TINSMAN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIDGETTE T.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-13547 (BRM)

v. OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff Bridgette T.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the final decision of the

Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her

application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the

“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in connection with the appeal and

having declined to hold oral argument in accordance with Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons

set forth below and for good cause shown, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

This matter arises out of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application

for DIB, dated June 18, 2025. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.) On March 23, 2023, Plaintiff applied for DIB

alleging disability beginning on June 30, 2021, based on the following allegations of impairments:

scoliosis, stenosis, degenerative disc disease, lordosis, bone loss, nerve pain, collapsed spine,

misalignment of the head with the pelvis, and fibromyalgia. (Transcript of Proceedings (“Tr.”)

(ECF No. 4) at 18, 232.)

At Plaintiff’s request, Administrative Law Judge David Suna (“ALJ” or “ALJ Suna”) held

a hearing on August 8, 2024. (Id. at 57.) In a decision dated September 26, 2024, the ALJ found

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Id. at 36.) The ALJ’s decision became

final when the Appeals Council declined review on June 18. 205. (Id. at 1–7.) Having exhausted

her administrative remedies, on July 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed her appeal with this Court pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of ALJ Suna’s decision. (ECF No. 1).

B. Administrative History

The ALJ determined Plaintiff last met the Act’s insured status requirements on June 30,

2021. (Tr. at 21.) To evaluate whether Plaintiff was eligible for social security and disability

benefits, the ALJ employed the five-step process established by the SSA. (Id. at 21–36.) At the

time of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was forty-three years old and had at least a high school

education.1 (Id. at 34, 233.)

At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity on June

30, 2021.2 (Id. at 21.) While Plaintiff “worked after the alleged disability onset date,” the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s earnings and found her work activity did not rise to the level of substantial

gainful activity. (Id.)

At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe medically determinable

impairments: lumbar spine impairment, scoliosis, leg length discrepancy, rheumatoid arthritis, and

1 Plaintiff has a “GED,” otherwise known as a general educational development

diploma/certificate. (Tr. at 233.)

2 The relevant period for this SSA appeal is indeed a period of just one day.

fibromyalgia. (Id. at 21 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) The ALJ determined the following

impairments were non-severe: ventral and umbilical hernia, Vitamin D deficiency, and right

epicondylitis. (Id. at 21–23.) Additionally, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged COVID-19 infection,

cervical spine impairment, migraine headaches, and impairments involving her thumbs and index

fingers were “not a medically determinable impairment through the date last insured.” (Id. at 23–

24 (emphasis added); but see ECF No. 6 at 14 (misstating the ALJ’s determination as to Plaintiff’s

“history of COVID-19, cervical spine impairment, migraine headaches, and thumb and index

finger impairments [as] non-severe impairments”).)

At step three, ALJ Suna concluded Plaintiff did not have an “impairment or combination

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” (Id. at 24.)

First, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of listing 1.15 for the scoliosis

and lumbar spine impairments because there was “no documentation of the use of any handheld

assistive devices, and the clinical examinations do not show any significant neurologic deficits in

the upper extremities such as motor strength deficits, loss of sensory functioning, or abnormalities

in reflexes.” (Id.) Second, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of listing

14.09 for the rheumatoid arthritis because there were no “remarkable” findings from either Dr.

Janet B. Bartov or Dr. Denis L. Autotte, except “findings of thoracic and lumbar scoliosis without

any apparent notations of gait abnormalities or neurologic deficits.” (Id. at 25.)

Additionally, before turning to step four, the ALJ considered “the entire record” and found

Plaintiff “had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b)” but with certain functional limitations.3 (Id. at 25–33.) In considering a claimant’s

symptoms, ALJs “follow a two-step process.” (Id. at 25.) First, the ALJ evaluated “whether there

is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” (Id.) Then, “once an

underlying physical or mental impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce the

claimant’s pain or other symptoms has been shown,” the ALJ “evaluate[d] the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they

limit the claimant’s work-related activities.” (Id.)

After considering the evidence and conducting the aforementioned two-step process,4 the

ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects

of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in

the record.” (Id. at 28.) With respect to her scoliosis, lumbar spine impairment, the ALJ noted there

was “minimal treatment, relatively unremarkable clinical examination findings, and no significant

treatment for the scoliosis or lumbar [impairment].” (Id.) The ALJ observed that Plaintiff “worked

at the substantial gainful activity level in 2019 and 2020 performing light to medium exertion, with

evidence of worsening of her condition clearly documented after the date last insured,” despite a

“May 2011 X-ray showing that her right leg was shorter than her left leg.” (Id. at 28, 30.) The ALJ

also considered Plaintiff’s diagnostic testing and treatment history. (Id. at 28–30.) Additionally,

the ALJ reviewed documentation from a time shortly after the date Plaintiff was last insured, which

3 The limitations are as follows: Plaintiff can “stand or walk no more than 4 hours in an eight-hour

workday[,] . . . occasional[ly] push/pull[,] . . . climb[] . . . ramps and stairs[,]” balanc[e], stoop[],

kneel[], and crouch[,] . . . and tolerate moderate noise as defined by the Selected Characteristics

of Occupations.” (Tr. at 25.) However, the ALJ also found Plaintiff could not “climb[] ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds[,] never crawl[,] [and could have] no exposure to hazards such as unprotected

heights, dangerous machinery, or operating a motor vehicle.” (Id.)

4 The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to cause the symptoms she had alleged. (Tr. at 28.)

revealed “normal gait, no muscle atrophy, no swelling of any joints, and full [range of motion] of

all joints.” (Id. at 30.)

As to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis, the ALJ observed “the only

treatment for these conditions [occurred] during the period at issue is the May 19, 2021 visit with

rheumatologist Dr. Bartov, who documented no acute distress, intact orientation, normal gait, no

muscle atrophy, normal affect, no swelling, and full [range of motion] in all joints.” (Id. at 31.)

Critically, “the record [revealed] only one treatment with [Plaintiff’s] rheumatologist just prior to

the alleged onset date and date last insured with an unremarkable clinical examination and

continuation of the Tramadol, which she has taken since at least 2012.” (Id.)

Additionally, mindful he “cannot defer or give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to any

prior administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s),” the ALJ “considered the medical

opinions and prior administrative” contained in the record. (Id. at 31–33.) The ALJ reviewed Dr.

Autotte’s various opinions and found each unpersuasive.5 (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ considered

5 On November 7, 2013, Dr. Autotte completed a form, where “she reported that she first treated

[Plaintiff] on July 19, 2010, with diagnoses of spinal stenosis and recurrent umbilical hernia.” (Tr.

at 31.) “She opined that [Plaintiff] could lift and/or carry 5 to 10 pounds, sit less than 6 hours per

day, stand and/or walk up to 2 hours per day, and [could not] bend[].” (Id.) The ALJ found this

opinion unpersuasive not only because it was provided “years prior to the alleged onset date and

date last insured,” but also because he found it inconsistent “with the objective evidence during

the period at issue.” (Id.) Dr. Autotte also completed a form on October 25, 2023, indicating

Plaintiff’s “most recent clinical examination was on July 21, 2023” with “abnormal”

musculoskeletal findings and “anxious” mood. (Id. at 32.) In that form, Dr. Autotte opined Plaintiff

had “severe” limitations in “the duration that she [could not] stand, sit, walk, lift, or carry.” (Id.)

The ALJ found that opinion unpersuasive because Dr. Autotte “did not quantify the degree of

limitations in these work related domains” and because the opinion was unsupported by her own

“contemporaneous treatment notes.” (Id.) On June 4, 2024, Dr. Autotte reported in a medical

source statement form that Plaintiff’s diagnoses were severe scoliosis, rheumatoid arthritis,

umbilical hernia, and a herniated nucleus pulposus. (Id.) She also reported Plaintiff’s symptoms

were “pain and fatigue, with pain described as severe sharp pain in [the] back, worse with more

than 10 minutes of standing or . . . more than 5 minutes” of sitting. (Id.) Dr. Autotte opined Plaintiff

“could walk less than one block without severe pain, sit for 10 minutes at one time, stand for

[twenty] minutes at one time, stand/walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, must be allowed

Dr. William E. Zaccheo’s opinion that Plaintiff “could return to work but should not do any heavy

lifting” but found it unpersuasive because the opinion “was provided years prior to the alleged

onset date and date last insured.” (Id. at 33.) However, the ALJ found the opinions of the state

agency medical consultants, Dr. Seung Park and Dr. Mohammad Rizwan, persuasive.6 (Id.)

Mindful that the letters submitted by Plaintiff’s husband, sister, and mother “are not medical

opinions under the . . . rules for the evaluation of opinion evidence,” the ALJ nevertheless

considered them as part of the overall record evidence. (Id.) Ultimately though, the ALJ concluded

the objective evidence did not support additional or more restrictive functional limitations in

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for the period at issue. (Id.)

to shift position from sit[ting], stand[ing], or walk[ing] at will, and could lift/carry no weight.”

(Id.) She further opined,

Plaintiff must get up every [ten] minutes [for a period of five]

minutes, would require unscheduled breaks two to three times per

hour lasting [five] minutes each, could never twist, crouch, squat, or

climb ladders, rarely stoop, bend, or climb stairs, and could use her

upper extremities for gross manipulation 10% of a workday, fine

manipulation 50% of the time, reach overhead less than 5% of a

workday, and reach in front of her body less than 10% of a workday.

(Id.) Dr. Autotte also opined Plaintiff “would be off-task 25% or more of the time, was incapable

of even ‘low stress’ work, and would be absent more than four days per month.” (Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted)). “She reported these limitations applied . . . since 2019.” (Id.) The ALJ

found these opinions unpersuasive for two reasons. First, while Dr. Autotte noted these limitations

started in 2019, the record shows Plaintiff “performed work at the substantial gainful activity level

requiring light to medium exertion in 2019 and 2020.” (Id.) Moreover, the ALJ concluded these

opinions were unsupported by Dr. Autotte’s contemporaneous treatment notes. (Id.)

6 On July 10, 2023, and November 13, 2023, Dr. Park and Dr. Rizwan opined Plaintiff “could

perform light exertion except standing or walking for four hours, with occasional postural activities

[but] never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.” (Id. at 33.) Dr. Park and Dr. Rizwan also

determined Plaintiff would “need to avoid all exposure to hazards.” (Id.) The ALJ found these

opinions persuasive because the state agency medical consultants “supported their opinions by

reviewing the evidence of record and providing a detailed rationale for them” and were “generally

consistent with the overall [record evidence] for the period at issue.” (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was “unable to perform any past relevant work”

through the date last insured. (Id.) The ALJ considered her work as a sales associate for a national

retail store from October 2018 and December 2020 and found this work “qualifie[d] as past

relevant work because [Plaintiff] performed it at the substantial gainful activity level[] within five

years of the date last insured[] and long enough to achieve average performance as required by

SSR 24-2p.” (Id. at 34.) However, given the vocational expert’s testimony at the hearing, the

limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC “would preclude her from meeting all exertional and nonextertional

and requirements of her past relevant work.” (Id.)

At step five, the ALJ took into account Plaintiff’s “age, education, work experience, and

[RFC],” and concluded “there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national

economy” Plaintiff “could have performed.” (Id. at 34, 36.) The ALJ determined that “[t]hrough

the date last insured,” Plaintiff “had the [RFC] to perform the full range of light work” but with

“additional limitations.” (Id. at 35.) At the hearing, the vocational expert, Melissa Fass-Karlin,

testified Plaintiff would have been able to perform the requirements of representative occupations

such as:

• Routing Clerk (DOT#222.687-022), which is light exertion that

is unskilled with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) of

two, with 117,393 jobs nationally;

• Marker (DOT#209.587-034), which is light exertion that is

unskilled with an SVP of two, with 136,791 jobs nationally;

• Apparel Stock Checker (DOT#299.667-014), which is light

exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with 11,293 jobs

nationally;

• Telephone Quotation Clerk (DOT#237.367-046), which is

sedentary exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with

2,730 jobs nationally;

• Call-Out Operator (DOT#237.367-014), which is sedentary

exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with 1,977 jobs

nationally;

• Document Preparer (DOT#249.587-018), which is sedentary

exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with 15,670 jobs

nationally.

(Id.) The ALJ determined “the vocational expert’s testimony [was] consistent with the information

contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” (Id.) The ALJ also assessed the fact that the

vocational expert’s basis for her opinion “that an individual with the same [RFC] could perform

[the aforementioned] jobs at light exertion” was her “professional knowledge, education, and

training in the field of vocational rehabilitation counseling” and found the opinion “based on her

expertise rather than the” Dictionary of Occupational Titles and/or the Selected Characteristics of

Occupations were “reasonable” and “accepted” the testimony “as a whole.” (Id.)

Moreover, “in response to a hypothetical question involving a person limited to sedentary

exertion with the same nonexertional limitations as the [ALJ’s] [RFC] findings,” the vocational

expert opined, “[i]f someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary

work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or [an] inability to

sit for long periods of time.” (Id. at 36.) Accordingly, ALJ Suna ultimately concluded Plaintiff

“was not under a disability, as defined in the [SSA], at any time from June 30, 2021, the alleged

onset date, through June 30, 2021, the date [Plaintiff] [was] last insured.” (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.

2001). The Commissioner’s decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive by a

reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp

v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). A district court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is

supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753

F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence “is more than a mere scintilla

of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541,

545 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding of the substantial evidence

standard in Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019). To determine whether an ALJ’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence, a court must review the evidence in its totality.

Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). “Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the

evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d

356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a court may not set an ALJ’s “decision aside if it is supported

by substantial evidence, even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft

v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

Under the Act, the SSA is authorized to pay SSI and DIB to “disabled” persons. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382(a). A person is “disabled” if “he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A person is unable to engage in substantial

gainful activity

only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage

in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the

immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy

exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

Regulations promulgated under the Act establish a five-step process for determining

whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of SSI and DIB. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant has shown he or she is not currently engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140

(1987). If a claimant is presently engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is

automatically denied disability benefits. Id. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has

demonstrated a “severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that significantly limits his

or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c);

see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140–41. Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes

necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). These activities include:

(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;

(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple

instructions;

(4) Use of judgment;

(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual

work situations; and

(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.

Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not considered disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c); see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).

Third, if a claimant’s impairment(s) is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether

the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1 (the “Impairment List”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates

his or her impairment(s) is equal in severity to, or meets, one of the impairments on the Impairment

List, the claimant has satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the claimant’s specific

impairment is not listed, the ALJ will consider the most similar listed impairment to decide whether

the claimant’s impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. If there is more than

one impairment, then the ALJ must consider whether the combination of impairments equals any

listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination of impairments is basically equivalent to a

listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most

similar. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992).

If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment

List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e), (f); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. Step four involves three sub-steps:

(1) the ALJ must make specific findings of fact as to the claimant’s

[RFC]; (2) the ALJ must make findings of the physical and mental

demands of the claimant’s past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ must

compare the [RFC] to the past relevant work to determine whether

claimant has the level of capability needed to perform the past

relevant work.

Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). When

determining RFC, an ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence is subject to the framework

articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (for claims filed before March 27, 2017) or 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c) (for claims filed after March 27, 2017).

Claimants are not disabled if their RFC allows them to perform their past relevant work.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). However, if the claimant’s RFC prevents him or her from

doing so, or if the claimant has no past relevant work, an ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step

of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(g). The final step requires the ALJ to “show there are

other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform,

consistent with [his or] her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and

[RFC].” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In doing so, “[t]he ALJ must

analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining whether she is

capable of performing work and is not disabled.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

An ALJ typically seeks the assistance of a vocational expert at this final step. Plummer, 186 F.3d

at 428.

The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four. Sykes v. Apfel, 228

F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither side bears the burden of proof for step three “[b]ecause step

three involves a conclusive presumption based on the listings.” Id. at 263 n.2; see Bowen, 482 U.S.

at 146 n.5. An ALJ bears the burden of proof for step five. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263.

On appeal, the harmless error doctrine requires a plaintiff to show, as to the first four steps:

(1) an error occurred; and (2) but for that error, they might have proven their disability. Holloman

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). In other words, when reviewing an

appeal based on the first four steps, a court considers whether the plaintiff articulated a basis for a

decision in their favor, based on the existing record. If the plaintiff cannot, it is unlikely they will

meet their burden of showing an error was harmful. See, e.g., Lippincott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

982 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380–81 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding ALJ’s error was harmless); Powers v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 19–21970, 2021 WL 1207793, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021) (finding the

plaintiff had not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s decision and had not shown an

error occurred amounting to harm).

The court’s review of legal issues within this appeal is plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). However, factual findings are reviewed “only to

determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the

findings.” Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262. Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the

evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). Substantial evidence also “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). When substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s factual findings, this

Court must abide by those determinations. See id. (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431); 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g).

IV. DECISION

Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asks the Court to reverse ALJ Suna’s

decision and remand the action for further proceedings. (ECF No. 6.) However, the Commissioner

requests the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision because it claims the ALJ relied on

substantial evidence to find Plaintiff not disabled during the relevant period. (ECF No. 8.)

A. Based on existing Third Circuit precedent, it was not error for the ALJ to discredit

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding fibromyalgia symptoms.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to properly assess her subjective complaints of

pain and fatigue from her fibromyalgia. (ECF No. 6 at 16–18.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges

the ALJ failed to adequately consider the waxing and waning of her fibromyalgia symptoms and

erroneously “rejected [her] reported symptoms based on a lack of objective evidence.” (ECF No.

6 at 16–17.)

The Commissioner disagrees. First, the Commissioner contests the supposed inadequacy

of the ALJ’s consideration of the waxing and waning nature of Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia symptoms,

noting the ALJ “acknowledged Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that she experienced ‘more flare ups

of her fibromyalgia . . . in 2021’” and considered “the longitudinal record, despite a relevant period

of only one day, and found that Plaintiff’s rheumatology treatment notes showed relative stability

of her fibromyalgia, particularly as her only treatment, tramadol, was required ‘very sparingly.’”

(ECF No. 8 at 8–9 (quoting Tr. at 27, 1221).) Additionally, the Commissioner points out that

“Plaintiff’s 2021 treatment records with rheumatologist Dr. Bartov” does not include a “complaint

regarding flare ups or waxing and waning symptoms, let alone a reported increase in the same.”

(Id. (citing Tr. at 1216).) Second, the Commissioner suggests Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ

incorrectly discounted her fibromyalgia complaints based on a lack of objective evidence is

unpersuasive because the ALJ “considered the objective evidence as one consideration, among

many, in his analysis.” (Id. at 9 (citing Tr. at 28–31).)

In reply, Plaintiff argues “the ALJ’s acknowledgment of [Plaintiff’s] hearing testimony of

having more flare ups in 2021,” his “consider[ation] [of] the longitudinal record,” and “f[inding]

that Plaintiff’s rheumatology treatment notes showed relative stability of her fibromyalgia” do not

constitute “a discussion of why symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or

cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence.” (ECF No. 9 at

2–3 (first quoting ECF No. 8 at 7; then quoting SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).)

Instead, Plaintiff contends the Commissioner has merely provided a post hoc rationale. (Id. (citing

Keiderling v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 07-2237, 2008 WL 2120154, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2008)).)

Plaintiff goes on to argue that courts in the Third Circuit have recognized that fibromyalgia is a

disease which is notable for its lack of objective diagnostic techniques and consequently held it is

legal error for an ALJ to reject a plaintiff’s fibromyalgia symptoms for lack of objective findings.

(Id. at 3–4 (citing Claudine J.N. v. Bisignano, Civ. A. No. 24-5925, 2025 WL 2555371, at *5 (E.D.

Pa. Sept. 4, 2025); Emily K. v. Dudek, Civ. A. No. 22-3279, 2025 WL 762688, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar.

11, 2025)).)

When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, ALJs must use the two-step framework set forth

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must

determine whether objective medical evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment”

that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.

Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess the

intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they affect the claimant’s

ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p,

2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step, objective evidence is not required to find the claimant

disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4–5. SSR 16-3p recognizes “[s]ymptoms cannot

always be measured objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. at *4.

As such, the ALJ must consider the entire case record and may “not disregard an individual’s

statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the

objective medical evidence does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5. This is especially important

when assessing the intensity and persistence of alleged fibromyalgia symptoms because “[t]he

problem with looking for independent findings and observations is that fibromyalgia is a disease

which is notable for its lack of objective diagnostic techniques.” Emily K., 2025 WL 762688, at

*10 (quoting Foley v. Barnhart, 432 F. Supp.2d 465, 475 (M.D. Pa. 2005)); see also Wilson v.

Apfel, Civ. A. No. 98-6511, 1999 WL 993723, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999) (symptoms of

fibromyalgia are subjective), aff’d, 225 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2000).

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments [including her

fibromyalgia] could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” satisfying the first

step of the symptom-evaluation framework. (Tr. at 28.) At the second step, the ALJ discredited

Plaintiff’s statements about the severity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms because

he did not find them to be “entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the

record.” (Id.) As the ALJ recounted, Plaintiff reported “flare ups of her fibromyalgia and

rheumatoid in 2021,” and shared that these conditions caused, inter alia, “more pain in her knees,

ankles, wrists, thumbs, and index fingers.” (Id. at 27.) “Due to these issues, [Plaintiff] reported that

she couldn’t really function that well anymore.” (Id. (internal quotation marks removed).)

However, the ALJ discounted these statements and emphasized: (1) Dr. Bartov’s documentation

[of] no acute distress, intact orientation, normal gait, no muscle atrophy, normal affect, no

swelling, and full range of motion in all joints,” (2) Plaintiff’s “continued [use] [of] . . . Tramadol

for her fibromyalgia” during the period at issue, (3) Plaintiff’s use of Tramadol “since at least

October 1, 2012,” and her request for more on November 6, 2017, “with good results,” and (4) Dr.

Autotte’s notation “Plaintiff ‘did well with [the] Tramadol that she only takes’ at night.” (Tr. at 31

(quoting Tr. at 586, 597, 1337, 1348).)

This was not error—at least not in the Third Circuit.7 Trauterman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

7 In Arakas v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the Fourth Circuit joined the First,

Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, holding “ALJs may not rely on objective

medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a

claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia.” 983 F.3d 83, 95–98 (4th

Cir. 2020) (concluding it was legal error for the ALJ to rely “principally on [normal examination]

results—i.e., a full range of motion and the lack of joint inflammation—in discounting [the SSA

claimant’s] complaints as inconsistent with the objective evidence”). The Fourth Circuit held it

was “doubly erroneous” for the ALJ to “‘effectively require[] ‘objective’ evidence for a disease

that eludes such measurement.’” Id. (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d

Cir. 2003)). Perhaps, in time—“based on the current medical understanding of [fibromyalgia],” id.

at 97—the Third Circuit will revisit Trauterman v. Commissioner of Social Security and join the

majority of its sister circuits. 296 F. App’x 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding it was appropriate for

the ALJ to consider objective evidence where the plaintiff not only suffered from fibromyalgia,

296 F. App’x 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008). In Trauterman, the Third Circuit found “it was quite

appropriate for the ALJ to consider the objective medical evidence of record” where the SSA

claimant’s claim of disability was “not attributed exclusively to fibromyalgia.” 296 F. App’x at

220. But see Johnson v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 2010); Green-Younger v. Barnhart,

335 F.3d 99,108 (2d Cir. 2003); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007);

Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996); Brosnahan v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 671, 677–

78 (8th Cir. 2003); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim for DIB is not based solely on fibromyalgia; the ALJ also found that

Plaintiff suffered from lumbar spine impairment, scoliosis, leg length discrepancy, rheumatoid

arthritis, among others. (Tr. at 21.) “In light of these diagnoses, it was . . . appropriate for the ALJ

to consider the objective medical evidence of record.” Trauterman, 296 F. App’x at 220 (finding

it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider objective evidence where the plaintiff not only suffered

from fibromyalgia, but also cervical spine disc herniation, lumbar spine degenerative joint disease,

and carpal tunnel syndrome); see also Ilaria G. v. Colvin, Civ. A. No. 22-1366, 2024 WL 5244864,

at *20 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2024) (noting “the ALJ properly considered the objective evidence relating

to Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines as well as fibromyalgia”).

Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that she was experiencing

“more flare ups of her fibromyalgia” and “more pain in her knees, ankles, wrists, thumbs, and

index fingers.” (Tr. at 27.) “Even in fibromyalgia cases, the ALJ must compare the objective

but also cervical spine disc herniation, lumbar spine degenerative joint disease, and carpal tunnel

syndrome). However, unless and until Trauterman is clearly overruled by the Third Circuit or the

Supreme Court of the United States, this Court is dutybound to follow Trauterman. See Gov’t

Emps. Ins. Co. v. Caring Pain Mgmt. PC, Civ. A. No. 22-5017, 2025 WL 2017255, at *6 (D.N.J.

July 18, 2025) (observing that district courts must follow Third Circuit precedent “until a proper

intervening change in the law has occurred”).

evidence and the subjective complaints and is permitted to reject plaintiff's subjective testimony

so long as [the ALJ] provides a sufficient explanation for doing so.” Ivelise S. v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., Civ. A. No. 24-9381, 2025 WL 2734160, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2025). ALJ Suna concluded

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 28.)

Specifically, as detailed above, the ALJ found “the only treatment for [Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia]

during the period at issue [wa]s the May 19, 2021 visit with . . . Dr. Bartov, who documented no

acute distress, intact orientation, normal gait, no muscle atrophy, normal affect, no swelling, and

full ROM in all joints.” (Id. at 31.) The ALJ also considered that Plaintiff “continued [using]

Tramadol for the fibromyalgia at that time . . . . [and] [had] been taking Tramadol since at least

October 1, 2012, as noted by primary care physician Dr. Autotte.” (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ

observed that Plaintiff “informed Dr. Autotte that Tramadol works for R.A. pain . . . [and] . . .

asked for more Tramadol, which she took at night, with good results.” (Id. (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).) Moreover, the ALJ also credited Dr. Autotte’s assessment that Plaintiff

“did well with [the] Tramadol that she only takes at night.” (Id.) Therefore, the Court finds the

ALJ sufficiently supported his reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony and subjective

complaints of pain. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129-130 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision where the ALJ considered parts of the plaintiff’s

testimony but found them inconsistent with other parts of the medical record); see also

Trauterman, 296 F. App’x at 221 (“The ALJ also concluded that Trauterman’s activities of daily

living and subjective complaints of pain were, in some respects, contrary to the medical evidence.

These findings are supported by substantial evidence . . . .”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. An

appropriate Order follows.

Date: March 19, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE