Ford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DEBRIA FORD, ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-1460

)

Plaintiff, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) JENNIFER DOWDELL ARMSTRONG

v. )

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

SECURITY, ) AND ORDER

)

Defendant. )

I. INTRODUCTION

The Commissioner of Social Security denied Plaintiff Debria Ford’s application for a

period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). Ms. Ford seeks judicial review of that

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The parties have consented to a

magistrate judge exercising jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Rule 73 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Rule 73.1. (Consents, ECF No. 4; Orders [non-

document], Dec. 16, 2025.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision denying

Ms. Ford’s application for benefits.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2021, Ms. Ford applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA) seeking

DIB.1 (Tr. 178.) She claimed that she became disabled on October 4, 2018. (Id.) She identified

seven allegedly disabling conditions: (1) “stroke [with] continued problems”; (2) memory loss;

1 The administrative transcript appears at ECF No. 6. The Court will refer to pages within that transcript by

identifying the Bates number printed on the bottom right-hand corner of the page (e.g., “Tr. 1678”). It will

refer to other documents in the record by their CM/ECF document numbers (e.g., “ECF No. 7”) and page-

identification numbers (e.g., “PageID# 2854”).

(3) weakness; (4) high blood pressure; (5) headaches and migraines; (6) insomnia; and (7) high

cholesterol. (Tr. 201.)

The SSA denied Ms. Ford’s application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 72, 74, 75,

85.) Ms. Ford requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 112.) Her

counsel submitted a letter–brief in advance of the hearing. (Tr. 254–56.) The ALJ held a hearing

on February 9, 2023, at which Ms. Ford was represented by counsel. (Tr. 36–60.) An independent

vocational expert also testified at the hearing. (Id.)

On February 27, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Ms. Ford is not

disabled. (Tr. 12–31.) Ms. Ford requested review of the ALJ’s decision, and her counsel submitted

a letter–brief asserting alleged errors in that decision. (Tr. 172, 257–59.) The Appeals Council

denied review in May 2023. (Tr. 1.)

Ms. Ford sought judicial review in this Court. Ford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 1:23-

cv-1284-AMK (N.D. Ohio); see also Tr. 1741. The parties stipulated that the case should be

remanded back to the agency, after which this Court ordered a Sentence Four remand. (Tr. 1741–

42) The Appeals Council then vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter to the ALJ with

instructions for the ALJ to further consider Ms. Ford’s sleep disorder to determine its severity and

to reassess her maximum residual functional capacity. (Tr. 1745–48.)2

The ALJ held a second hearing on October 1, 2024. (Tr. 1688–1710.)

On October 11, 2024, the ALJ issued a second decision, finding that Ms. Ford is currently

disabled but only became disabled in September 2024 when her age category changed. (Tr. 1658–

78.) Ms. Ford again sought Appeals Council review; her counsel submitted a letter–brief

2 The order notes that the ALJ had found the disorder not severe, but had failed to explain his consideration

of certain abnormal findings from a sleep study and had further not adequately considered evidence that

she had been prescribed medication for management of the sleep disorder. (Tr. 1745–48.)

identifying alleged errors in the decision. (Tr. 1827.) On May 16, 2025, the Appeals Council denied

review, rendering the ALJ’s decision final. (Tr. 1651.)

On July 13, 2025, Ms. Ford filed her Complaint, challenging the Commissioner’s final

decision that she is not disabled. (ECF No. 1.) Ms. Ford asserts the following assignments of error

for review:

First Assignment of Error: The ALJ erred by selectively citing evidence

and minimizing consistent findings showing greater limitation than assessed

in his finding of residual functional capacity.

Second Assignment of Error: The ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s

fatigue, cognitive, and language-based limitations despite consistent

medical support.

(Pl.’s Merit Br. at 17, 21, ECF No. 7, PageID# 2854, 2858.)

III. BACKGROUND

A. Personal, Educational, and Vocational Experience

Ms. Ford was born in September 1969 and was 51 years old on the date of her application.

(E.g., Tr. 178.) She graduated high school and completed some courses in cosmetology and

dentistry. (Tr. 202.)

Ms. Ford last worked in 2018 as a phlebotomist and charge technician at a hospital

laboratory. (Tr. 202–03, 249.) She had worked in that role since 2006. (Id.) Prior to that work, Ms.

Ford worked as a machine worker and a cashier. (Tr. 1879.)

Ms. Ford lives alone. (Tr. 41.) She is able to drive. (Id.) She has an adult son. (Tr. 50.)

B. Function Report

In seeking reconsideration of the initial denial of her application, Ms. Ford informed the

agency that she “still can’t sleep,” “does not want to get out of bed, does not want to do anything”

and is not able to “do much” even when she tries. (Tr. 213.) She said she cannot do yard work,

clean her house, or do laundry or cooking. (Id.) She cannot walk around the grocery store for long

before needing to sit down. (Id.) She has people help her bring in groceries and cook for her. (Id.)

Her fatigue and migraines have gotten worse, to the point that she cannot concentrate for very

long. (Id.) But she said she “can still take care of her daily activities,” although she uses an alarm

to remember to take her medications. (Tr. 215.)

C. Relevant Hearing Testimony

1. Ms. Ford’s Testimony

Ms. Ford testified at the first hearing that she worked as a phlebotomist at a hospital since

at least 2008. (Tr. 42.) She worked between 50 and 60 hours per week, and she was in a charge

role on the weekends. (Tr. 42–43.)

Ms. Ford had a stroke in 2018 that caused her to have blood on her brain. (See Tr. 48.) She

described that her body has felt like she has “the flu” ever since her stroke. (Id.) She feels fatigued

overall, especially in the “back of [her] body” and her legs. (Tr. 51.)

Now, on a typical day she does “basically nothing.” (Tr. 46.) She wakes up and takes her

medication. (Id.) Some days, her body hurts so much that she does not get out of bed. (Id.) When

she is able to get out of bed, she will wash her face, brush her teeth, make coffee, and then watch

television. (Id.) Sometimes, when she gets up from sitting, she cannot walk. (Id.)

Ms. Ford cannot shovel snow or rake leaves. (Tr. 47.) She cannot carry a laundry basket,

so when she does laundry she will put her clothes in a garbage bag and roll the bag down the stairs.

(Tr. 52.)

Ms. Ford testified that she went to speech therapy for a time, until the staff told her she was

“done.” (Tr. 52–53.) She also had a physical examination that showed weakness in the left side of

her body. (Id.) She continues to have trouble with words and spelling. (See Tr. 49.) The Court notes

that, at the hearing, Ms. Ford repeatedly mixed up the words “rake” and “shovel” in her testimony.

(See Tr. 46–47, 51.) Ms. Ford said she has difficulty remembering recipes. (Tr. 51.) She put signs

on her door, reminding her to lock her door before bed. (Id.) She loses her keys. (Tr. 52.) She once

left a sink running, causing it to overflow and spill all over the floor. (Id.)

Ms. Ford plays games that were given to her by a speech therapist to help with reading and

remembering words. (Tr. 47.) She said her reading ability was “horrible.” (Tr. 54.) She cannot

remember numbers and certain names. (Tr. 54–55.)

Ms. Ford tried to volunteer at a high school after her stroke, but her doctors told her to

avoid long exposure to the sun. (Tr. 48–49.)

Ms. Ford said that “everything scares [her]” now. (Tr. 50.)

If Ms. Ford walks through the entire grocery store, she finds her body hurting by the time

she gets to the checkout line. (Tr. 51.) She has difficulty moving after she has been sitting for a

long period. (Tr. 53.) She cannot stand long enough to prepare food. (Tr. 54.) When she needs to

rest, she will often sit for about 20 minutes before moving again. (Tr. 55.)

At the second hearing, Ms. Ford testified that she has a driver’s license and drives to

doctors’ appointments and sometimes to the grocery store. (Tr. 1696.)

Ms. Ford described that, on a typical day, she will wake up and then try to make herself

something to eat. (Tr. 1699.) She will sit down and watch television. (Id.) She completes her

physical therapy exercises for her legs and knees. (Id.) She will sometimes sit on the porch. (Id.)

Ms. Ford does her own laundry approximately once per month, using machines that are located in

her basement. (Id.) She prepares her own meals, but doing so causes her body to hurt and she finds

that she is too fatigued to eat. (Id.) She shops for groceries at the store around once per month, but

she finds that she cannot stand for long. (Tr. 1699–1700.) On one occasion, she left her groceries

in the store and left, crying, due to the pain. (Tr. 1700.)

Ms. Ford does not attend church. (Id.) She was interested in volunteering at a local school,

but her inability to walk and her anxiety prevented her from doing so. (Id.) Ms. Ford described that

she is “really scared” to go outside because the world is different and “kids are crazy” now. (See

Tr. 1700–01.) She is afraid of people; if there is a strange car on her street, she will go inside and

lock the door. (Tr. 1701.)

Ms. Ford testified that she gets around four or five hours of sleep per night, and she spends

the night “toss[ing] and turn[ing].” (Id.) Her sleep is “horrible.” (Id.)

Ms. Ford said that her body has not stopped hurting since her stroke. (Tr. 1702.) Her body

is weaker on the left side, so she has trouble with certain tasks like opening the ice tray in her

refrigerator. (Id.) Her sleep trouble, depression, and fatigue have been present since her stroke.

(Tr. 1702–03.) She feels like she constantly has “the flu,” no matter what she does. (Tr. 1704.)

Ms. Ford testified that her concentration is “horrible”; she will go upstairs and forget why

she did so. (Tr. 1703.) She will forget her keys on the porch. (Id.) She tried to write a letter and

could not finish. (Id.) She has left the water in the sink on several times, causing flooding. (Id.)

She will forget things after fifteen minutes. (Tr. 1703–04.) She still has trouble with certain words,

and her reading ability is “terrible.” (Id.)

2. Vocational Experts’ Testimony

Kathleen Reis testified as a vocational expert (“VE”) at the first hearing. (Tr. 57.) The VE

characterized Ms. Ford’s past relevant work of that of a phlebotomist (DOT 079.364-022) and a

“lab clerk” (DOT 222.587-026). (Id.)

The ALJ asked the VE to assume that a hypothetical individual with Ms. Ford’s age,

education, and work experience is capable of work at the light exertional level, with additional

limitations. (Tr. 58.) Specifically, the person can frequently climb ramps and stairs but cannot

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.) Their work can require no more than frequent “speaking

on the job.” (Id.) They can never work near unprotected heights or dangerous moving machinery.

(Id.) They can understand, remember, carry out, and complete simple repetitive tasks with no strict

production rate pace requirements. (Id.) They can adapt to routine workplace changes. (Id.)

The VE testified that such a person could not perform Ms. Ford’s past relevant work but

could perform the work of a cashier II (DOT 211.462-010), housekeeping cleaner (DOT 323.687-

014), or merchandise marker (DOT 209.587-034). (Tr. 58–59.) The VE confirmed that the mental

limitations from the hypothetical question would limit a person to unskilled work. (Tr. 59.) The

VE testified that employers will tolerate an employee who is off task up to 15 percent of the

workday. (Id.)

George Coleman testified as a VE at the second hearing. (Tr. 1704.) The ALJ asked the VE

to assume that a hypothetical individual with Ms. Ford’s age, education, and work experience is

capable of work at the light exertional level, with additional limitations. (Tr. 1705.) Specifically,

the person can frequently climb ramps and stairs but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.)

Their work can require no more than frequent “speaking at work.” (Id.) They can never work at

unprotected heights or near dangerous moving machinery. (Id.) They can understand, remember,

carry out, and complete simple instructions with no strict production rate pace requirements (like

assembly line work). (Id.) They can adapt to only routine workplace changes. (Id.)

The VE testified that such a person could perform the work of an office helper or clerical

assistant (DOT 239.567-010), mailroom clerk (DOT 209.687-026), or cafeteria attendant

(DOT 311.677-010). (Tr. 1705–06.)

The VE testified that employers will tolerate up to 10 percent off-task time and one absence

per month. (Tr. 1706–07.)

Ms. Ford’s counsel asked the VE to further limit the hypothetical individual to one-step

tasks and to superficial interaction with others. (Tr. 1707.) The VE testified that no competitive

work would be available to such a person, explaining that the “hard limitation” to one-step tasks

(as opposed to, say, a limitation to one to two step tasks) would impede the essential functions of

even unskilled work. (See Tr. 1707–08.)

D. State Agency Consultants

A disability examiner (Jennifer Maxson), a physician (Mehr Siddiqui, M.D.) and a

psychologist (Mary Hill, Ph.D.) reviewed Ms. Ford’s claim at the initial review level. (Tr. 61–74.)

Dr. Hill opined that Ms. Ford had moderate limitations in her ability to understand,

remember, and apply information; to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace; and to adapt and

manage herself. (Tr. 66.) No limitation was noted in Ms. Ford’s ability to interact with others. (Id.)

Dr. Hill found that Ms. Ford was capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple

one- or two-step instructions. (Tr. 70.) She is able to remember “work like procedure[s] and

locations for repetitive work” within a “learned routine” and in a structured and predictable work

setting without stringent time or pace demands. (Tr. 70–71.)

Dr. Siddiqui opined that Ms. Ford remained capable of standing or walking for six hours

and sitting for six hours in an eight hour workday. (Tr. 68.) He limited Ms. Ford to occasionally

lifting and carrying up to 20 pounds and frequently up to 10 pounds. (Id.) Dr. Siddiqui noted that

an examination from September 2021 showed normal bulk and tone, intact sensation, normal

coordination, and a stable gait. (Id.) He limited Ms. Ford to frequent climbing of ramps and stair

and no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 69.) He opined that Ms. Ford was limited to

frequent speaking due to “mild expressive aphasia.” (Id.) He limited Ms. Ford from exposure to

unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. (Tr. 70.)

Based on these opinions, the consultants determined that Ms. Ford could perform the work

of a flagger (DOT 372.667-022), marker (781.687-042), or car wash attendant (DOT 915.667-

010). (Tr. 72.)

The consultants therefore found that Ms. Ford was not disabled. (Id.)

In a letter explaining the decision to Ms. Ford, the agency wrote that it found her “able to

complete simple and low stress work tasks which do not require heavy lifting.” (Tr. 95.)

A disability examiner (Katharine Brodzeller), a physician (W. Scott Bolz, M.D.), and a

psychologist (Karla Delcour, Ph.D.) reviewed Ms. Ford’s claim at the reconsideration level.

(Tr. 75–85.)

Drs. Bolz and Delcour opined that the findings at the initial level are “reasonable and well

supported.” (Tr. 79, 82.)

Based on these opinions, the consultants affirmed the initial findings and opined that Ms.

Ford could perform the work of a router (DOT 222.587-038), order caller (DOT 209.667-014), or

call-out operator (DOT 237.367-014). (Tr. 85) The consultants affirmed that Ms. Ford was not

disabled. (Id.)

In a letter to Ms. Ford, the agency wrote that she remains able to “walk, stand and move

about adequately” and is “able to think, communicate and care for [her] own needs.” (Tr. 106.)

E. Relevant Medical Evidence

Ms. Ford presented to a hospital emergency department on October 4, 2018, complaining

of mental status changes and memory loss over the preceding three days. (Tr. 440.) She was found

to be alert and oriented, but she had difficulty in conversation, could not remember her child’s

name, and began putting her clothes on over her hospital gown. (Id.) She had mild to moderate

expressive aphasia. (Tr. 450.) Imaging revealed evidence of an ischemic stroke. (See Tr. 443.)

Upon discharge five days later, doctors assessed that she was in a condition to see to her

own affairs without assistance but was unable to carry out all her previous activities. (Tr. 471.)

By the time that Ms. Ford followed up with a provider on October 11, 2018, she had quit

smoking and begun taking medication to manage her blood pressure; she said that her memory

issues had been improving. (Tr. 436.) She had no difficulty finding words on examination.

(Tr. 437.)

Ms. Ford began outpatient speech therapy on October 18, 2018. (Tr. 432.) The therapist

noted communication impairments, including that Ms. Ford needed extra time and “occasional

repetition or rephrasing” during “higher level conversation.” (Tr. 434.) She had some word-finding

difficulty but spoke fluently in mostly complete sentences. (Id.) The therapist recommended

continued therapy and opined that Ms. Ford had an excellent prognosis for improvement with time

and therapy. (Tr. 432.)

At a follow-up medical appointment on October 29, 2018, Ms. Ford expressed that she was

anxious to return to work and driving. (Tr. 427.) She said her symptoms had improved, although

she was continuing to have difficulty reading. (Id.) On examination, Ms. Ford’s ability to name

objects was impaired (she named three out of five objects), as was her ability to read with fluency.

(Tr. 429.) She displayed good attention, her ability to repeat was intact, and her speech was fluent.

(Id.) Her strength and sensation were normal, and she walked with a “narrow-based, normal spaced

and stable” gait. (Id.)

When Ms. Ford next met with her speech therapist, she displayed fewer instances of

difficulty with naming objects. (Tr. 425.) Ms. Ford found home exercises frustrating, but she said

her naming troubles were getting better, and her therapist noted that she had shown an “[e]xcellent

response” to therapy. (Tr. 425–26.) The therapist noted that Ms. Ford had mild to moderate reading

impairment. (Id.)

By November 2018, Ms. Ford was beginning to write several sentences using her work

team’s medical abbreviations. (Tr. 423.) While she continued to experience occasional moments

of anomia and paraphasia when writing, her therapist noted that she was making “excellent

progress” and had been using word-retrieval strategies well. (Id.) She was able to balance her

checkbook, although it took a while, and she was able to count money and tell time; she also said

her ability to send text messages was improving. (Tr. 415 (also, “no moments of anomia during

conversation today”)).

Ms. Ford underwent a simulated driving assessment and was cleared to take an on-the-road

assessment, with the occupational therapist concluding that her mental examination was within

normal limits for driving. (Tr. 421–22.) Ms. Ford passed her road assessment, too, with the

occupational therapist noting that she “was able to hold a conversation with therapist and multi-

task throughout the drive . . . without any issues.” (Tr. 414.)

At a cerebrovascular follow up appointment on November 26, 2018, Ms. Ford expressed a

desire to return to work, but she said she did not believe she would be able to do her job. (Tr. 409–

10.) She was tearful and said she was not progressing as quickly as she would like. (Id.) On

examination, the nurse practitioner noted mild expressive aphasia and mild word finding

difficulties, although Ms. Ford was able to use compensatory measures to overcome the word

finding difficulties. (Tr. 411.) Her reading ability was impaired but improved, and she could read

three out of five sentences on stroke assessment cards. (Id.) Ms. Ford endorsed symptoms of

depression and anxiety, but she declined an antidepressant medication. (Tr. 411–12.)

Ms. Ford’s speech therapist continued to note steady improvement through appointments

in December 2018, with Ms. Ford seemingly exhibiting the most difficulty and frustration with

reading. (See Tr. 408, 406, 405, 404.)

At primary care appointments around this time, Ms. Ford complained of sleepiness and

was advised to exercise and counseled on good sleep hygiene. (Tr. 400, 402, 416, 418.) She was

recommended for a sleep apnea study but declined. (Tr. 402.)

At a speech therapy re-evaluation on January 3, 2019, Ms. Ford was assessed to have mild

expressive aphasia, mild alexia, and mild to moderate agraphia. (Tr. 398.) Her aphasia quotient

from the Western Aphasia Battery was just below the cut-off for normal. (Tr. 397.) The therapist

noted that Ms. Ford was able to “talk[] around” forgotten words to avoid a communication

breakdown. (Tr. 398.) She was often aware of her spelling errors and used her phone to correct her

spelling. (Id.) The therapist opined that Ms. Ford may be able to go back to work with “some

accommodations for language deficits.” (Id.)

At a cerebrovascular follow up appointment with neurologist Jayashree Sundararajan,

M.D., on January 15, 2019, Ms. Ford said she had significant trouble reading but her

comprehension had improved. (Tr. 389.) She said she was still having some difficulty finding

words. (Id.) She complained of head pain but had difficulty describing the quality of the pain. (Id.)

Ms. Ford showed slow but steady improvement at her speech therapy appointments in

January and early February 2024; she was able to read a short news article and was focusing on

accurately writing names and dates of birth (tasks needed to return to her work as a phlebotomist).

(Tr. 382, 384–85, 387.)

Ms. Ford went to a walk-in medical facility on February 15, 2019, complaining of

headaches, high blood pressure, and a swollen eye. (Tr. 379.) She was recommended to the

emergency department due to her history of stroke. (Tr. 379–80.) She complained of a headache at

the hospital, but physicians quickly noted that she was asymptomatic in that regard and was

primarily there “due to acute psychological stress” related to recently being laid off, a friend’s

significant illness, and difficulty adjusting to new limitations since having her stroke. (Tr. 376.)

Physicians noted that her symptoms were most consistent with adjustment disorder. (Tr. 379.) She

declined to take a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) but said she was open to a

psychology referral. (Tr. 378.) She asked for medication to help her sleep and was instructed to

take melatonin and over the counter diphenhydramine until she could follow up with her primary

care physician and a behavioral health clinic. (Tr. 378–79.)

Ms. Ford’s speech therapist noted steady progress and “nice improvements” in Ms. Ford’s

written expression at the end of February 2019. (Tr. 374–75.)

Ms. Ford followed up with a primary care physician, Stacey Jolly, on March 1, 2019.

(Tr. 370.) She said that she had washed her car outside and felt “very good” after that. (Id.) Ms.

Ford said she does not exercise but was trying to eat better. (Tr. 371.) On examination, Ms. Ford

presented with a pleasant mood. (Tr. 372.) Ms. Ford was continued on her current treatment plan;

Dr. Jolly discussed a psychological consultation, but Ms. Ford declined. (Tr. 373.)

Ms. Ford’s speech therapist identified continued steady progress “with notable

improvements in written expression” at appointments throughout March and April 2019. (Tr. 368–

69, 365, 364, 363, 356–57). There are instances where Ms. Ford complained of fatigue and trouble

sleeping, or intermittent headaches. (Tr. 360, 364.) Ms. Ford told a provider that she cooks “a lot”

at home, including every Sunday, and she started walking for exercise. (Tr. 357, 358.) By April 11,

2019, Ms. Ford was having “only very rare moments of anomia” and was making improvement in

reading comprehension and written expression. (Tr. 358.)

On May 2, 2019, Ms. Ford’s speech therapist characterized her expressive aphasia as “very

mild” and her agraphia and alexia as mild “but demonstrating steady improvements.” (Tr. 355.)

Ms. Ford underwent neuropsychological testing on May 6, 2019, with Richard Naugle,

Ph.D. (Tr. 347.) Ms. Ford was “able to express herself without appreciable difficulty throughout

the interview,” but she expressed distress about feeling out of control of her life due to

communication difficulties. (Id.) She had “some difficulty” with word finding “and at times

required elaboration and repetition of instructions.” (Id.) But she was alert and attentive

throughout, she tolerated frustration in response to more demanding measures, and she consistently

seemed to be working to the best of her ability. (Id.) Dr. Naugle opined that her performance on

various tests was “entirely consistent with frontal dysfunction within the language-dominant

hemisphere” and the other medical records showed “considerable recovery” since the stroke.

(Tr. 348.) In the course of casual conversation, Ms. Ford was able to “compensate for her word

finding difficulty with relative ease.” (Id.) Dr. Naugle opined that Ms. Ford “will likely function

most effectively in those situations that are familiar to her and when undertaking tasks with which

she has experience.” (Id.)

Ms. Ford continued showing improvements in speech therapy from May through August

2019. (Tr. 345, 344, 342–43, 341, 336.)

Dr. Sundararajan opined in August 2019 that Ms. Ford was not currently able to return to

her work as a phlebotomist but “can attempt other positions that have a set routine.” (Tr. 335.) Ms.

Ford said she had occasional headaches, but she denied in January 2020 that her headaches were

frequent or severe. (Tr. 328, 331.) She missed an appointment the same month because she had

been swimming. (Tr. 327.)

Ms. Ford was noted to still have mild expressive aphasia at a neurology consultation with

certified nurse practitioner Susan Jaeger on February 7, 2020. (Tr. 323.) Ms. Ford said that her

memory was getting better, she was able to drive, and she had signed up for a gym membership.

(Tr. 322.)

On February 10, 2020, Ms. Ford told a provider that her sleep was better and she had been

swimming. (Tr. 318.) She had not been running because her ankle was sore. (Id.)

When Ms. Ford next met with her speech therapist, her verbal expression scores had

improved (“10/10”). (Tr. 315.) She continued to exhibit mild expressive aphasia but “demonstrated

excellent ability to use semantic circumlocution” to prevent a breakdown in communication at

those times. (Tr. 316.)

Ms. Ford continued with speech therapy, and it was consistently noted that she was actively

participating with continued mild aphasia and agraphia, most prominent in structured reading

tasks. (See Tr. 312, 311, 310, 308, 307, 305.)

Ms. Ford was re-evaluated by Dr. Naugle on June 30, 2020. (Tr. 303.) The objective testing

revealed, among other things, difficulties in flexible thinking and problem solving, and she had

“some difficulty” generating alternative problem solving strategies. (Tr. 304.) Overall, the

examination revealed residual difficulty with expressive language, “particularly confrontation

naming and timed phonemic fluency.” (Id.) She also had difficulty on tests assessing attention, free

recall of non-contextual verbal material, and flexible thinking and problem solving. (Id.) But her

delayed recognition of verbal rote learning was much better preserved than in her previous

examination. (Id.) While Dr. Naugle reported these findings, he also noted that Ms. Ford appeared

distressed during the examination. (Id.) He concluded, based on his observations and the test

scores, that “psychological factors were contributing to her presentation.” (Id.) He opined that Ms.

Ford’s “actual level of functioning on a day-to-day basis might be somewhat higher than suggested

by these test results” and recommended that she be referred to a health psychologist. (Id.)

Her speech therapist noted largely stable limitations at an appointment in July 2020.

(Tr. 302.)

Ms. Ford followed up with Ms. Jaeger on August 4, 2020. (Tr. 296.) She complained of

fatigue and body soreness, but she said she was swimming at a recreation center three or four times

a week. (Tr. 297.) She continued to have mild expressive aphasia. (Tr. 300.)

Ms. Ford’s status and abilities seemingly remained stable through speech therapy

appointments in August and September 2020. (Tr. 296, 294–95.) At an appointment with a primary

care doctor, Kathryn Dere, M.D., on September 11, 2020, Ms. Ford said that her reading and

writing troubles were “getting better slowly.” (Tr. 290.) She was remembering more recipes. (Id.)

She occasionally wakes up tired, but not all the time. (Id.) On examination, she was “conversant”

with “intact language.” (Tr. 291.)

Ms. Ford did not show up for a scheduled speech therapy appointment on September 16,

2020. (Tr. 288.)

On November 9, 2020, Dr. Dere completed a form in support of Ms. Ford’s application for

long term disability. (Tr. 261.) He opined that Ms. Ford had improved and was ambulatory since

her stroke. (Id.) But he further checked a box that Ms. Ford was “totally disabled” and was capable

only of sedentary activity. (Tr. 262.) He indicated that Ms. Ford was not expected to be permanently

disabled, but he wrote that she continues to have “significant deficits in memory [and] planning

skills needed for the job” and needed to continue building her strength. (Id.)

Ms. Ford underwent a consultative examination with Joseph Konieczny, Ph.D., on

December 1, 2020. (Tr. 264.) Ms. Ford reported crying spells two to three times per week, but she

denied any history of depression. (Tr. 265.) Throughout the interview, Ms. Ford displayed no

obvious indications of aphasia and “she seemed quite capable of expressing herself in a clear and

coherent manner.” (Tr. 265.) She said that she had sleep difficulties due to racing thoughts. (Tr.

266.) But her ability to concentrate and attend to tasks showed no indication of impairment during

testing. (Id.) IQ and memory testing revealed “scatter[ed]” results, leading to “patchy but

significant” declines in some areas of functioning. (Tr. 267–68.) Dr. Konieczny opined that Ms.

Ford would have some limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out

instructions, would have some diminished tolerance for frustration and diminished coping skills to

respond to “severe supervision and interpersonal situations” and stressful situations in the

workplace. (Tr. 268.) But the doctor opined that Ms. Ford remained capable of responding

appropriately in “normal situations.” (Id.)

Ms. Ford underwent a physical capacity evaluation on January 26, 2022. (Tr. 677.) The

administrator noted segmental inconsistencies resulting in mild sub-maximal effort and opined

pain could have been considered while making functional decisions. (Id.) Ultimately, the examiner

concluded that she could perform sedentary work and just over half of her previous job duties as a

phlebotomist. (Tr. 677–78.)

On February 2, 2022, Dr. Dere completed another statement in which she opined that Ms.

Ford was not able to perform medium-capacity work and would be off task for 25 percent or more

of the workday. (Tr. 675.)

Ms. Ford began consulting with a psychotherapist on March 17, 2022. (Tr. 685.) She

complained of memory, concentration, and mood difficulties, crying spells, poor sleep, and anxiety

(Tr. 686.). On examination, Ms. Ford was tearful and talkative; her anxiety and depression were

“high.” (Tr. 688.)

At an appointment with Dr. Sundararajan on March 31, 2022, Ms. Ford reported difficulty

with planning her meals and shopping and said she got tired easily. (Tr. 1099.) On examination,

her speech was fluent with some receptive aphasia. (Tr. 1101.) She had difficulty with multi-step

tasks. (Id.)

Ms. Ford underwent treatment with a therapist in 2022 that included complaints and

observations of stress and tearfulness. (Tr. 1098, 1547.)

Ms. Ford underwent a consultative examination with Herschel Pickholtz, Ph.D., on May 3,

2022. (Tr. 1517.) Dr. Pickholtz opined that her verbal IQ fell within the borderline range, but her

overall capacity to understand, remember, and carry out instructions for simple work activities

suggested a slight impairment “if at all.” (Tr. 1524.) Her capacity to understand, remember, and

carry out more complex work was “slight to somewhat impaired at worst.” (Id.) Her capacity to

perform one to two step tasks did not reflect any serious impairment. (Tr. 1525.)

Ms. Ford consulted with Michael Saribalas, D.O., complaining of sleep trouble, on May

27, 2022. (Tr. 1539.) A polysomnogram was ordered. (Tr. 1543.)

Ms. Ford continued treating with a therapist; her mental status examinations were largely

normal, but she described having difficulty since her stroke and endorsed financial strain. (Tr.

1535, 1537–38, 1626, 1645–46.)

A polysomnogram in June 2022 revealed hypersomnia that was not explained, as well as

poor sleep efficiency and long latencies at various sleep stages. (Tr. 1552–53.)

At a psychiatric appointment with Gabriella Stamper, M.D., Ms. Ford reported difficulty

explaining herself, headaches triggered by frustration or sleep troubles, and forgetfulness

(Tr 1638).

A follow up sleep appointment noted “sleep-onset and maintenance insomnia,” possibly

related to depression and poor sleep hygiene. (Tr. 1562.) She was started on mirtazapine and

weaned from Zoloft. (Id.)

In October 2022, Ms. Ford was in an altercation with a woman at a funeral when she was

sprayed with a self-defense spray, after which she was treated in an emergency room. (Tr. 2036.)

On October 25, 2022, Ms. Ford endorsed frequent crying since a friend passed away, poor

sleep, low energy, and anxiety about leaving her home. (Tr. 1610–13.) A mental status examination

was unremarkable. (Tr. 1612.)

Ms. Ford continued in physical therapy. (Tr. 2032, 2029, 2027, 2025, 2021, 2018.)

At a neurology appointment on December 9, 2022, examination revealed a negative

attitude, an increased speech rate and tone at times, tangential and somewhat circumstantial

reasoning, and labile and slightly irritable affect. (Tr. 2015.) Medication changes were made later

that month. (Tr. 1604.)

Ms. Ford complained of occasional headaches in December 2022; she described having

left sided weakness and memory loss, along with sleep trouble and depression (but medication was

helping). (Tr. 1933, 1935.)

Ms. Ford was discharged from physical therapy in December 2022 “due to goal

achievement and maximal benefit.” (Tr. 1991.)

Ms. Ford consulted with Dr. Sundararajan on February 16, 2023. (Tr. 1980.) She

complained of significant anxiety but said that she was able to see to all her activities of daily

living. (Id.) She was still swimming occasionally. (Id.) Dr. Dunn opined that Ms. Ford was unable

to return to work. (Tr. 1985.)

On March 3, 2023, Ms. Ford reported continued sleep trouble and was working on her

sleep hygiene. (Tr. 1904.)

At an appointment on April 26, 2023, Ms. Ford’s speech therapist found that her mild

expressive aphasia was stable from her last appointment, but “poor sleep and mood” were

“significantly impacting cognition.” (Tr. 1965.) Ms. Ford reported babysitting for her two-year-

old grandson. (Tr. 1966.) She described memory trouble, fatigue, and trouble with words, among

other things. (Id.)

Ms. Ford continued with speech therapy and psychological appointments. (E.g., Tr. 2150,

2054–69.)

Ms. Ford’s speech therapist noted on June 6, 2023, that she was tearful and frustrated; she

had experienced difficulty getting to the appointment. (Tr. 1951.) The therapist continued to opine

that her mental condition was stable but “poor sleep and mood” were “significantly impacting [her]

cognition.” (Tr. 1952.)

On June 22, 2023, Ms. Ford underwent a neuropsychological evaluation with Katherine

Reiter, Ph.D. (Tr. 1946.) Dr. Reiter noted that Ms. Ford’s task engagement seemed “suboptimal,”

so she couched her conclusions with the advisement that the results were not a valid indicator of

her current functioning. (Tr. 1948.) Dr. Reiter opined that the behavioral observations were

consistent with anomia, but “further characterization of aphasia cannot be completed due to

suboptimal task engagement.” (Tr. 1948–49.)

Ms. Ford had a pap smear in December 2023, after which a fibroid was removed. (Tr.

2785.) Laboratory testing confirmed a carcinoma with papillary features. (Tr. 2782.)

On December 31, 2023, Ms. Ford was treated in the emergency department for a syncopal

episode. (Tr. 2679).

On January 22, 2024, Ms. Ford missed a speech therapy appointment because she had

thought her appointment was at a different time. (Tr. 2697.)

Ms. Ford continued to report feeling depressed at an appointment on January 25, 2024. (Tr.

2767.)

Ms. Ford complained to a provider that she had left knee pain in August 2024. (Tr. 2812.)

Ms. Ford consulted with Heather Rainey, M.D., regarding knee pain on September 3, 2024.

(Tr. 2806.) After imaging, she was cleared to engage in activity as tolerated, and she was referred

to physical therapy for muscle strengthening. (Tr. 2810.)

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ found that Ms. Ford met the insured status requirements of the Social Security

Act through December 31, 2024. (Tr. 1664.) The ALJ further found that Ms. Ford had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since October 4, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Id.)

The ALJ next determined that Ms. Ford had the following severe impairments: (1) vascular

insult to the brain (2018); (2) neurocognitive disorders; (3) obesity; (4) sleep disorders;

(5) depressive disorders; and (6) anxiety disorders. (Id.)

The ALJ noted that Ms. Ford had a non-severe impairment of hypertension, finding that

the condition was controlled with medication. (Id.) The ALJ declined to find a medically

determinable impairment of migraines or a primary headache disorder. (Tr. 1664–65.)

The ALJ then concluded that none of Ms. Ford’s impairments, whether considered singly

or in combination, met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 1665.)

The ALJ determined that Ms. Ford had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform

work at the light exertional level with a number of additional limitations. (Tr. 1667.)

With respect to exertional and environmental limitations, Ms. Ford can frequently climb

ramps and stairs but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.) She is able to speak no more

than frequently. (Id.) She must never work at unprotected heights or around dangerous moving

machinery. (Id.)

With respect to non-exertional limitations, Ms. Ford can understand, remember, carry out,

and complete simple instructions with no production-rate pace requirements (like assembly line

work). (Id.) She can adapt to routine changes in the workplace. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Ms. Ford had at least a high school education and no past relevant

work. (Tr. 1676.) The ALJ found that Ms. Ford was in the administrative age category of “younger

individual” (ages 18 to 49) until September 2024, when her age category changed to “individual

of advanced age.” (See id.)

The ALJ then determined that—considering Ms. Ford’s age, education, work experience,

and RFC—there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she

could have performed until September 2024, including work as an “office helper” (DOT 239.567-

010), “mailroom clerk” (DOT 209.687-026), or “cafeteria attendant” (DOT 311.677-

010).3 (Tr. 1676–77.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Ford was not disabled before

September 2024. (Tr. 1677–78.)

Finally, the ALJ found that Ms. Ford became disabled in September 2024 when her age

category changed. (Id.)

3 These jobs refer to entries in the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The DOL

no longer publishes the tool—see Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2014)—but the most

recent version, from 1991, is available online through the DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges Law

Library. Dictionary of Occupational Titles—Fourth Edition, Revised 1991, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR OFF.

OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/topics/libraries/LIBDOT.

V. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931,

937 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“Under the substantial evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record

and asks whether it contains ‘sufficient evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The standard for “substantial evidence” is “not high.” Id. While

it requires “more than a mere scintilla,” “[i]t means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consolidated

Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).

In addition to considering whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied proper legal standards.

Failure of the Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations

is grounds for reversal. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir.

2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by

substantial evidence, . . . a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails

to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives

the claimant of a substantial right.”).

Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence

in the record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp.

2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996))

(alteration in original).

B. Standard for Disability

To establish entitlement to DIB, a claimant must be insured at the time of disability and

must prove an inability to engage “in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment,” or combination of impairments, that can be expected

to “result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.315, 404.1505(a).

Consideration of disability claims follows a five-step review process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

First, the claimant must demonstrate that he is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful

activity” at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant

must show that he suffers from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits . . . physical or

mental ability to do basic work activities.” Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment

that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment, or combination of

impairments, meets or medically equals a required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education, or work

experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

Before considering Step Four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, i.e., the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis

despite limitations from his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). An RFC “is the most [a

claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). Agency

regulations direct the ALJ to consider the functional limitations and restrictions resulting from a

claimant’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including the

impact of any related symptoms on the claimant’s ability to do sustained work-related activities.

See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *5 (July 2, 1996).

“A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved

to the Commissioner.” Golden v. Berryhill, No. 1:18CV00636, 2018 WL 7079506, at *17 (N.D.

Ohio Dec. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, 2019 WL 415250 (N.D. Ohio

Feb. 1, 2019). The ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of determining the RFC based on [the

ALJ’s] evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence.” Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F.

App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013). “[T]he ALJ must give some indication of the evidence upon which

he is relying, and he may not ignore evidence that does not support [the ALJ’s] decision, especially

when that evidence, if accepted, would change [the ALJ’s] analysis.” Golden, 2018 WL 7079506

at *17.

At the fourth step, if the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not

prevent him from doing his past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(e)–(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant’s impairment does prevent him

from doing his past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled if other work exists in the national

economy that the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). See Abbott, 905 F.2d at 923.

C. Analysis

1. Evaluation of Objective Medical Evidence

In her first assignment of error, Ms. Ford argues that the ALJ “selectively parsed the

evidence” and failed to properly articulate his analysis of the evidence when crafting the RFC.

(Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 7, PageID# 2854.) She admits that the ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Ford

experienced stroke-related language deficits, fatigue, and cognitive symptoms, but she contends

that the ALJ then “highlighted isolated findings of improvement or normality while minimizing

substantial, longitudinal evidence supporting more restrictive limitations.” (Id.)

The Commissioner defends the ALJ’s decision as a thorough discussion of the objective

evidence, including examination results from visits to psychologists and neurologists. The

Commissioner points out that the ALJ accurately noted where providers listed unremarkable

findings on examination. And the Commissioner contends that Ms. Ford’s argument is merely a

request to reweigh the evidence.

After careful consideration, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ did not

engage in improper “cherry picking” here.

As an initial matter, courts in this Circuit are generally skeptical of arguments that an ALJ

“cherry picked” the record for evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. As the Sixth Circuit has

stated, “claims that the ALJ ‘cherry-picked’ the record are ‘seldom successful’ because they

essentially amount to a request that the court ‘re-weigh record evidence,’ which [a court] may not

do.” Chicora v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 852 F. App’x 968, 971 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting DeLong v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014)); see also White, 572 F.3d at 284 (noting

that accusations of cherry picking “can be described more neutrally as weighing the evidence”).

Moreover, here the ALJ specifically referenced Ms. Ford’s testimony about her symptoms

and accurately summarized her treatment history. The ALJ cited medical records showing that Ms.

Ford’s anomia and alexia symptoms persisted despite treatment.

With respect to Ms. Ford’s testimony, the ALJ wrote as follows:

In written reports and at both hearings, the claimant alleged disability due

to a combination of physical and mental impairments. The claimant testified

at the February 2023 hearing that she had good days and bad days including

days she did not get out of bed. On these days, the claimant testified that

she had pain in the back of her body and legs. The claimant endorsed having

a stroke. The claimant indicated that she was scared to go out because of

Covid. The claimant testified that she did not have the energy to do chores

like shovel snow or rake leaves. The claimant endorsed problems with

memory such as remembering recipes when cooking. The claimant testified

that she forgets things such as running water or where her keys are. The

claimant testified that she had done speech therapy. The claimant testified

that she reentered physical therapy in October 2022. The claimant testified

that she sometimes did not have the energy go downstairs. The claimant

endorsed problems moving and getting up. The claimant testified that she

had problems standing and could not wash a sink of dishes or wash

vegetables. Following this, the claimant indicated that she needed to sit

down and rest for 20 minutes. The claimant endorsed problems reading and

remembering numbers and names.

During the February 2023 hearing, the claimant testified that she lives alone

and drives to medical appointments and shopping. On a typical day, the

claimant testified that she cared for hygiene such as brushing her teeth. The

claimant indicated that she could no longer shovel snow or rake leaves. The

claimant testified that she had fallen the last time she tried to shovel snow.

The claimant testified that she watched television. The claimant testified

that she had tried to volunteer as a cheerleading coach but did not have the

energy or ability to come up with cheers. The claimant testified that she

experienced body pain when waiting in a line at a store. The claimant

endorsed problems lifting and carrying laundry.

At the October 2024 hearing, the claimant offered similar allegations.

However, she provided addition testimony regarding sleep disorder. Sleep

is limited to about 5 hours per day. She described insomnia, fatigue, and

daytime sleepiness. She has headaches and reduced concentration due to the

sleep issues. The claimant is not able to nap during the day. There is pain in

the left side of the body. The pain feels similar to flu symptoms. These

symptoms limit the amount of time she can participate in any activities. The

claimant stated that she no longer attends church. She grocery shops, fixes

something to eat, does some chores (one at a time), works on home

exercises, and sits on the porch. She does laundry in the basement.

(Tr. 1668–69.)

The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Ford had a “cerebrovascular accident” in October 2018

and experienced aphasia from the stroke, but the ALJ accurately noted that it was consistently

described as “mild” and responded to therapy. (Tr. 1669.) The ALJ summarized her treatment

history and evaluations over several pages in the decision. (Tr. 1669–72.)

The ALJ also acknowledged Ms. Ford’s activities of daily living, which could support a

conclusion that Ms. Ford’s conditions do not prevent her from completing simple instructions in a

position that does not require a production-rate pace and adapt to routine changes in the workplace.

Thus, the ALJ discussed both positive and negative evidence regarding Ms. Ford’s post-

stroke impairments, concluding that those impairments placed limitations on her ability to work,

but that they were not so severe as to render her disabled. Ms. Ford believes that the ALJ should

have relied more heavily on evidence supporting her position. As noted above, however, the Court

may not overturn the ALJ’s decision merely because evidence in the record would have supported

a different conclusion, so long as the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Jones,

336 F.3d at 477.

Ms. Ford contends that the ALJ failed to grapple with formal testing showing frontal-lobe

dysfunction and mild aphasia, but the Court disagrees that the ALJ improperly minimized these

findings in the decision. The ALJ discussed consultative examinations and opinion evidence over

several pages. (Tr. 1672–75.) Ultimately, the ALJ accurately concluded that the record reflected

that Ms. Ford had continued aphasia and other symptoms, including a sleep disorder, after her

stroke, but that these conditions were repeatedly characterized as mild and treated conservatively.

The examination findings Ms. Ford identifies do not substantially cut against that finding, and in

any event the Court may not reweigh the evidence so long as substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s conclusions.

This case is not akin to Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 723–24 (6th Cir.

2014), wherein the ALJ outright ignored substantial record evidence reflecting severe problems

with psoriatic plaques over time in concluding that the claimant’s allegations were inconsistent

with the record. Id., 741 F.3d at 725.

To the contrary, the ALJ accurately read the record evidence to substantiate that Ms. Ford

has residual aphasia and related symptoms after her stroke, but that those symptoms are repeatedly

cast as mild. The ALJ further, accurately, noted that Ms. Ford engages in activities of daily living

suggesting that she is not disabled from all work. She performs household chores, shops, drives,

swims, goes for walks, watches her grandson on occasion, prepares meals, and texts.

The Court is similarly unconvinced that the ALJ engaged in cherry picking when it comes

to the opinion evidence. While certain treating professionals opined that Ms. Ford could not return

to work, those opinions were largely directed to Ms. Ford’s work as a phlebotomist. Providers also

opined that she could attempt work in a different, simpler work environment. Ultimately, the ALJ

credited the opinions of the state agency consultants, whose opinions are reflected in the RFC.

After carefully reviewing the record, the Court cannot say that the ALJ committed reversible error

in doing so.

Finally, the Court considered and rejected the argument that ALJ erred in considering Ms.

Ford’s sleep disorder. The ALJ acknowledged Ms. Ford’s sleep troubles since the stroke, including

that the records “consistently describe issues with fatigue, insomnia, and daytime sleepiness.” (Tr.

1671.) But the ALJ then accurately noted that apnea was ruled out, that Ms. Ford denied napping

during the day, and that providers consistently found her to be “alert” on examination. (Id.) The

Court cannot conclude that it was reversible error for the ALJ to determine that Ms. Ford’s fatigue

was adequately addressed by a limitation to light exertion work with the additional limitations of

the RFC.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC here. Accordingly, Ms. Ford’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

2. Evaluation of Ms. Ford’s Fatigue, Cognitive, and Language-Based

Limitations

In her second assignment of error, Ms. Ford argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate

her description of her symptoms, in violation of Social Security Ruling 16-3p. (Pl.’s Br. at 21, ECF

No. 7, PageID# 2858.)

SSR 16-3p provides that the SSA will conduct a two-step process in considering a

claimant's symptoms. 2017 WL 5180304, at *3 (Oct. 25, 2017). At step one, the SSA determines

whether the individual has one or more medically determinable impairments that could reasonably

be expected to produce the individual’s alleged symptoms. Id. If so, at step two, the SSA evaluates

the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms, such as pain, to determine the extent to

which those symptoms limit the claimant's ability to work. Id. at *4.

With respect to a claimant’s subjective statements, SSR 16-3p provides that the SSA will

“consider an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

symptoms” and “will evaluate whether the statements are consistent with objective medical

evidence and the other evidence.” Id. at *6. SSR 16-3p identifies seven factors that the SSA will

consider in evaluating an individual's symptoms: (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration,

frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate

symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication; (5) treatment an

individual receives or has received other than medication; (6) any measures other than treatment

an individual uses or has used; and (7) any other factors concerning the claimant's functional

limitations and restrictions. Id. at *7–8. “The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors but should

show that she considered the relevant evidence.” Phillips v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-CV-

01144-JGC, 2023 WL 4078204, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted, 2023 WL 5602726 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2023).

Notably, “[a] plaintiff does not demonstrate a violation of SSR 16-3p simply by reiterating

the same subjective symptoms she believes should have been credited by the ALJ, as an ALJ is not

required to accept a claimant’s subjective complaints.” Zingale v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-02197,

2022 WL 824148, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2022); see also Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336

F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003) (“an ALJ is not required to accept a claimant’s subjective

complaints”). Moreover, “[i]t is for the administrative law judge, not the reviewing court, to judge

the consistency of a claimant’s statements.” Lipanye v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F. App’x 165,

171 (6th Cir. 2020). However, while determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the

ALJ, “those determinations must be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Rogers v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 249 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Kurman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 1:20-cv-01837, 2022 WL 765072, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2022) (“The ALJ’s decision . . .

must be rooted in the record and must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the

[claimant’s] symptoms.”) (quotations omitted).

Here, as discussed above, the ALJ acknowledged Ms. Ford’s descriptions of her symptoms

and limitations. The ALJ concluded that her medically determinable impairments could reasonably

be expected to produce those symptoms. But the ALJ then reasoned that her description of her

limitations was not fully supported by the record evidence.

Ms. Ford challenges the ALJ’s reasoning as “minimizing the symptoms” and says that the

ALJ focused on “isolated facts of brief moments of normal mood or cooperation” while ignoring

“years of evidence documenting persistent and severe cognitive and fatigue-related impairments.”

This is, again, a straightforward “cherry-picking” argument. While Ms. Ford points to

evidence in the record that she believes should have supported a different result, “the

Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance

of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the

conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 477; see also Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 1:21-CV-1471, 2022 WL 4545188, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2022) (“it is also well-

established that as long as the ALJ cites substantial, legitimate evidence to support the conclusion

reached, the reviewing court may not second-guess that decision”).

Here, the ALJ accurately and thoroughly summarized the treatment record and discussed

Ms. Ford’s activities of daily living in conjunction with the objective medical evidence. See Napier

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.4th 1000, 1006 (6th Cir. 2025) (no reversible error where the ALJ

relied on the claimant’s activities of daily living and “carefully analyzed the entirety of the record

evidence regarding [claimant’s] ability to function, using [claimant’s] statements regarding her

activities only as one factor among many”); Laney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-01290-

CEH, 2022 WL 2176539, at *8-9 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2022) (holding that ALJ did not err in

relying on claimant’s reports of daily activities in conjunction with objective medical evidence).

The ALJ acknowledged Ms. Ford’s complaints and testimony regarding aphasia, sleep

difficulty, fatigue, decreased concentration, and memory deficits, among other things.

The ALJ then considered the objective medical evidence, thoroughly summarizing her

treatment history, physical examination findings, and mental status examination findings—noting

both abnormal and normal findings. The ALJ reasonably concluded that Ms. Ford’s aphasia was

mild and her sleep disorder and any difficulty concentrating were adequately addressed by the state

agency consultants’ opined RFC limiting her to light work and simple instructions in a work

environment where she need not speak more than frequently and which does not involve more than

routine changes.

In short, the ALJ’s analysis was sufficient to satisfy SSR 16-3p. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 261558 (Feb. 2, 2026) (ALJ complied with SSR 16-3p where the ALJ

thoroughly and accurately summarized the claimant’s allegations and testimony, then reasonably

found that those allegations were not fully supported, discussing and reasonably weighing the

record evidence). Notably, beyond pointing to evidence that Ms. Ford wishes the ALJ had weighed

differently, Ms. Ford does not suggest any specific functional limitation that she would have had

the ALJ include in the RFC.

The Court is also unconvinced that the ALJ failed to adequately address sustainability when

crafting the RFC.

“A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved

to the Commissioner.” Golden v. Berryhill, No. 1:18CV00636, 2018 WL 7079506, at *17 (N.D.

Ohio Dec. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, 2019 WL 415250 (N.D. Ohio

Feb. 1, 2019). The ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of determining the RFC based on [the

ALJ’s] evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence.” Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F.

App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013).

Ordinarily, RFC is the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do

sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on

a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC assessment must include a

discussion of the individual’s abilities on that basis. A

“regular and continuing basis” means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or

an equivalent work schedule.

SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *2 (July 2, 1996) (emphasis in original).

Here, the ALJ adequately addressed Dr. Dere’s opinion that Ms. Ford would be off-task.

The ALJ limited Ms. Ford not just to “simple work,” but to simple instructions in a role that would

not require more than frequent speaking and no more than routine changes, alongside certain

exertional limitations. The ALJ acknowledged the consistent notations of fatigue but explained

how the medical evidence and Ms. Ford’s activities of daily living, among other things, convinced

the ALJ that Ms. Ford would be able to sustain work of the type permitted by the RFC. The ALJ’s

conclusions in this regard were supported by the opinions of the state agency consultants.

After careful consideration, the Court is convinced that the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Ford

can sustain work activity on a continuing basis was supported by substantial evidence, that is

“‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support’” the ALJ’s

conclusions. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

“The substantial-evidence standard . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice within

which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Blakely v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,

545 (6th Cir. 1986)). “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence,

or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant'’ position, so long as substantial

evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d

469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003). A reviewing court may not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in

evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” O’Brien v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F. App’x 409,

416 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Here, the ALJ acknowledged Ms. Ford’s statements about her limitations, thoroughly and

accurately summarized the treatment record, reasonably explained how the record partially

contradicted Ms. Ford’s description of her limitations, and reasonably concluded that Ms. Ford

remained capable of sustained work activity under the limitations set forth in the RFC. The ALJ’s

conclusion regarding sustained work activity was supported by the opinions of the state agency

medical and psychological consultants. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find

reversible error in the ALJ’s conclusions.

Accordingly, Ms. Ford’s second assignment of error is overruled.

VI. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Ms. Ford’s assignments of error for the reasons set forth above, the Court

AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision.

Dated: May 8, 2026 /s/ Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

U.S. Magistrate Judge