading deficiencies as noted in this Report and Recommendation. King should be

instructed he cannot include any claim in his Fourth Amended Complaint that has

been dismissed with prejudice.

It is also recommended King’s motion for spoliation sanctions be denied as

King has not met his burden with respect to the requested spoliation sanctions.

Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and

Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, King, because he is

a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if any, to this

Report and Recommendation by June 1, 2026. The Correction Defendants, because

they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by May 27,

2026. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this

timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,

193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983).

See also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100

(3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific

objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).

DATED this 12th day of May, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: SHAWN KING

MM2246

SCI PHOENIX

1200 Mokychic Drive

Collegeville, PA 19426

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

Margaret Potter

PA Office of Attorney General

(via ECF electronic notification)