Clark-Esteen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TIERRANI CLARK-ESTEEN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 24-2142

NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL SECTION: T (4)

TRANSIT AUTHORITY

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, New Orleans

Regional Transit Authority (“RTA”). R. Doc. 37. RTA’s Motion seeks dismissal with prejudice of

all claims made against it by Plaintiff, Tierrani M. Clark-Esteen. Plaintiff opposes RTA’s motion,

R. Doc. 38, and RTA has filed a reply in support, R. Doc. 42. The Court has considered the parties’

briefs, the record, and the applicable law. For the following reasons, RTA’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (R. Doc. 37) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation action arising under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Plaintiff, Tierrani M. Clark-Esteen, is an African American

female, over the age of thirty, who suffers from Crohn’s disease and has worked in the New

Orleans transit system since 2018. R. Doc. 1, pp. 1-2. Plaintiff was initially hired by Transdev

Services, Inc. (“Transdev”), which operated the transit system until Defendant, New Orleans

Regional Transit Authority (“RTA”), assumed operations in December 2020. Doc. 37-1, pp. 1-2

(citing R. Doc. 37-4, pp. 6, 29 (Plaintiff’s Deposition)). At this time, “all Transdev employees

were laid off and required to apply to be rehired under the RTA.”1 Id. On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff

was officially hired by the RTA as a Road Supervisor within the Fixed Route Department, which

included bus and streetcar routes. Id. at p. 2.

Plaintiff alleges that, from approximately 2018 to 2020, she was subjected to inappropriate

conduct by Safety Operations Supervisor Wayne Nelson. R. Doc 1, p. 2; R. Doc. 37-4, pp. 20.

Specifically, she alleges that he “forced Plaintiff to facetime him while he groped himself,

masturbated, and committed other sexual acts.” Id. According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony,

Mr. Nelson, “was apparently investigated and terminated by Transdev for his sexual harassment

of several female employees.” R. Doc. 37-1, p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 37-4, p. 22).

Plaintiff further alleges that, beginning in February 2022, she experienced disparate

treatment with respect to seniority and scheduling. See R. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4. According to Plaintiff,

a male Senior Operations Officer altered the existing seniority roster in favor of a male supervisor

with less seniority, prompting Plaintiff to complain internally. Id.; R. Doc. 38-4, p. 1. Plaintiff also

alleges that male supervisors were permitted to select supervisory details and exercise scheduling

preferences that were denied to her. R. Doc. 38-4, p. 1.

Plaintiff took continuous leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)

beginning in October 2022. R. Doc. 38-4, p. 1. Following her return to work in January 2023,

Plaintiff met with RTA management regarding her seniority concerns. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff alleges

that, during that meeting, she was informed that she would be transferred from the Fixed Route

Department to the Paratransit Department. Id. Plaintiff contends that the transfer was inconsistent

with seniority practices within the RTA and materially diminished her prestige, authority, and

1 Plaintiff characterizes this occurrence as “continued employment following Defendant RTA’s

operational transition from Transdev in December 2020.” R. Doc. 38, p. 2.

opportunities for advancement. R. Doc. 38, p. 3. Defendant, by contrast, maintains that the

reassignment was a temporary, lateral transfer necessitated by operational needs and that Plaintiff’s

seniority was restored when she returned to the Fixed Route Department in July 2024. R. Doc. 37-

1, pp. 12-13.

On January 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sex-based

discrimination. R. Doc. 37-1, p. 4 (citing R. Doc. 37-5, pp. 3-5); R. Doc. 1, p. 4. On August 29,

2024, Plaintiff commenced the present action in this Court, asserting claims for sexual harassment,

gender discrimination, racial discrimination, and disability discrimination under the ADA. Id. at

pp. 2-6.

RTA’s instant Motion for Summary Judgment seeks dismissal of all claims asserted by

Plaintiff. R. Doc. 37. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, R. Doc. 38, and subsequently

submitted a Notice of Supplemental Authority directing the Court to the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), which addressed the

standard applicable to adverse employment actions arising from employee transfers, R. Doc. 41.

Defendant subsequently filed a reply memorandum in further support of its Motion, which is now

submitted before the Court.2

2 Defendant argues in its reply that the Court should disregard Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental

Authority because it was filed after the deadline for filing an opposition. See R. Doc. 42, p. 9. The

Court declines to do so. Plaintiff’s filing merely directs the Court to controlling Supreme Court

authority addressing the standard applicable to adverse employment actions arising from employee

transfers. In any event, the Court has an independent obligation to apply governing law.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

a. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A court must hold “a

factual dispute to be ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party and a fact to be ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing substantive law.” Voekel McWilliams Const., LLC v. 84 Lumber Co., 2015 WL

1184148, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2015) (quoting Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996

(5th Cir. 1989)).

When assessing whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, courts “consider

all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing

the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99

(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. See, e.g., Darden v. City of

Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 603 (2015); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986)).

Of course, “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts

and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation and

citation omitted). Although the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact, if it can carry that burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond

the pleadings and . . . designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. This burden is not satisfied by a “metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts” or only a “scintilla” of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.

1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Davis

v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)). Summary judgment must thus be

entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n such a situation,

there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”

Id. at 322-23. Courts “do not . . . in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party

could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). Thus, “summary judgment is appropriate in any case ‘where

critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in

favor of the nonmovant.’ ” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir.

1993)) (emphasis in original).

b. Plaintiff’s Sexual Harassment Claims

Defendant first seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims against RTA,

arguing that it is not liable for alleged conduct which occurred while Plaintiff was employed by

Transdev (i.e., before Defendant assumed operation of the transit system), that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to those claims, and that such claims have

prescribed. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 6-11. Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace

harassment “may depend on the status of the harasser.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421,

424 (2013). “If the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable only if it

was negligent in controlling working conditions.” Id. However, a different set of rules applies if

the harasser is a “supervisor,” meaning that “he or she is empowered by the employer to take

tangible employment actions against the victim.” Id. Namely, an employer is strictly liable for a

supervisor’s harassment that “culminates in a tangible employment action.” Id. “A tangible

employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,

failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing

a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.742, 761 (1998). If no such

“tangible employment action” is taken, then the employer may establish as an affirmative defense

that “(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and

(2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective

opportunities that the employer provided.” Vance, 570 U.S. at 424. See also Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 776, 807-08 (1998).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was the victim of unwanted sexual advances from supervisor

and co-worker Wayne Nelson from approximately 2018 through 2020. R. Doc. 1, p. 2; R. Doc.

37-4, p. 20. As noted by Defendant, this alleged conduct occurred before Defendant assumed

operations of the transit system in December 2020. R. Doc. 37-1, p. 7 (citing R. Doc. 37-5, p. 1).

Additionally, Plaintiff was not hired by Defendant until January 2021, R. Doc. 37-5, p. 1, and Mr.

Nelson was terminated by Transdev in September 2020, R. Doc. 37-1, p. 7 (citing R. Doc. 37-4,

p. 11). Thus, at the time Plaintiff alleges the conduct occurred, neither she nor Mr. Nelson were

employed by Defendant, but rather by Transdev. Because Defendant was not the employer at the

time of the alleged conduct, it is not the proper entity for Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim, and

this claim should be dismissed.3 Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion to the

extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims.

c. Plaintiff’s Disability and Racial Discrimination Claims

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination under the ADA

and her claim for racial discrimination must be dismissed, contending that neither claim is properly

before the Court. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 15-22. A plaintiff may not file an ADA or Title VII claim in

federal court without first exhausting the statutorily required administrative remedies, which

include the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Adams v. Columbia/HCA

of New Orleans, Inc., No. 22-30389, 2023 WL 2346241, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2023) (citing Dao

v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).4 The Fifth Circuit has

interpreted the scope of the exhaustion requirement as being defined “somewhat broadly, not

solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself, but by the scope of the EEOC investigation

which ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Pacheco v.

Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d

455, 466 (5th Cir.1970)). See also Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp. 995 F.2d 576, 577–78 (5th Cir.1993)

(holding that administrative remedies were not exhausted with respect to sex discrimination

because the incident sued upon was separate from the one raised in her EEOC charge); Young v.

3 Having found that Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim should be dismissed because RTA is not

the proper defendant, the Court will not address Defendant’s arguments concerning exhaustion of

administrative remedies and prescription.

4 In Dao, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff was required to exhaust all administrative remedies

under the ADA before filing an action in federal court and noted that the ADA incorporates the

procedures applicable to actions under Title VII, including the “fil[ing] of a timely charge with the

EEOC, or with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the alleged

unlawful employment practice.” Dao, 96 F.3d at 789.

City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that sex discrimination claim had not been

exhausted by plaintiff’s EEOC charge of race and age discrimination).

Here, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s EEOC charge “did not include any

disability discrimination allegations or any facts as a basis for such claims,” the “vague allegations

regarding failure to accommodate and failure to promote” which she made in her Complaint are

not properly before the Court. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 16-17. In support, Defendant suggests that the

scope of an EEOC investigation brought on Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims is “too narrow

to prompt additional review of other unrelated claims not asserted,” including claims of disability

discrimination. Id. at p. 17. Thus, Defendant argues, these disability-based claims should be

dismissed because they remain unexhausted and have prescribed.

In opposition, Plaintiff generally references her Crohn’s disease but does not specifically

address Defendant’s exhaustion arguments or identify evidence demonstrating that a disability

discrimination investigation would reasonably be expected to arise from the EEOC charge. See R.

Doc. 38. Plaintiff’s EEOC charge only checked the box for discrimination based on sex and stated

that she believed she had been discriminated against “because of my sex, female, in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” R. Doc. 38-4, pp. 1-2. Throughout the charge, Plaintiff

complained of seniority issues, her transfer to the Paratransit Department, and disparate treatment

relative to male supervisors. Id.

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge does reference her use of “disability/continuous FMLA” leave

and stated that she was not permitted to select her supervisory detail or vacation time while on

leave. Id. at p. 1. However, nowhere in the charge did Plaintiff allege that she was discriminated

against because of her disability, denied a reasonable accommodation, or otherwise subjected to

unlawful conduct prohibited by the ADA. Id. at pp. 1-2. Instead, Plaintiff consistently attributed

the challenged conduct to sex discrimination and ultimately concluded that she had been

discriminated against because she was female. Id. at pp. 1-2.

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that an EEOC investigation into Plaintiff’s

charge would reasonably have focused on her allegations of sex discrimination and retaliation, not

disability discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with

respect to her ADA claims, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these

claims.

Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her ADA claims because she

does not provide a factual basis for either the failure to accommodate claim or the failure to

promote claim. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 17-18. Specifically, Defendant highlights that Plaintiff does not

claim that she requested accommodation or that the RTA denied any accommodation. Id. at p. 18.

Having already found that Plaintiff’s ADA claims should be dismissed due to failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, the Court need not consider these remaining arguments.

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims should be dismissed due

to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. R. Doc. 37-1, p. 18. As with the disability

discrimination claims, Defendant argues that the scope of the EEOC investigation into Plaintiff’s

gender discrimination claims is too narrow to prompt review of racial discrimination claims and

that Plaintiff has offered no evidence regarding this claim. Id.

The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s EEOC charge contains no allegations concerning race and

does not identify any conduct allegedly motivated by Plaintiff’s race. See R. Doc. 38-4, pp. 1-2.

As discussed above, the charge consistently characterizes the alleged discrimination as sex based.

Thus, an investigation into racial discrimination could not reasonably be expected to grow out of

the allegations contained in the charge. See Young, 906 F.2d at 179-80. Accordingly, the Court

will GRANT Defendant’s Motion to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s disability and

racial discrimination claims.

d. Plaintiff’s Gender Discrimination Claims

Defendant next contends that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of sex

discrimination. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 11-14. “A prima facie case of sex discrimination requires an

employee to demonstrate that ‘(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for

the position she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others similarly

situated but outside the protected class were treated more favorably.’” Dixon v. Garland, No. 4:23-

CV-19, 2024 WL 4948843, at *2 (quoting Saketoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990,

997-98 (5th Cir. 2022)). Here, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has demonstrated the first two

elements but argues that she is unable to satisfy the third and fourth elements. R. Doc. 37-1, pp.

11-14.

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not suffer from an adverse employment action

because her transfer from the Fixed Route Department to the Paratransit Department was a

“temporary” and “lateral transfer.” R. Doc. 37-1, p. 12. Specifically, Defendant claims that because

Plaintiff “remained a supervisor throughout the period of her transfer,” she was not demoted.

Defendant additionally notes that, under RTA’s practices, when a supervisor is placed on a

temporary assignment, their “seniority status is restored upon return to their permanent

department.” Id. (citing R. Doc. 37-5, pp. 1-2 (Declaration of Kentrella Crawford)). Thus, “[w]hen

Plaintiff was transferred back to the Fixed Route Department on July 8, 2024, her prior seniority

status was fully restored.” Id. at p. 13 (citing R. Doc. 37-4, pp. 56, 72). Furthermore, the transfer

did not result in a payment reduction. Id. (citing R. Doc. 37-5, pp. 8-20).

Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s characterization of her reassignment to the Paratransit

Department as a “lateral transfer.” R. Doc. 38, p. 3. She instead argues that “the reassignment

materially diminished her employment conditions, prestige, operational authority, and

advancement opportunities,” and she points to the deposition of Christopher Clark, “an

experienced supervisor at RTA” for support. Id. (citing R. Doc. 38-3, p. 43 (“We could say she

was knocked down a peg for sure.”)). Plaintiff further argues that “Defendant’s asserted

nondiscriminatory explanations for its actions and [] the proffered justifications are pretextual.” R.

Doc. 38, p. 3.

Following her memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental

Authority directing the Court to the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601

U.S. 346 (2024). R. Doc. 41. In Muldrow, the Supreme Court clarified that a plaintiff asserting a

Title VII discrimination claim need not demonstrate that the challenged employment action caused

a “significant” disadvantage. Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355. Rather, a plaintiff need only show that

the action caused “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that

genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment

action. Although Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff retained her title and rate of pay and that her

seniority was ultimately restored, Plaintiff has produced evidence suggesting that her reassignment

adversely affected her prestige, authority, and opportunities for advancement. R. Doc. 38, p. 2.

Under the standard articulated in Muldrow, a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s

transfer resulted in harm to an identifiable term or condition of her employment.

Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish that a similarly situated male

was treated more favorably. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 13-14. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to

identify a proper comparator and that any purported comparators are not similarly situated under

Fifth Circuit precedent. Id. Plaintiff disagrees and points to evidence of male supervisors receiving

preferential treatment with respect to seniority and scheduling. See R. Docs. 38, 38-4. For example,

Plaintiff alleged in her EEOC charge that Shawn Davis, a male supervisor, was permitted to select

a supervisory detail while on FMLA leave, whereas Plaintiff was denied that same opportunity. R.

Doc. 38-4, p. 1. Plaintiff further alleges that male supervisors with less seniority received more

favorable treatment. R. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4.

Although Defendant disputes whether these employees constitute valid comparators, the

Court finds that genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on this element.

Whether employers are similarly situated is a fact-intensive inquiry, see, e.g., Lee v. Kansas City

S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2009), and resolution of the parties’ competing

characterizations would require the Court to weigh evidence and make credibility determinations,

which it may not do at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, viewing the evidence and all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that genuine

disputes of material fact remain concerning Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim. Therefore, the

Court will DENY Defendant’s Motion to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII

sex discrimination claim.

e. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claims

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for retaliation. R. Doc. 37-

1, pp. 14-15. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) she

engaged in a protected activity; (2) ‘she suffered an adverse employment action’; and (3) ‘a causal

connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’ ” Brown v.

Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Byers v. Dall. Morning News,

Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000)). A plaintiff can satisfy her prima facie burden of causation

“simply by showing close enough timing between [her] protected activity and [her] adverse

employment action.” Id. (quoting Garcia v. Prof’l Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir.

2019)). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer “to provide a

‘legitimate, non-discriminatory reason’ for the adverse employment action.” Id. (quoting Patrick

v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004)). If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff may

then prove that the proffered reason is pretextual “by showing that a discriminatory motive more

likely motivated her employer’s decision, such as through evidence of disparate treatment, or that

her employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of

La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Here, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite causal connection

between any protected activity and the challenged employment actions. R. Doc. 37-1, pp. 14-15.

Defendant additionally maintains that Plaintiff’s reassignment to the Paratransit Department was

motivated by legitimate business considerations, including a shortage of supervisors within the

department. Id. Plaintiff, however, contends that Defendant’s asserted nondiscriminatory

explanation is pretextual. R. Doc. 38, p. 3.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that

genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s explanation for her reassignment, contending that the transfer was

retaliatory, and resolution of these competing explanations would require the Court to weigh

evidence and assess credibility, which it may not do at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly,

Defendant’s Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant New Orleans Regional Transit Authority’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 37) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion

is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's sexual harassment, disability

discrimination, and racial discrimination claims, and DENIED to the extent that it seeks dismissal

of Plaintiff's Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs sexual harassment, disability

discrimination, and racial discrimination claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 11th day of June, 2026.

Cond Gud

Sony Ged Guu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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