Carter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PAMELA CARTER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-2273

QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, WOOD & SECTION “R” (4)

BOYER, P.A., ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the motion of defendants Eric Boyer and Deborah

Riley to dismiss two of plaintiff Pamela Carter’s claims.1 Plaintiff filed a

response motion in which she states she does not oppose the dismissal of

those claims as brought against Boyer and Riley and requests leave to

amend.2 For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion and

provides plaintiff fourteen days to amend her complaint as brought against

Boyer and Riley.

I. BACKGROUND

Pamela Carter brings this employment-related suit against QPWB,

Debbie Riley, Eric Boyer, and Elisa Hernandez (collectively, “Defendants”).3

Carter alleges that she was employed by QPWB at its Metairie, Louisiana

1 R. Doc. 26.

2 R. Doc. 31.

3 R. Doc. 1.

office.4 She alleges that her employment by QPWB began around December

10, 2021, and that she served as the Managing Partner of the Metairie Office.5

Carter claims that she was diagnosed with breast cancer on May 30,

2023, and that she notified Riley and Boyer of her diagnosis and need for

treatment.6 She alleges that she began to undergo chemotherapy on June 1,

2023, and that she continued to work remotely through August 2023.7 She

further alleges that she was hospitalized in September 2023 due to a severe

reaction to chemotherapy, and that she informed Riley and Boyer of her

condition and the need for two surgeries.8 She claims that she formally

requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) that same

month.9 In October 2023, she allegedly underwent additional medical

treatment and was hospitalized for two weeks.10

Carter alleges that Riley, Boyer, and other unnamed QPWB employees

made comments that her medical treatment was an inconvenience to the

firm.11 In October 2023, QPWB allegedly terminated most of the Metairie

4 Id. at ¶ 11.

5 Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.

6 Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.

7 Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.

8 Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.

9 Id. at ¶ 19.

10 Id. at ¶ 20.

11 Id. at ¶ 21.

staff, despite a lack of history of performance issues.12 Carter alleges that she

was terminated on November 1, 2023, while on approved FMLA leave via an

email from Boyer.13 Boyer allegedly said the reason for her termination was

“the office, management office, files, disgruntled staff, unhappy clients both

defense and plaintiff . . . it’s all a mess,” which Carter alleges was false and

pretextual.14 Carter alleges that her termination was in violation of 29 U.S.C.

§ 2615 and in violation of the QPWB Employment Policy Manual.15

Carter further alleges that she suffered a medical relapse following her

termination which has resulted in injuries and required medical care.16 She

additionally claims that defendants have refused to pay her fees that she

earned from cases she handled for QPWB.17 And she alleges that Riley and

Boyer made false and defamatory statements to QPWB clients regarding her

performance and conduct.18

Carter filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging disability

discrimination and retaliation with the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and a charge of employment

12 Id. at ¶ 22.

13 Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25.

14 Id. at ¶ 24.

15 Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.

16 Id. at ¶ 29.

17 Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.

18 Id. at ¶¶ 30-35.

discrimination with the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights (“LCHR”)

on March 13, 2024.19 She alleges that she received a notice of dismissal and

right to sue from the LCHR on August 11, 2025, and a right-to-sue letter from

the EEOC on September 4, 2025.20

On November 6, 2025, plaintiff filed this suit.21 She brings eight claims

against defendants: first, for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act

against QPWB; second, for wrongful termination/retaliation under La. R.S.

§ 23:323 against QPWB, Riley, and Boyer; third, for defamation against Riley

and Boyer; fourth, for tortious interference with business relations against

Riley and Boyer; fifth, for breach of contract against QPWB and Hernandez;

sixth, for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against

QPWB; seventh, for violation of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination

Law (“LEDL”) against QPWB, Riley, and Boyer; and eighth, for violation of

the Louisiana Wage Payment Act against QPWB, Riley, and Boyer.22

19 Id. at ¶ 36.

20 Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.

21 See id.

22 See id. The Court notes that counts seven and eight are both numbered

“Count VII.” To avoid confusion, the Court refers to plaintiff’s LEDL

claim, which is at issue in the present motion, as “first-stated count

VII.”

Defendants Boyer and Riley now move to dismiss portions of plaintiff’s

complaint.23 Plaintiff responded to the partial motion to dismiss, stating that

she does not oppose the dismissal of the claims at issue and requesting leave

to amend.24

The Court considers the parties’ arguments below.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)), and “that, if true, ‘raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.’” Franklin v. Regions Bank, 976 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir.

2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true

and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand

v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court

23 R. Doc. 26.

24 R. Doc. 31.

is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

District courts must dismiss with leave to amend “unless the defect is

simply incurable, or the plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after

being afforded repeated opportunities to do so.” Young v. U.S. Postal Serv.

ex rel. Donahoe, 620 F. App’x 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hart v.

Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000)). The presumption is

that courts should dismiss a complaint only after “affording every

opportunity” to the plaintiff to state a claim unless it would be futile. Hitt v.

City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curium); Briggs v.

Miss., 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003). An amendment is futile if “it would

fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).

Defendants Boyer and Riley seek dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful

termination/retaliation and LEDL claims as brought against them as

individuals.25 Boyer and Riley argue that they were not plaintiff’s “employer”

and therefore plaintiff cannot bring her wrongful termination/retaliation

and LEDL claims against them.26 Plaintiff does not contest this.27

25 See R. Doc. 26.

26 Id.

27 See R. Doc. 31.

Both counts that defendants seek to dismiss were brought under La.

R.S. 23:323, which is part of the LEDL. LEDL claims lie only against the

plaintiff’s “employer.” La. R.S. 23:303(A) (authorizing civil suits against an

“employer, employment agency, or labor organization”); see also Dejoie v.

Medley, 9 So. 3d 826 (La. 2009). The LEDL defines “employee” as “an

individual employed by an employer,” and defines “employer” as:

a person, association, legal or commercial entity, the state, or any

state agency, board, commission, or political subdivision of the

state receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving

compensation of any kind to an employee.

La. R.S. 23:302. Co-workers and supervisors are not “employers,” and they

are not subject to individual liability under the LEDL. See Aronzon v.

Southwest Airlines, 2004 WL 57079, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2004) (collecting

cases). In her complaint, plaintiff names QPWB as her employer, not Boyer

and/or Riley. Plaintiff cannot bring count II and first-stated count VII

against Boyer and Riley. The Court must dismiss count II and first-stated

count VII as brought against Boyer and Riley.

Further, for the reasons above, amendment of these counts would be

futile and must be dismissed with prejudice. But plaintiff’s request for leave

to amend appears to seek to allege new theories of liability against Boyer and

Riley. Plaintiff has not previously amended her complaint, and defendants

have not opposed her request to amend the complaint or argued that an

amendment to add other claims would be futile. Accordingly, plaintiff may

amend her complaint. See Mayeanux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co.,

376 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2004) (amendments that propose alternative

legal theories of recovery “generally should be permitted”).

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to

dismiss. The Court DISMISSES claim II and first-stated claim VII as brought

against Boyer and Riley WITH PREJUDICE. These claims remain as

brought against QPWB, plaintiff's employer.

Plaintiff shall have FOURTEEN DAYS to file an amended complaint

proposing other theories of liability based upon the alleged conduct of Boyer

and Riley.

Plaintiff is not authorized to conduct any discovery to determine

whether she has new claims.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this _12th day of June, 2026.

derak Vaven_

SARAH 8S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE