The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MILLS SIDING AND ROOFING, LLC, PUBLISHED
June 22, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:20 AM
v No. 372914
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
MARGIE ROSARIO and ANGEL ROSARIO, LC No. 2024-000192-AV
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and KOROBKIN and BAZZI, JJ.
CAMERON, P.J.
This case requires us to interpret and apply the Home Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA),
MCL 445.111 et seq. Plaintiff, Mills Siding and Roofing, LLC, sued defendants, Margie Rosario
and Angel Rosario, after they refused to pay for a new roof that plaintiff installed on their home.
During the trial in district court, defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the HSSA
precluded plaintiff from filing suit. The district court denied the motion, and defendants appealed
the decision to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed, concluding the HSSA applied. Plaintiff
now appeals the circuit court’s decision by leave granted.1 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the
circuit court erroneously held that the HSSA governed the parties’ transaction. We agree.
Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order and reinstate the district court’s orders.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2021, a “door knocker” employed by plaintiff went to defendants’ home to offer
a free roof inspection after a hailstorm. Defendant Margie Rosario (Margie) expressed interest in
a roof inspection, prompting one of plaintiff’s sales associates to contact her to schedule an
inspection. The sales associate inspected defendants’ roof and showed Margie pictures he took of
hail damage. Margie then filed a claim with defendants’ insurance provider, which sent an adjuster
to evaluate the damage. Margie informed plaintiffs’ sales associate of when the insurance adjuster
1
Mills Siding and Roofing LLC v Rosario, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
April 28, 2025 (Docket No. 372914).
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would be there, and the sales associate was present at the home for the insurance inspection. After
the insurance adjuster verified the damage and the insurance claim was approved, Margie
contacted plaintiff’s sales associate to come back to her home. The sales associate returned on a
different day to defendants’ home with a written agreement to replace the roof, which Margie
signed at defendants’ home. Plaintiff then replaced defendants’ roof.
The parties later discovered that the shingles plaintiff used had a manufacturing defect,
which plaintiff reported to the manufacturer. The manufacturer approved a warranty claim, but
defendants refused to make any additional payments to plaintiff for the roof replacement because
they were dissatisfied with plaintiff’s workmanship. As a result, plaintiff filed suit in district court.
During trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the written agreement
Margie signed failed to comply with a mandatory disclosure requirement in the HSSA, thereby
making the agreement unenforceable, and entitling defendants to dismissal of the lawsuit.
Specifically, defendants argued that plaintiff was precluded from seeking payment under the
contract because the parties’ written agreement did not notify defendants of their right to cancel
the contract within three business days of signing the agreement as required by the HSSA. The
district court denied the motion, reasoning that the mere fact that the agreement was signed at
defendants’ home did not automatically implicate the HSSA. Rather, it found that the parties’
conduct after plaintiff’s initial door-knocker solicitation took the agreement outside the scope of
the HSSA. The district court ultimately found in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, the circuit court
reversed the district court’s ruling, concluding that the HSSA did apply, and remanded the case
for entry of an order granting defendants’ directed-verdict motion and dismissing the case.
Plaintiff now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a circuit court’s review of a district court’s decision de novo. Noll v Ritzer, 317
Mich App 506, 510; 895 NW2d 192 (2016). Although defendants framed their motion as one for
a directed verdict, because this was a bench trial, the “appropriate label is one for involuntary
dismissal because it is a case without a jury.” Adair v Michigan, 497 Mich 89, 99 n 18; 860 NW2d
93 (2014). “The involuntary dismissal of an action is appropriate where the trial court, sitting as
the finder of fact, is satisfied at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence that on the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. MCR 2.504(B)(2).” Samuel D Begola Servs, Inc v Wild
Bros, 210 Mich App 636, 639; 534 NW2d 217 (1995) (quotation marks omitted). We review the
trial court’s decision on the motion for involuntary dismissal de novo but review its factual findings
for clear error. Id. “A trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous only where we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Because this appeal concerns the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion, we only
consider the facts as they were known at the time of the district court’s ruling. That is, our review
is limited to whether the evidence submitted at the time the motion was made supported the district
court’s ruling.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by reversing the district court’s order denying
defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. We agree.
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The HSSA defines a “home solicitation sale” as:
[A] sale of goods or services of more than $25.00 in which the seller or a
person acting for the seller engages in a personal, telephonic, or written solicitation
of the sale, the solicitation is received by the buyer at a residence of the buyer, and
the buyer’s agreement or offer to purchase is there given to the seller or a person
acting for the seller. [MCL 445.111(a).]2
Thus, a sale must have four specific elements to qualify as a home solicitation sale under the
HSSA: (1) it must be for goods or services for more than $25; (2) the seller or seller’s
representative solicits the sale personally, over the telephone, or in writing; (3) the solicitation is
made at the buyer’s residence; and (4) the buyer’s agreement to the sale is “there given” to the
seller or seller’s representative.
Relevant here, the HSSA mandates that, if a sale qualifies as a home solicitation sale, the
resulting sales contract must include a notice of cancellation that informs the buyer of their right
to cancel the agreement within three business days of signing. MCL 445.113(1). Failure to comply
with this requirement renders the contract unenforceable. MCL 445.117 (“No person may bring
any action in any court of this state for the collection of any home solicitation sale contract without
proving that such person was at all times in compliance with this act.”). Here, the written
agreement did not include a cancellation notice of any kind. Thus, the question is whether this
transaction qualifies as a home solicitation sale such that the three-day cancellation notice was
required under the HSSA.
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.” Gleason v Kincaid, 323 Mich App 308, 317-318; 917 NW2d 685 (2018). “When
determining the intent of the Legislature, a court must first look to the specific language of the
statute.” Patrick v US Tangible Investment Corp, 234 Mich App 541, 545-546; 595 NW2d 162
(1999). “The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the
law, should govern.” Id. at 546. “If the language is clear, then the Legislature must have intended
the meaning it plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written.” Id.
It is undisputed that the sale at issue was for more than $25 and that the parties’ relevant
interactions occurred at defendants’ home. We must therefore decide whether Margie’s agreement
to the sale was “there given.”
The term “there given” is not defined in the statute. Thus, we turn to the dictionary to
discern its plain and ordinary meaning. San Marino Iron, Inc v Haji, 341 Mich App 634, 639; 991
NW2d 828 (2022). Merriam-Webster defines the word “there” as “in or at that place” or “at that
point or stage.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th ed). These distinct definitions
demonstrate that the word “there” can refer to a specific location, time, or both, depending on the
context in which the word is used. Fortunately, binding precedent resolves this definitional issue:
2
This definition has various exceptions that do not apply to this case. MCL 445.111(a)(i)-(vii).
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the term “there given” means that the seller’s solicitation and the buyer’s agreement must occur at
the same time and at the same place (at the buyer’s residence). Because that did not occur here,
defendants’ HSSA argument fails.
The first published case that examined the HSSA was Brown v Jacob, 183 Mich App 387;
454 NW2d 226 (1990), rev’d 439 Mich 865 (1991) (Brown I). In Brown I, the buyer hired a home
repair contractor and signed a service agreement while the contractor was still at the buyer’s home
providing an estimate. In a divided opinion, this Court held that the transaction qualified as a home
solicitation sale under the HSSA. Id. at 391-392. But in Brown v Jacob, 439 Mich 865 (1991)
(Brown II), our Supreme Court reversed “for the reasons stated” in Brown I’s dissenting opinion.
That dissenting opinion argued that the transaction at issue was not a home solicitation sale because
the buyer contacted the seller first. Brown I, 183 Mich App at 392-395. Relevant to the
development of our caselaw, the dissent explained the purpose and scope of the HSSA:
The instant situation is not the type of transaction that the Michigan HSSA
was designed to regulate. The legislative histories of these statutes indicate that
their purpose was to protect consumers from intrusions into their homes by door-
to-door and telephone solicitors. In those circumstances, the consumer has not yet
prepared himself or herself for the negotiation process or braced himself or herself
for the possibility of high-pressure sales tactics. The consumer is therefore in a
uniquely vulnerable position and is susceptible to an unwanted sale of consumer
goods. The home solicitation sales act serves to protect the consumer from such
vulnerabilities. [Id. at 395.]
This Court later applied this same reasoning in Patrick, concluding that the HSSA’s term
“there given” required that the solicitation and the agreement occur at the same time. Patrick’s
interpretation and application of the term “there given” is equally applicable here. This Court held
in Patrick that the agreements at issue “were not signed in the home at the time the sales
presentation was given. In fact, the contracts were not signed until the following month.” Patrick,
234 Mich App at 545 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court held that, “[b]ecause the purchase
agreement was not there given at the place of the sales presentation, the transaction [was] outside
the scope of the [HSSA].” Id. 547. Patrick supported its analysis by relying on the dissent’s
reasoning in Brown I that the plaintiffs were “not the vulnerable consumers that [the HSSA] was
created to protect[,]” because they “did not assent to the purchase agreements until after
defendant’s agent left [their] home[.]” Id. Binding precedent establishes that, in order for a
buyer’s agreement to be “there given” under the HSSA, it must occur at the same time and place
as the solicitation of the sale. Id.3
3
Patrick buttressed its reasoning by adopting the dissent’s assessment of the “spirit and purpose[]”
of the HSSA in Brown v Jacob, 183 Mich App 387, 395; 454 NW2d 226 (1990), rev’d 439 Mich
865 (1991):
The legislative histories of these statutes indicate that their purpose was to protect
consumers from intrusions into their homes by door-to-door and telephone
solicitors. In those circumstances, the consumer has not yet prepared himself or
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Because the term “there given” imposes a temporal connection to the solicitation giving
rise to the agreement, we must next determine which of the parties’ various interactions constituted
plaintiff’s “solicitation of the sale[.]” MCL 445.111(a). The HSSA does not define the term
“solicitation;” therefore, we again turn to the dictionary to discern its plain and ordinary meaning.
San Marino Iron, Inc, 341 Mich App at 639. Merriam-Webster provides various definitions of the
word “solicit.” Relevant here, these definitions include “to make petition to,” “to approach with a
request or plea,” and “to try to obtain by usu[ally] urgent requests or pleas.” Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (12th ed). Considering these definitions in the context of a solicitation of a
sale, the statute considers a seller’s interaction with a buyer, at the buyer’s home, for the purpose
of obtaining a sale. See also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) (defining solicitation as “[t]he act
or an instance of requesting or seeking to obtain something[.]”).
We conclude that the door knocker’s interaction with defendants constituted a solicitation
of the sale under the HSSA. The relevant trial testimony established that plaintiff, a roofing
company, employed door knockers to canvass hundreds of homes in defendants’ neighborhood
after a hailstorm. Plaintiff’s sales associate testified that “Door knockers are just guys that either
go door to door or if we’re working on a roof, maybe, nearby and then go to a neighbor and say,
‘Hey, are you interested in us taking a look at your roof?’ ” The sales associate confirmed that the
door knockers’s job is to offer a service for the purpose of making a sale: “[They] go to
homeowners, at their home, knock on the front door, and say, ‘Hey, we’ve got a service we can
provide for you.’ ” Then plaintiff goes “to the homeowner, knock[s] on their door, and [says],
‘We can get you a new roof, if you have storm damage, working with your insurance company[.]’ ”
This testimony establishes that the purpose of the door knocker’s visit to defendants in this case
was to get a roofing job by offering a free roof inspection and assistance dealing with insurance
claims.4 Viewing this trial testimony and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to
herself for the negotiation process or braced himself or herself for the possibility of
high-pressure sales tactics. The consumer is therefore in a uniquely vulnerable
position and is susceptible to an unwanted sale of consumer goods. The home
solicitation sales act serves to protect the consumer from such vulnerabilities.
We agree with plaintiff that this reasoning provides further support to the district court’s denial of
a directed verdict in this case because Margie’s reengagement with plaintiff after the initial
solicitation demonstrates that she was not the vulnerable consumer in need of the HSSA’s
protection against high-pressure sales tactics. Nevertheless, consultation of the legislative history
of the HSSA is inappropriate because the statute itself is clear and unambiguous, and “we assume
that the Legislature intended its plain meaning,” and must enforce it as written. Rouch World, LLC
v Dep’t of Civil Rights, 510 Mich 398, 410; 987 NW2d 501 (2022) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). It is only if the statute is ambiguous that consulting the legislative history “to determine
the underlying intent of the Legislature[]” is appropriate. Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
4
Indeed, during trial, defense counsel made this very point when he noted that plaintiff obtained
roofing contracts with homeowners when it “knock[ed] on their door and—and solicit[ed] for new
roofs[.]”
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plaintiff, there is ample evidence in the record that the door knocker’s interaction with defendants
constituted a solicitation. Wilkinson, 463 Mich at 391.
Margie did not sign the sales contract until long after the door knocker’s solicitation. In
fact, the record reflects that at least two weeks—possibly more—had elapsed between the door-
knocker solicitation and the sale. Accordingly, Margie’s agreement was not “there given” under
the HSSA and was not subject to the HSSA’s notice requirements.5
We reverse the circuit court’s order and reinstate the district court’s orders.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
5
We decline to establish a bright-line rule for determining how much time must elapse between
the initial solicitation and a buyer’s agreement for the agreement to be considered “there given”
under the HSSA. That determination depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. Because the facts here show that considerable time elapsed between the initial solicitation
and Margie’s eventual assent, the transaction is beyond the scope of the HSSA.
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