Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-128

Judge James L. Graham

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

FRANKLIN COUNTY CHILDREN

SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Richard Jones, sues Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”), and two

FCCS employees, James Edwards, and DeJournay Ray, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation

of parental rights in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due

process rights. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s request to file a civil action in forma

pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis.

All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been

prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 11)1 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to

1 Plaintiff’s original Complaint was filed on February 4, 2026. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff filed a

motion for leave to supplement the Complaint on February 13, 2026 (ECF No. 8), and a motion

for leave to file supplemental pleading on February 20, 2026 (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff then filed

the Amended Complaint on February 25, 2026. (ECF No. 11.) Because Plaintiff is permitted to

amend his Complaint once as a matter of course without leave of Court or consent of the

opposing parties at this early stage of the case (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)), Plaintiff’s Amended

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the

initial screen, for the reasons below, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his individual-capacity

claims for damages and declaratory relief against Defendants Edwards and Ray, but it is

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Finally, for the reasons below, Plaintiff’s Motion to require Defendants to Preserve

Evidence (ECF No. 9), Motion for Expedited Discovery (ECF No. 6), and Motion to Compel

(ECF No. 12) are DENIED.

I. SCREEN OF PLAINTIFF’ AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. Standard of Review

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

Complaint became operative upon filing and supersedes his original Complaint. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s motions to supplement the complaint (ECF Nos. 8, 10) are GRANTED.

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic

federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Edwards and Ray removed Plaintiff’s children from his

custody without a warrant or a pre-removal hearing. Defendants subsequently entered an

administrative neglect determination against Plaintiff, again without notice or an opportunity to

be heard prior to the determination. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.) The neglect determination has

since been used by Defendants as a justification for ongoing restrictions on Plaintiff’s visitation

with his children. (See Mot. to Supplement Complaint, ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that these

actions violated his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. His Amended Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as

declaratory relief. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.)

Plaintiff may proceed on his individual-capacity claims for damages and declaratory

relief against Defendants Edwards and Ray. His remaining claims, however, must be dismissed.

First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Franklin County Children Services or Franklin

County. “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . .

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Nichols v. Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App’x 445, 448

(6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the

deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) that was

directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.”) (citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d

238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” by

demonstrating “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an

official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy

of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or

acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)

(citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish an unconstitutional policy or custom on the part of

Franklin County. As to his due process claims, he generally alleges that “the constitutional

violations described herein were carried out pursuant to official policies, customs, practices, or

deliberate failures to train and supervise attributable to FCCS” and that the actions of Edwards

and Ray “were taken in conformity with the above-described policies or customs.” (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 28, 30.) But Plaintiff alleges no facts to support his allegations that any violations of his rights

were caused by a County custom or policy (as opposed to the misconduct of an individual). That

is, “[h]e offers only . . . bare legal conclusions which the Court properly disregards.” Freeman v.

Spoljaric, 667 F. Supp. 3d 636, 651 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (dismissing a claim for Monell liability

due to conclusory allegations); see also Assi v. Hanshaw, 625 F. Supp. 3d 722, 750 (S.D. Ohio

2022) (dismissing a claim for Monell liability because it was “simply too conclusory to

survive”). Plaintiff’s claims against Franklin County Children Services, therefore, must be

dismissed.

Next, to the extent that Plaintiff advances any official-capacity claims against Edwards or

Ray, those claims fail. A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is “not a

suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

But, as just discussed, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Franklin County, the relevant

entity. Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Edwards and Ray must therefore be dismissed.

II. PLAINTIFF’S MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS

Plaintiff's motion to require Defendants to preserve evidence (ECF No. 9) is DENIED.

Defendants already have an obligation to preserve relevant evidence, and Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts suggesting evidence is at any special risk of loss absent a court order. See John

B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[B]ecause all litigants are obligated to preserve

relevant information in their possession, preservation orders generally must be premised on a

demonstration that a real danger of evidence destruction exists, a lack of any other available

remedy, and a showing that the preservation order is an appropriate exercise of the court's

discretion.”) (quoting The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for

Addressing Electronic Document Production, Second Edition 33).

Similarly, Plaintiff’s motions for expedited discovery (ECF No. 6) and to compel

production of safety assessment and removal authorization records (ECF No. 12) are DENIED

as premature. Once Defendants have been served with the summons and Complaint, and the

parties have conferred about a discovery plan under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f),

Plaintiff may serve discovery requests on Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 5) and

Plaintiff’s motions to supplement the Complaint (ECF Nos. 8, 10) are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

Motion to require Defendants to Preserve Evidence (ECF No. 9), Motion for Expedited

Discovery (ECF No. 6), and Motion to Compel (ECF No. 12) are DENIED.

Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his individual-capacity claims for damages and

declaratory relief against Defendants Edwards and Ray, but it is RECOMMENDED that

Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted.

If Plaintiff wishes to have the United States Marshal effect service of the summons and

Complaint on Defendants Edwards and Ray, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a completed

summons form (Form AO-440) and a service of process by U.S. Marshal form (Form USM-285)

for each Defendant, and to submit two service copies of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11)

to the Clerk of Court.2 If Plaintiff does so, the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summonses and

the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to serve by certified mail upon Defendants Edwards

and Ray the issued summons, a copy of the Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order and

Report and Recommendation.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

2 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff previously submitted summons and U.S. Marshal forms

along with his original Complaint (ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4); however, those forms are deficient

because Plaintiff did not fill in his name and address in all the necessary locations.

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE