Frost

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN LEE FROST,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:26-cv-00709-MAL

RICHARD ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Frost’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. 3). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

I. Background

Many facts in this case are disputed. Parties seem to agree on the following.

John Frost is an inmate at the Missouri Department of Corrections in Bonne Terre,

Missouri. (Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 29–30). Frost was placed in administrative segregation in

December 2025 and February 2026 after he was accused of masturbating to a female

officer. Id. at ¶¶ 32–34; Doc. 4-1 at 2. Maintaining his innocence, and in frustration

with prison staff, Frost initiated a 32-day hunger strike after being placed in

administrative segregation. (Doc. 8 at ¶ 3).

After this, the facts become contested. Frost alleges that during his time on

his hunger strike, Defendants did not adequately monitor his condition or provide

appropriate medical care. (Doc. 8 at ¶ 44). Defendants report that Frost received

adequate medical care, was moved to the infirmary after declaring a hunger strike,

and while there he frequently refused medical care. (Doc. 12 at 4) (citing Doc. 12-1).

The medical records indicate that Frost was evaluated by a physician sixteen days

after he ended his strike, who noted no significant medical issues requiring

immediate attention. (Doc. 12-1 at 1; Doc. 12-2 at ¶ 11). At the time of that evaluation

(May 7, 2026), the medical records indicate that Frost’s only complaint was nausea.

(Doc. 12-1 at 22).

In addition to inadequate medical care, Frost also maintains that Defendants

retaliated against him for filing this suit, availing himself of the prison grievance

process, and retaining an attorney. (Doc. 8 at 31, 33). Frost alleges Defendants

interfered with his access to counsel by obstructing receipt and return of legal mail,

damaging or withholding correspondence, denying Frost materials necessary to

contact and write to counsel, and failing to provide reasonable means to confidential

attorney communication. Id. at ¶ 207.

Frost filed a Complaint (Doc. 8) and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3). Frost asked for a TRO and PI directing

the ERDCC Warden Richard Adams and Missouri DOC Director Trevor Foley to

(1) have Frost promptly evaluated by a physician within 48 hours for mental and

physical complications arising from his hunger strike; (2) ensure Frost is provided

appropriate follow up care for any complications/conditions; (3) prevent retaliation

against Frost for filing the present Action, contacting counsel, and initiating the IRR

(informal resolution request) and grievance procedure; and (4) provide confidential

attorney access through unmonitored legal calls, visits, and privileged

correspondence. (Doc. 4 at 3–4).

II. Legal Standard

Temporary restraining orders are permitted only in limited, somewhat dire

circumstances. District courts may issue temporary restraining orders to preserve

the status quo until there is an opportunity to adjudicate parties’ claims. Dataphase

Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The

standard for analyzing a motion for a temporary restraining order is the same as a

motion for a preliminary injunction. Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 665 (8th

Cir. 2022). The four factors a court must consider when deciding whether to grant a

temporary restraining order are (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likelihood

of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of

the equities, and (4) whether a restraining order is in the public interest. Winter v.

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Dataphase Sys., Inc., 640

F.2d at 114 (same factors). “While no single factor is determinative, the probability

of success factor is the most significant.” Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d

494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, a temporary restraining order

should show likelihood of irreparable harm. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s,

LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 318–19 (8th Cir. 2009); Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844

(8th Cir. 2003). “Failure to show irreparable harm is an independently sufficient

ground upon which to deny a preliminary injunction.” Id.

III. Analysis

A. Requests 1 and 2

Frost’s first and second requests are: (1) to have Frost promptly evaluated by

a physician within 48 hours for mental and physical complications arising from his

hunger strike and (2) to ensure Frost is provided appropriate follow up care for any

complications/conditions. (Doc. 4 at 14–15). The Court denies both these requests

because Frost fails to demonstrate that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm.

Irreparable harm is a very high bar. “To succeed in demonstrating a threat of

irreparable harm, ‘a party must show that the harm is certain and great and of such

imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.’” Roudachevski

v. All-Am. Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iowa Utils.

Bd. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir.1996)).

Here, there is no likely irreparable harm because great harm is not certain and

imminent. With respect to Frost’s request to be promptly evaluated by a physician

within 48 hours, he cannot show that great harm will occur if this does not occur. His

only complaint at his last medical appointment was nausea—a symptom his counsel

admits he experienced, and his medical records reflect, he experienced even before

the hunger strike (Doc. 12-1 at 170). And at Frost’s May 7 medical appointment, a

physician performed an exam and did not suggest additional care but noted that Frost

could request additional follow up care (Doc. 12-2 at ¶ 12). At the hearing, Frost’s

attorney admitted she was not aware that Frost had asked for follow-up care.

Further, the medical record suggests that Frost has regained a fair amount of the

weight he lost during the hunger strike. Frost reported that he weighed 170 pounds

before the strike, decreased to weighing 155.4 pounds during the strike, and has

rebounded to 163 pounds. (Doc. 12-1 at 9, 133). As Frost’s attorney said at the

hearing, the most we can say is “we don’t know what we don’t know.” But that’s not

enough to show a likelihood of irreparable harm.

With respect to Frost’s request that Defendants ERDCC Warden Richard

Adams and Missouri DOC Director Trevor Foley ensure that Frost is provided

appropriate follow up care for any complications/conditions, again, this fails for lack

of likely irreparable harm. As noted, Frost has not even demonstrated that he has

asked for follow-up care, he is gaining weight, and he was seen by a physician who

noted no abnormalities. There is no likelihood of irreparable harm for Requests 1

and 2, and Frost’s request for a TRO on these bases is denied.

B. Requests 3 and 4

Frost’s third and fourth requests are: (3) that the Court prevent retaliation

against Frost for filing the present Action, contacting counsel, and initiating the IRR

(informal resolution request) and grievance procedure; and (4) that the Court order

that Frost be provided confidential attorney access through unmonitored legal calls,

visits, and privileged correspondence. (Doc. 4 at 15). The Court denies these requests

for the same reason as the first and second—because Frost has not demonstrated a

likelihood of irreparable harm.

With respect to access to counsel, Frost’s counsel indicated at the hearing that

the irreparable harm Frost is alleging is that he will not be able to pursue his

underlying claims through to the merits because of lack of access to his attorney. At

this point, this is too speculative to constitute a likelihood of irreparable harm. One

alleged instance of damaged mail and one alleged instance of being denied a call with

his attorney is not enough to demonstrate that Frost will be denied access to the

courts or to his civil attorney—the constitutional claims underlying his § 1983 claim.

(Doc. 8 at ¶ 77, 83). There is no evidence that Frost currently is being denied a call

with his attorney or that he will continue to be denied calls or other correspondence

with his attorney. And there is evidence that Frost is keeping track of what his claims

are through correspondence with his mother. (Doc. 8-2). Though the Court’s

determination on this claim could change based on additional evidence, the Court

currently does not believe that there is a likelihood that Frost will not be able to

pursue his claims in Court or access his attorney.

With respect to Frost’s alleged thwarted access to the IRR procedure, this too

is not likely to cause irreparable harm. As Frost’s attorney admitted, a claimant need

not exhaust prison administrative remedies if he can show impossibility of doing so,

and lack of access to the IRR procedure is a type of impossibility. (Doc. 4 at 11–12);

Porter v. Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2015). With respect to the argument that

Frost will lose track of what has happened and what claims he would have brought,

the Court does not believe this is likely. Frost’s counsel admits that Frost is keeping

track of what is happening to him, and this Court has seen evidence that he is doing

this partially through text messages with his mother. (Doc. 8-2). Lack of access to

the IRR procedure is not likely to cause Frost irreparable harm.

With respect to Frost’s request that this Court order the Defendants not to

retaliate against Frost, at this point there is no likelihood of irreparable harm either.

There is no indication that Defendants intend to retaliate against Frost, meaning

that irreparable harm fails for lack of imminence.

CONCLUSION

Because Frost fails to demonstrate, at this point, a likelihood of irreparable

harm, the Court denies his request for a TRO. Frost’s Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED,

This 19th day of May, 2026. ,

MARIA A. LANAHAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE