The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Paige Goodin :
:
v. : No. 870 C.D. 2024
: Argued: May 12, 2026
Police Officer Christopher Fountas :
and Police Officer Johangelie :
Thomas-Estrada, :
Appellants :
BEFORE: HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: June 22, 2026
Two City of Philadelphia (City) Police Officers, Christopher Fountas
(Fountas) and Johangelie Thomas-Estrada (Estrada) (individually, Officer and
collectively, the Police), appeal from the June 5, 2024 order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying their post-trial motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Following a jury trial, the trial court
entered a June 13, 2024 final judgment in favor of Paige Goodin (Goodin) and
against the Police in the amount of $4.1 million. After review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Goodin initiated this action by Complaint on February 4, 2022. Trial Court
Opinion (Trial Ct. Op.), 11/21/24, at 1. Goodin alleged that on October 27, 2020,
while attempting to protect one of her two daycare locations1 from riots in West
Philadelphia, she sustained personal injuries, emotional injuries, and economic
damages after Estrada struck her in the head with a police baton and Fountas
wrongfully arrested her.2 Id. The case proceeded to jury trial from April 8-12, 2024,
against Fountas for assault, battery and false arrest, and against Estrada for assault,
battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found the Police
acted with willful misconduct and awarded Goodin $2 million in compensatory
damages against each Officer and $50,000 in punitive damages against each Officer,
for a total award of $4.1 million. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1186a.
On June 5, 2024, the trial court denied the Police’s post-trial motions,3 and the
Prothonotary entered judgment on June 13, 2024. On appeal, the Police challenge
1
Throughout the record, Goodin’s two daycare locations are referenced as 52nd Street and 60th
Street. The October 27, 2020 riot occurred at the 52nd Street location, and Goodin closed this
facility approximately one month later. Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
2
Goodin also sued Sergeant Strubinger of the City Police for negligent supervision; however, the
trial court granted the City’s motion for compulsory non-suit and the motion for directed verdict
for willful misconduct. Trial Ct. Op. at 2, n.1.
3
The Police have narrowed their issues for appellate review, as their post-sentence motions also
challenged the trial court’s failure to grant JNOV as to Goodin’s claims for false arrest, assault and
battery against Fountas, and claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and
battery against Estrada. Appellants’ Br. at 15. Specifically, the Police question:
Where the trial court upheld the jury’s finding that [the Police] were liable for
(among other things) assault and battery arising from an altercation with [Goodin]
during the October 2020 Walter Wallace riots in West Philadelphia:
1. Should this Court reverse and enter JNOV for [the Police], given that the unfolding
chaos of the evening precluded a reasonable jury from finding that either [Officer]
acted with the high degree of intentionality required to prove willful misconduct;
and given that no reasonable jury could doubt that [Goodin] resisted and attempted
(Footnote continued on next page…)
2
the trial court’s failure to enter JNOV based upon lack of proof of willful misconduct
and, alternatively, the failure to grant a new trial on damages, or at least to order a
significant reduction.
DISCUSSION
JNOV may be entered where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law or where the evidence is such that no two reasonable persons could disagree that
the verdict should have been rendered for the movant. Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d
1003, 1007 (Pa. 1992). This Court’s review of a denial of JNOV or for a new trial
is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed
an error of law. Glover v. Dept. of Transp., 647 A.2d 630, 631 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
Moreover, in conducting such review, this Court is required to view the evidence in
the light which is most favorable to the verdict winner and give such party every
favorable inference. Id. “[A] new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in testimony or because the trial judge on the same facts would have arrived
at a different conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (Pa.
to punch the [P]olice prior to being physically tackled by one [Officer] and struck
by a baton by the other [Officer]?
2. Alternatively, should the Court order a new damages trial (or a significant
remittitur) because the jury’s award of $4 million in damages for lost profits from
[Goodin’s] daycare business – due to her alleged inability to work at one of her two
locations – was unsupported and impermissibly speculative where: the business
had been losing money before the incident; [Goodin’s] expert based his future-
profits projections upon one anomalous and non-reproducible profit-making year
when the business was closed for COVID but received large government assistance
funds; and the expert based his lost-profits conclusion upon the one branch’s
closure, but ignored the fact that the business’s other branch continued to operate
successfully, that [Goodin] continued to work there, and that children transferred
into the remaining branch from the closed branch?
Id. at 4-5.
3
1994) (quotation omitted). Moreover, our Supreme Court instructed “[i]t is not the
place of an appellate court to invade the trial judge’s discretion any more than a trial
judge may invade the province of a jury, unless both or either have palpably abused
their function.” Id. at 1190. In assessing whether the trial court palpably abused its
discretion, this Court must
“examine the record and assess the weight of the evidence; not
however, as the trial judge, to determine whether the preponderance of
the evidence opposes the verdict, but rather to determine whether the
court below in so finding plainly exceeded the limits of judicial
discretion and invaded the exclusive domain of the jury.” Where the
record adequately supports the trial court, the trial court has acted
within the limits of its judicial discretion.”
Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
The Police first contend the trial court erred in refusing to enter JNOV,
because no reasonable jury, given the unfolding chaos of the evening, could have
found either Officer acted with the high degree of intentionality required to prove
willful misconduct. Appellants’ Br. at 4. The Police assert they were attempting to
restore order, not act unlawfully. Id. at 18.
Section 8550 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act)
provides a police officer with official immunity from liability unless his conduct
constitutes “willful misconduct.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. The trial court noted this Court
interpreted “willful misconduct” as “willful misconduct aforethought” and
construed it synonymously with “intentional tort.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13. “Willful
misconduct means the actor ‘desired to bring about the result that followed or at least
that he was aware that it was substantially certain to ensue.’” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court determined the evidence supported the jury’s finding that
the Police acted with willful misconduct. First, Estrada testified although Goodin
4
did not pose a threat, Estrada was wearing heavy riot gear and a cloudy mask that
obstructed her view, and she intended to strike Goodin with her police baton. Id.
Estrada testified she did not use an alternative means of restriction that would have
required less force. Id. Second, Fountas swung his baton at Goodin, and Goodin
testified she grabbed it to prevent being hit. Id. Fountas testified after Goodin
punched him in the face, he grabbed her, and she fell to the ground. Id. at 13-14.
The trial court concluded if the jury believed Goodin did not punch Fountas in the
face, the jury reasonably could have concluded [the Tort Claims Act] prohibited him
from making contact with Goodin. Id. at 14. Thus, the trial court found the jury’s
finding of willful misconduct supported by the evidence. Id.
We find no abuse of discretion. The Police emphasize their actions in trying
to “subdue a flailing” Goodin during a chaotic evening did not rise to the high degree
of intentionality required to prove willful misconduct. Appellants’ Br. at 18.
Fountas contends even if Goodin did not initially hit him, video evidence shows
Goodin “indisputably jabbed” at him when she was shoved in the back. Id.
However, Goodin was never questioned during trial about a specific jabbing motion.
Accordingly, the jury, as fact-finder, was entitled to determine the weight to ascribe
to Goodin’s actions. We will not disturb its findings on appeal. Moreover, Goodin
testified all of her arm movements were defensive in nature, as she was trying to
reach for her phone and block nightsticks from hitting her. R.R. at 123a-24a. The
jury, having viewed all of the evidence, was in the best position to evaluate these
claims and interpret the video footage. Insofar as Fountas would have this Court
ignore the jury’s findings and reweigh the evidence in his favor, we cannot do so.
Estrada explained she did not observe Goodin until near the end of the
incident, and in attempting to aid her fellow officers, she intended to hit Goodin on
5
the arm but instead, hit her on the head. Appellants’ Br. at 26. However, Estrada
admitted before intervening, she did not observe Goodin punch Fountas. R.R. at
215a-16a. Estrada acknowledged striking someone in the head with a baton is
contrary to police protocols. Id. at 225a. Estrada testified she was trained to use
lesser control techniques before employing baton strikes, but she did not do so. Id.
at 220a-21a. Similar to Fountas, we refuse to reweigh the jury’s findings. The trial
court did not err in determining the record supported the jury’s finding of willful
misconduct by Estrada.
Second, the Police contend the trial court erred in refusing to award a new
damages trial, or a significant reduction, as the jury’s award of $4 million in lost
profits for Goodin’s daycare business, based upon her inability to work at one of her
two business locations, was unsupported and impermissibly speculative.
Appellants’ Br. at 4.
In reviewing a damages award, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he
duty of assessing damages is within the province of the jury and should not be
interfered with by the court, unless it clearly appears that the amount awarded
resulted from caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption or some other improper
influence.” Ferrer v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 825 A.2d 591, 611 (Pa. 2002) (internal
quotation omitted). Importantly, the appellate courts “should give deference to the
decisions of the trier of fact who is usually in a superior position to appraise and
weigh the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Under Pennsylvania law,
damages need not be proved with mathematical certainty, but only with reasonable
certainty, and evidence of damages may consist of probabilities and inferences.
Bailets v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 181 A.3d 324, 336 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).
“Judicial reduction of a jury award is appropriate only when the award is plainly
6
excessive and exorbitant.” Id. (citation omitted). “The refusal of a remittitur is
peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion or error of law.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Police first contend Goodin failed to establish their actions were both the
cause in fact and the proximate cause of her injuries, both necessary to establish
causation.4 Regarding proximate causation, the Police assert although plaintiffs
frequently recover lost earnings capacity claims in tort cases, these are categorically
different from lost profits claims. Appellants’ Br. at 30. In turn, the Police contend
Goodin failed to establish her absence caused the business’s lost profits, because she
had 30 total employees between the two business locations, and her mother assisted
her in running the business. Id. at 33. Regarding but-for causation, the Police argue
even without the alleged misconduct, the business would have struggled. Id. at 34.
The Police emphasize the business lost thousands of dollars in 2019 before the
pandemic and the incident, and the Police assert two months before the incident, a
change to government pandemic subsidies severely and detrimentally impacted the
business. Id. at 34-35. In turn, the Police criticize Goodin’s expert’s analysis that
the business would have earned millions of dollars in profits if only the Police had
never interacted with Goodin. Id. at 35.
We disagree. The trial court noted in its decision the jury’s award was
supported by the trial testimony and concluded it did not err in denying the Police’s
motion for a new trial on grounds the verdict was “excessive, speculative, and
unforeseeable.” Trial Ct. Op. at 15. The trial court noted Goodin’s presentation of
forensic economist Andrew Verzilli (Verzilli) who testified Goodin had a retirement
4
“Proximate cause” is defined as “[a] cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability,” and a
“cause in fact,” also known as “but-for cause,” is defined as “[t]he cause without which the event
could not have occurred.” Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
7
age of 67 years old and closing the daycare caused her to “conservatively lose about
$2,200,000.” Id. Particularly regarding causation, the trial court recognized “[t]he
jury found that the actions of [the Police] directly caused . . . Goodin to close her
daycare and compensated her for her resulting financial loss; the jury accepted the
testimony and opinions of . . . Verzilli.” Id.
In addition, Dr. Frank Dattilio, a psychologist, testified Goodin suffered Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from the October 27, 2020 incident, and she
closed one of her two daycare locations because “it was too intolerable for her” to
return to that locale. R.R. at 1011a-12a. Goodin also testified about the trauma she
experienced upon attempting to return: “I went into shock. I was anxious . . . . I
even vomited once I got into the building.” Id. at 111a. Goodin testified her
specialized certification and sole physical presence were legally required for her
business to operate, and her mother did not have the requisite certification. Id. at
111a-12a. Lost profits may be recovered in tort cases where “profits are entirely, or
almost entirely, the direct result of the personal labor and endeavor of the owner.”
Dempsey v. Scranton, 107 A. 877, 879 (Pa. 1919). Thus, substantial evidence
supports the jury’s determination the Police’s actions were the proximate cause of
Goodin’s economic damages. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.
Regarding but-for causation, the trial court noted the jury rejected the Police’s
contention Goodin closed one daycare center location because of changes in state
subsidization. Trial Ct. Op. at 15. The revenue adjustment occurred in September
2020, and Goodin’s decision to close did not occur until after the October 27, 2020
incident. Goodin denied she closed the business because of financial issues. R.R.
at 112a, 126a. Goodin testified the revenue adjustment raised “[n]o concern about
8
the business’s future, as “[p]arents were not pulling their children out. They were
just losing their funding.” Id. at 116a. Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury’s
determination the Police’s actions were the factual cause of Goodin’s economic
damages. We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The Police next contend Goodin failed to prove her $4 million claim with
reasonable certainty. Appellants’ Br. at 36. More specifically, the Police allege
error in five regards, entitling them to either a new trial or significant remittitur. Id.
at 37.
First, the Police assert Goodin improperly asked the jury to award $4 million
in lost profits because her expert Verzilli never directly testified to this figure. Id. at
37-38. In making this assertion, the Police concede the $4 million amount was
within Verzilli’s report and he testified about it when he responded to a hypothetical
question at trial. Id. at 38-42.
We disagree. A review of the record reveals Goodin presented evidence
supporting approximately $2.2 million in lost business profits, a figure Verzilli
testified could potentially double if the location had reached full capacity. R.R. at
170a. The trial court charged the jury about expert opinion testimony, including the
expert’s use of hypothetical facts to formulate an opinion. Id. at 309a. Specifically,
the trial court instructed:
In general, the opinion of an expert has value only when you accept the
facts upon which it is based. This is true whether the facts are assumed
hypothetically by the expert or they come from the expert’s personal
knowledge, from some other proper source, or from some combination
of these.
9
Id. Thus, there is no merit to the Police’s assertion that Goodin suggested an
unsupported damages number to the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.
Second, the Police contend Verzilli’s lost profits calculation improperly
extrapolated from only one year’s income, 2020, a year including anomalous
profitability due to government subsidies. Appellants’ Br. at 42-43. The Police
suggest Verzilli should also have accounted for 2019, the year the daycare lost
$200,000. Id. at 43.
We disagree with the Police’s characterization of Verzilli’s testimony. The
Police attempt to characterize Goodin’s business as financially troubled before the
incident, emphasizing a $200,000 loss in 2019 and suggesting Goodin inevitably
would have closed the business regardless of their misconduct. However, careful
review of the record reveals substantial evidence of the business’s clear upward
financial trajectory. Verzilli attributed the 2019 loss to higher than normal labor
costs that year, which were much lower in 2018 and 2020. R.R. at 169a. Thus, the
evidence shows 2019 to be the anomalous year, as Verzilli summarized, “net income
in ’18 was positive. She turned it around in ’20.” Id. at 177a. Regarding the Police’s
contention Verzilli’s 2020 calculations are askew because of government subsidies,
Verzilli testified he based his lost profits calculation on the lower revenue figures
from September-December 2020, and not on the higher figures from earlier in the
year. Id. By using the post-subsidy revenue as his baseline, Verzilli’s analysis
results in a more conservative damages estimate. Thus, substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
set aside the jury’s verdict.
10
Third, the Police contend Verzilli incorrectly assumed Goodin would not have
been able to recoup any of the lost 52nd Street earnings by transferring students to
the 60th Street location, or even other locations. Appellants’ Br. at 44. Further, the
Police suggest even if 60th Street was at capacity, Goodin could have opened a
different location. Id. at 45.
We disagree. A plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages; however, this duty
“‘is not onerous and does not require success.’” Merrell v. Chartiers Valley Sch.
Dist., 51 A.3d 286, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quotation omitted). Mitigation is for
the fact-finder. Id. (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury
Instruction 7.100 addresses the mitigation of damages. Pennsylvania Suggested
Standard Civil Jury Instructions, § 7.100 (2024). Here, the trial court’s instruction
precisely parroted the standard instruction, as the trial court charged the jury that
Goodin needed to “make reasonable efforts to reduce her . . . financial damages” and
if they found “Goodin could have avoided financial damages without unreasonable
expense, risk, or humiliation, she is not entitled to recover damage for that harm.”
R.R. at 315a. Thus, the trial court did not err as to the law.
The Police’s assertion Verzilli’s model disregards Goodin’s transfer of
students from the 52nd Street location to the 60th Street location is contrary to the
evidence. When questioned on cross-examination about students transferring to 60th
Street following the closure, Verzilli replied, “My understanding is the location has
closed. And although some students moved over, you’re still out a location where
she would have been open.” Id. at 174a. Further, the Police’s contention Goodin
should have simply opened another facility disregards Goodin’s unrefuted testimony
concerning the specialized nature of childcare facilities and the extensive regulatory
requirements. Specifically, Goodin testified eight months of work were required
11
before she could open the 52nd Street location. Id. at 98a. She also explained the
intrinsic value of 52nd Street; namely, it “came with everything we needed” as “a
preexisting daycare.” Id. at 99a. The evidence of record also supports a jury
determination Goodin could not mitigate damages absent unreasonable expense,
risk, or humiliation. The evidence also demonstrates the difficulty in finding a new
turn-key locale. Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to upset the jury’s verdict.
Fourth, the Police criticize Verzilli’s method of calculating expenses,
contending his formula necessarily implies a plaintiff incurs expenses only when she
earns money. Appellants’ Br. at 47. Another way, the Police contend Verzilli’s
formula disregards fixed capital expenses, such as rent and heat, and focuses only
on variable expenses, thus guaranteeing a plaintiff automatically makes a profit. Id.
Expert testimony on projected business losses is admissible and can form the
basis of a jury’s damages determination. Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215,
1225-26 (Pa. Super. 1987).5 Our Supreme Court has recognized the “peculiar
difficulties” in proving prospective lost profits and has identified, among other
things, evidence of past profits and “[t]he evidence of experts if based on anything
more than individual opinion or conjecture” as types of permissible evidence to
establish damages. Id. at 1226 (quotations omitted). Here, review of the record
reveals the Police had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Verzilli about his
methodology. His computation incorporated historical data from Goodin’s business,
accounted for variable costs and made conservative assumptions regarding future
growth. This constitutes the substantial evidence our Supreme Court has held could
5
Although Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, they may provide
persuasive authority where they address analogous legal issues. DeSantis v. Lenox Place Condo
Ass’n, Inc., 316 A.3d 1119, 1121 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).
12
establish business losses, and supports the jury’s finding. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the jury’s verdict.
Fifth, the Police criticize Verzilli’s assumption Goodin owned the entire
business, and disregarded Goodin’s testimony on direct examination that her mother
was her “partner.” Appellants’ Br. at 48. In turn, the Police contend the jury was
required to cut the damage award in half. Id.
We disagree. The Police’s argument mischaracterizes the evidence. The tax
returns submitted into evidence during Goodin’s direct examination established
Goodin’s 100% ownership, as each denoted “Paige Goodin, 100 percent.” R.R. at
113a. On both direct and cross-examination, Verzilli testified he used these tax
returns to formulate his opinion. Id. at 168a, 173a. The Police did not question
Verzilli about Goodin having anything other than a 100% ownership interest and
failed to introduce any evidence requiring a reduction in the lost profits allocation.
Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination of Goodin’s ownership
percentage. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the
verdict.
Finally, the Police argue the $4 million damage award was clearly based in
lost profits; however, to the extent it included other types of non-economic damage,
such as emotional distress or pain and suffering, this Court should remand for a new
trial to determine the specific amounts. Appellants’ Br. at 49-50.
We disagree. At a charging conference, the Police objected to a special
verdict slip, and the jury utilized a general verdict slip. R.R. 275a, 1186a. During
closing argument, Goodin’s counsel requested the jury award not only compensatory
damages for economic loss, but also pain and suffering and loss of life’s enjoyments.
Id. at 292a-93a. The trial court instructed the jury its award must compensate
13
Goodin for the past and future physical and financial injury she sustained. Id. at
310a. The court then specifically instructed regarding aggravation of a preexisting
condition, physical and mental pain and suffering, embarrassment and humiliation,
loss of ability to enjoy life’s pleasures and disfigurement. Id. at 310a-11a. Under
the general verdict rule, “when a litigant fails to request a special verdict slip that
would have clarified the basis for a general verdict, and the verdict rests upon valid
grounds, ‘the right to a new trial is waived.’” Cowher v. Kodali, 283 A.3d 794, 804
(Pa. 2022) (quotation omitted). “The rule ‘promote[s] judicial efficiency’ by
preventing needless retrials as well as ‘fairness’ by keeping a litigant from benefiting
from its own omission in failing to request a special verdict slip.” Id. (citation
omitted). Here, by objecting to a special verdict slip, the Police waived the right to
a new trial. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Addressing the Police’s alternative request for remittitur, the trial court denied
the request because it “did not find the jury’s award to be guided by partiality,
mistake, prejudice or corruption,” and found “sufficient evidence from [Verzilli] was
presented to the jury to support its award and the jury’s award did not shock this
Court’s [conscience] or sense of justice.” Trial Ct. Op. at 20-21. The Police contend
the trial court’s reference to Verzilli demonstrates the compensatory award was
based exclusively on economic loss. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 21.
We disagree. By failing to request a special verdict slip, the Police waived
their right to challenge the composition of the jury’s compensatory damage award.
This is especially true where Goodin requested both economic and non-economic
damages, and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying remittitur.
14
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s June 5, 2024 order.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Paige Goodin :
:
v. : No. 870 C.D. 2024
:
Police Officer Christopher Fountas :
and Police Officer Johangelie :
Thomas-Estrada, :
Appellants :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of June 2026, the June 5, 2024 order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby AFFIRMED.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge