Opinion

Teleca Donachricha v. Nightingale Nurses, LLC

Court
Louisiana Court of Appeal
Filed
Jun 24, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

25-729 consolidated with 25-730

TELECA DONACHRICHA

VERSUS

NIGHTINGALE NURSES, LLC, AND

LOUISIANA INSURANCE GUARANTY

ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE

OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 3

PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 23-04740 C/W 22-00929

MELISSA A. ST. MARY, WORKERS COMPENSATION JUDGE

**********

GARY J. ORTEGO

JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Clayton Davis,

Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John C. Turnage

Mayer, Smith & Roberts, LLP

8570 Business Park Dr., Suite 200

Shreveport, LA 71105

(318) 221-2135

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:

CHRISTUS Health Southwest Louisiana

Michelle M. Sorrells

Walters, Thomas, Cullens

12345 Perkins Rd., Building 2

Baton Rouge, LA 70810

(225) 236-3646

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:

Teleca Donachricha

Eric J. Waltner

Allen & Gooch

2000 Kaliste Saloom Rd. Suite 400

Lafayette, LA 70508

(337) 291-1400

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:

Louisiana Insurance GuarantyAssociation

Nightingale Nurses, LLC

ORTEGO, Judge.

This case arises from a worker’s compensation claim. However, the appeal

involves only a dispute between party defendants regarding reimbursements of

benefits payments made by the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (“LIGA”)

to a claimant after the insolvency of the employer’s worker’s compensation

insurance carrier.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Teleca Donachricha (“claimant”), filed a claim for worker’s

compensation benefits after an accident on September 30, 2011. Claimant claims

she sustained an injury to her right knee and reinjured the knee a few nights later.

Claimant was a direct employee of Nightingale Nurses, LLC (“Nightingale”) as a

traveling nurse.

The accident occurred at CHRISTUS Health Southwest Louisiana d/b/a

CHRISTUS St. Patrick Hospital (“CHRISTUS”) which had contracted with

Nightingale to supply certain nurses at the St. Patrick facility when requested.

Michelle Aguillard, a CHRISTUS representative, testified that hospitals acquire

travel nurses by either (1) directly contracting with a nursing agency or (2)

contracting with an intermediary entity that contracts directly with nursing agencies.

In the case of an intermediate entity’s involvement, Ms. Aguillard testified the

contract would be between the nursing agency and the intermediary.

Although CHRISTUS and Nightingale sometimes worked together through

an intermediary such as ShareStaff (a nursing agency), evidence shows CHRISTUS

paid Nightingale directly at the time of this accident. The worker’s compensation

judge (“WCJ”) found that CHRISTUS was the “borrowing employer” of claimant

at the time of the accident and that a direct contract existed between CHRISTUS and

Nightingale.

Additionally, at the time of claimant’s injury, CastlePoint Insurance Company

(“CastlePoint”) provided worker’s compensation insurance coverage. Pursuant to

claimant’s injury and claims, CastlePoint paid claimant’s benefits on behalf of

Nightingale from the date of the injury until March 2017, when CastlePoint went

into receivership. Thereafter, LIGA was called upon to pay these claims.1

LIGA paid medical and indemnity benefits from 2017 until 2022, specifically

520 weeks of supplemental earnings benefits. In 2022, LIGA terminated payment

of claimant’s indemnity benefits. On February 14, 2022, claimant filed a 1008

against Nightingale and LIGA seeking reinstitution of indemnity benefits. On

August 4, 2022, claimant filed an amended 1008 adding LIGA as a defendant. LIGA

answered the 1008 on August 23, 2022, and filed a third-party demand against

CHRISTUS. On December 12, 2022, CHRISTUS was served with the third party

demand, this was the first notification CHRISTUS had of CastlePoint’s insolvency.

The claim was officially tendered to CHRISTUS in November of 2024 via email to

counsel for CHRISTUS.

LIGA’s original, supplemental and amended third party demands, sought

reimbursement from CHRISTUS for all of sums paid on this claim since

CastlePoint’s 2017 receivership.

The trial was on June 4, 2025. On June 23, 2025, the WCJ rendered judgment

in favor of LIGA and against CHRISTUS. Specifically, the WCJ awarded LIGA

the full amount of its claim of $247,928.35 for reimbursement against CHRISTUS

and denied CHRISTUS’s request for reimbursement from Nightingale/LIGA for any

1

LIGA is a private nonprofit unincorporated legal entity created by statute to provide

payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies with minimal delay and financial loss

to claimants or policyholders due to insurer insolvency. La.R.S. 22:2052. Claims by insurers,

including excess insurers or self-insured employers, seeking subrogation or reimbursement from

LIGA are generally excluded as covered claims under LIGA. 1 Couch on Ins. § 6:30.

2

amounts it has paid or will pay on the claim, including penalties, attorney’s fees,

costs, and interest.

Thus, the only issues on appeal are the reimbursement claims between LIGA

and CHRISTUS, and CHRISTUS’s claim for reimbursement against Nightingale/

LIGA.2

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The [WCJ] committed manifest error in ordering CHRISTUS to

reimburse LIGA for the full amount paid to or on behalf of the

claimant, by LIGA, including all costs of the case and attorney’s

fees.

2. The [WCJ] committed manifest error in not ordering Nightingale

Nurses, LLC/LIGA to reimburse CHRISTUS for any amounts that

CHRISTUS has or will pay on this claim, including penalties,

attorney’s fees, costs and interest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In worker’s compensation cases, the appropriate standard of

review to be applied by the appellate court to the OWC’s findings of

fact is the “manifest error-clearly wrong” standard. . . . Accordingly,

the findings of the OWC will not be set aside by a reviewing court

unless they are found to be clearly wrong in light of the record viewed

in its entirety. . . . Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable

evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not

be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that

its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.

Dean v. Southmark Const., 03-1051, p.7 (La. 7/6/04), 879 So.2d 112, 117 (citations

omitted).

LAW AND DISCUSSION

As to these reimbursement claims by these parties, there is no dispute that

CHRISTUS is self-insured.

2

Other issues in this case regarding a 1009 appeal concerning a spinal cord stimulator,

along with the disability status of the claimant, past due indemnity due to the claimant,

compensability of the left knee injury to the work accident, and any penalties, attorneys fees, or

costs have been settled and are not before the court in this appeal.

3

LIGA argues and primarily relies on La.R.S. 22:2062(A)(1) (titled

“Exhaustion of other coverage” in the LIGA statutory scheme) in asserting that it is

owed reimbursement from CHRISTUS, which states, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. (1) Any person having a claim against an insurer shall be required

first to exhaust all coverage provided by any other policy, including

the right to a defense under the other policy, if the claim under the

other policy arises from the same facts, injury, or loss that gave rise

to the covered claim against the association. The requirement to

exhaust shall apply without regard to whether or not the other

insurance policy is a policy written by a member insurer. However,

no person shall be required to exhaust any right under the policy of

an insolvent insurer or any right under a life insurance policy or

annuity.

Nightingale argues that it falls under the “other insurance” provision of La.R.S.

22:2062(A)(5)(b) and is a solidary obligor pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2062(A)(4):

(4) A claim under a policy providing liability coverage to a person who

may be solidarily liable as a tortfeasor with the person covered under

the policy of the insolvent insurer that gives rise to the covered claim

shall be considered to be a claim arising from the same facts, injury or

loss that gave rise to the covered claim against the association.

(5) For purposes of this Section, a claim under an insurance policy other

than a life insurance policy or annuity shall include, but is not limited

to:

...

(b) Any amount payable by or on behalf of a self-insurer.

Conversely, CHRISTUS argues that La.R.S. 22:2058(A)(5), concerning the

powers and duties of LIGA, casts LIGA with the obligation to timely inform

CHRISTUS of CastlePoint’s insolvency. LIGA failed to do so. Thus, LIGA is not

due any reimbursement, and Nightingale and LIGA should reimburse CHRISTUS

for any amounts that CHRISTUS has or will pay on this claim, including penalties,

attorney’s fees, costs and interest.

4

La.R.S. 22:2058(A)(5) states:

A. The association shall do all of the following:

...

(5) Notify claimants, insureds and other interested parties of the

determination of insolvency and of their rights under this Part as

deemed necessary by the commissioner and upon the commissioner’s

request, to the extent records are available to the association. The

association may discharge this duty by notice mailed to the last known

address or notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation

when a mailing address is unavailable or insufficient.

Nightingale further argues CHRISTUS is statutorily prohibited from making

a request for reimbursement pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2055(6)(a)(iii), which lists

circumstances not included as “covered claims”:

. . . In addition, any person insured under a policy issued by an insolvent

insurer shall likewise not be liable for any subrogation claim or any

contractual indemnity claim asserted by any reinsurer, insurer,

insurance pool, underwriting association, health maintenance

organization or plan, hospital plan corporation, professional health

service corporation, preferred provider organization or plan, employee

retirement fund including but not limited to plans subject to the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Medicare or

Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, self-insurer, or any other person with

an interest in the claim, other than to the extent the claim exceeds the

association's obligation limitations. . . .

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

Appellant’s arguments

CHRISTUS’s principle argument is that it was deprived of the opportunity to

investigate the claim because LIGA’s failed to inform CHRISTUS of CastlePoint’s

insolvency in a timely manner. It contends that with timely notuce, it would have

searched for evidence of an intermediary entity such as ShareStaff, which also could

have possibly been held liable for the claim. However, it contends that the passage

of time has rendered such an investigation impossible. Thus, CHRISTUS argues

that Nightingale should be prohibited from making a claim for reimbursement dating

back to 2016-2017 when LIGA began making payments.

5

CHRISTUS further argues that the contracts between Nightingale,

CHRISTUS, and ShareStaff created certain obligations, including the agreement to

hold harmless and defend CHRISTUS against any worker’s compensation claims.

Furthermore, a representative of LIGA once agreed to continue to pay the medical

benefits to claimant while speaking with claimant.

Additionally, CHRISTUS argues that LIGA acted in bad faith when it failed

its statutory duty to notify CHRISTUS of the claim after the incident and 11 years

thereafter. CHRISTUS contends that La.R.S. 22:1258(5) required LIGA to notify

claimants, insureds, and other interested parties of CastlePoint’s insolvency.

CHRISTUS was an obviously interested party, and is owed reimbursement by LIGA.

Alternatively, CHRISTUS avers that the WCJ erred in finding that payments

by LIGA before December, 2022 were owed, as it had not been put on notice of

CastlePoint’s insolvency at that time. Otherwise, this court is permitting LIGA to

profit from its dereliction of duty.

Appellee’s arguments

In support of its argument that LIGA is entitled to reimbursement, Nightingale

cites Cline v. Pac. Marine Ins. Co., 619 So.2d 1256, (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied,

625 So.2d 1045 (La.1993). Cline allowed LIGA to recover payments made, where

the claimant was required to exhaust worker’s compensation benefits from the

employer’s carrier before involving LIGA. The court applied the “nonduplication

of recovery” statute, (La.R.S. 22:1386(1)),3 the precursor to La.R.S. 22:2062 and

3

The text of prior La.R.S. 22:1386(1) read as follows:

1386. Nonduplication of recovery

…

(1) Any person having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an

insurance policy other than a policy of an insolvent insurer which is also a

covered claim, shall be required to exhaust first his rights under such policy.

6

determined that LIGA was therefore entitled to recover any amounts it had paid to

the claimant that would otherwise have been the policy holder’s responsibility.

Pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2062 (A)(5)(b), self-insurance is considered “other

insurance.” Thus, CHRISTUS, the borrowing employer, is a solidary obligor

responsible for paying the claim pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2062(A)(1)(4).

The question then is whether LIGA, the payor of last resort, is entitled to full

reimbursement from CHRISTUS in accordance with La.R.S. 22:2062 and Cline.

Nightingale argues that CHRISTUS incorrectly (1) asserts that the language

of La.R.S. 22:2062 is different than it was in the Cline case, implying that the

amended language affects the result of this case;4 (2) argues that the WCJ’s reference

to it as a “high net worth insured” in the reasons for ruling results in a basis for

appeal; and (3) asserts that recovery is precluded pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2058.

CHRISTUS incorrectly taking the position that it qualifies as an “interested party”

and disregards the fact that the obligation to notify an interested party is qualified by

three phrases in the statute: “as deemed necessary by the commission”; “upon the

Commissioner's request”; and “to the extent that records are available to the

Association.”

Any amount payable on a covered claim under this Part shall be reduced by the

amount of any recovery under such insurance policy.

4

When the Cline case was decided, the relevant statute was La.R.S. 22:1386, which had

slightly different wording than the statute in its current form, La.R.S. 22:2062. The differences,

discussed further below in our analysis, are as follows:

Current (La.R.S. 22:2062)

(2) Any amount payable on a covered claim under this Part shall be reduced by the

full applicable limits stated in the other insurance policy, or by the amount of the

recovery under the other insurance policy as provided herein.

Previous (La.R.S. 22:1386)

(1) ... Any amount payable on a covered claim under this part shall be reduced by

the amount of any recovery under such insurance policy.

7

Thus, Nightingale contends that the record contains no evidence that the

commission deemed notification to CHRISTUS necessary; no evidence of a

Commissioner’s request that notification be provided to CHRISTUS; and no

evidence that records were available to the Association establishing the contractual

relationship. Therefore, Nightingale concludes CHRISTUS has failed to prove that

all three of those necessary elements are satisfied in this case; thus, no manifest error

can be found.

Although Nightingale acknowledges that CHRISTUS asserts that it was

prejudiced by the inability to locate evidence in the five to six years between the

insolvency and CHRISTUS’s notice of the insolvency, Nightingale contends that it

was able to carry its burden of proof. Specifically, Nightingale shows that the

testimony of Melissa Penzato, a former employee of ShareStaff, explained that the

direct contract between CHRISTUS and Nightingale indicated that ShareStaff and

its successors would not have been involved in that business dealing. Thus, no

prejudice could have resulted.

According to Penzato, Nightingale and CHRISTUS used the same template

of the document that was previously used when the middle entity, ShareStaff, was

involved as an intermediary in the contractual agreement. Penzato explained that

what was determinative was the fact that the intermediary’s “middle persons” were

not involved in the contractual arrangement and that this was a direct relationship

between Nightingale and CHRISTUS. If an intermediary had been involved, no

direct contract would have existed between Nightingale and CHRISTUS.

Contracts entered into evidence also establish that direct agreements between

Nightingale and CHRISTUS existed as follows: one signed in 2006; one executed

on December 10, 2009 that expired on November 30, 2010 and was executed

December 10, 2009; a hospital contract agreement dated February 22, 2011,

8

scheduled to end June 4, 2011; another hospital contract agreement dated May 27,

2011, extending through September 3, 2011; and, another extension dated August

30, 2011, extending through October 1, 2011, the contract that applied to claimant’s

injury. The invoice for the work the claimant did bearing invoice 105391 was paid

directly by CHRISTUS to Nightingale on December 22, 2011. That spreadsheet

shows total payments from CHRISTUS of $100,000.00.

Accordingly, Nightingale contends there was no manifest error in the WCJ’s

ruling that CHRISTUS did not suffer any prejudice to preclude LIGA’s recovery.

Analysis

As detailed above, self-insurance is considered “other insurance” pursuant to

La.R.S. 22:2062(A)(5)(b). Thus, CHRISTUS is a solidary obligor ultimately

responsible for paying the claim per La.R.S. 22:2062(A)(1) and (4). LIGA accepted

the claim, and as a result of accepting the claim, placed it within the guidelines of a

covered claim pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2055.

First, we address CHRISTUS’s argument that amended language of La.R.S.

22:2062 (previously La.R.S. 22:1386) substantively changes the meaning of the

statute. After review, we find that the amended language does not abrogate Cline,

as the newly worded statute contains almost identical language:

Current:

(2) Any amount payable on a covered claim under this Part shall be

reduced by the full applicable limits stated in the other insurance policy,

or by the amount of the recovery under the other insurance policy as

provided herein.

Previous:

(1) . . . Any amount payable on a covered claim under this part shall be

reduced by the amount of any recovery under such insurance policy.

We find that the change in language does not change the meaning of the law.

9

Additionally, the WCJ made no substantive finding that CHRISTUS is a “high

net worth insured” as to this case. That term is reserved for an insured whose value

is so high it does not qualify for LIGA protection. Rather, we find that CHRISTUS

was self-insured, thus an “other insurance” pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2062. Although

the WCJ refers to CHRISTUS as a “high net worth insured,” in the reasons for ruling,

it is not relevant to our analysis, because the judgment, not the reasons issued for it,

controls. See Filmore Parc Apartments II v. White, 24-475 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/25),

418 So.3d 42.

CHRISTUS further argues that recovery is precluded under La.R.S. 22:2058,

which requires notifications to claimants, insureds, and “other interested parties” of

insolvency. We disagree. As Nightingale noted, any obligation to provide statutory

notification is prescribed by three circumstances/phrases: “as deemed necessary by

the commission”; “upon the Commissioner’s request”; and “to the extent that

records are available to the Association.” Again, we find that the record contains no

evidence that any of these three requirements/qualifiers have been met.

After review, we agree with the WCJ’s finding of fact that the contracts in

evidence demonstrate a direct contract existed between Nightingale and CHRISTUS.

In fact, around the date of claimant’s incident, CHRISTUS directly paid Nightingale

for the claimant’s work. We agree that the presence of multiple direct contracts

indicates there was no intermediary entity between CHRISTUS and Nightingale.

Thus, CHRISTUS could not have been prejudiced because in fact no insurance other

than CHRISTUS was available to the claimant after CastlePoint’s insolvency.

Therefore, we find that no prejudice occurred from the lack of notification to

CHRISTUS of CastlePoint’s insolvency as LIGA is the carrier of last resort and pays

sums that should be paid by another entity, reimbursement is due and payable. See

Cline, 619 So.2d 1256.

10

Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

Appellant’s arguments

In assignment of error number two, CHRISTUS argues that neither LIGA nor

Nightingale put CHRISTUS on notice that the contract between the parties could not

be located. Therefore, every contract introduced into evidence and attached to the

documents deposition of CHRISTUS contained language that Nightingale would be

responsible for paying worker’s compensation for employees such as claimant and

would agree to indemnify and hold CHRISTUS harmless. Thus, CHRISTUS argues

it is entitled to indemnification against Nightingale and LIGA. CHRISTUS further

requests penalties and attorney’s fees against Nightingale.

CHRISTUS urges this court to find that LIGA, which it claims is responsible

for the debts of Nightingale under its duty to provide employee insurance coverage

to CHRISTUS, be allowed to proceed against CHRISTUS for amounts it paid or to

reimburse CHRISTUS. Alternatively, CHRISTUS argues that Nightingale and

LIGA are liable to CHRISTUS for their virile share if this matter is deemed a

solidary obligation.

Additionally, CHRISTUS contends it is due reimbursement under the

Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Act, specifically La.R.S. 23:1031(C), which

states:

As between the special and general employers, they shall have the right

to seek contribution from the other for any payments made on behalf of

the employee, unless there is a contract between them expressing a

different method of sharing the liability.

Thus, CHRISTUS argues that even if this court determines no indemnification

agreement exists between Nightingale and CHRISTUS, the statute above allows

11

CHRISTUS to seek contribution against Nightingale, or LIGA, who stands in the

position of Nightingale.

Appellee’s arguments

Nightingale argues that CHRISTUS seeks to circumvent the provisions of

Louisiana law regarding LIGA by making a claim against Nightingale in violation

of La.R.S. 22:2055(6)(b)(iii):

. . . In addition, any person insured under a policy issued by an insolvent

insurer shall likewise not be liable for any subrogation claim or any

contractual indemnity claim asserted by any reinsurer, insurer,

insurance pool, underwriting association, health maintenance

organization or plan, hospital plan corporation, professional health

service corporation, preferred provider organization or plan, employee

retirement fund including but not limited to plans subject to the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Medicaid, self-

insurer, or any other person with an interest in the claim, other than to

the extent the claim exceeds the association's obligation limitations.

Nightingale argues that CHRISTUS failed to establish the existence of a

contract establishing defense, indemnity, and hold harmless provisions applicable to

this case. Thus, the WCJ’s ruling was not manifestly erroneous.

Nightingale also formally answered the appeal requesting this court to uphold

the sum reached by the WCJ and further seeking attorney’s fees and requesting oral

arguments.

Analysis

The WCJ determined that there was no defense, indemnity or hold harmless

provision (contractual or otherwise) applicable in this case. We review this

determination under the manifest error standard, and find that, based on the record,

it is not clearly wrong.

In this matter, LIGA steps into the position of the defunct carrier, CastlePoint.

This to the extent the “other insurance” provisions exonerate LIGA, those provisions

also exonerate Nightingale. To hold otherwise would make our laws pertaining to

12

LIGA irrelevant and would provide absurd consequences by punishing a business

when its insurance carrier went out of business, notwithstanding LIGA’s immunity

and the existence of “other insurance.” Furthermore, La.R.S. 22:2055 is directly on

point in that regard and precludes recovery by CHRISTUS as discussed above.

Additionally, the record does not contain any document indicating that

Nightingale would be responsible if its compensation carrier went out of business,

and none of the contracts in evidence contain this language. The only contracts that

included these types of indemnity and hold harmless provisions were the previous

contracts between ShareStaff, and Nightingale. Those contracts did not apply here.

Moreover, at the time of the incident, ShareStaff had ceased to exist as an entity, and

the contracts had expired. Thus, we find neither Nightingale nor LIGA were

obligated to reimburse CHRISTUS.

Finally, CHRISTUS asserts that La.R.S. 23:1031 assigns the virile share

obligations. That assignment cannot apply where LIGA has stepped into the position

of the carrier pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2062 A(1) and (4).

In summary, LIGA accepted the claim, and the legal ramifications of that

acceptance are that the claim was confirmed as falling within the guidelines of a

covered claim pursuant to La.R.S. 22:2055. That issue has not been challenged or

disputed. Therefore, we find that LIGA, the payor of last resort, is entitled to full

reimbursement from CHRISTUS, and CHRISTUS is entitled to no reimbursement.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

13

DECREE

Defendants raised two assignments of error. We find no merit to defendant’s

assignments of error, and we affirm the WCJ’s judgment. Further, the request for

attorney fees by all parties is denied.

Costs of these proceedings, including this appeal, are assessed to defendant/

appellant, CHRISTUS Health Southwest Louisiana d/b/a CHRISTUS St. Patrick.

AFFIRMED.

14

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

25-730 consolidated with 25-729

TELECA DONACHRICHA

VERSUS

CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHWEST, ET AL

**********

APPEAL FROM THE

OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION - # 3

PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 23-04740 C/W 22-00929

MELISSA A. ST. MARY, WORKERS COMPENSATION JUDGE

**********

GARY J. ORTEGO

JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Clayton Davis,

Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John C. Turnage

Mayer, Smith & Roberts, L.L.P.

8570 Business Park Dr, Suite 200

Shreveport, LA 71105

(318) 629-7019

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:

Christus Health Southwest Louisiana

Michelle M. Sorrells

Walters, Thomas, Cullens

12345 Perkins Rd, Building 2

Baton Rouge, LA 70810

(225) 236-3646

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:

Teleca Donachricha

Eric J. Waltner

Allen & Gooch

2000 Kaliste Saloom Rd. Suite 400

Lafayette, LA 70508

(337) 291-1400

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:

Louisiana Insurance GuarantyAssociation

Nightingale Nurses, LLC

ORTEGO, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in Teleca Donachricha v. Nightingale Nurses, LLC.,

et al., 25-729, (La.App. 3Cir. 06/__/26, __So.3d __, handed down this day, the

following Decree is provided in this consolidated matter:

DECREE

Defendants raised two assignments of error. We find no merit to defendants’

assignment of errors, and we affirm the WCJ’s judgment. Further, the request for

attorney fees by all parties is denied.

Costs of these proceedings, including appeal, are assessed to defendants

/appellants, CHRISTUS Health Southwest Louisiana d/b/a CHRISTUS St. Patrick.

AFFIRMED.

2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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