J.G.J.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.G.J.

Petitioner, | 3:26-cv-706

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V.

JESSICA SAGE,

Warden, Federal Correctional :

Institution, Lewisburg, et al., :

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner J.G.u. (“Petitioner’ of “J.G.J.”), a noncitizen from Haiti with a pending

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) application, seeks habeas relief. J.G.J. filed a TPS

application in November 2024 and is prima facie eligible for TPS, and therefore ne cannot

be removed from the United States and is entitled to work authorization while his application

remains pending. On or about January 19, 2025, J.G.J. was arrested for and charged with

strangulation in violation of Pennsylvania law ten days before the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”)

was signed into law by President Trump. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025) (amending 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c}). The strangulation charge was dismissed in April 2025, and J.G.J. was

releasecl from state custody and taken into Respondents’ custody, where rernains to this

day.

In Count | he alleges that Respondents cannot detain him “on the basis o* his

immigration status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). Specifically, he claims that because his TPS

application remains pending, and he is prima facie eligible for TPS, he cannot lawfully be

detained by Respondents based on his immigration status under the 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), as

amended by the LRA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4)(“An alien provided temporary protected

status under this section shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the

alien’s immigration status in the United States.”). Respondents claim they are not detaining

J.G.J. solely on the basis of his immigration status. Instead, they are detaining him because

he was arrested for and charged with strangulation and that his detention without bond is

mandatory under Section 1226(c). Because the plain language of the TPS statute only

confers protections against detention based on immigration status to TPS holders, not TPS

applicants, the Court finds that TPS protection from detention only applies to persons who

hold TPS, and not those applicants who are prima facie eligible for TPS. Accordingly, it will

reject J.G.J.’s statutory claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a and dismiss Count | of the petition.

In Count Il, J.G.J. brings an as applied constitutional challenge to his detention under

Section 1226(c). According to JGJ, because he is prima facie eligible for TPS, and

therefore cannot be removed, his detention—with or without bond—violates his due process

rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Count Ill, Petitioner

seeks alternative relief, claiming his prolonged civil immigration detention pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and seeks a

prompt individualized bond hearing under German Santos v. Warden Pike County

Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020). Because J.G.J.’s civil immigration

detention has become unreasonable, the Court will grant Petitioner's request for relief in

Count Ill and order a prompt individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).

In that hearing, Respondents must prove by “clear and convincing evidence that continued

detention is necessary.” German Santos, 965 F.3d 213.

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 18, 2026, Petitioner J.G.J., a citizen of Haiti residing in the United States

since his arrival at a port of entry in March 2023 and release on humanitarian parole, filed a

verified petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.' (Doc. 1).

Petitioner, who applied for TPS in November 2024, alleges he is prima facie eligible for TPS

and thus cannot be detained based on his immigration status. J.G.J. has been detained

since April 8, 2025, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and, as such, is not eligible for a bond hearing

under the statute.2

In the petition, Petitioner challenges his civil immigration detention. In Count |,

Petitioner alleges a violation of the Immigration and National Act (“INA”). (/d., JJ 76-80).

Specifically, he alleges a violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254a(a)(4)(B), 1254(a)(d)(4), because he

“is prima facie eligible for temporary protected status and, as such, is entitled to the benefits

1 The Court conditionally granted J.G.J.’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym, and Respondents

indicate that they do not oppose the motion. (Doc. 9 at 1 n.1).

2 The Petition names as Respondents Jessica Sage, Warden of the FC! Lewisburg; Todd Lyons,

Acting Director, ICE (“ICE”): Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security

(‘DHS’); Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General; and John Rife, Acting Field Office Director, ICE

ERO Philadelphia Field Office. (Doc. 1 ff 17-21).

of temporary protected status and cannot be detained.” (/d., J 79). In Count Il, Petitioner

alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, claiming his detention “is

not rationally related to any immigration purpose,” “is not the least restrictive mechanism for

accomplishing any legitimate purpose the government could have in imprisoning Petitioner,”

and because the government “lacks any statutory authorization.” (/d., 81-83). In Count

III, Petitioner alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, claiming his

prolonged detention without a constitutionally adequate bond hearing is unreasonable and

violates due process. (/d., {J 84-96).

Petitioner seeks various forms of relief. He seeks an Order declaring that his

detention violates both 8 U.S.C. § 1254a and the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment. (/d. at 29). He further seeks an order granting his petition and ordering his

immediate release from custody and an order enjoining Respondents from detaining

Petitioner so long as the termination of Haitian TPS is not in effect.3 (/d. at 30). Counsel

further requests attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing and heard oral argument on April 1, 2026.

Petitioner also seeks various forms of alternative relief. (Doc. 1 at 30) (“g) “In the alternative, issue

a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner from custody on his own recognizance

or under parole, bond or reasonable conditions of supervision, on the ground that his continued prolonged

detention by ICE violates his due process rights; h) Or, in the alternative, conduct an individualized bond

hearing at which Respondents bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner's

continued detention is justified because he poses a danger of a flight risk that cannot be remedied by other

conditions of release; i) Or, in the alternative, order an immediate and constitutionally adequate bond hearing

before an immigration judge at which DHS bears the burden to demonstrate that Petitioner's continued

detention is necessary, consistent with the Third Circuit's decision in German Santos, and that the

Immigration Judge consider Petitioner's ability to pay a bond.”).

Il. | BACKGROUND

A. TPS & Haiti’s Designation of Haiti as TPS

When Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990, it created a humanitarian

program known as TPS. Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990). It allows the

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, “after consultation with appropriate

agencies of the Government, [to] designate a foreign state” for TPS. 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(b)(1). The Secretary of DHS “may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals

of that state cannot return there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other

extraordinary and temporary conditions, unless the Secretary finds that permitting the

noncitizens to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of

the United States.” Nat’ TPS Alliance v. Noem, 150 F. 4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Once a foreign state has been designated,

certain noncitizens from that country may apply for protection from immigration-related

removal and detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a), (c), (d)(4). “Congress created TPS to provide

4 Although the TPS statute refers to the “Attorney General,” Congress has since delegated that

authority to Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. 6 U.S.C. § 557; see also Nielsen v. Preap,

586 U.S. 392, 398 n.2 (2019) ("We replace ‘Attorney General’ with ‘Secretary’ because Congress has

empowered the Secretary to enforce the Immigration and National Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ef seq., though the

Attorney General retains the authority to administer removal proceedings and decide relevant questions of

law.”) (citation omitted).

stability, predictability, and a brief reprieve from deportation to qualifying citizens of

designated countries.” Nat'l TPS Alliance v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 748 (9th Cir. 2026).

“TPS shields foreign nationals present in the United States from removal during

armed conflict, environmental disasters, or other extraordinary conditions in their .

homeland.” Sanchez v. Sec. United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 967 F.3d 242, 244-25

(3d Cir. 2020), aff'd, 593 U.S. 409 (2021). DHS first designated Haiti for TPS status in

2010, following a devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake. Haitian Evangelical Clergy Ass'n

v. Trump, 789 F. Supp. 3d 255, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). DHS “subsequently extended this

designation and redesignated Haiti for TPS status multiple times based on continuing harms

from the earthquake.” /d.; see also Natl TPS Alliance, 166 F.4th at 752 (“Haiti's TPS was

repeatedly extended due to ongoing complications caused by the earthquake, as well as a

cholera outbreak.”) (collecting TPS extensions).

On July 1, 2024, DHS Secretary Mayorkas extended Haiti's TPS status from August

4, 2024, through February 3, 2026. Miot v. Trump, _F. Supp. 2026 WL 266413, at

*6 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2026) (citing 89 Fed. Reg. 54484 (July 1, 2024)). On February 24, 2025,

Secretary Noem issued a “partial vacatur” of Secretary Mayorkas July 2024 extension and

redesignation of Haiti for TPS. That partial vacatur “purported to shorter) Haiti's desiigiation

period from the existing end date of February 3, 2026, to Asgust 3, 2025.” Id.

5 The reprieve from deportation “is guaranteed for no more than 18 months ata time.” National TPS

Alliance, 166 F.4th at 748 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1251a(b)(2)(B), (b)(3)(C)).

On July 1, 2025, Judge Cogan of the Eastern District of New York held that

Secretary Noem lacked statutory authority to issue the partial vacatur. Haitian Evangelical,

789 F. Supp. 3d at 275. Secretary Noem thereafter issued a formal notice “purporting to

terminate Haiti’s TPS status as of September 2, 2025.” Miot, 2026 WL 266413, at *6 (citing

90 Fed. Reg. 28760 (July 1, 2025)). Litigation ensured.

In Miot, Judge Reyes of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

granted the plaintiffs’ motion to stay Secretary Noem’s decision to terminate Haiti's TPS

designation under the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 U.S.C. § 701 ef seg. The United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the Government’s motion

to stay. Miot v. Trump, No. 26-5050, 2026 WL 659420 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2026) On March

16, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States deferred ruling on the Government's

motion to stay, granted certiorari before judgment, and set oral arguments for April 20,

2026.6 Trump v. Miot, 2026 WL 731087.

The TPS statute permits “immigrants from designated countries [to] remain in the

United States and receive work authorization” under certain circumstances. Haitian

Evangelical, 789 F. Supp. 3d. at 264-65 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a). A foreign state’s “TPS

designation does not automatically mean its citizens receive TPS.” Miot, 2026 WL 266413,

at *3. Rather, “[a] foreign national is eligible for TPS only if she meets several criteria,

6 As counsel for Petitioner and Respondents both agreed at oral argument, because the Supreme

Court declined to stay the district court's order postponing the effective date of DHS Secretary Noem’s

termination of TPS for Haiti, Haiti's TPS status remains in effect and is not terminated.

including being otherwise admissible and registering for TPS within a specific time frame.””

Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c): 8 C.F.R. § 244.2)). A noncitizen waives eligibility for TPS, “if,

among other things, she has been convicted of a felony or two or more misdemeanors in

the United States.” /d. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)); see also Natl TPS Alliance, 166

F.4th at 755 (“The statute also sets forth the procedure by which foreign nationals of TPS-

designated states can qualify and apply for work authorization and protection from removal,

as well as the Secretary’s authority to withdraw a foreign national’s TPS.”).

The TPS statute mandates that United States Customs and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) “shall grant employment authorization to and shall not remove from the United

States any noncitizen who establishes” he is prima facie eligible for TPS status “until USCIS

makes a final determination of their eligibility.”® Mansor v. United States Citizenship &

Immigr. Servs., 2025 WL 4274509, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(a)(4)). The TPS further provides that “an alien provided temporary protected status

under this section shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s

immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). “That status, once

? A noncitizen is eligible for TPS: (1) if they have been “continuously physically present in the United

States since the effective date of the most recent designation,” (2) if they have “continuously resided in the

United States since that designation date,” and (3) if they are “admissible as an immigrant.” 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).

8 The applicable regulations define “prima facie eligible” to mean “eligibility established with the filing

of a completed application for [TPS] containing factual information that if unrebutted will establish a claim of

eligibility.” 8 C.F.R. § 244.1. “Noncitizens apply for TPS using Form 1-821 during the registration period

established by DHS and are considered” prima facie eligible for TPS “if the applicant satisfies the

requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A).” Mansor, 2025 WL 4274509, at *2.

granted, provides a noncitizen with certain benefits for as long as the TPS designation lasts.

Those benefits include a statutory prohibition on the noncitizen’s removal and detention.”

Echeverria v. Janecka, 2026 WL 44896, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026) (citations omitted).

“However, removal proceedings may continue and a noncitizen ‘may be ordered

removed while under TPS, though the order remains inexecutable so long as the

[noncitizen] remains a TPS beneficiary.” Geincharles v. Rokosky, 2026 WL 266093, at *2

(D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2026) (quoting Duarte v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 1044, 1054 (5th Cir. 2022)).

“The TPS program gives foreign nationals nonimmigrant status, but it does not admit

them.”® Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409, 413-13 (2021).

B. The Laken Riley Act

On January 29, 2025, the LRA was signed into law by President Trump. Pub. L. No.

119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). The LRA mandates the

detention, without bond, of a noncitizen who “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of,

admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements

of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or

any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person.” 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)(1)(E)(2).8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Detention must occur “when the alien is released”

9 “The INA defines ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ as ‘the lawful entry of the alien into the United States

after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Sachez, 967 F.3d at 245 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(13)(A)). Here, J.G.J. entered the United States at a port of entry, “after inspection and authorization

by an immigration officer.” Id.

from criminal custody on the underlying offense, regardless if they are released on “parole,

supervised released, or probation,” and “without regard to whether the alien may be

arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.”"° /d.

Under Section 1226(c), the Attorney General “shall take into custody” any noncitizen

who meets its statutory criteria. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Relevant to J.G.J.’s petition, the LRA

provides two statutory preconditions to apply. First, the noncitizen must be “inadmissible

under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title.’ 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)(1)(E)(1). Second, the LRA applies to a noncitizen who “is charged with, is arrested

for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the

essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law

enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to

10 This “release and re-detain provision predates the LRA’s amendment to Section 1226 of the IIRIRA,

where it formerly applied only to alien noncitizens convicted of a specified set of crimes, not merely arrests.”

Matute v. Jamison, 2026 WL 461557, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2026). “Thus, under the LRA, ‘if a noncitizen

entered the country illegally and was subsequently convicted or charged,’ or arrested for, ‘certain crimes, that

noncitizen must be detained without a bond hearing while their removal proceedings are pending.”). /d.

(quoting Ndiaye v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3229307 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2025)).

1 Section 1182(a)(6)(A) applies to “Aliens present without admission or parole.” 8 U.S.C.

1182(a)(6)(A). In relevant part, it renders inadmissible noncitizens “present in the United States without being

admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the

Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Section 1182(a)(6)(C) applies to “misrepresentations” and

makes inadmissible, in part, noncitizens “who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to

procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United

States or other benefit provided under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Section 1182(a)(7) of the

INA is entitled “Documentation requirements.” In relevant part, it renders inadmissible a noncitizen

“who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification

card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable

travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such document is required under the regulations

issued by the Attomey General under section 1181(a) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7).

10

another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(2). Courts interpreting the LRA have found that

its text does not indicate any Congressional intent to make the LRA retroactive, despite

Respondents assertion at oral argument that the LRA is a retroactive statute.'2 April 1,

2026, Unofficial Hr'g Tr. at 9:19-11:11.

C. Factual Allegations

Petitioner J.G.J. is a Haitian national who has been in ICE custody since April 8,

2025. (Doc. 1,1). On March 20, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States at a

designated port of entry in Brownsville, Texas utilizing the Customs & Border Protection

(“CBP”) One application.’ (/d., § 22). CBP processed J.G.J. for a Notice to Appear (“NTA”)

and paroled him into the United States. The NTA charged Petitioner as inadmissible

pursuant to INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for lacking a valid, unexpired immigrant visa or proper

12 See, e.g., Matute, 2026 WL 461557, at “5 ("This Court finds (and the Government agrees) that the

text of the LRA does not evince any intent on the part of Congress for its retroactive application. ... Thus,

his prior shoplifting arrest cannot justify denying him bond under its provision.”) (citing /.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533

U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (“A statute may not be applied retroactively, however, absent a clear indication from

Congress that it intended such a result.”); Singh v. Noem, 2026 WL 523216, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2026)

(‘The undersigned finds that the LRA does not justify petitioner's mandatory detention because it is not

retroactively applicable to his 2024 arrest.”) (citing Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 262 (2012)); Araiza v.

Hermosillo, 2025 WL 3516103, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2025) (noting that respondents agreed with

petitioner that the Laken Riley Act “does not apply retroactively’).

13 CBP One “was a mobile application launched by the Department of Homeland Security in October

2020.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 57 n.2 (D.D.C. 2025). “It

enabled noncitizens to book an appointment to appear for inspection at a port of entry, submit information in

advance, and potentially obtain parole or admission into the country.” /d. On January 25, 2025, “DHS

removed the scheduling functionality from the CBP One app.” /d. Further, DHS has also “renamed the

application CBP Home, which it now says facilitates voluntary self-deportation.” /d.

11

travel documents, and instructed Petitioner to appear on October 9, 2024, before an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Miami.

On February 4, 2024, Petitioner filed an I-589 Application for Asylum, Withholding of

Removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture with the USCIS. (Doc. 1, J 22).

On July 1, 2024, DHS Secretary Mayorkas extended Haiti's TPS status from August 4,

2024, through February 3, 2026. 89 Fed. Reg. 54484, 54489 (July 1, 2024). Petitioner

submitted a completed application for TPS on November 28, 2024. (Doc. 1, ] 24). His

application for TPS remains pending before USCIS. (/d.).

Petitioner alleges that the factual information in his TPS application establishes his

eligibility for TPS. (/d., | 25). Specifically, he alleges “he is a Haitian national who has been

physically present in the United States since March 20, 2023, prior to the effective date of

the most recent TPS designation for Haiti; that he has resided here since then; that he is not

subject to any bars to TPS eligibility because he does not have any criminal convictions;

and that he is otherwise admissible under 8 C.F.R. § 244.3.” (Id.) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.1,

244.2). At the evidentiary hearing and oral argument, counsel for Petitioner submitted

J.G.J.’s pending TPS application, which contains factual information supporting his

assertion that he is prima facie TPS eligible. Thus, the Court agrees with J.G.J. that his

pending application establishes that he is prima facie eligible for TPS. April 1, 2026,

Unofficial Hr'g Tr. at 21:13-24:9.

12

On or about January 18, 2025, J.G.J. was arrested by the York County Regional

Police Department for Strangulation - Applying Pressure to Throat or Neck, in violation of 18

Pa. C.S. § 2718(a)(1). (Doc. 9-2). Following dismissal of the criminal complaint on or about

April 8, 2025, ICE officials took Petitioner into custody. (Doc. 1, ] 26). J.G.J. was held at

the Moshannon Valley Processing Center (“MVPC’) in the Western District of Pennsylvania

without bond from April 8, 2025, to January 21, 2026. (/d., J. 27). He was thereafter

transferred to FC] Lewisburg within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

On August 19, 2025, Petitioner represented himself pro se on his Application for

Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. (Doc. 1,

q 29). The lJ denied all applications for relief and ordered Petitioner removed to

Haiti. (/d.). Petitioner timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (/d.).

On January 21, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Western District of Pennsylvania arguing that his detention without a bond hearing under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) had become unconstitutionally prolonged. (/d., | 30) (citing U.G.u. v.

Oddo., No. 3:26-cv-79-WSS (W.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2026)). On February 12, 2026, Judge

Strickman denied the petition, finding that his detention at MVPC did not violate due process

and that J.G.J. was lawfully detained without bond pursuant to the LRA based on his arrest

13

for strangulation. (/d., 31). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

denied on March 4, 2026."4 (Id., | 32).

On March 12, 2026, the BIA affirmed the lJ’s decision, dismissed J.G.J.’s appeal and

denied his motion to reopen and remand. On March 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review and Application for a Stay of Removal in the United States Courts of Appeals for the

Third Circuit and received an automatic temporary stay of his removal order. (/d., | 34)

(citing U.G.J. v. Att'y Gen., No. 26-1593 (3d Cir. Mar 18, 2026)).

ill. | STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

(citing U.S. Const., Art l, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal district court

may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner's immigration detention is “in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically,

“the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive

detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,

533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration detainees seeking relief from

their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas corpus.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604

U.S. 670, 672 (2025). It is well established that a federal habeas corpus petitioner generally

14 Respondents do not claim that the abuse of the writ doctrine applies to bar Petitioner's habeas

petition. Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434 (3d Cir. 2021). The abuse of the writ doctrine

“generally prohibits a petitioner under § 2241 from raising new claims that could have been resolved in a

previous action.” Id. at 442 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

14

has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley,

464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

Although no party raised the issue, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition and

grant relief. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 538 U.S. 281, 292-296 (2018); see Patel v. O'Neil, 2025

WL 3516865, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025). Further, Petitioner challenge is not “inextricably

linked” to his removal proceedings, and the Court of Appeals could not meaningfully address

Petitioner's current detention without bond and the attendant constitutional concerns related to

his mandatory, and perhaps indefinite, detention for a dismissed criminal charge along with a

final order of removal. Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026).

In the petition, J.G.J. raises one statutory and two constitutional claims. The Court will

address each claim in turn.

A. Statutory Claim

In Count | Petitioner first claims his detention is unlawful and violates the INA

because he is a TPS applicant and is prima facie eligible for TPS. Specifically, he directs

the Court to a subsection of the TPS statute which provides that “[a]n alien provided

temporary protected status under this section shall not be detained by the Attorney General

on the basis of the alien’s immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4).

According to J.G.J., although his TPS application remains pending, because he is prima

15

facie TPS eligible, he cannot be detained based on his immigration status. (Doc. 1 at 78-

79).

Respondents assert that J.GJ.’s prima facie application for TPS does not prevent his

detention under Section 1226(c). (Doc. 9 at 13-23). According to Respondents, “even if

Petitioner has a prima facie application for temporary protected status,” a position which

Respondents take no position, he “is still subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c) because he is not being detained based upon his immigration status . .

. alone.”5 (Doc. 9 at 20-21) (emphasis added). Rather, “Petitioner is being detained

because he is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i}(I) and because he was

recently arrested for Strangulation - Applying Pressure to Throat or Neck, in violation of 18

Pa. Con. Stat. § 2718.” (Id. at 21) (emphasis in original).

The TPS statute and applicable regulations “only list non-detention on the basis of

immigration status as a benefit of TPS and do not list a general protection against non-

detention as a benefit of TPS.” Gudino v. Lowe, 2026 WL 526366, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25,

2026). The Court must look at the TPS statute to determine if J.G.J., as a TPS applicant

with prima facie eligibility, cannot be detained.

“When the meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to interpret the act of

Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

1 At oral argument, counsel for Respondents took the position that, upon further review, J.G.J. is not

prima facie eligible for TPS, although Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner filed a TPS application

which remains pending with USCIS. April 1, 2026, Unofficial Hrg Tr. at 23:24-24:9.

16

603 U.S. 369, 395 (2024) (quotations omitted). “We start, of course, with the statutory text.

Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their

ordinary meaning.” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006). Courts must read

statutes and regulations “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.” Arguenta-

Orellana v. Att'y Gen. United States, 35 F.4th 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2022).

Here, the relevant statute states that a noncitizen “provided temporary protected

status under this section shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the

alien's immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). J.G.J. claims that

§ 1254a(a)(4) extends its protection against detention to person like him—noncitizens who

submitted TPS application and are prima facie eligible for TPS. At oral argument, counsel

for J.G.J. noted that the TPS statute use of the term “provided,” in Section 1254a(d)(4),

rather than “granted,” indicates Congress’s intent to extend protections against detention

based on immigration status to TPS applicants who are prima facie eligible for TPS." The

Court disagrees.

The TPS statute provides:

(4) Temporary treatment for eligible aliens

(A) In the case of an alien who can establish a prima facie case of eligibility for benefits

under paragraph (1), but for the fact that the period of registration under subsection

(c)(1)(A}(iv) has not begun, until the alien has had a reasonable opportunity to register

16 According to J.G.J., Congress knew the difference between “provided” TPS and “granted” TPS and

did not limit Section 1254a(d)(4)’s application to only those granted TPS, as it did elsewhere in the statute.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(e) (“With respect to an alien granted temporary protected status under this section...”);

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f) (“During a period in which an alien is granted temporary protected status under the

section...”).

17

during the first 30 days of such period, the Attorney General shall provide for the

benefits of paragraph (1).

(B) In the case of an alien who establishes a prima facie case of eligibility for benefits

under paragraph (1), until a final determination with respect to the alien’s eligibility for

such benefits under paragraph (1) has been made, the alien shall be provided such

benefits.

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(4)(A)-(B). By its plain terms, Section 1254a(a)(4)(B) limits the benefits

extended to TPS eligible noncitizens to the benefits appearing in paragraph (1). See

Geincharles, 2026 WL 266093, at *2 (interpreting TPS statute). The benefits set forth in

paragraph (1), are protections from removal from the United States “during the period in

which such status in effect” and authorization “to engage in employment in the United

States and provide the [noncitizen] with an ‘employer authorized’ endorsement or other

appropriate work permit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1).

The TPS statute’s implementing regulations support this interpretation. 8 C.F.R. §

244.10 entitled “Decision and appeal,” provides, in relevant part:

(e) Grant of temporary treatment benefits.

(1) Temporary treatment benefits shall be evidenced by the issuance of an

employment authorization document. The alien shall be given, in English and

in the language of the designated foreign state or a language that the alien

understands, a notice of the registration requirements for Temporary Protected

Status and a notice of the following benefits:

(i) Temporary stay of deportation; and

(ii) Temporary employment authorization.

(2) Unless terminated under § 244.13, temporary treatmerit deriefits shall

rernain in effect until a final decision has been macle on the application for

Temporary Protected Status.

8 C.F.R. § 244.10(e)(1)-(2); see also Mansor v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,

345 F.R.D. 193, 199 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The temporary treatment benefits are protection

18

from deportation and employment authorization.”). No further benefits, such as protections

from detention, are listed in the statute or regulations providing benefits to prima facie

eligible TPS applicants.

“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that where a section of a statute

does not include a specific term or phrase used elsewhere in the statute, the drafter did not

wish such a requirement to apply.” In re Visteon Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2010)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The TPS statute makes clear that Congress

“did not intend to give TPS applicants the full protection and benefits that are accorded to

TPS recipients.” Geincharles, 2026 WL 266093, at *3. Accordingly, the Court finds that the

plain language of Section 1254a(d)(4) does not apply to J.G.J. because he is a TPS

applicant, not a TPS recipient. See Geincharles, 2026 WL 266093, at *3 (“By its plain

language, § 1254a(d)(4) only applies to noncitizens who are TPS recipients; TPS applicants

are protected from removal while their applications are being considered, but not deterition.

Assuming without deciding that petitioner has established prima facie eligibility for TPS

statute, § 1254a does not categorically prohibit his detention.”); see also Dassas v. Mordant,

2026 WL 653686, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2026) (“Had Congress intended to give TPS

applicants the full protections and benefits that are accorded to TPS recipients, it could have

done so. Instead, it delinsated the specific benefits available to such persons.”). For these

reasons, the Court will dismiss Count | of the petition because J.G.J. is not entitled to the

relief he seeks under the TPS statute.

19

B. Constitutional Claims

In the petition, J.G.J. raises two constitutional claims. First, he claims that since he

cannot be deported under the TPS statute, his detention violates his substantive due

process rights. (Doc. 10 at 7). Second, and in the alternative, Petitioner raises an

as applied constitutional challenges to his prolonged immigration detention under Section

1226(c). German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020).

Because the Court will grant habeas relief on alternative grounds, it need not address Count

Il of the petition.

Count Ill - Due Process Prolonged Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

In Count Ill, Petitioner seeks alternative relief, claiming his prolonged civil

immigration detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates his due process rights under

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) requires the

Government to detain immigrants with certain criminal convictions pending removal without

bond hearings.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL

263483, at *11 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that Ҥ 1226(c)

does not on its face limit the length of the detention it authorizes.” 583 U.S. at 303. But

as applied constitutional challenges to prolonged immigration detention, like those

advanced here, are recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit. German Santos, 965 F.3d 203.

20

To determine whether prolonged detention is unreasonable, a “highly-specific-fact

inquiry,” this Court must consider “a nonexhaustive list of four factors to consider in

assessing whether an alien's detention has grown unreasonable.”'? German Santos, 965

F.3d at 210-11. “The most important factor is the duration of detention.” /d. at 211. The

Court must also consider: (1) whether the detention is likely to continue; (2) reasons for the

delay, such as a detainee’s request for continuances; and (3) “whether the alien’s conditions

of confinement are meaningfully different from criminal punishment.” ‘8 /d. If a noncitizen’s

“civil detention under § 1226(c) looks penal, that tilts the scales toward finding the detention

unreasonable.” /d (citations omitted). “And as the length of detention grows, so does the

weight that we give this factor.” /d.

Duration of Detention

Petitioner has been detained by Respondents since April 8, 2025—approximately

one year, (Doc. 1, ] 26). “There is no presumption of reasonableness or

unreasonableness of any duration.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. The Third Circuit has

7 “When an alien is first detained, we can presume that detention is needed to prevent flight or danger

to the community.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 209 (citing Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison,

783 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2015)). “The benefit of detaining these aliens as a class outweighs their short-

term deprivation of liberty.” /d. (citing Chavez-Alvarez 783 F.3d at 474). “Eventually, though, that burden

‘outweighs a mere presumption that the alien will flee’ or pose a danger.” /d. (citing Chavez-Alvarez 783 F.3d

at 474-75). At some point, “due process requires the Government to justify continued detention at a bond

hearing.” Id.

18 The Court cannot hold a noncitizen's “good-faith challenge to his appeals or applications for relief’

against him, otherwise that would effectively punish him for pursuing his legal rights and remedies. German

Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. “Nor do we hold the agency's legal errors against the Government, unless there is

evidence of careless or bad faith.” /d.

21

declined to impose a per se rule that any detention longer than a specific duration is

unreasonable. However, the Third Circuit finds that, “detention becomes more and more

suspect after five months.” /d. at 211. In German Santos, the Third Circuit held that

“detention became unreasonable sometime between six months and one year” after it

began. Id. Here, Petitioner has been detained for approximately one year and the Court

finds that the duration of civil immigration detention favors relief at this time.

Likelihood of Detention

Petitioner has established he is likely to stay detained for some time. Petitioner's

appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is currently pending. No final order of removal

exists. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the second German Santos factor

favors granting habeas relief. See Joseph v. Warden, 2026 WL 497532, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

Feb. 23, 2026) (“The second factor, the likelihood that detention will continue, favors

granting habeas relief. Joseph is appealing his removal order to the BIA, and expresses his

intent to appeal to the Third Circuit if necessary.”). Similarly, J.G.J. has a pending

application for TPS. Even if his TPS application is denied, he “would have a right to appeal

that decision, during which time he would remain unremovable” and that “further attenuates

the likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Salad v. Dept. of Corr.,

769 F. Supp. 3d 913, 923 (D. Alaska 2025).

22

Reasons for the Delay

The Court finds no party is responsible for any delay. Accordingly, this factor is

neutral.

Conditions of Confinement

The Court next finds that Petitioner's civil immigration detention at FCI Lewisburg “is

indistinguishable from criminal punishment.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213.

Respondents do not dispute that J.G.J.’s conditions of confinement are indistinguishable

from criminal punishment, and J.G.J. submitted the Declaration of Chris Setz Kelly, (Doc. 1-

3), which lends support that finding. If a noncitizen’s “civil detention under § 1226(c) looks

penal, that tilts the scales toward finding the detention unreasonable.” /d. at 211.

Weighing the German Santos factors, the Court finds that Petitioner's civil

immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) has become unreasonable. Petitioner has

been detained for approximately one year based on a dismissed criminal charge that

predated the LRA’s amendment to Section 1226(c). Further, J.G.J. has demonstrated that

he is likely to be detained for an extended period of time. Moreover, because Petitioner's

detention looks penal, that tips the scales toward a finding that his detention has become

unreasonable. The next question is the appropriate remedy.

Remedy

J.G.J. asks that this Court, rather than an lJ, hold the bond hearing required by

German Santos. The Third Circuit in German Santos found the appropriate remedy for

23

prolonged civil immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was a prompt and

individualized bond hearing before an lJ. In that bond hearing, “the Government must put

forth clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary.” German

Santos, 965 F.3d 213. Because this Court finds Petitioner’s continued detention is

unreasonable, at the bond hearing required by German Santos the Government “must

show,” by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner “would likely flee or pose a danger

to the community if released.”19

Petitioner's request for fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act will be

held in abeyance until the termination of this proceeding. Michelin v. Warden Moshannon

Valey Corr. Cent., F. 4!"__, 2026 WL 263438, at *11 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (allowing fees

under EAJA in immigration habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

19 At oral argument, both Petitioner and Respondents acknowledged that this Court may conduct the

bond hearing. April 1, 2026, Unofficial Hr’g Tr at 36:23-38:14; see Centeno-Martinez, 2025 WL 3157711, at

*3 (“The Court will conduct the individualized bond hearing itself as ahabeas remedy.”). In Centeno-Martinez,

Judge Sanchez noted that “[d]istrict courts in this Circuit have exercised that authority, describing it as a legal

and logical concomitant of habeas jurisdiction, particularly where delay risks perpetuating the constitutional

injury.” /d. at *3. (collecting cases); see also Chiguano v. Lowe, 2025 WL 3187161, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14,

2025) (Wilson, J.) (“Federal district courts have the authority to enforce writs of habeas corpus and to conduct

bond proceedings in habeas corpus cases brought by immigration detainees.) (citing Sylvain v. U.S. Att'y

Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2013)). Upon review, however, the Court believes the appropriate remedy

is a prompt and individualized bond hearing before an IJ. After that hearing, Petitioner may file an amended

petition should he wish to raise any procedural infirmities with the lu’s hearing with this Court.

24

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s habeas petition will be granted in part. Count

| will be dismissed and Count III will be granted> Asg araiAoveet follows. ,

4 UNM,

obert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

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