“The concept of standing in Fourth Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest . . . before seeking relief” for an allegedly unconstitutional action.
How later courts described this case
- “The concept of standing in Fourth Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest . . . before seeking relief” for an allegedly unconstitutional action.
- explaining that an arrest is justified “by showing probable cause for any crime”
- “[R]efusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 25-10954 Document: 73-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-10954 June 23, 2026
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
E’Mann Comichi,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Officer Ingrid A. Pethel; Officer Brian S. Lord; Officer
Wesley R. Hamilton; Detective William M. Norwood,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:25-CV-512
______________________________
Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Higginbotham and Graves, Circuit
Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Plaintiff–Appellant E’Mann Comichi attempted to stop the towing of
his nephew’s illegally parked Penske rental truck in Euless, Texas. Three
police officers arrived at the scene and, after a lengthy discussion, arrested
him. Comichi alleges numerous claims against the police officers and a
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 25-10954 Document: 73-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/23/2026
No. 25-10954
detective under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including unlawful search and seizure,
false arrest, failure to intervene, and malicious prosecution. The district
court granted Defendants–Appellees’ motion to dismiss, dismissing all
claims with prejudice on qualified immunity grounds.
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Comichi’s unlawful-
search and unlawful-seizure claims against Officers Pethel, Lord, and
Hamilton. We REVERSE only as to its dismissal of his false-arrest claim
against Officer Pethel. Based on this reversal, we must also VACATE its
dismissal of Comichi’s failure-to-intervene and malicious-prosecution claims
against Officers Lord and Hamilton, which the district court has not yet
addressed on the merits, for consideration on the merits in the first instance.
I
A
Sometime in September 2024, Comichi’s nephew parked a Penske
rental truck in a public parking lot near the Euless Dog Park before leaving
town for a vacation. Comichi’s nephew was the only renter listed on the
truck’s rental agreement, but Comichi had paid for the rental.
On September 16, 2024, police “red tagged” the truck as illegally
parked. The red tag ordered the vehicle moved by September 18. On
September 22, Officers Ingrid Pethel and Brian Lord observed the truck still
parked in the parking lot. Officer Pethel called a towing company to tow the
vehicle.
On September 22, 2024, Comichi was walking his nephew’s dog near
the dog park when he observed the Penske truck in the road, positioned
behind the tow truck. Comichi ran to the truck and sat in the driver’s seat to
prevent the tow truck operator from completing the tow. The operator
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No. 25-10954
informed Comichi that he would not release the truck unless Comichi paid a
$350 “drop fee.”
Comichi called the police. Officer Wesley Hamilton arrived, and
Comichi informed him that, because the Penske truck was not completely
hooked up to the tow truck, he was entitled to reclaim it. Officer Hamilton
told Comichi that, if the Penske truck was already hooked up to the tow truck,
his act of entering the truck and preventing the tow was “obstructing.”
The tow truck operator asked Comichi to roll the driver window up so
that he could show him the red tag. Officer Hamilton then asked Comichi to
step out of the truck so that he could see the language on the red tag, and
Comichi began to raise his voice at Officer Hamilton and object that this was
not a criminal matter. Officer Hamilton told Comichi, “Look, but now
you’re obstructing the police. This [the red tag] is a police notice.” Comichi
protested but ultimately complied, stepping out of the truck and reading the
information on the red tag aloud.
Comichi fervently continued to assert that the truck had not been fully
hooked up to the tow truck. Officer Hamilton told Comichi to “chill out,”
and Comichi apologized. The tow truck operator then stated: “He’s right, I
was not 100% connected to it, I had moved [the Penske truck] from its spot
to connect to it, and he got me as I was backing up.” The operator again
offered for Comichi to pay the drop fee to reclaim the truck, and Comichi
refused. The operator explained that he had already picked up the truck from
its original parked location and that the tow was already in progress.
During this interaction, Officer Hamilton radioed for other officers to
“come down here.” Officers Pethel and Lord arrived at the scene. Officer
Pethel asked Comichi to move out of the roadway, and the group moved
toward the side of the road.
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Officer Pethel then informed Comichi that she would pat him down
to check for weapons. She took his arm and moved him to the sidewalk,
instructing him on how to stand for the pat-down, and he complied. Comichi
alleges that the pat-down included touching his genitals and searching his
pockets. Officers Lord and Hamilton watched Officer Pethel pat Comichi
down.
After the pat-down, Officer Pethel asked Comichi for his name several
times while Comichi explained his view of the incident to her. He declined
to give his name but continued speaking with her. Officer Pethel offered
Comichi the option to pay a drop fee to reclaim the truck, and he declined.
After explaining that the truck had been abandoned pursuant to the relevant
city ordinance, Officer Pethel informed Comichi that the truck would be
towed. Comichi then acquiesced and began to walk away.
Officer Pethel asked Comichi to give her his name before he left.
Comichi again refused to identify himself. Officer Pethel replied: “I spoke
with you, and you were detained, so you need to give me your name. And
I’m not going to make it super difficult for you; I’m making it very easy for
you. You are going to give me your name, or else you’re under arrest.”
Comichi stated that he would let the officers arrest him, and Officer Pethel
responded: “No, how about you make it much simpler and just give me your
name so that I don’t have to take you to jail for this.” Comichi said nothing
and placed his hands behind his back to be handcuffed.
Officer Pethel again asked for his name, but Comichi did not respond.
She handcuffed Comichi and stated that he was under arrest. She escorted
him to her vehicle, searched his person, and removed his personal belongings.
After the squad cars departed, the tow truck operator towed the Penske truck
pursuant to officer instruction.
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No. 25-10954
Officer Pethel transported Comichi to the Hurst Jail, where he
continued to refuse to identify himself. He was charged with Interference
with Public Duties and Failure to Identify. Two days later, while Comichi
was still in custody, Detective William Norwood reviewed the incident and
requested to drop the Interference with Public Duties charge. Comichi spent
forty-five hours at the jail before his release. The Failure to Identify charge
was later dropped.
B
Comichi sued Officers Pethel, Lord, and Hamilton and Detective
Norwood, the tow truck company, and the tow truck operator. 1 He alleges
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) false arrest; (2) unlawful search; and
(3) unlawful search and seizure incident to unlawful arrest; (4) failure to
intervene; (5) unlawful seizure of the truck; and (6) malicious prosecution. 2
Defendants–Appellees moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion
and dismissed all claims with prejudice. Comichi timely appealed.
II
We review a “motion to dismiss granted on the basis of qualified
immunity” de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” T.O. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 2
F.4th 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2021). We do not accept “[c]onclusory allegations,
_____________________
1
The tow truck company and tow truck operator originally were parties to this
appeal. After oral argument, Comichi moved unopposed under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) for
partial dismissal of the appeal as to the claims against these two parties, and we granted the
motion.
2
Comichi attached Officers Lord and Hamilton’s body camera video and a portion
of the police report to the complaint.
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No. 25-10954
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions” as true. Santander v.
Salazar, 133 F.4th 471, 477 (5th Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2024)). When the pleadings
incorporate video evidence, as they do here, “the video depictions of events,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, should be adopted over the
factual allegations in the complaint if the video ‘blatantly contradict[s]’ those
allegations.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021)
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
Qualified immunity involves two inquiries: first, whether the officer
violated a constitutional right; and second, whether that right “was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.” Morrow v. Meachum,
917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). When a defendant asserts qualified
immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense does not
apply. Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). Qualified
immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law,’ so we do not deny immunity unless ‘existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Morgan
v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original) (first
quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); and then quoting Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
III
Comichi’s claims primarily concern his interactions with Officer
Pethel, the arresting officer. We address these claims first and then turn to
the claims involving the other Defendants–Appellees.
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No. 25-10954
A
First, Comichi contends that Officer Pethel unlawfully searched him
We disagree, concluding that Officer Pethel is entitled to qualified immunity
on this claim.
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may detain a person
for investigative purposes if he or she has reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot. United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014).
Whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective question that considers
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 160
(5th Cir. 1992). The officer must “point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant” the detention. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. “Officers develop reasonable
suspicion through commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” United States v. Larremore, 150 F.4th 463, 474 (5th Cir. 2025)
(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)). “Observations capable
of innocent explanation when considered alone might rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion in the aggregate.” United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d
485, 491 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277–78
(2002)).
If an officer reasonably believes that an individual is “armed and
presently dangerous to the officer[ ] or to others, [he or she] may conduct a
limited protective search for concealed weapons”—called a “frisk.” United
States v. Darrell, 945 F.3d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). “[I]n order to ensure
their safety during the stop, police may frisk the subject for weapons that they
reasonably suspect he may carry.” United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d 603,
614 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 441 (5th
Cir. 2010)). Officers may take steps that are “reasonably necessary to protect
7
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No. 25-10954
their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the
stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985). The standard is
whether a reasonably prudent officer could believe, based on specific and
articulable facts, that his or her actions were appropriate. See Rideau, 969
F.2d at 1574.
Comichi has failed to plead facts demonstrating that he was unlawfully
searched during Officer Pethel’s pat-down. Officer Pethel arrived at the
scene after Officer Hamilton called for backup. As she approached, Comichi,
Officer Hamilton, and the tow truck operator were engaged in an argument
in the middle of the road. Comichi spoke in a raised voice. Officer Pethel
instructed Comichi to move to the side of the road for his safety, gesturing
for him to walk to the back of the Penske truck. Comichi disregarded her
direction and walked in the opposite direction to stand between the tow truck
and the Penske truck. Officer Pethel then told Comichi to step fully onto the
sidewalk. Comichi followed her directions, but he protested and maintained
a heated tone while moving back and forth.
In light of these facts, we cannot say Officer Pethel acted unreasonably
in frisking Comichi’s outer clothing for weapons out of concern for officer
safety. See United States v. Ducksworth, 168 F.4th 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2026)
(collecting cases holding that nervous, erratic behavior created reasonable
suspicion for an officer to conduct a pat-down). Comichi has therefore failed
to meet his prong-one burden of pleading facts indicating that Officer
Pethel’s pat-down lacked reasonable suspicion and thereby violated a
constitutional right. See Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874. We thus conclude that
Officer Pethel is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
B
Comichi asserts that Officer Pethel violated his Fourth Amendment
rights when she arrested him without probable cause. We agree, concluding
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that Officer Pethel is not entitled to qualified immunity on Comichi’s false-
arrest claim.
To prevail on a false-arrest claim, “a plaintiff must show that he was
arrested without probable cause.” Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135, 142 (5th
Cir. 2007). “Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and
circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed
or was committing an offense.” Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th
Cir. 2000). “[I]f a reasonable officer could have concluded that there was
probable cause upon the facts then available to him, qualified immunity will
apply.” Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2001). “If there was
probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported
by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.” Wells v. Bonner,
45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis removed); Voss v. Goode, 954 F.3d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that an arrest is justified “by showing
probable cause for any crime”). This is because false-arrest claims do not
focus “on the validity of each individual charge” but rather “on the validity
of the arrest.” Wells, 45 F.3d at 95.
Thus, to determine whether Officer Pethel falsely arrested Comichi,
we must consider whether she had probable cause for at least one of the
charges against him: Failure to Identify and Interference with Public Duties.
We consider each charge in turn, concluding that probable cause did not exist
for either charge.
1
In Texas, “[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to
give his name . . . to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and
requested the information.” Tex. Penal Code § 38.02(a) (emphasis
added). But we have long recognized that “police cannot arrest an individual
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No. 25-10954
solely for refusing to provide identification.” Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678,
695 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437
(1991) (“[R]efusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal
level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”).
Although Comichi alleges in his complaint that his arrest lacked
probable cause, we need not take this legal conclusion as true. See Santander,
133 F.4th at 481. Nonetheless, the bodycam footage supports his allegations.
As shown in the bodycam footage, Officer Pethel arrived at the scene
when Comichi was standing outside the truck in the street with Officer
Hamilton and the tow truck operator. She directed Comichi to move to the
side of the road, and he complied. Comichi described the situation to her,
amidst which Officer Pethel repeatedly asked for his name, and he ignored
her. Officer Pethel offered Comichi the option to pay a drop fee to reclaim
the Penske truck, and he declined, prompting her to inform him that the truck
would be towed.
Comichi turned to walk away. Officer Pethel then stated: “Let me get
your name before you leave.” Drawing inferences Comichi’s favor, this
statement suggests that Officer Pethel recognized that his detention had
ended. Comichi responded that he would not give his name. Officer Pethel
then escalated the encounter, saying: “I spoke with you, and you were
detained, so you need to give me your name. And I’m not going to make it
super difficult for you; I’m making it very easy for you. You are going to give
me your name, or else you’re under arrest.” When Comichi still refused,
saying he would not answer questions, she told him a third time: “How about
you make it much simpler and just give me your name so that I don’t have to
take you to jail for this.” When Comichi declined to respond, Officer Pethel
handcuffed him and told him that he was under arrest.
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No. 25-10954
Viewed in the light most favorable to Comichi, the bodycam footage
shows that Officer Pethel arrested Comichi because he refused to identify
himself—not because he was actively interfering with public duties. And
based on the facts available to Officer Pethel at the scene, we are satisfied that
no reasonable officer “could have concluded that there was probable cause”
for a Failure to Identify charge. Brown, 243 F.3d at 190.
2
But because Comichi was also charged with Interference with Public
Duties, we must ask whether probable cause existed for this charge, as well,
in order to determine whether his arrest was valid. 3 See Wells, 45 F.3d at 95.
Probable cause did not exist.
A person commits Interference with Public Duties when he “with
criminal negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes
with . . . a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or
exercising authority imposed or granted by law.” Tex. Penal Code
§ 38.15(a)(1). “[A] person’s interference must consist of more than speech
alone.” Voss, 954 F.3d at 239. For example, we have found probable cause
for Interference with Public Duties when a person fails to abide by officer
instructions pertaining to physical conduct. Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412,
415 (5th Cir. 2017). But “‘merely arguing with police officers about the
propriety of their conduct’ . . . does not constitute probable cause to arrest
someone for interference.” Voss, 954 F.3d at 239 (quoting Freeman v. Gore,
483 F.3d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 2007)).
_____________________
3
The district court reasoned that, because Comichi had no legal right to interrupt
the tow under the language of the relevant municipal ordinance, the officers had probable
cause to arrest him for Interference with Public Duties. It assumed, without analyzing, that
Comichi’s “entering of the vehicle and subsequent actions” qualified as interruption,
disruption, or interference under the statute.
11
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Viewed in the light most favorable to Comichi, the bodycam footage
shows that Comichi was not interfering with public duties at the time of his
arrest. He did not fail to abide by officer instructions as to his physical
conduct. See Childers, 848 F.3d at 415. He followed Officer Hamilton’s
instruction to get out of the Penske truck prior to Officer Pethel’s arrival.
And when Officer Pethel asked him to step out of the road, he did so readily.
He then complied with Officer Pethel’s instructions regarding how to stand
during the pat-down and continued standing with the officers as they
dialogued about the situation. He only began to walk away when he learned
the truck would be towed and believed that the encounter had ended.
Comichi’s only noncompliance was verbal noncompliance: arguing
about the propriety of the tow and the officers’ conduct and negotiating
whether he should have to pay a drop fee. And the bodycam footage shows
that Officer Pethel affirmatively engaged in mutual negotiation. Comichi’s
verbal noncompliance was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause
for an Interference with Public Duties charge. See Voss, 954 F.3d at 239.
3
In sum: viewing the allegations in the complaint and the bodycam
footage in the light most favorable to Comichi, Officer Pethel lacked probable
cause to arrest Comichi for both Failure to Identify 4 and Interference with
Public Duties. “[I]t is beyond question that [it is] a clearly established
constitutional right to be free from arrest absent an arrest warrant or probable
cause.” Freeman, 483 F.3d at 411; see Turner, 848 F.3d at 695. Consequently,
_____________________
4
The district court reasoned that the officers had probable cause to charge Comichi
with Failure to Identify because he refused to identify himself after he already had been
arrested for Interference with Public Duties. This conclusion disregards the numerous
facts that support Comichi’s position and draws inferences in favor of the defendants,
which the court may not do at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See T.O., 2 F.4th at 413.
12
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Comichi has met his burden of showing that Officer Pethel is not entitled to
qualified immunity on his false-arrest claim. See Kovacic, 628 F.3d at 211.
The district therefore court erred in dismissing this claim.
C
Next, Comichi asserts that Officers Pethel, Lord, and Hamilton
unlawfully seized the Penske truck, in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege that a defendant
deprived [him] of a federal right and that the defendant acted under color of
state or territorial law.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 752 (5th Cir.
2024). Whether the plaintiff was deprived of a federal right depends in part
on whether he has Fourth Amendment standing to bring his claim. Byrd v.
United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410 (2018) (“The concept of standing in Fourth
Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a
person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest . . . before
seeking relief” for an allegedly unconstitutional action.).
To have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a search or seizure,
a plaintiff must establish: (1) “an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
with respect to the place being searched or items being seized”; and (2) that
“that expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize as
[objectively] reasonable.” United States v. Wise, 877 F.3d 209, 218 (5th Cir.
2017) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754
(5th Cir. 1996)). He must also establish that he “had a possessory interest in
the personal property” and that he “took normal precautions to maintain
that expectation of privacy.” United States v. Gaulden, 73 F.4th 390, 393 (5th
Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 457–58 (5th Cir.
2001)).
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Comichi lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the seizure
of the Penske truck. Although he is not listed on the rental agreement,
Comichi alleges that his nephew expressly authorized him to access and use
the truck and that he paid for the rental. It is true, as Comichi asserts, that
“the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is
not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise
reasonable expectation of privacy.” Byrd, 584 U.S. at 411. But the truck had
been red-tagged as abandoned several days before Officer Pethel ordered it
towed. Accordingly, even if Comichi had a possessory interest in the truck
at the time of the incident, and even assuming that he therefore had some
expectation of privacy with respect to the truck, he left the truck illegally
parked long enough for it to be considered abandoned under municipal
ordinance. Thus, he has not plausibly pleaded facts indicating that he “took
normal precautions to maintain an expectation of privacy” in the truck.
Gaulden, 73 F.4th at 393. He therefore has not established Fourth
Amendment standing to bring his unlawful-seizure claim, and the district
court did not err in dismissing it.
D
Last, Comichi contends that Officers Lord and Hamilton failed to
intervene when Officer Pethel violated his constitutional rights. 5 He also
asserts malicious-prosecution claims against Officers Pethel, Lord, and
Detective Norwood.
Because the district court dismissed the false-arrest and unlawful-
search-and-seizure claims on which Comichi’s failure-to-intervene and
_____________________
5
Having determined that Comichi has failed to sufficiently allege an unlawful-
search claim, see supra § III(A), we address the officers’ liability for failure to intervene
only as to the false-arrest claim.
14
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No. 25-10954
malicious-prosecution claims are predicated, it did not consider the merits of
these two claims. We, on the other hand, have concluded that Comichi’s
false-arrest claim can proceed. See supra § III(B). Accordingly, we must
consider how to dispose of these claims.
We are “a court of review, not first view.” Stringer v. Town of
Jonesboro, 986 F.3d 502, 509 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cruson v. Jackson Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 954 F.3d 240, 249 n.7 (5th Cir. 2020)). It would therefore be
improper to address the merits of these claims for the first time on appeal.
Cruson, 954 F.3d at 249 n.7. We therefore vacate the district court’s
dismissal of these claims and remand for the court to consider them in the
first instance. 6 We express no opinion as to whether these claims will survive
a qualified-immunity challenge on remand.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal
of Comichi’s unlawful-search and unlawful-seizure claims against Officers
Pethel, Lord, and Hamilton. We REVERSE only as to its dismissal of his
false-arrest claim against Officer Pethel. Based on this reversal, we also
VACATE its dismissal of Comichi’s failure-to-intervene and malicious-
prosecution claims against Officers Lord and Hamilton for consideration on
_____________________
6
On remand, the district court should consider the malicious-prosecution claim in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 563
(2024) (“So if an invalid charge—say, one fabricated by police officers—causes a detention
either to start or to continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated. And that is so even
when a valid charge has also been brought . . . . [T]he bringing of one valid charge in a
criminal proceeding should not categorically preclude a claim based on the Fourth
Amendment.”).
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the merits in the first instance. We REMAND for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
16