Choi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

KYU BONG CHOI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-1692-CLM

HORIZON FREIGHT

SYSTEM INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Kyu Bong Choi was driving a tractor-trailer truck

eastbound on Interstate-20 on November 15, 2021, when he collided with

another truck driven by Defendant Anthony Dyches. Choi alleges that

Dyches caused the accident by swerving into his lane, and that he

sustained substantial injuries. So Choi sues Dyches and Dyches’ alleged

employers, Defendants Horizon Freight System, Inc. (“Horizon Freight”)

and Horizon Mid Atlantic, Inc. (“Horizon Mid Atlantic”) (collectively

“Defendants”), for Negligence (Count I); Wantonness and Recklessness

(Count II); and Negligent Entrustment (Count III) against the Defendant

Companies. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 8-16). Choi seeks both compensatory and

punitive damages for Defendants’ alleged misconduct.

All Defendants move for summary judgment on Counts II and III

and on Choi’s claims for punitive damages. Defendant Horizon Freight

also seeks summary judgment as to Choi’s negligence claim (Count I). For

the reasons explained below, the court will GRANT IN PART and DENY

IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 85).

BACKGROUND

Below the court details the facts; some are genuinely disputed and

some are not. When needed, the court explains the difference and presents

the genuinely disputed facts in the light most favorable to Choi because

he is the non-moving party.

_____

This case stems from a collision that occurred on November 15,

2021, at around 8:00 p.m. on I-20 east in St. Clair County, Alabama. (Doc.

86-1, p. at 64). That day, Anthony Dyches, an independent contractor of

Horizon Mid Atlantic, was operating a tractor truck which Dyches owned

and leased to Horizon Mid-Atlantic. (Doc. 86-15, pp. 339-352). Dyches was

traveling east from Alabama to Charleston, South Carolina to pick up a

load to transport for Horizon Mid-Atlantic. (Doc. 86-2, p. 58).

Choi was on I-20 east at the same time, operating a tractor trailer

truck owned by CST Liners, Inc., transporting a load to Charlotte, North

Carolina. (Docs. 86-1, p. 65; 86-3). I-20 has three lanes of travel in each

direction. (Doc. 86-2, p. 66-67). Dyches was traveling east in the middle

lane, while Choi was traveling east in the right lane. (Id.) Choi and Dyches

drove beside each other for several minutes leading up to the collision.

(Id.) What happened next is disputed.

Dyches says that as he drove down I-20 a third tractor trailer truck

was driving closely behind him, and that Choi and the third truck were

“going at it” fighting over the lane. (Doc. 86-2, pp. 70, 72). Dyches tapped

on his brakes and activated his right turn signal to try to let the third

truck get around him. (Doc. 86-2, p. 82). Dyches could see that Choi’s front

bumper was about in line with Dyches’ rear tire and admitted that the

two trucks were “too close for [him] to get over.” (Doc. 86-2, p. 82).

Then, according to Dyches, the third truck drove into the left lane

to get around him, and in the process of doing so, swerved and “tried to

hit” Dyches’ tractor. (Doc. 86-2, p. 86). So, to avoid being hit by the third

truck driver, Dyches overcorrected to the right and swerved into Choi’s

line of travel in the right lane. (Doc. 86-2, pp. 87-91). Because of the

overcorrection, Dyches’ vehicle collided with Choi’s, resulting in both

vehicles running off the right side of I-20 and colliding with a ditch. (Id.)

As Dyches tells it, the erratic driving of the third truck caused his

overcorrection and collision with Choi’s vehicle. But all eyewitnesses

present at the scene of the accident tell a different story.

Shariya Curry and Jaylah King were also on I-20 east on the night

of the accident. (Doc. 86-5, p. 19). King was driving and Curry was in the

passenger seat as they rode behind Choi and Dyches for several minutes.

(Id.) King kept her distance from the tractor trailers because she observed

that Dyches was driving his truck “too close” to Choi’s. (Doc. 86-4, p. 37).

King was not sure whether the trucks were “tussling over a lane” or

whether “someone was asleep,” (id.), but she could “sense that a collision

was going to happen.” (Doc. 86-4, p. 28).

In her deposition, King’s testimony was clear that Choi stayed

within his lane, and that she never saw him do anything that would have

contributed to the accident. (Doc. 86-4, p. 27). Instead, King saw Dyches

drift into Choi’s lane causing the vehicles to collide and crash into the

ditch. (Doc. 86-4, p. 40). As for the presence of a third truck, King testified

that she did not see another tractor trailer near Choi or Dyches’ trucks,

and that there was no third truck that was in any way involved in the

collision. (Doc. 86-4, pp. 23-24). King testified that she only saw the third

tractor trailer after the wreck when a driver pulled over to ask if Choi and

Dyches were okay. (Doc. 86-4, p. 24).

Curry’s testimony lines up with King’s. Curry also said that she did

not observe Choi doing anything that she believed caused or contributed

to the accident. (Doc. 86-5, p. 20). Rather, Curry stated that Dyches was

“going a little bit faster than … he was supposed to,” (doc. 86-5, p. 22),

guessing that Dyches was driving anywhere between 85 and 90 miles per

hour, (doc. 86-5, p. 32). Curry was similarly clear that the third tractor

trailer had nothing to do with the cause of the accident. (Doc. 86-5, p. 23).

In fact, Curry stated that the third truck was behind Dyches and Choi at

all times leading up to the accident and only went around them to pull

over and assist the drivers after the collision. (Doc. 86-5, pp. 46-47).

Curry and King’s deposition testimony is consistent with the

statements they gave Alabama State Trooper Jordan Dill at the scene of

the accident. (See docs. 86-3, p. 3; 90-1, pp. 23-24). When he arrived shortly

after the collision, Trooper Dill took statements from Choi, Dyches, King,

and Curry. During his deposition, Trooper Dill explained that when Curry

and King gave their witness statements at the scene, “[t]hey stated that

there was no other vehicle involved or no other vehicle that contributed to

the accident.” (Doc. 90-1, pp. 23-24).

If the witnesses had seen Choi and Dyches “tussling over a lane,”

Dill would have annotated it in his report. (Doc. 90-1, p. 31). But Curry

and King said “[n]othing remotely close” to that effect. (Id.) Dill similarly

would have included in his report if another vehicle was considered a

possible cause of the accident and “would have done every effort … to find

that other vehicle.” (Id.) But he didn’t.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the

facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party. See Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 285

F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when

there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party asking for

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of telling the

court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the

pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 requires the

nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

The court has “wide discretion” to take judicial notice of appropriate

adjudicative facts at any stage in a proceeding. Lodge v. Kondaur Cap.

Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2014). The court may take judicial

notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally

known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed R. Evid. 201(b). “Courts may take judicial

notice of ‘relevant public documents required to be filed’ that are ‘not

subject to reasonable dispute.’” Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n,

Inc., 133 F.4th 1032, 1036 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bryant v. Avado

Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999)). Further, the court

“must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied

with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2).

Choi requests that the court take judicial notice of three documents:

(1) the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration (“FMCSA”) Licensing and Insurance Public Details for

Horizon Freight Systems, (doc. 89-5); (2) the FMCSA Licensing and

Insurance Public Details for Horizon Mid Atlantic, Inc., (doc. 89-6); and

(3) the Ohio Secretary of State’s Business Details for Horizon Mid

Atlantic, Inc., (doc. 89-7). (See doc. 92). The court finds that these

documents are not subject to reasonable dispute, and their contents can

be accurately determined from public records available from the U.S.

Department of Transportation and the Ohio Secretary of State, sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed R. Evid. 201(b); see

also Watts, 133 F.4th at 1036 n.3. Because Choi requests that the court

take judicial notice and has supplied the necessary information, the court

“must take judicial notice” of these documents. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2).

DISCUSSION

All Defendants move for summary judgment on Choi’s negligent

entrust claim, wantonness claim, and claim for punitive damages. Horizon

Freight moves for summary judgment on all Choi’s claims against it,

including negligence. So the court begins its discussion by deciding

whether Horizon Freight will remain a Defendant in this case at all. After

determining to whom the remaining claims apply, the court will move to

Choi’s negligent entrustment claim. The court will then address Choi’s

wantonness claim, which in turn will inform whether Choi can maintain

his claim for punitive damages.

I. Vicarious Liability and the Horizon Defendants

Generally, Choi argues that the Horizon Defendants are vicariously

liable for Dyches’ conduct because they are his employers. But Defendants

disagree. Horizon Freight argues that it has no connection to Dyches or

the underlying accident, so it cannot be liable for any of Choi’s claims

arising from the accident with Dyches. According to Horizon Freight, it

was “not the motor carrier, did not contract with Dyches, did not own or

lease the subject tractor trailer, and played no role in the events giving

rise to Plaintiff’s claims.” (Doc. 87, p. 24). Horizon Freight instead points

the finger at Horizon Mid Atlantic because it contracted with Dyches and

leased his truck. The record, however, is not as clear cut as Horizon

Freight makes it out to be.

Choi, on the other hand, says that both Horizon Defendants

employed Dyches. (See doc. 91, p. 22). And, as you will see, Choi presents

substantial evidence to back up that claim. Whether the Horizon

Defendants can be held liable for Dyches’ conduct comes down to the scope

of vicarious liability of a lessee under a federally regulated carrier lease.

The parties’ briefings on Horizon Freight’s liability do not squarely

address the historic developments or trends in this evolving area of the

law. Nevertheless, the court discusses the issue below.

A. Federal “Statutory Employee” Liability

For more than 50 years, lease agreements between truck owners

and interstate motor carriers have been governed by extensive and

evolving federal regulations. In the mid-1950s, Congress recognized the

increasing prevalence of arrangements in which motor carriers, rather

than owning fleets and employing drivers directly, contracted with

independent owner-operators while retaining substantial control over the

equipment and operations. By calling the drivers “independent

contractors,” the motor carriers sought to escape liability for incidents

arising from the drivers’ negligence.

In 1956 Congress amended the Interstate Common Carrier Act to

address abuses arising from these “often fly-by-night arrangements,”

which had resulted in “a helter-skelter operation of thousands of

unregulated vehicles on the highways as a menace to safety.” Simmons v.

King, 478 F.2d 857, 866–67 (5th Cir. 1973).1 The purpose of the

amendment was to “protect the public from the tortious conduct of the

often judgment-proof truck lessor operators by requiring interstate motor

carriers to assume full direction and control of the vehicles as if they were

the owners of such vehicles.” Edwards v. McElliotts Trucking, LLC, 268

F. Supp. 3d 867, 877 (S.D.W. Va. 2017) (citations omitted). Congress

codified this purpose in 49 U.S.C. § 14102, which states:

49 U.S.C § 14102 - Leased motor vehicles

(a) General authority of Secretary—The Secretary may

require a motor carrier … that uses motor vehicles not

owned by it to transport property under an arrangement

with another party to—

1 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals rendered before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc).

(1) make the arrangement in writing signed by the parties

specifying its duration and the compensation to be paid by

the motor carrier;

(2) carry a copy of the arrangement in each motor vehicle to

which it applies during the period the arrangement is in

effect;

(3) inspect the motor vehicles and obtain liability and cargo

insurance on them; and

(4) have control of and be responsible for operating those

motor vehicles in compliance with requirements prescribed

by the Secretary on safety of operations and equipment, and

with other applicable law as if the motor vehicles were

owned by the motor carrier.

49 U.S.C § 14102.

The legislation also authorized the Interstate Commerce

Commission (“ICC”) to regulate the leasing of trucking equipment. Taking

direction from 49 U.S.C § 14102, the ICC promulgated regulations

governing lease arrangements.2 The most relevant of these regulations,

sometimes referred to as the “control regulation,” reads as follows:

49 CFR § 376.12 - Lease requirements.

(c) Exclusive possession and responsibilities.

(1) The lease shall provide that the authorized carrier lessee

shall have exclusive possession, control, and use of the

equipment for the duration of the lease. The lease shall

further provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall

2 The ICC was abolished in 1996, and 49 U.S.C. § 11107 was reenacted substantially

unchanged as 49 U.S.C. § 14102, referring to the Secretary of Transportation instead

of the ICC.

assume complete responsibility for the operation of the

equipment for the duration of the lease.

49 CFR § 376.12(c)(1).

Before 1992, a majority of courts interpreted § 376.12(c)(1) to create

an irrebuttable “statutory employment” relationship between carriers and

owner-operator lessors that was independent of any state common law

definition. See, e.g., Price v. Westmoreland, 727 F.2d 494, 495 (5th Cir.

1984); Rodriguez v. Ager, 705 F.2d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 1983). In other

words, even if there was not a clear agency relationship between the

carrier and the driver under the applicable state law, the federal-lease

regulations established such a relationship. See Simmons, 478 F.2d at

867. So, “whether the drivers are called direct employees, independent

contractors, or owner-operators[,] if the carrier hires them to transport a

shipment, they are the carrier’s statutory employees and the carrier has

statutory control over the equipment and the driver to support vicarious

liability.” Puga v. About Tyme Transp., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 760, 763 (S.D.

Tex. 2017).

The former Fifth Circuit, and other courts, also found that the

statutory relationship created by § 376.12(c)(1) was not always limited to

a driver and a single motor carrier. See Simmons, 478 F.2d at 867 (holding

that the statutory liability of one carrier lessee does not preclude joint and

several liability of another carrier lessee based on a common law theory).

“[U]nder certain conditions it is clear that more than one common carrier

can share ownership and control of leased vehicles.” Zamalloa v. Hart, 31

F.3d 911, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1994). In some cases, two common carriers may

share ownership and control such that it “implies a consequent sharing of

responsibility.” Zamalloa, 31 F.3d at 915; see also Simmons, 478 F.2d at

867.

“Beginning in the late 1980’s, however, and at the behest of

petitions by industry trade groups, the ICC began issuing guidance

documents that seriously questioned the prevailing judicial interpretation

of its regulations.” Edwards, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 878 (citing Lease &

Interchange of Vehicles (Identification Devices) (49 C.F.R. Part 1057), 3

I.C.C.2d 92, 93 (1986)). “The [ICC] emphasized that the nature of

vicarious liability under a regulated lease is a matter of state, not federal,

law ....” Lohr v. Zehner, No. 2:12-cv-533, 2014 WL 2504574, at *3 (M.D.

Ala. Jun. 3, 2014).

In 1992, the ICC formally amended §376.12(c) by adding Subsection

(4), to clarify that:

(4) Nothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of

this section is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver

provided by the lessor is an independent contractor or an

employee of the authorized carrier lessee. An independent

contractor relationship may exist when a carrier lessee

complies with 49 U.S.C. 14102 and attendant administrative

requirements.

49 CFR § 376.12(c)(4).

“Despite the amendment’s apparent clarity, there is no consensus

among federal courts of the amendment’s effect on the relationship

between carriers and owner-operator lessors.” Edwards, 268 F. Supp. 3d

at 878. As other district courts examining the issue have observed, three

approaches have surfaced in the intervening years. First, some courts

have clung to the pre–1992 interpretation of the control regulation,

applying an irrebuttable presumption of liability on the motor carrier. See

e.g., Zamalloa, 31 F.3d at 917. An emerging second group places a greater

emphasis on the amended regulation, specifically subsection (c)(4),

holding that courts must look to state law to classify the relationship

between carriers and owner-operators. See, e.g., Lohr, 2014 WL 2504574,

at *2–3; Jett v. Van Eerden Trucking Co., Inc., No. 10-cv-1073, 2012 WL

37504, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2012). And a third group of courts has

taken an approach that splits the difference. Those courts read §

376.12(c)(1) and (c)(4) together to create a rebuttable presumption of

employment that can be rebutted by resort to state common law

principles. See e.g., Edwards, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 878; Delaney v. Rapid

Response, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 769, 779 (D.S.D. 2015); Thomas v. Johnson

Agri–Trucking, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1249 (D. Kan. 2011); Bays v.

Summitt Trucking, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730-31 (W.D. Ky. 2010).

The Eleventh Circuit has said little about the interpretation of

motor carrier liability. The only case in which the Eleventh Circuit has

done so arose in the workers’ compensation context before the 1992

amendment. See Judy v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 844 F.2d 1496 (11th

Cir. 1988). Still, that case, as well as surviving precedent from the former

Fifth Circuit, are instructive as to how the regulations should be

interpreted as amended. Adding circuit precedent/instruction to the

general interpretative canon that a statute or regulation “should be

construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,” Corley v. United

States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009), this court will apply the “rebuttable

presumption” approach to motor carrier liability.

Let’s start with the canon that gives effect to all provisions. As my

colleague in the Southern District of West Virginia explained:

The ‘rebuttable presumption’ standard avoids the

fundamental problem with each of the other two

interpretations—disregard of either Subsection (c)(1) or

(c)(4). Courts that have continued to hold that the control

regulation creates an irrebuttable employment relationship

read Subsection (c)(4) out of the ICC regulations and ignore

the ICC’s plainly stated intent in its guidance documents. …

Courts that have held that the control regulation, and

thereby Section 14102, has no impact on the relationship

between carriers and owner-operators wish away Subsection

(c)(1). Subsection (c)(1), however, quite clearly carries out

the Congressional mandate found in Section 14102 that

compelled the ICC to promulgate leasing regulations

requiring carriers to exert control over leased trucks “as if

the motor vehicles were owned by the motor carrier.” 49

U.S.C. § 14102.

Edwards, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 879. Applying a rebuttable presumption of

employment between the carrier and operator gives effect to subsection

(c)(1), and the plain language and stated purpose of 49 U.S.C.§ 14102. It

does so without “over-correct[ing] the problem Congress sought to

address.” Bay, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 731. And under this approach,

subsection (c)(4) and the ICC’s guidance are not left out in the cold because

the presumption can be overcome by state common law norms. In sum,

the rebuttable presumption approach “respects both the ICC’s desire to

base the ultimate classification of the carrier-owner-operator relationship

on state common law and Congress’ intent to ‘thwart abuses by carriers

who would lease equipment from independent contractors who are not ...

regulated.’” Edwards, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 878-79 (citation modified).

Now for precedent. In White v. Excalibur Ins. Co., the former Fifth

Circuit examined 49 U.S.C.§ 14102 in the workers’ compensation context.

599 F.2d 50, 53 (5th Cir. 1979). Even before the 1992 regulatory

amendments came into play, the former Fifth Circuit observed: “To make

[interstate carriers] assume the burden of liability for the harm caused by

their leased vehicles without according them the protection given

employers under state substantive law would broaden their exposure to

suit beyond that to which employers in fact are subject. We find no

warrant for such strict liability in the federal law.” White, 599 F.2d at 53.

Nearly a decade after White, the Eleventh Circuit took up a motor

carrier liability case, also in the workers’ compensation context. See Judy,

844 F.2d 1496. In Judy, the Eleventh Circuit “endorse[d] the holding in

White that federal law creates a statutory employment relationship

between interstate carriers and the drivers of the trucks leased to them[.]”

Id. at 1501. But the Eleventh Circuit clarified that “whether that

statutory employment relationship is sufficient to constitute an

employer/employee relationship for the purposes of workers’

compensation is a question of state law.” Id. In dicta, however, the Judy

court distinguished workers’ compensation issues from liability to the

general public, emphasizing the stronger federal interest in regulating the

latter relationship. See id. at 1501. In doing so, the Court quoted a Fifth

Circuit decision stating that “the traditional common law doctrine of

master-servant relationships and respondeat superior does not apply” in

the context of public liability. Id. (quoting Price, 727 F.2d at 497).

The rebuttal presumption approach sits in a “Goldilocks” zone

between White and Judy. Interstate carriers are not forced to assume an

additional “burden of liability” without “the protection given [to]

employers under state substantive law” because state-law is the final

arbiter of the employment relationship. White, 599 F.2d at 53. And the

heightened federal interest in public safety recognized by the Eleventh

Circuit in Judy is protected by the presumption that establishes a

baseline of liability. See Judy, 844 F.2d at 1501.

For these reasons, the court will apply the rebuttal presumption

approach to Choi’s claims against the Horizon Defendants. That means

(a) the court presumes an employment relationship between the Horizon

Defendants and Dyches but (b) the Horizon Defendants can overcome that

presumption by pointing to Alabama common law.

B. Employer Liability Under Alabama Law

Several factors are relevant in determining whether an individual

is an employee or agent of another under Alabama law. See Lathan Roof

Am., Inc. v. Hairston, 828 So. 2d 262, 265 (Ala. 2002). “Obviously, one of

the most important factors is whether there is evidence of an offer of

employment and acceptance of that offer. Another important factor is the

degree of control the alleged employer retains over the alleged employee.”

Id. (citation modified). And while there must be a right of control by the

principal over the agent, it is not essential that the right actually be

exercised. See National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 447 So.2d 133, 137

(Ala. 1983).

“Other factors are certainly relevant. For example, the exercise of—

or the failure to exercise—prerogatives inherent in the alleged employee

status give some indication as to whether a person actually holds (or

believes that he or she holds) that status.” Hairston, 828 So. 2d at 265-66.

Ultimately, “[a]gency is determined by the facts and not by how the

parties may characterize their relationship.” Ex parte Hicks, 537 So. 2d

486, 488 (Ala. 1988). And “[b]ecause working relationships take a wide

variety of forms, each case must depend on its own facts, and all features

of the relationship are considered together.” Jackson v. Allen, 352 So. 3d

678, 685 (Ala. 2021).

Generally, whether an employment relationship exists is a question

for the fact-finder or jury. S. Ala. Skills Training Consortium v. Ford, 997

So. 2d 309, 327 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). In Alabama, “the rule is that if there

is a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiff’s case, that is, a mere gleam,

glimmer, spark, the smallest trace, of evidence to support the plaintiff’s

theory,” the jury must decide the employment question. Cox v. Howard

Hall Co., 265 So. 2d 580, 584 (1972). Likewise, the jury must resolve

whether the alleged employer or principal exercised sufficient control to

be held liable for the agent or independent contractor’s conduct. See

Jackson, 352 So. 3d at 685.

By the same token, whether an employee of one company has been

transferred into employment of another company is a jury question.

Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 142 So.2d 228, 239 (1962). “Where the

evidence does not clearly establish who the employer is, consideration

must be given to the character of the service to be rendered, the duration

of employment, and the one who is paying the employee.” Id. “[A]ll

competent, relevant, legal evidence tending to prove or disprove the issue

should be considered” and “each case must be determined on its own

facts.” Id. But “[w]here there is evidence of a measure of control over an

employee by two or more putative employers, a finding of ‘control’ and

liability in just one of them would be obviously erroneous.” Ex parte

Stewart, 518 So. 2d 118, 120 (Ala. 1987).

C. Application To These Facts

Horizon Mid Atlantic does not dispute that Dyches was driving

under its motor carrier authority on the day of the accident (though it does

dispute whether Dyches was an employee or agent subject to Horizon Mid

Atlantic’s direction and control). (See docs. 89-2, p. 40; 95, p. 5). Horizon

Freight, on the other hand, maintains that it did not employ Dyches at

all. (See docs. 91, p. 5; 86-15, p. 107). During his deposition, Mark Doland,

the Director of Safety at Horizon Mid Atlantic, explained that Horizon

Freight and Horizon Mid Atlantic are separate companies, but they do

share resources. (See doc. 86-15, p. 107). This sharing of resources extends

to things like hiring applications, drug testing pools, and explains—at

least according to Doland—why Horizon Freight’s name was listed on

many of Dyches’ hiring documents despite him only being “leased on” with

Horizon Mid Atlantic. (See doc. 86-15, pp. 107-108, 339-49).

The record also suggests that the Horizon companies shared

personnel. Take Mr. Doland for example. Doland is employed as the

Director of Safety for both Horizon Freight and Horizon Mid Atlantic. (See

doc. 86-15, pp. 49-50). The companies are so closely intertwined that

Doland does not even know which of the two companies writes his

paycheck. (See id.) The two companies also share the same President,

David Ferrante. (See docs. 86-15, pp. 72-73; 89-7). And Choi submits

substantial evidence that Horizon Freight and Horizon Mid Atlantic may

have also co-employed Dyches. For example:

24. Horizon Freight undertook and/or oversaw the hiring

process of Mr. Dyches. (See Doc. 86-15, pp. 353-441)

25. On or around August 27, 2020, Dyches submitted a

“Contractor Application” to drive for Horizon Freight

System, Inc. (Doc. 86-15 [Ex. 5 to Doland Depo], pp. 353-357)

26. In his application to Horizon Freight, Dyches authorized

“Horizon Freight System” to “investigate[] and inquire[] of

my personal, work, financial driving and medical history and

related matters as may be necessary in arriving at a []

decision.” (Doc. 86-15 [Ex. 5 to Doland Depo], p. 357)

27. On August 27, 2020, Horizon Freight requested and

received motor vehicle records for Dyches prior to Dyches

contracting with Horizon Mid-Atlantic. (Doc. 86-15 [Ex. 7 to

Doland Depo], pp. 360-364; see also id., p. 130:3-21)

28. On August 27, 2020, Horizon Freight requested and

received a criminal background check on Dyches. (Doc. 86-

15 [Ex. 9 to Doland Depo], pp. 367-370)

29. On September 2, 2020, Dyches signed a Horizon Freight

“Corporate Commitment to Safety And Contractor

Acknowledgement.” (Doc. 86-15 [Ex. 6 to Doland Depo], p.

358-359; see also id., pp. 115:11-117:20)

30. On September 2, 2020, Dyches signed a “Training

Overview and Acknowledgement” as part of his retention

with Horizon Freight. (Doc. 86-15, p. 377; id., p. 158:2-16)

31. On September 2, 2020, Dyches signed acknowledgements

to Horizon Freight that he received the safety manual and

the FMCSA handbook. (Doc. 85-16 [Exs. 14 and 15 to Doland

Depo], pp. 440-441; id., pp. 171:8-22, 172:7-173:16)

***

43. The Lease and Service Agreement allowed Horizon Mid

Atlantic, but not Mr. Dyches, to assign the Lease and Service

Agreement to an “affiliated” motor carrier. (Doc. 86-15 [Ex.

4 to Doland Depo], p. 347, § 18)

***

47. Prior to and at the time of the subject accident giving rise

to this action, Horizon Freight was the certificate holder for

Dyches’ insurance policies covering Dyches’ vehicle. (Doc. 89-

8)

48. “Annual Vehicle Inspection Reports” for Dyches’ vehicle

were submitted to Horizon Freight. (Doc. 89-9)

49. Similarly, monthly “Preventative Maintenance Reports”

were submitted to Horizon Freight. (Doc. 89-10)

50. Horizon Freight maintained all inspection reports. (Docs.

89-9, pp. 1-4; Doc. 89-10, pp. 1-14; Doc. 86-15 [Ex. 13 to

Doland Depo], p. 397)

(Doc. 91, pp. 12-17).

Again, Horizon Freight’s only explanation for their involvement in

Dyches’ hiring process and continued oversight is that Horizon Freight

and Horizon Mid Atlantic “share resources.” (Doc. 86-15, p. 107). But that

does not amount to an explanation for why Horizon Freight, rather than

Mid Atlantic, seemingly undertook the obligations of Dyches’ motor

carrier under 49 U.S.C § 14102. Horizon Freight inspected Dyches’ vehicle

and maintained insurance on it as required by § 14102(a)(3). (See docs.

89-8; 89-9; 89-10; 86-15, p. 397). Horizon Freight ensured Dyches’

compliance with federal regulations as required by § 14102(a)(4). (See doc.

86-15, p. 440). In short, there is a significant overlap between Horizon

Freight and Mid Atlantic. And if the line between the companies is so thin

that the Director of Safety can’t be sure who his actual employer is, then

the court can’t be certain who Dyches’ employer is either. At the very least,

the record evidence does not provide a clear answer.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Choi, a

reasonable factfinder could decide that Dyches was co-employed by

Horizon Freight. Admittedly, the rebuttal presumption of employment

under the federal regulations applies to Horizon Mid-Atlantic, not

Horizon Freight, because Mid Atlantic leased Dyches’ truck and Dyches

was driving under its authority at the time of the accident. (See docs. 86-

15, pp. 339-352; 89-2, p. 40). But under Eleventh Circuit precedent, more

than one motor carrier can share ownership and control of leased vehicles

such that they become jointly liable. See Simmons, 478 F.2d at 867. And

Choi has provided far more than a “scintilla of evidence” to support his

theory that the Horizon Defendants shared ownership and control of the

vehicle leased from Dyches. Cox, 265 So. 2d at 584. Under Alabama law,

that is enough to send the employment question to the jury. See Smith,

142 So.2d at 239. So the court will DENY Horizon Freight’s motion for

summary judgment on Choi’s negligence claim (Count I).

II. Negligent Entrustment

In Count III of his complaint, Choi asserts a negligent entrustment

claim against the Horizon Defendants. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 15-16). Under

Alabama law, “[t]he essential ingredients of a cause of action for negligent

entrustment are: (1) an entrustment; (2) to an incompetent; (3) with

knowledge that he is incompetent; (4) proximate cause; and (5) damages.”

Halford v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409, 412 (Ala. 2005)

(quoting Mason v. New, 475 So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1985)). The Horizon

Defendants contend that Choi cannot establish that Dyches was

incompetent, so they are entitled to summary judgment on Count III.3

Applying the high bar that Alabama law sets for incompetence,

Defendants are right.

In Alabama, “the incompetence of a driver is measured by the

driver’s demonstrated ability (or inability) to properly drive a vehicle,”

Halford, 921 So. 2d at 413–14 (Ala. 2005), and this may be measured by

characteristics such as “general incompetence” or “habitual negligence.”

Edwards v. Valentine, 926 So. 2d 315, 322 (Ala. 2005). The law requires

that a driver have a “demonstrated ability [] to properly drive a vehicle,”

Halford, 921 So.2d at 413–14; it does not require that he have a record

completely free of mistake. See, e.g., Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674

So. 2d 45, 52 (Ala. 1995) (“[Defendant]’s prior driving record—two

speeding tickets and a suspended prosecution of a DUI charge over a 10-

year period—is not sufficient to support a claim of negligent

entrustment.”); Thompson v. Havard, 285 Ala. 718, 722 (1970) (“[P]roof of

two moving violations or accidents within a two year period prior to the

accident ... is probably insufficient [to present the question of

3 The Horizon Defendants also argue that Choi cannot establish the entrustment or

knowledge elements of his negligent entrustment claim. Because the court finds that

Choi cannot establish incompetence, it need not address those issues.

incompetency to a jury].” (internal citations and quotations omitted));

Askew v. R & L Transfer, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2009)

(finding that a driver’s record of two moving violations and four minor

accidents over an approximately nine-year period did not amount to

incompetence); Green v. Markovitch, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1198 (N.D. Ala.

2019) (finding that a driver’s record of two pre-employment traffic

citations, one speeding violation, a jack-knife incident, and three non-

moving violations did not amount to general incompetence); Taylor v.

Salem Carriers, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-0886-JHE, 2026 WL 852121, *5 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 27, 2026) (finding that evidence of one accident, with no

evidence in the record that the defendant was at fault, and one non-out-

of-service violation was insufficient to establish incompetence); Wallace v.

Ebaugh, No. 2:20-CV-02062-KOB, 2022 WL 17672619, *5 (N.D. Ala. 2022)

(finding that four speeding citations in six-year period was insufficient to

create an issue of fact regarding incompetence).

Here, Choi’s evidence of Dyches’ incompetence can be organized into

three buckets: (1) Dyches’ driving history; (2) Dyches’ criminal history;

and (3) Dyches’ inexperience driving tractor trailers. The court will

address each in turn.

1. Driving history: Choi asserts that the Horizon Defendants

performed motor vehicle record (MVR) searches on Dyches prior to his

employment. Those MVR searches showed Dyches had at least the

following: (1) conviction for “reckless driving” in September 2014; (2)

conviction for “driving too fast for conditions” in June 2014; (3) conviction

for “speeding 10-mph or less” in February 2015; and (4) “reportable”

accidents in July 2021, November 2017, and May 2016. (Doc. 86-15, pp.

360-365, 371-376; id., pp. 130-136).4 The most relevant of these incidents

is the July 2021 accident because it is only one that occurred within two

years of the accident at issue in this case. See Thompson, 285 Ala. at 722.

4 The July 2021 accident occurred after Dyches began working for Horizon, so that

accident would not have appeared on the pre-employment MVR searches.

This is also the incident that Choi places the greatest emphasis on because

it is factually the most similar to the accident with Choi.

The police report from the July 2021 accident shows that Dyches

was involved in a collision while driving for Horizon Mid Atlantic with

another tractor-trailer due to “an improper lane change” causing one

truck to “strike” the other. No citations were issued “[d]ue to conflicting

stories” of the two drivers “and no witnesses along with no physical

evidence.” (Docs. 86-7, pp. 58-59; 86-15, pp. 146 -147).

Favorable to Choi, the July 2021 accident took place only four

months before Dyches collided with Choi, and (like this case) the accident

stemmed from an improper lane change. But despite these similarities,

the July 2021 accident by itself does not establish that Dyches was

incompetent; particularly when Choi offers no evidence that Dyches

caused the July 2021 accident. See Thompson, 285 Ala. at 722 (“[P]roof of

only one previous traffic violation is grossly inadequate to establish

incompetency or recklessness, and proof of two moving violations or

accidents within a two year period prior to the accident made the basis of

the suit, is probably insufficient[.]” (internal citation and quotation

omitted)); see also Taylor, 2026 WL 852121, at *5 (finding that evidence

of one accident, with no evidence in the record that the defendant was at

fault, and one non-moving violation was insufficient to establish

incompetence).

As for the other traffic violations and minor accidents listed on

Dyches’ MVR, they are too remote in time, and too few in number, to prove

that Dyches was incompetent. Even competent drivers may sometimes be

negligent. See McGowin v. Howard, 251 Ala. 204, 209 (1948). But

competency, under Alabama law, does not require that Dyches have a

driving record completely free of mistake. See Pryor, 674 So. 2d at 52. So

this bucket of evidence isn’t enough.

2. Criminal history: Choi combines Dyches’ 2014 and 2015 speeding

violations with Dyches’ 2010 conviction for “Assault/Assault and Battery

of a High and Aggravated Nature” to argue that Dyches’ criminal history

made him an incompetent driver. (See doc. 91, pp. 15, 31; see also doc. 86-

15, pp. 367-370; id., 140-145). Again, Dyches’ traffic violations that

occurred six and seven years before this accident have, at best,

questionable value in the competency analysis. An 11-year-old assault

conviction has even less value because it provides no evidence of Dyches’

competency as a driver. An assault conviction certainly would seem to

have less relevance for a driver’s competency than prior DUI convictions.

And even then, other courts have found that prior DUI convictions are not

dispositive. See Jones v. Richardson, No. 2:22-CV-00875-RDP, 2023 WL

8284375, *6 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 30, 2023) (finding that commercial truck

driver was not incompetent despite two prior DUI charges and testing

positive for marijuana twice during his career as a commercial driver).

C.f., Valentine, 926 So. 2d at 323 (finding that three instances of driving

under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance—including the

underlying accident—was one factor, among others, bearing on driver’s

competency). So the evidence of Dyches’ criminal history is insufficient to

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his incompetency.

3. Inexperience: Choi’s final bucket of evidence doesn’t move the

needle either. Choi suggests that Dyches was incompetent because he only

had 18 months experience driving tractor trailers before Horizon hired

him, whereas Horizon’s internal policy requires two years of experience.

(See docs. 91, p. 28; 86-2, pp. 27-28; 86-15, p. 354; 86-6, p. 90). While that

may be true, the record demonstrates that Horizon complied with all

federal and state regulatory requirements in hiring and qualifying

Dyches. (See docs. 86-6, pp. 97-98, 140; 86-15, p. 149). That “Dyches held

a valid CDL, met all FMCSA qualification standards, and had no

disqualifying safety history” does not establish that Dyches was a

competent driver. (Doc. 87, p. 12). But the fact that Dyches didn’t have the

two years of experience mandated by Horizon’s internal policy does not

make him incompetent either.5

5 While Dyches may have only had 18 months experience driving tractor-trailers when

he was hired by Horizon, Dyches did have experience driving other large trucks and

equipment. Dyches began driving heaving equipment such as a “forty-foot goose neck

_____

To sum up, viewing all of the evidence together in the light most

favorable to Choi, the court finds that the evidence fails to support a

finding that Dyches was incompetent. Compared to other Alabama cases,

this case is more like the cases that found the evidence insufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact as to a driver’s competency than it

is to the cases that have sent the question to the jury. Compare Green, 385

F. Supp. at 1198; Taylor, 2026 WL 852121, at *5; Wallace, 2022 WL

17672619, at *5; Jones, 2023 WL 8284375, at *6; with, Vasser v. Tezi

Express, LLC, No. 4:19-cv-1823-CLM, 2022 WL 19625, at *7 (N.D. Ala.

Jan. 3, 2022) (finding a jury could infer incompetence from the driver

receiving “a lot” of tickets; receiving a speeding ticket, citation for

following too closely, and citation for a lane restriction violation within

two years of the accident; receiving 28 traffic tickets while in his personal

vehicle; having his driver's license suspended five times; and being

involved in two accidents in his personal vehicle); Hobbs v. U.S. Xpress,

Inc., No. 7:18-CV-02129-LSC, 2021 WL 913398, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 10,

2021) (finding a jury could infer incompetence from two DUI convictions,

four accidents in the two years preceding the accident in the case,

admitted “dependency” on Xanax and Tramadol, and health issues days

before the accident). So the court will GRANT Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on Choi’s negligent entrustment claim (Count III).

with equipment on it and a thousand-gallon chemical tank,” and a “hotshot, flatbed” as

early as 2010, and drove such vehicles until he was hired by Horizon in 2020. (See docs.

86-2, pp. 26-28; doc. 86-7, p. 62).

III. Wantonness and Punitive Damages

Finally, the court turns to Count II, in which Choi pleads a claim of

wantonness and recklessness that would result in compensatory and

punitive damages.

Under Alabama law, “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded in

any civil action … other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear

and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately

engaged in … wantonness… with regard to the plaintiff.” Ala. Code § 6-

11-20(a). “[W]hen the law imposes the higher burden of proof of clear and

convincing evidence as to a particular claim or factual issue, the

nonmovant must present evidence at the summary-judgment stage that

would qualify as clear and convincing evidence if accepted and believed by

the fact-finder.” Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 323 So.3d 1210, 1213 (Ala. 2020)

(quoting Phillips v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 34 So.3d 1260, 1266 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2007). “Substantial evidence in the context of a case in which

the ultimate standard for a decision is clear and convincing evidence is

evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and

convincingly establish [the existence of] the fact sought to be proved.

Thus, even if a trial judge reaches his or her own conclusion that the

evidence presented does not clearly and convincingly establish [the

subject fact], it is not for him or her to act upon that factual determination,

but to determine instead whether the actual fact-finder could reasonably

make a different finding based upon the same evidence.” Ex parte

McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 776 (Ala. 2008) (citation modified).

So before the court can decide whether Choi can maintain his claim

for punitive damages, the court must determine whether Choi has

presented substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably find

that Dyches’ conduct was wanton.

A. Wantonness and Recklessness

Under Alabama law, wantonness is “the conscious doing of some act

or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and

being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely

or probably result.” Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (citing

Bozeman v. Cent. Bank of the S., 646 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1994)) (emphasis in

original). Wantonness is not simply a more severe version of negligence,

but is an entirely different tort concept. See id. While negligence is

characterized as “the inadvertent omission of duty,” wanton misconduct

is characterized by the state of mind of consciously taking an action with

knowledge that “the doing or not doing of [the act] will likely result in

injury ....” Id. (quoting Tolbert v. Tolbert, 903 So. 2d 103, 114–15 (Ala.

2004)). “Wantonness is a question of fact for the jury, unless there is a

total lack of evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer

wantonness.” Cash v. Caldwell, 603 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Ala. 1992).

In Alabama, drivers are presumed to not engage in self-destructive

behavior. See Essary, 992 So. 2d at 12. Implicit in this presumption is the

requirement that the defendant’s behavior creates a “risk of injury to

[himself] ... as real as any risk of injury to the plaintiffs.” Id. Thus, other

courts have held that the Essary presumption against self-destructive

behavior did not apply when a truck driver’s actions caused smaller

passenger vehicles to collide into the trailer portion of commercial

vehicles. See McCutchen v. Valley Home, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1240

(N.D. Ala. 2015); Griffin v. Modular Transp. Co., No. 2:12–CV–2378–

WMA, 2014 WL 896627, at *4 (N.D. Ala. March 6, 2014). However, there

is no per se rule that the driver of a commercial vehicle can never enjoy

the Essary presumption. See Green, 385 F. Supp. at 1195; Craft v.

Triumph Logistics, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1222 (M.D. Ala. 2015).

Based on the facts of this case, the court finds that the Essary

presumption applies. This is not a case like McCutchen or Griffin where

the defendant drivers’ actions caused smaller passenger vehicles to collide

into the trailer portion of his vehicle, and therefore there was no real risk

of injury to those defendants. Dyches’ actions allegedly caused another

large tractor trailer to collide with his vehicle. The size of both Dyches and

Choi’s trucks meant that a collision could pose a substantial risk of harm

to both drivers, and in fact it did. So there is a rebuttable presumption

that Dyches did not consciously engage in self-destructive behavior.

But the presumption doesn’t end the inquiry. Choi can rebut the

presumption that Dyches would not intentionally engaged in behavior

that could injure himself by presenting evidence that Dyches’ driving is so

“inherently reckless” that it signals the kind of “depravity consistent with

disregard of instincts of safety and self-preservation.” See Essary, 992 So.

2d at 12. “That is, when a defendant’s allegedly wanton conduct toward

others would also endanger the defendant, the evidence must support

finding that the defendant’s wantonness extended to her own safety.”

Tutor v. Sines, 380 So. 3d 1035, 1039 (Ala. 2023). The Alabama Supreme

Court “has held that while speed alone does not amount to wantonness,

speed, coupled with other circumstances, may amount to wantonness.”

Hicks v. Dunn, 819 So. 2d 22, 24 (Ala. 2001). “Indeed, evidence of an

unsafe lane change in a speeding case is an additional circumstance that

can support a finding of wantonness.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Wood, 392 So. 3d 489, 498 (Ala. 2023) (citing Hornady Truck Line, Inc. v.

Meadows, 847 So. 2d 908, 916 (Ala. 2002)).

Viewed in the light most favorable to Choi, there is sufficient

evidence to overcome the Essary presumption and create a genuine

dispute of material fact as to Dyches’ wantonness. First, there is a genuine

issue as to whether Dyches was driving at an unsafe speed. Curry, an

eyewitness to the collision, testified that Dyches was speeding, driving as

much as 90 mph in a 70-mph zone. (See docs. 86-5, pp. 22, 32) Dyches,

however, claimed that he was only going 70 mph at the time of the

collision. (See doc. 86-2, p. 67). So there is a genuine fact dispute.

Second, there is a genuine dispute whether Dyches was conducting

an unsafe lane change. When Dyches activated his right turn signal,

Choi’s front bumper was in line with Dyches’ own rear tire or

“thereabouts.” (See doc. 86-2, pp. 82, 84-85). Choi had been right of Dyches

for two minutes before the collision. (See doc. 86-2, pp. 70-71). Dyches

admitted that when he activated his right turn signal, he knew “[i]t was

too close for [him] to get over.” (Doc. 86-2, p. 82). And despite seeing Choi

next to him, Dyches changed lanes into Choi within “seconds.” (Doc. 86-2,

p. 82). That’s another material dispute that, if resolved in Choi’s favor,

could establish that Dyches knew he was about to put himself and Choi in

danger. See Wood, 392 So. 3d at 498; Meadows, 847 So. 2d at 916 (Ala.

2002).

Third, there is a genuine dispute whether an “Unknown Vehicle”

contributed to Dyches’ conduct in changing lanes. Defendants try to spin

King and Curry’s testimony to suggest that Choi was fighting over a lane

with the unknown vehicle before the collision with Dyches. (See doc. 95,

p. 17). But read in a light favorable to Choi (if not plainly), the witnesses

testified that Choi and Dyches that were “tussling over a lane,” not Choi

and an unknown vehicle. (Doc. 86-4, p. 37). Curry testified that no vehicle

attempted to pass Dyches on the left. (Doc. 86-5, pp. 23, 28-29). Curry and

King both testified, respectively, that they never observed any non-party

vehicle contribute to this collision nor cause Dyches to swerve. (See docs.

86-5, pp. 20-21, 23; 86-4, p. 19). They also testified that Choi was always

operating his vehicle within his lane of travel and that they did not see

Choi do anything that caused or contributed to the collision. (See docs. 86-

4, pp. 27, 40-41; 86-5, pp. 20, 33).

Ultimately, the “pivotal question” is whether a factfinder could view

the evidence as proving that Dyches “consciously and intentionally

changed lanes in such a manner as to charge him with knowledge that his

action would probably result in injury to” others. Green v. Leatherwood,

727 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). Viewing all the evidence in the

light most favorable to Choi, the answer is yes. If a jury believed the

testimony from Choi, King, and Curry, the jury could reasonably conclude

that Dyches acted wantonly by (1) intentionally violating the speed limit

(2) while fighting over a lane with Choi, and (3) seeing that Choi’s vehicle

was too close to his own to get over, intentionally conducted an unsafe

lane change (4) with knowledge that his actions constituted a risk of

probable harm to himself and to Choi. Based on this evidence, the court

concludes that a reasonable jury could find that Dyches’ behavior was

“inherently reckless.” Hornady Truck Line, 847 So. 2d at 915-16. At

minimum, the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact. So the court will DENY Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on Choi’s wantonness claim.

B. Punitive Damages

Because the court finds that Choi might be able to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that Dyches’ conduct was wanton, the court also

finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Choi is entitled

to punitive damages. So the court will also DENY Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on Choi's claim for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained within, the court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc.

85). The court GRANTS Defendants’ motion on Choi’s claim for negligent

entrustment (Count III). And the court DENIES Defendants’ motion to

the extent that they seek summary judgment on Choi’s claim for

negligence against Horizon Freight (Count I), on Choi’s claim for

wantonness (Count II), and Choi’s claim for punitive damages.

The court will enter a separate order that RESETS the schedule for

trial on Choi’s remaining claims.

DONE and ORDERED on June 23, 2026.

COREY4L. MAZE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27