Ballard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

WANDA BALLARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00857

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

PREMIER MEDICAL GROUP, P.C., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM

The defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, which brings discrimination and

retaliation claims under Title VII. For the reasons set forth herein, the defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. No. 18) will be granted and this case will be dismissed without prejudice. Leave is

granted to the plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint within 14 days, if discovery has

revealed additional facts that substantiate any of her claims.1

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Wanda Ballard has brought suit against her former employer, defendant Premier

Medical Group, P.C. (“PMG”), alleging race-based discrimination, including disparate treatment,

a hostile work environment, and constructive discharge (Count I) and retaliation (Count II) under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Am. Compl.

(“FAC”), Doc. No. 16 ¶¶ 31–40.) Ballard asks this court to enjoin the defendant from future

1 The court apologizes that the Motion to Dismiss was not ruled on more promptly and that

the parties have presumably engaged in substantial discovery. If the plaintiff does file a timely

Second Amended Complaint, the defendant is encouraged to hold its arguments for a properly

supported summary judgment motion instead of filing another motion to dismiss.

discrimination and retaliation, to reinstate the plaintiff to her job or award her front pay in the

alternative, and to award her compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and fees. (FAC at 8.)

Ballard filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC Charge”) and received her Notice of Right to Sue before filing this lawsuit.

(Id. ¶ 7.)2 The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 18) with an accompanying

Memorandum (Doc. No. 19), to which the plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 25), and in further

support of which the defendant filed a Reply (Doc. No. 26). The defendant moves for dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and asks the court to dismiss the FAC with

prejudice. (Doc. No. 18 at 1.)

II. FACTS3

The defendant is a medical practice for which the plaintiff handled insurance billing.

Ballard, who is African American, worked for PMG from 2007 until April 2024, first as a Certified

Medical Coder and eventually as a Coding Manager. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 29.) During her employment,

PMG employed “very few African American employees,” many of whom “were forced out or

terminated.” (Id. ¶ 11.) In 2012, Ballard “raised a verbal internal complaint of racial

discrimination,” which the FAC does not describe, by “her Caucasian supervisors,” whom the FAC

does not identify. (Id. ¶ 12.) After PMG’s Human Resources department failed to investigate her

2 The plaintiff did not file her EEOC Charge with this court, but the defendant attached a

copy of it to its Memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 19-1.) The court may

consider the EEOC Charge in ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion because it is “referred to in the

Complaint and . . . central to the claims contained therein.” Williams v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 498 F.

App’x 532, 534 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426,

430 (6th Cir. 2008)).

3 Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the complaint’s

well-pleaded facts as true and draws “all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Romero v.

City of Lansing, 159 F.4th 1002, 1006 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907,

916 (6th Cir. 2019)).

complaint, Ballard met with one of her supervisors, Chief Financial Administrator Missy Liverett,

who is Caucasian,4 and the Director of Human Resources at the time, who is also Caucasian, but

PMG “still took no action.” (Id.) “Soon after” her 2012 complaint, Ballard was demoted without

justification.5 (Id. ¶ 13.)

Roughly eight years later, in February 2020, Ballard raised another “discrimination

complaint[]” with Liverett, explaining “to Liverett that the harassment and discrimination,” which

the FAC does not describe, “was based on Ballard’s race.” (Id. ¶ 14) Liverett “instructed Ballard

to not mention race in her written complaint.” (Id.) Roughly two years later, in “early 2022,”

Ballard made a presentation to PMG’s four-person, all-Caucasian “Administration Team,” during

which she “outlined suggestions on how to build morale among the staff,” including instituting

“company-wide DEI initiatives and training.” (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.)6 Leadership thanked Ballard but did

not implement her suggestions. (Id. ¶ 16.) Instead, after the meeting, the “discrimination and

hostile work environment worsened,” including unspecified “negative treatment from physicians

and the administrative team,” and, when Ballard reported the worsening conditions to Liverett,

Liverett “continued to fail to act.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

4 Ballard does not clarify whether Liverett is one of the supervisors about whom she made

the 2012 complaint.

5 The FAC does not clarify the timeline of the plaintiff’s roles with PMG. The court infers

the following. Ballard was hired in 2007 as a Certified Medical Coder. She was promoted one or

more times to Billing Manager by 2012, when she was demoted to an unspecified position as a

result of her complaint. By the time Ballard separated from PMG, in 2024, she was a Coding

Manager. It is not clear whether Billing Manager or Coding Manager is the more senior position

or whether she had been promoted since her 2012 demotion.

6 Ballard also suggested that company leaders (1) have “conversations with minority staff

members in a group setting regarding office equality,” (2) increase workplace diversity, and (3)

“provid[e] staff “with a ‘safe place/person’ to discuss equality issues with.” (FAC ¶ 16.)

Approximately one year later, in February 2023, Ballard met with other company

administrators regarding her “concerns of a hostile work environment and discrimination,”

including “favoritism, unfair treatment, and conflicts of interest.” (Id. ¶ 18.) The FAC does not

specify what form the favoritism, unfair treatment, or conflicts of interest took, except to provide

one example: the HR Director, who was also a Nurse Supervisor, “improperly trained” nurses,

which caused billing errors that required the plaintiff to “consistently make the necessary

corrections, adding to her workload.” (Id.) The FAC does not state that the concerns Ballard

reported related to her race. The administrators did not address the problems Ballard outlined,

despite their promises. (Id.)

In addition, Ballard alleges that she was “ignored over simpler matters” during her time

working for the defendant, and she provides two examples. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) In 2019, Ballard

“submitted a work order” to have book cabinets installed her in office, but her request was ignored

for one year, so she installed the cabinets herself. (Id. ¶ 20.) The plaintiff does not allege that her

request was ignored because of her race, but she alleges that, thereafter, Ballard had her Caucasian

colleagues place unspecified work orders on her behalf, which were promptly addressed. (Id.) As

another example, in late 2022, Ballard asked the IT Director, who was Caucasian, for help with a

“phone extension issue,” but he did not help her until six months later, when Ballard included the

Human Resources Manager on her email. (Id. ¶ 19.) By contrast, the “average response time

turnaround” for IT requests was “no more than two days.” (Id.) Ballard does not allege whether

other IT requests she made were handled similarly or that the delay in this instance was due to her

race.

During an unspecified period, which the court infers to be early 2023, the “hostile work

environment worsened” because many departments had downsized, as a result of which Ballard

was given extra work, which “forced her into voluminous overtime hours,” for which she was not

additionally compensated because she was a salaried employee.7 (Id. ¶ 22.) For example, in

addition to her duties as Coding Manager, she also “became responsible for” the Billing,

Credentialing and Industry departments, which entailed managing “at least” six additional

employees. (Id.) She trained physicians and new staff and created training materials. (Id.) The FAC

does not allege that Ballard was given increased work or not given extra pay because of her race

or that any comparators were given less work or overtime pay. Rather, the FAC alleges race-neutral

reasons for the extra work (downsizing) and lack of overtime pay (she was a salaried employee).

(Id.)

During this time, Ballard worked from home on Tuesdays only. (Id. ¶ 23.) Because of her

increased responsibilities, Ballard asked someone, whom the FAC does not specify, to work from

home all the time, “like clinical supervisors and managers could,”8 but that request was denied

because, she was told, she was “needed on campus.” (Id.) The FAC does not allege that her request

was denied because of her race, that anyone else with her job duties was permitted to work

remotely, the race of clinical supervisors who were allowed to work remotely, or that the

7 The court construes the FAC as alleging that the downsizing caused the hostile work

environment to worsen. The FAC actually states: “The hostile work environment worsened, and

as many departments were already downsized, Ballard was given even more work that forced her

into voluminous overtime hours without extra pay due to being on salary.” (FAC ¶ 22.) Strictly

construed, the plaintiff could be alleging two discrete facts: first, that the hostile work environment

worsened, and, separately, that, because of downsizing, she was given increased responsibility

without compensation. If that is the case, the FAC does not state what made the hostile work

environment worse.

8 The court construes the FAC’s allegation that Ballard “requested to work remote” as a

request for permission to work exclusively from home. (FAC ¶ 23.) And the court construes the

FAC’s allegation that clinical supervisors and managers were permitted to work remotely to imply

that Ballard was not a clinical supervisor or manager, despite the plaintiff’s characterization of the

FAC as alleging the “denial of remote work flexibility available to similarly situated supervisors.”

(Doc. No. 25 at 3 (citing FAC ¶ 23).)

explanation she was provided was not genuine. Ballard also asked the defendant to hire more staff,

but that request was denied, she was told, because of cost. (Id. ¶ 25 (“[Ballard] was told ‘we can’t

afford more coders.’”).) During an unspecified period “[w]hen working from the office,” a

sergeant with the Clarksville Police Department would “often park next to her office door,” until

she “began recording him.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Ballard does not allege that the sergeant did so for reasons

having to do with her race, that the sergeant knew it was her office he was parking next to, that he

did so at the defendant’s request, or how this affected her.9

Ballard also alleges interpersonal issues. “Around August of 2023,” for example, the

plaintiff reported to Liverett, her supervisor, that a physician “condescendingly referred to Ballard

and her staff as ‘her and her minions.’” (Id. ¶ 26.) Ballard does not allege that the physician’s

comment was racially tinged or directed at her because of her race, or that she reported as much to

her supervisor. Liverett attributed the remark to the doctor’s personality but “escalated the

complaint to” the Chief Administrative Director. (Id.) Ballard does not allege what came of her

complaint. Further, the plaintiff alleges that, during multiple conference calls with four of her

colleagues, they “would not acknowledge [her] presence.” (Id. ¶ 27.) These colleagues also once

“discuss[ed] Ballard’s son and his recent arrest” when they thought she had hung up. (Id.) In

February 2024, the IT Director “tore Ballard’s papers apart in front of her face” and threw them

away because he was upset that Ballard had “completed a coding task without him.” (Id. ¶ 28.)

The FAC does not allege that the foregoing incidents occurred because of Ballard’s race.

Ballard alleges that, on March 6, 2024, because of the “increasingly intolerable conditions

and a hostile work environment that was severe and pervasive,” she was “constructively

discharged as she was ultimately left with no choice but to submit her resignation.” (Id. ¶ 29.)

9 The plaintiff does not refer to this allegation in her Response.

However, when Ballard’s supervisor asked her to stay on for six more months, she “agreed to stay

only through April 26, 2024,” just over seven weeks after she submitted her resignation. (Id.)

While the FAC alleges that Ballard submitted her resignation and then agreed to stay seven more

weeks, it does not actually state that she in fact left PMB. The court infers that Ballard eventually

resigned because she requests reinstatement (FAC at 8), her EEOC Charge refers to her

“constructive discharge on April 26, 2024”10 (EEOC Charge ¶ 1), and she alleges that she declined

an exit interview, which presumably would not have been offered to her unless she separated from

PMB. (FAC ¶ 30.)11

III. LEGAL STANDARDS – RULE 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the complaint’s legal sufficiency. RMI Titanium

Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Such a motion is properly

granted if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Marvaso v.

Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). A

complaint has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). But a complaint that “tenders

10 The plaintiff also states that her constructive discharge occurred on March 6, 2024

(EEOC Charge ¶ 9; FAC ¶ 29; Doc. No. 25 at 13 (citing FAC ¶ 29)), and that “her constructive

discharge beg[an] in February of 2024 and end[ed] on April 26, 2024.” (Doc. No. 25 at 4.)

11 The FAC contradicts the EEOC Charge regarding whether the plaintiff had an exit

interview. (Contrast EEOC Charge ¶ 9 (“At her exit interview, [Ballard] was required to meet with

one of [PMG]’s attorneys.”), with FAC ¶ 30 (“Ballard was offered an exit interview with one of

Defendant’s attorneys, but Ballard politely declined.”).)

‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness & Exhaustion

Before filing suit in federal court, a Title VII plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative

remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Alexander v. Univ. of Memphis, No. 20-5426, 2021 WL 2579973, at *3 (6th Cir. June 7, 2021)

(citing Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2018)). Two deficiencies with EEOC

charges can provide appropriate bases for dismissal. First, in Tennessee, a plaintiff must file an

EEOC charge within 300 days of discriminatory acts, or else Title VII bars claims related to those

actions. Jones v. City of Franklin, 309 F. App’x 938, 944 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The

plaintiff filed the EEOC Charge on September 12, 2024, so only discriminatory employment

actions alleged to have taken place on or after November 17, 2023 were timely raised. (Doc. No.

19-1 at 3.) Most of the allegations in the EEOC Charge and the FAC concern events before

November 2023. Second, “as a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit

that were not included in her . . . charge.” Davis v. Univ. of Toledo, No. 25-3296, 2026 WL 179990,

at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (alterations adopted) (quoting Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610

F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010) (omission in Davis)).

The defendant argues that the court should dismiss any claims arising out of the majority

of the FAC’s allegations that were either not included in the EEOC Charge or were untimely,

including any claims stemming from Ballard’s allegations regarding her 2012 complaint and

resulting demotion, her 2020 complaint regarding unspecified harassment and discrimination, her

2022 presentation to PMG’s Administration Team, and her February 2023 meeting with company

officials regarding hostile work environment and discrimination. (Doc. No. 19 at 4–6.)

The plaintiff appears to concede the defendant’s point regarding timeliness as to certain

allegations. Ballard acknowledges that 300 days before she filed the EEOC Charge was November

17, 2023 and states that the “Amended Complaint gives prior-dated acts to add context.” (Doc.

No. 25 at 5.) That is, “these additional facts are not new legal claims requiring separate exhaustion

but are only presented to show the broad pattern and growingly severe conditions of discriminatory

treatment that led to Ballard’s constructive discharge.” (Id.) In any case, the plaintiff argues, the

EEOC Charge timely raised, and the FAC alleges, “her constructive discharge beginning in

February of 2024 and ending on April 26, 2024.”12 (Id. at 4.) The court notes that it is not required

to “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(citation omitted). And alleging constructive discharge is a legal conclusion. Accord Ali v. City of

Cleveland, No. 1:23-cv-00157, 2025 WL 2653592, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2025) (“The

assertion that one has been constructively discharged, without more, is not a factual averment but

a legal conclusion not entitled to any weight when addressing a motion to dismiss.”).

Ballard also refers to an anticipatory argument the defendant made in its Memorandum

regarding the continuing violation doctrine. (Doc. No. 25 at 5–6; see Doc. No. 19 at 6.) The

continuing violation doctrine provides that, when “there is an ongoing, continuous series of

discriminatory acts, they may be challenged in their entirety as long as one of those discriminatory

acts falls within the limitations period.” Singh v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 23-3414, 2024 WL

2070683, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2024) (quoting Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806,

829 (6th Cir. 2000)). The “continuing-violation theory is only available for hostile-work-

12 The plaintiff does not clarify why her constructive discharge began in February 2024,

other than that is when the IT Director tore up her papers and threw them away. (FAC ¶ 28.)

Moreover, the plaintiff does not allege any events between March 6, 2024, when she submitted

her resignation, and April 26, 2024, when, the court infers, she actually separated from PMB.

environment claims.” Phillips v. Shelby Cnty., No. 23-5118, 2024 WL 3384190, at *3 (6th Cir.

July 9, 2024) (citing O’Donnell v. Univ. Hosps. Cleveland Med. Ctr., 833 F. App’x 605, 613 (6th

Cir. 2020)). The court will discuss the doctrine in greater detail when addressing the plaintiff’s

claim for hostile work environment.

B. Discrimination under Title VII

1. Allegations of Race-based discrimination

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1). The plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of her race under three theories: disparate

treatment, a hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. (FAC ¶ 33.) “Title VII

plaintiffs need not allege the elements of a prima facie case under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

framework to avoid dismissal.” Lee v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 22-5607, 2023 WL 4188341, at *3

(6th Cir. June 22, 2023). Nevertheless, “[i]t is axiomatic that, to state a claim of race discrimination

under Title VII, the plaintiff must plead facts which allow the court to infer that the employer’s

wrongful termination related to the plaintiff’s race.” Flynn v. Memphis Pathology Lab. (AEL), No.

2:19-2882-cv-SHL-TMP, 2020 WL 5801087, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2020) (dismissing the

Title VII termination claims “[b]ecause there are no factual allegations to support different

treatment based on race”). That is, the plaintiff must allege facts from which the court can

reasonably infer that the employer’s misconduct occurred because of the plaintiff’s race. See Doe

v. Blanche, No. 25-1442, 2026 WL 1211480, at *4 (6th Cir. May 4, 2026) (“‘Harassment is based

on’ a plaintiff’s protected category ‘when it would not have occurred but for the plaintiff’s’

membership in that category; in other words, the harassing conduct must have occurred because

of the plaintiff's protected trait.” (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th

Cir. 2011)).

2. The Continuing Violation Doctrine

The court earlier described the continuing violation doctrine, under which “a charge

alleging a hostile work environment claim . . . will not be time barred so long as all acts which

constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls

within the time period.” Hayes v. Clariant Plastics & Coatings USA, Inc., 144 F.4th 850, 866 (6th

Cir. 2025) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002) (omission in

Hayes)). A continuing violation occurs not on one day, but “over several incidents that are not

themselves actionable.” Robinson v. Genesee Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 18-2099, 2020 WL

1486792, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2020) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

114–15 (2002)). By contrast, “discrete events that are easily identifiable and separately actionable

do not constitute a continuing violation.” Norman v. Granson, No. 18-4232, 2020 WL 3240900,

at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2020) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–

15 (2002)). The Sixth Circuit has “recognized two categories of continuing violations: (1) ‘those

alleging serial violations’ and (2) ‘those identified with a longstanding and demonstrable policy of

discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 2003)).

The defendant argues that many of the FAC’s allegations are time-barred and that the

continuing violation doctrine does not apply because the plaintiff has not alleged ongoing

discriminatory actions or an established policy of racial discrimination. (Doc. No. 19 at 6 (citing

Nicholson v. City of Clarksville, No. 3:11-cv-0355, 2011 WL 4729759, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5,

2011)).) The plaintiff appears to argue that both categories of continuing violations apply. First,

she argues that she has alleged a long-standing pattern of discrimination. (Doc. No. 25 at 5–6

(citing FAC ¶¶ 11–12).) She points to Paragraph 11 of the FAC, which alleges that, throughout

Ballard’s employment with PMB, it “had very few African American employees and of those it

did employ, many were forced out or terminated.” (FAC ¶ 11.) In addition, Paragraph 12 alleges

that, in 2012, Ballard reported “racial discrimination from her Caucasian supervisors,” but

company leadership did not address her concerns. (Id. ¶ 12.) To invoke the second category of

continuing violations, however, a plaintiff “must demonstrate something more than the existence

of discriminatory treatment in his case.” Basista Holdings, LLC v. Ellsworth Twp., 710 F. App’x

688, 693 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 268). So Ballard’s allegation regarding the

defendant’s allegedly longstanding discriminatory behavior toward her does not advance her

argument that PMB had an established policy of discrimination. And the plaintiff’s allegation that

PMB had few African American employees, who were forced out or terminated, even if true, does

not suggest that PMB’s “‘standing operating procedure’ included intentional discrimination

against the class of which plaintiff was a member.” Austion v. City of Clarksville, 244 F. App’x

639, 647 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sharpe, 319 F.3d at 269).

Second, the plaintiff argues that she has alleged ongoing discrimination, starting with her

2012 complaint, continuing with her 2020 complaint, and, “[f]rom there, the Amended Complaint

gets detailed in dates, times, names and actions.” (Doc. No. 25 at 6 (citing FAC ¶¶ 12, 14).) The

court assumes without deciding that the continuing violation doctrine applies to the allegations

giving rise to the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, which are not actionable as discrete

events. Norman, 2020 WL 3240900, at *3. As previously mentioned, the “continuing-violation

theory is only available for hostile-work-environment claims.” Phillips, 2024 WL 3384190, at *3

(citing O’Donnell, 833 F. App’x at 613).

3. Hostile Work Environment

A plaintiff may prove a violation of Title VII by showing harassment that created a racially

hostile work environment. Smith v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 154 F.4th 375, 383 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing

Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 515 (6th Cir. 2009)). At the motion to dismiss stage,

Ballard only needs to allege sufficient facts from which the court, “informed by its judicial

experience and common sense, could draw the reasonable inference that [Ballard] was subjected

to a hostile work environment.” Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 168 F.4th 367, 377 (6th Cir. 2026)

(quoting Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

A “hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Id. (quoting Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). “The conduct must be so severe or pervasive as to

constitute a hostile or abusive working environment both to the reasonable person and the actual

victim.” Id. (quoting Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006)).

And while a plaintiff need not show “significant” harm, he must show “some harm respecting an

identifiable term or condition of employment.” McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887, 904

(6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024)). Thus, the court

must determine whether the FAC contains well-pleaded facts from which the court, using its

judicial experience and common sense, can draw the reasonable inference that Ballard’s workplace

was permeated with racially discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create an abusive working environment. The court finds that it does not.

a. Whether the Alleged Harassment was Based on Race

The court agrees with the defendant that the plaintiff’s few references to race-based

discrimination are vague and conclusory. The plaintiff alleges that, in 2012 and then again in 2020,

she made complaints regarding discrimination based on race, but she does not explain what the

discrimination consisted of. (See FAC ¶ 12 (describing only a “complaint of racial

discrimination”); id. ¶ 14 (describing her 2020 complaint to her supervisor that “the harassment

and discrimination was based on Ballard’s race”).) These allegations, insofar as they purport to

allege discrimination, are conclusory and not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

680–681. The remaining allegations of discrimination, the defendant argues, are not alleged to be

based on the plaintiff’s race, nor are they sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile

work environment. (Doc. No. 19 at 9–10.) Again, the court agrees.

As a preliminary matter, the FAC alleges that some of the discriminatory conduct came

from Caucasian colleagues or supervisors. (FAC ¶¶ 12, 15, 18, 19.) But the mere fact that her

supervisors were white and she is African American, does not, in and of itself, allow the court to

draw the inference that their alleged mistreatment of her was motivated by race. Accord Ramsey

v. Frisch’s, No. 1:16-cv-1129, 2016 WL 7637287, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2016) (“Plaintiff’s

assertion that the manager who terminated him is Caucasian is not sufficient to support the

inference that defendant terminated plaintiff on account of his race.”), R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL

25553 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2017).

While the plaintiff does not provide details regarding the alleged discrimination on the

basis of race, as the court has explained above, where the plaintiff does provide details regarding

the alleged discrimination, she either does not allege the motivation for the alleged mistreatment

or provides race-neutral explanations. For example, in a February 2023 meeting with company

leaders, Ballard raised “concerns of a hostile work environment and discrimination.” (FAC ¶ 18.)

Specifically, her concerns related to “favoritism, unfair treatment, and conflicts of interest” (id.

¶ 18), which are not, without explanation, race-based concerns. The plaintiff’s further description

of unfair treatment does not implicate race. (See id. (giving, as an example of her concerns that an

“ongoing reimbursement issue[]” required her to “consistently make the necessary corrections,

adding to her workload”).) The plaintiff refers to her allegation that company leaders did not accept

“DEI recommendations” she made during a presentation. (Doc. No. 25 at 8; see FAC ¶¶ 15–16.)

The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant declined to implement her suggestions regarding

workplace morale because of her race. (Id. ¶ 16.) After making those suggestions, the plaintiff

alleges that the “discrimination and hostile work environment worsened,” but she does not explain

what the underlying discrimination and hostility consisted of or how it worsened. (Id. ¶ 17.)

The plaintiff refers to “incidents of differential treatment, exclusion, and disrespect from

Caucasian colleagues.” (Doc. No. 25 at 8–9 (citing FAC ¶¶ 15, 17–18, 26–27).) But the

interpersonal issues the plaintiff alleges do not concern race, even construing the FAC in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. A physician “condescendingly” referred to her and her staff as “her

and her minions.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Even if the comment was condescending, the FAC does not allege

how that comment is or could be construed as racially insensitive; nor does the FAC allege that

the physician targeted her with disrespect because of her race. The FAC alleges that her colleagues

“would not acknowledge [her] presence” on phone calls and once discussed her son’s arrest when

they thought she was no longer on the call. (Id. ¶ 27.) In her Response, the plaintiff characterizes

the conversation about her son as “showing racial stereotyping and humiliation” (Doc. No. 25 at

9), but the pleading does not support that characterization—it alleges only that certain colleagues,

after a conference call, “started discussing Ballard’s son and his recent arrest.” (FAC ¶ 27.) The

court cannot infer racial stereotyping on the facts in the pleading. In a similar vein, the plaintiff

alleges that her colleague tore her “papers apart in front of her face.” (Id. ¶ 28.) In her Response,

the plaintiff characterizes that episode as “symbolic of the contempt and hostility she faced after

years of raising race-related concerns.” (Doc. No. 25 at 9.) But the plaintiff does not allege that

her colleague tore her papers because of her race, and in fact she explains that he was “upset and

agitated that Ballard completed a coding task without him.” (FAC ¶ 28.)

Ballard alleges that, in 2023 (as the court construes the allegations), the “hostile work

environment worsened, and as many departments were already downsized, Ballard was given even

more work that forced her into voluminous overtime hours without extra pay due to being on

salary.” (Id. ¶ 22.) The court construes the FAC to allege that PMG’s downsizing and the resulting

extra work Ballard was made to do caused the hostile work environment. If there is a separate

explanation for the worsening environment, the FAC does not allege it. The plaintiff alleges that

she was not compensated for this extra work but explains that this is because she was “on salary.”

(Id.) That is, salaried employees like her were ineligible for overtime pay. The plaintiff alleges that

her request for more staff was denied because PMG “can’t afford more coders.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Her

request to work remotely was denied because she was “needed on campus.” (Id. ¶ 23.) The FAC

simply does not allege that Ballard was overworked and underpaid because of her race, or that any

employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably with respect to work hours,

support staff, or remote work arrangements.

While the court construes the FAC to allege that her superiors and colleagues were unkind

to her, the court cannot infer, without any allegations to support such an inference, that the

unkindness was due to the plaintiff’s race. The court cannot construe the FAC to allege a “pattern

of race-based marginalization and intimidation,” as the plaintiff argues. (Doc No. 25 at 9.) The one

exception to this conclusion is the plaintiff’s allegation that, after the Maintenance department

ignored her work order requesting the installation of book cabinets in her office, she had “her

Caucasian peers place work orders for her,” which were swiftly addressed. (FAC ¶ 20.)13

13 The plaintiff also argues that her 2012 demotion constitutes “race-linked harassment.”

(Doc. No. 25 at 8.) The plaintiff did not mention her demotion in the EEOC Charge, so it was not

administratively exhausted, nor, had she mentioned it, would it have been timely raised unless the

continuing violation doctrine applies to it. And even though the court has assumed that the

continuing violation doctrine applies to some of the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory conduct,

b. Whether the Alleged Harassment Created a Hostile Work Environment

To constitute a hostile work environment, the discrimination must have been “sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.” Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances,” which “may

include ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee’s work performance.” Schlosser v. VRHabilis, LLC, 113 F.4th 674, 687 (6th Cir.

2024) (first quoting Randolph, 453 F.3d at 733; and then quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). This

“standard filters out complaints merely attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such

as the sporadic use of abusive language, discriminatory jokes, and occasional teasing.’” Amini v.

Rite Aid Corp., 819 F. App’x 344, 348 (6th Cir. 2020) (alteration adopted) (quoting Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). The parties disagree about whether the alleged

conduct suffices under the “severe or pervasive test.” (Contrast Doc. No. 19 at 9–10, and Doc.

No. 26 at 4, with Doc. No. 25 at 9–10.)

Title VII is not a “general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). Put another way, the “conduct of jerks, bullies, and

persecutors is simply not actionable under Title VII unless they are acting because of the victim’s

protected status.” Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469, 484 (6th Cir. 2020) (alteration adopted)

(quoting Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467 (6th Cir. 2012)).

it does not apply to discrete events, like demotions. See Blanche, 2026 WL 1211480, at *5 (noting

that the doctrine “applies when employees ‘allege not that they suffered a tangible employment

injury (such as a firing or demotion), but that their workplace was so riddled with racial or sexual

abuse that it affected the “terms” or “conditions” of their employment.’” (quoting Bannister v.

Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1015 (6th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added))).

The plaintiff has alleged that her office was populated by what some would call “jerks.”

But she has not alleged conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working

environment. Accord Parker v. Hankook Tire Mfg. Tennessee, LP, No. 23-5208, 2023 WL

10404971, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2023) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s Title VII hostile-

work-environment claim where the plaintiff alleged that “certain coworkers and superiors

slandered, mocked, disrespected, threatened, or ignored him”). Indeed, “[m]ere disrespect or

antipathy will not be actionable under the statute unless a plaintiff can prove that such was

motivated by discriminatory animus.” Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469, 484 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). And in this case, the plaintiff has alleged no “facts showing that

[her] coworkers’ and superiors’ alleged conduct was motivated by discriminatory animus,” with

the possible exception of one unanswered maintenance request. Parker, 2023 WL 10404971, at *4

(citing Khalaf, 973 F.3d at 484).

4. Constructive Discharge

The plaintiff rests her constructive discharge claim on the existence of a hostile work

environment, which is what the Supreme Court has referred to as a “hostile-environment

constructive discharge claim.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). (See Doc. No.

25 at 11 (“Defendant deliberately permitted an environment so hostile that a reasonable person

would feel compelled to resign. Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for

constructive discharge.”).) The “[c]reation of a hostile work environment is a necessary predicate

to a hostile-environment constructive discharge case.” Brown v. Metro. Gov’t, 722 F. App’x 520,

526 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Suders, 542 U.S. at 149). See also Burns v. Berry Glob., Inc., No. CV

5:20-044-DCR, 2021 WL 895642, at *15 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2021) (“A constructive discharge claim

presupposes that a plaintiff has properly alleged racial discrimination.”), aff’d, No. 21-5359, 2022

WL 351769 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2022). The court has found that the plaintiff has not stated a claim

for a hostile work environment, so her hostile work environment constructive discharge claim also

fails.14

5. Disparate Treatment

To succeed on a Title VII claim for disparate treatment based on race, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “adverse employment decisions would not have been made ‘but for’ her race.”

King v. Gould, 124 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325

(6th Cir. 1988)). That is, “to prevail on a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, a plaintiff must prove

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him because of a protected trait.” Hittle v.

City of Stockton 145 S. Ct. 759, 759 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). As the court noted, and as the plaintiff emphasizes, she need not make

out a prima facie case at the motion to dismiss stage; she need only state a plausible claim for

relief. (Doc. No. 25 at 6–8.) Even on the liberal pleading standard, though, a Title VII plaintiff

must “allege facts to support a ‘plausible explanation for how he was discriminated against based

on his race.’” Donaldson v. DeJoy, No. 22-1651, 2024 WL 3493870, at *3 (6th Cir. May 1, 2024)

(quoting White v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., 680 F. App’x 410, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2017)

(alteration adopted)). At a minimum, therefore, Ballard must allege an adverse employment

decision and its race-based motivation.

14 Ballard’s allegation that the “Defendant through Liverett,” her supervisor, asked her to

stay on for six months after she submitted her resignation undermines the plausibility that the

Defendant intended her to quit, which plaintiffs must show to succeed on a constructive discharge

claim. Lee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 676 F. App’x 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that a

plaintiff must show that the employer created intolerable working conditions “with the intention

of forcing the employee to quit” (quoting Hurtt v. Int’l Servs., Inc., 627 F. App’x. 414, 420 (6th

Cir. 2015))). And Ballard’s decision to stay seven weeks after submitting her resignation on March

6, 2024 (FAC ¶ 29)—without any explanation—undermines the plausibility that the working

conditions were, as the plaintiff puts it, “so intolerable that Plaintiff ‘was left with no choice but

to submit her resignation.’” (Doc. No. 25 at 11 (quoting FAC ¶ 29).)

The defendant argues that the FAC does not meet the low threshold to survive a motion to

dismiss. First, the defendant argues, the FAC’s allegations concerning race-based discrimination

are vague. (Doc. No. 19 at 7–8.) Second, the defendant argues, the FAC’s remaining allegations

do not concern race at all. Rather, as the defendant puts it, the FAC alleges a “series of ordinary

workplace grievances unrelated to race.” (Id. at 8 (citing FAC ¶¶ 19–28).) In her Response, the

plaintiff argues that the FAC adequately alleges that PMB “intentionally treated her less favorably

because of her race.” (Doc. No. 25 at 8.) In support, she refers to the FAC’s allegations of “(1)

repeated racial complaints ignored by white supervisors, (2) an all-white administrative team

dismissing her DEI initiatives, (3) materially worse treatment compared to white colleagues, and

(4) constructive discharge following protected activity.” (Doc. No. 25 at 7–8 (citing FAC ¶¶ 12–

20, 25, 29)

As the court has discussed, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged discriminatory conduct

that she timely raised with the EEOC. The only non-conclusory allegation of her white colleagues

receiving better treatment relates to one unanswered work request. Moreover, to state a Title VII

employment a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must plead an adverse employment action.

Brownlee v. 41B Dist. Ct., No. 24-CV-12745, 2025 WL 2712826, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 23,

2025) (citing Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 516 F. Supp. 3d 711, 723 (E.D. Mich. 2021)). An

adverse employment action is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,

failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing

a significant change in benefits.” Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC, 154 F.4th 396, 403 (6th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). The only allegation in the

FAC that could be considered an adverse employment action is the plaintiff’s alleged constructive

discharge. See Funk v. City of Lansing, 821 F. App’x 574, 580 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that

constructive discharge is “an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII”) (citing Laster

v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 727 (6th Cir. 2014)). But the court has found that Ballard has

not adequately pled constructive discharge. Thus, the plaintiff has not stated a claim for

discrimination under a disparate treatment theory, or any other. Accordingly, Ballard’s

discrimination claim (Count I) will be dismissed.

C. Retaliation

Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for opposing a

discriminatory practice. Kirkland v. City of Maryville, 54 F.4th 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff

must show that “(1) he . . . engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of

the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against the

employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action.” Lee v. Dana, Inc., No. 24-1964, 2025 WL 1684347, at *3 (6th Cir. June 16,

2025) (quoting Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008) (omission in Lee)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, however, the plaintiff must only “plead sufficient facts from which

we can plausibly conclude that the [defendant] retaliated against him because he engaged in a

protected activity.” Donaldson, 2024 WL 3493870, at *4 (citing Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of

Cincinnati, 35 F.4th 1053, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 2022)).

PMB moves to dismiss the retaliation claim on the basis that the plaintiff has not pled an

adverse action and describes the plaintiff’s only protected activities as occurring in 2020 and 2023.

(Doc. No. 19 at 12–13.) Ballard responds that she engaged in protected activity when she

“repeatedly complained about racial discrimination,” including in 2012, 2020, 2022, and 2023.

(Doc. No. 25 at 12 (citing FAC ¶¶ 12, 14–16, 18).) Furthermore, Ballard argues that many of the

allegations in the FAC were adverse actions made by the defendant in response to her protected

activity. (Id. at 12–13 (citing FAC ¶¶ 17–20, 22–23, 25–29).) The plaintiff states that, “[a]fter her

2012, 2020, and 2022 race-related complaints, the discrimination and hostile work environment

worsened.” (Id. at 12.) Ballard notes that she was assigned extra responsibility without pay, was

not permitted to work remotely, that a physician referred to “her and her minions,” she was

“discussed disparagingly by colleagues,” and a coworker tore her papers up and threw them away.

(Id. at 12–13.) The plaintiff points “especially” to her demotion in 2012, her “increased workload

without [extra] pay,” and her constructive discharge as materially adverse events. (Doc. No. 25 at

13.) None are persuasive on this point. The plaintiff did not mention her 2012 demotion in the

EEOC Charge. The plaintiff explains both her increased workload and why she did not receive

overtime pay: “many departments were . . . downsized” and she did not receive extra pay “due to

being on salary.” (FAC ¶ 22.) And the court has found that Ballard was not constructively

discharged.

Nevertheless, Title VII sets a lower bar for what constitutes an adverse employment action

for retaliation claims than discrimination claims. See Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921

F.3d 599, 614 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have

found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” (quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). But the court need not decide

whether the plaintiff has alleged any adverse employment actions for purposes of her retaliation

claim because the plaintiff does not tie any possible materially adverse action to her protected

activity. For example, Ballard’s claim that she was “denied support, staffing, and IT assistance” is

not alleged to be related to her complaints regarding discrimination. (Doc. No. 25 at 12 (citing

FAC ¶¶ 19–20, 25).) That is, her unanswered 2019 maintenance request and the delay in resolving

her 2023 “IT phone extension issue” are not alleged to have been in response to any protected

activity. (FAC 9§ 19-20.) And Ballard herself pleads the reasons for the denial of her request for

additional staff (cost), the denial of her remote work accommodation (she was “needed on

campus”), and the reason her colleague tore up her papers (Ballard “completed a coding task

without him”). Ud. §§ 23, 25, 28.) Nor does Ballard explain her description of a physician’s

allegedly disrespectful comment as one of many “retaliatory conditions.” (Doc. No. 25 at 12-13.)

The plaintiff has not stated a claim for retaliation. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim of retaliation

(Count IT) will be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted and the FAC will be

dismissed without prejudice.

An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

Meith hag—_

United States District Judge

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