HOYE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

NATHAN HOYE, )

)

Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01015

)

vs. ) United States Magistrate Judge

) Christopher B. Brown

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF )

PENNSYLVANIA, ALLEGHENY )

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, )

WARDEN ALLEGHENY COUNTY )

JAIL, )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION DISMISSING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before the Court1 is the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Amended Petition”) filed pro se by Petitioner, Nathan

Hoye. At the time of filing, Hoye was a state prisoner in the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections but he has since been released. He

challenges the July 14, 2022, Judgment of Sentence imposed by the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, at Criminal No. CP-02-CR-

0004077-2018. He also has filed two motions for leave to file an amended petition.

ECF Nos. 186 and 188. For the reasons explained below, the Amended Petition will

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have voluntarily

consented to have a U.S. Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a

final judgment. See ECF Nos. 25 and 30.

be dismissed with prejudice and a certificate of appealability will be denied as to

each claim. The motions for leave to file another amended petition will also be

denied as futile.

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas

statute applicable to prisoners in custody pursuant to a state court judgment.2 It

permits a federal court to grant a state prisoner the writ of habeas corpus “on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Errors of state law are not, however, cognizable in a

federal habeas action. Id.; see, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Indeed, the Court is bound by the state courts’ determinations of state law. See,

e.g., Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts reviewing

habeas claims cannot ‘reexamine state court determinations on state-law

questions.’”)(quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68).

It is a petitioner’s burden to establish entitlement to the writ. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); see, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49

(3d Cir. 2017), as amended (July 18, 2017). There are prerequisites, however, that a

petitioner must satisfy before habeas relief is deemed appropriate. For example,

the burden imposed on a petitioner by the standard of review enacted by the

2 State prisoners seeking to obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must demonstrate

that they were “in custody” at the time the federal habeas petition was filed. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). As explained previously, Hoye is no longer in custody but at the time his initial petition was

filed he was a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) (which is

discussed below). But, ultimately, a petitioner cannot receive federal habeas relief

unless it is established the petitioner is in custody in violation of federal

constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see, e.g., Vickers, 858 F.3d at 849.

II. Relevant Legal Standards

Before seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court, a state prisoner must

first exhaust his remedies in state court. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). To do so, the petitioner must “give the state

courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a

federal court in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842. The petitioner

must “give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”

Id. In Pennsylvania, one complete round includes presenting the federal claim

through the Superior Court on direct or collateral review. See Lambert v. Blackwell,

387 F.3d 210, 233 (3d Cir. 2004). When a claim is not exhausted because it has not

been ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the

applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is

satisfied because there is ‘an absence of available State corrective process. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (holding modified by Martinez v.

Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)); Johnson v. Mahanoy, 144 F.4th 178, 186-87(3d Cir. 2025)

(quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (explaining the doctrines of

procedural default and exhaustion “ensure that federal habeas courts rarely ‘upset

a state conviction without an opportunity [for] the state courts to correct a

constitutional violation.”). “In such cases, however, [petitioners] are considered to

have procedurally defaulted their claims and federal courts may not consider the

merits of such claims unless the” petitioner can demonstrate “cause and prejudice”

or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Johnson, 144

F.4th at 188. To show cause and prejudice, a petitioner must show he had good

cause for the procedural default and had suffered prejudice from the alleged

violation of federal law. Johnson, 144 F.4th at 199. To establish a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make a credible showing of actual

innocence. See Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2018), as amended

(July 25, 2018). It is a petitioner’s burden to demonstrate circumstances excusing

procedure default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 650.

III. Relevant Background

Hoye’s convictions arise from an incident that occurred while he was an

inmate at the Allegheny County Jail. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in its

decision of April 15, 2025, affirming the dismissal of Hoye’s PCRA petition,

summarized the relevant factual and procedural history as follows:

[I]n in 2018, while incarcerated in the Allegheny

County Jail, Hoye threatened to harm himself.

Corrections officers put him in a suicide gown and placed

him in a processing cell. When officers ordered Hoye to

submit to handcuffing, he refused. Instead Hoye, . . . ,

reached into his toilet and threw urine on one of the

corrections officers, striking him in the upper torso and

head. The officer was thereafter transported to the

emergency department at a nearby hospital for treatment.

In 2019, Hoye entered an open guilty plea to one count

each of aggravated assault, assault by a prisoner,

aggravated harassment by prisoner, and recklessly

endangering another person. Ultimately, on July 14,

2022, the trial court sentenced Hoye to fifty-seven to 114

months in prison.2 This Court affirmed Hoye’s judgment

of sentence on November 1, 2023. See Commonwealth v.

Hoye, 309 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished

memorandum). Hoye did not seek further review of his

judgment of sentence.

2 Hoye successfully appealed his initial judgment of

sentence, which this Court vacated, requiring a

remand for resentencing. See Commonwealth v.

Hoye, 249 A.3d 1157 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(unpublished memorandum). Upon remand, the

trial court imposed the same sentence, which Hoye

also successfully appealed, requiring a further

remand for resentencing. See Commonwealth v.

Hoye, 279 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(unpublished memorandum).

ECF No. 137-96 at 1-2. On July 14, 2022, Hoye was sentenced to fifty-seven to 114

months in prison. ECF No. 137-72. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed

Hoye’s judgment of sentence on November 1, 2023. ECF No. 137-96. Hoye did not

seek further review of his judgment of sentence. It is this July 14, 2022 judgment of

sentence issued as a result of the third remand that is at the heart of this habeas

case.

A. PCRA Proceedings

Hoye filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on December 4, 2023, in which he

raised three issues: (1) his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

state and federal constitutions; (2) he sought a reduction in the terms of his

sentence; and (3) he appeared to be challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

forming the factual basis for his guilty plea. See ECF 137-77. The PCRA court

appointed counsel, ECF No. 137-78, who filed a motion to withdraw and a “no-

merit” letter under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). ECF 137-79.

The PCRA court granted the motion to withdraw and filed a notice of its intention

to dismiss the petition without a hearing. ECF 137-80. Hoye did not file a response

to the notice to dismiss and the PCRA court dismissed the petition on July 2, 2024.

ECF 137-86. Hoye, proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal and the PCRA

court ordered him to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

under Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. ECF No.

137-91. “[T]he pro se concise statement he submitted consisted of two pages of

handwritten notes stating the following:

Trial records will prove no evidence

Failed to raise my mental health

Double Jeopardy

Illness PTSD Schnoprenic

Illegal prosecution

Failed to raise was incarnated 5-2-13 to 3-9.23

Failed to raise medical issues

hiv

Mouse tapeworm in stomach

There was no camera

Trial records will prove no evidence

Survill[] evidence all hearsay

Can’t prove I assaulted CO-Kelly 2018

only took a plea because my mental health

Was tricked

taken advantage of

No dna evidence

See Brady vs. Maryland

● Mentally illness ptsd schizophrenic

● Mentally ill. Anxiety depression

● Not knowing the law

MH tricked and taken advantage of (conflict counsel)

Medical issues – HIV, tapeworm in stomach

No camera evidence

all hearsay. Look at trial record

No DNA evidence

See Bracy vs. Maryland

NO witness

Cop[] shall be dismissed

ECF No. 137-96 at 5 (quoting Concise Statement, 9/11/2024). See also ECF No. 137-

92.

The PCRA court found Hoye’s concise statement did not coherently identify

the issues he intended to raise on appeal and was so vague the court was forced to

guess what actions Hoye was contending amounted to error and who committed the

purported error. ECF No. 137-93 at 9. On this basis, the PCRA court found Hoye’s

“incoherent September 2024 Concise Statement results in waiver of any claims on

appeal.” Id. at 10.

Hoye appealed the dismissal of his PCRA petition and on April 14, 2025, the

Superior Court affirmed the dismissal finding all issues had been waived: “Because

Hoye’s vague concise statement prevented the PCRA court from discerning his

issues or providing this Court with any legal analysis of those issues, it has

hampered our appellate review. We therefore deem all issues waived.” ECF No.

137-96 at 6. The Superior Court also noted “[e]ven if we had not deemed all issues

waived due to Hoye’s deficient concise statement, we would have dismissed the

appeal due to Hoye’s deficient appellate brief.” Id., n.5. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court denied Hoye’s petition for allowance of appeal (“PAA”) on August 25, 2025.

ECF No. 137-101.

While the PAA was pending, Hoye filed a second PCRA petition on May 5,

2025. ECF No. 137-97. The PCRA court issued a notice of intention to dismiss on

September 15, 2025, ECF No. 137-102, and two days later, Hoye filed a “Motion for

Post Conviction Relief,” which was construed as a third PCRA petition. ECF No.

137-103.

On October 9, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed Hoye’s second PCRA petition,

ECF No. 137-103, and issued a notice of intention to dismiss the third PCRA

petition. ECF No. 137-105. The PCRA court dismissed the third PCRA petition on

November 6, 2025. ECF No. 137-107. Hoye did not appeal the dismissal of either

the second or third PCRA petitions to the Superior Court.

B. The Instant Federal Habeas Case

While his state court proceedings were ongoing, Hoye filed two federal habeas

cases in this court. First, on October 8, 2019, he filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus, which was docketed at Civil Action No. 19-1309. See Case No. 19-cv-1309,

ECF No. 5. In that Petition, Hoye challenged the Order of Sentence entered on

August 6, 2019. Id. Because Hoye had a pending appeal before the Superior Court,

this Court dismissed without prejudice his petition for failure to exhaust state

remedies. Id., ECF No. 33.

Then, on July 13, 2022, Hoye filed this case. ECF No. 1. After his original

filing, Hoye filed several amendments and supplements to the petition. See ECF

Nos. 14, 19, 22, 26, 54, 76, and 125. On February 16, 2023, the case was stayed as

Hoye had a pending appeal of his July 2022 sentence before the Superior Court.

ECF No. 32. During the time the case was stayed, Hoye on multiple occasions

sought to have his case reopened, but his requests were denied without prejudice as

his state court proceedings had not concluded due to the pending appeal in the

Superior Court and the case remained stayed. See ECF Nos. 35, 36, 44, 49, 50, 52,

73, 84, 88, 89, 99, 103, 104, 106, 108, 113, and 115. Hoye was advised by the Court

on numerous occasions that pending proceedings challenging his conviction at CP-

02-CR-0004077-2018, the same conviction that is being challenged in this federal

habeas case, prevented the Court from reopening his case and the case would

remained stayed and administratively closed until the state court proceedings were

completed. See ECF Nos. 41, 48, 53, 56, 57, 62, 78, 85, 93, 101, 103, 105, 112, 114,

and 116. He was further advised that once the state court proceedings had

concluded, the federal case would be reopened and he would be given the

opportunity to file an Amended Petition. Id.

On November 24, 2025, Hoye filed a motion to reopen indicating his state

court proceedings had concluded on or about November 6, 2025. ECF No. 120.

About two weeks later, he filed an amended motion to reopen, ECF No. 121, and

without objection from Respondents, the stay was lifted on January 5, 2026. ECF

No. 127.

Finding Hoye’s multiple submissions, which he called “amendments” to his

original petition, unmanageable, see ECF Nos. 14, 19, 54, 76, and 125, the Court

ordered Hoye to file one, all-inclusive Amended Petition. ECF No. 127. On January

21, 2026, Hoye filed an Amended Petition raising what appears to be three grounds

for habeas relief: (1) counsel forced him to take a guilty plea; (2) no DNA or camera

evidence that CO Kelly was assaulted; and (3) his sentence was excessive. ECF No.

129. Respondents filed an Answer on February 4, 2026 arguing the petition should

be dismissed as all three claims are procedurally defaulted and, in the alternative,

each claim lacks merit. ECF No. 137.3

Three weeks later, on February 27, 2026, Hoye filed a motion to amend. ECF

No. 152. The motion was granted and an Amended Petition was docketed at ECF

No. 157, which remains the operative petition. Hoye raises three claims in the

Amended Petition: (1) he asserts there was not sufficient evidence to convict him

because there was no “DNA or camera evidence.” ECF No. 157 at 5-6; (2) he asserts

a Brady violation occurred, id. at 9; and (3) he asserts an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim contending counsel induced him to plead guilty, id. at 12.

Respondents filed an Answer arguing the Amended Petition should be dismissed as

3 Respondents attached as Exhibits to their Answer relevant state-court filings and decisions.

For ease of reference, the Court uses page numbers from the CM/ECF header. Respondents have

also provided a hard copy of the original state court record, including the transcript from Hoye’s

guilty plea hearing (T20 0384), sentencing hearing held on August 6, 2019 (T20 0410), resentencing

hearing held on April 22, 2021 (T26 0218) and resentencing hearing held on July 14, 2022 (T22

1901).

the claims are procedurally defaulted and, in the alternative, the claims lack merit.

ECF No. 158.

IV. Analysis

Before turning to the merits, the Court notes Hoye presents his habeas

claims in vague assertions, noncoherent phrases and sentences, and does not

provide any analysis, citation to relevant records, or applicable law.

It is a petitioner’s burden to establish entitlement to the writ. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). And “[b]ald assertions and conclusory allegations do not afford a sufficient

ground to provide habeas relief.” Daniels v. Wilson, No. Civ. A. 06-741, 2010 WL

4788046, at *28 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010

WL 4789106 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2010), aff’d, 507 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 & n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

901 (1991) and Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,

484 U.S. 946 (1987)).

With that said, the Court recognizes Hoye is proceeding pro se and, as such, a

pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se habeas

petition must be construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance. See Royce v.

Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney Gen., 878 F.2d 714, 721-

22 (3d Cir. 1989); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970). That said, a federal district court can

dismiss a habeas corpus petition if it appears from the face of the petition that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996);

Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (8d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989).

With these standards in mind, the Court will address each of Hoye’s claims.

Hoye raises the following three claims in the Amended Petition:

Ground One:

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(b) Ifyou did not exhaust your state 7 on Ground One, explain why:

OR-Camemd.€yeeAep

. Page bof 16

Vill Shou/ 20 Dna) Camenm elYden

Ground One, ECF No. 157, at 5.

12

Ground Two:

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□□□ U/E. O€ELAAY_fS-

Ground Three:

a fi □

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(b) If you did not exhaust your state remedies on Ground Four, explain why: ~

7 OLAS (s1t fT Gy

(c) Direct Appeal of Ground Frugy” vO NG ¢ . (f C/f

(1) If you appealed from the judgment of conviction, did you raise this issue? O Yes O No

(2) If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal, explain why:

(d) Post-Conviction Proceedings: aL [ /\ Co <l? L

(1) Did you raise this issue through a post-conviction motion or petition for habeas corpus in a triaLcdurt?

O Yes O No.

ECF No. 157.

Hoye faces two hurdles in bringing these claims. First, the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania determined Hoye had waived all his arguments on appeal by failing

13

to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. ECF No. 137-96 at

6. And to the extent Hoye raised these claims in his second and third PCRA

petitions, those petitions were dismissed as untimely under the requirements of the

PCRA. ECF Nos. 137-103 and 137-107. Hoye did not appeal those rulings and the

time for doing so has now passed. Pa.R.A.P. 903.

Because the Superior Court denied Hoye relief based on a procedural rule of

waiver, the claims he raises in his Amended Petition are barred from federal habeas

review based on the procedural default doctrine. This doctrine is “grounded in

concerns of comity and federalism[.]” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772, 729-30

(1991). It prohibits federal habeas courts from reviewing a state court decision

involving a federal question if the state court decision is based on a rule of state law

that is “independent” of the federal question and “adequate” to support the

judgment. See, e.g., Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732. See also Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (“Federal habeas courts

reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are

guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the

finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within

our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default,

under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including

constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed

to abide by a state procedural rule.”) (emphasis added).

A state rule of procedure is “independent” if it does not depend for its

resolution on answering any federal constitutional question. See, e.g., Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). A state rule is “adequate” if the state appellate

court reviewing the petitioner's claim refused to review it on the merits because the

petitioner failed to comply with the rule and the state court's refusal was consistent

with other decisions. Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (June 12,

2007); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009) (discretionary state rules can be

“adequate”); see also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1991) (a state

procedural rule is “adequate” if it is “firmly established and regularly followed” at

the time that the alleged procedural default occurred).

The state procedural rule, Rule 1925(b), under which the Superior Court

found the claim waived is an independent and adequate state procedural rule. See

Adams v. Kyler, Civ. A. 01-0627, 2002 WL 1896385, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug.15, 2002)

(failure to comply with Rule 1925(b) is an adequate state procedural bar to federal

habeas review); Com. v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“[F]rom this date

forward, in order to preserve their claims for appellate review, Appellants must

comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a Statement of Matters

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925. Any issues not raised in a 1925(b)

statement will be deemed waived.”).

Similarly, the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations which prevents Hoye

from filing a PCRA petition at this point in time, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §

9545(b)(1), also is an adequate and independent ground for precluding federal

habeas review. See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is now

clear that this one-year limitation is a jurisdictional rule that precludes

consideration of the merits of any untimely PCRA petition, and it is strictly enforced

in all cases, including death penalty cases.”).

The three grounds for habeas relief raised by Hoye in the Amended Petition

are procedurally defaulted and Hoye has not advanced any argument as to why the

Court should excuse the procedural default. And denying review of these claims

would not constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice because Hoye fails to

present any “new reliable evidence” of actual innocence. See Schulp, 513 U.S. at

316 (“Without any new evidence of innocence, even the existence of a concededly

meritorious constitutional violation is not itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage

of justice that would allow a habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim.”).

Thus, Hoye has not established grounds to excuse the default and, as a result, all

three claims raised in this Amended Petition are procedurally defaulted and

foreclosed from habeas review.

VI. Motions for Leave to Amend (ECF Nos. 186 and 188)

Habeas petitions “may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules

of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), Hoye may only amend his petition with the

Respondents’ consent or the court's leave. Although courts “should freely give leave

when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), courts may nevertheless deny a

motion to amend when the amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999).

“Specifically, an amendment to a habeas petition may be considered futile when,

inter alia, the amendment is meritless.” Wright v. Smith, No. 18-524, 220 WL

1626757, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2020) (citing Rushing v. Pennsylvania, 637 F. App'x

55, 58 (3d Cir. 2016)).

Hoye seeks to amend his petition to “challenge all evidence,” ECF No. 186,

and to challenge his sentence as excessive and on double jeopardy grounds. ECF

No. 188-1. The same analysis that applies to the three claims raised in the

Amended Petition applies to the claims Hoye seeks to add to his petition. These

claims are procedurally defaulted and foreclosed from habeas review. Thus,

amendment would be futile and, as a result, leave to amend will be denied.

VII. Conclusion

A review of the Amended Petition, the Answer, and the relevant state court

record, reveals the three claims Hoye raises in his Amended Petition have not been

fairly presented to the state courts and therefore are procedurally defaulted. Hence,

the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 will be

dismissed with prejudice as procedurally defaulted and Hoye has failed to advance

any argument as to why this Court should excuse the procedural default of his

claims. Hoye’s motions to amend will be denied as futile.

Hoye is not entitled to a certificate of appealability as jurists of reason would

not find it debatable that the claims presented in this habeas petition are

procedurally defaulted and Hoye has not advanced any argument as to why this

Court should excuse the procedural default of his claims. Therefore, a certificate of

appealability as to each claim will be denied. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). A separate order follows.

DATED this 8th day of June, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: NATHAN HOYE

704 2nd Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

Ashley N. Oravetz

Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office

(via ECF electronic notification)