Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

CORTEZ J. JACKSON,

Petitioner, : Case No. 2:25-cv-00795

- vs - District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

ROCHELLE MOORE, WARDEN,

Pickaway Correctional Institution,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Cortez Jackson, is before the Court for

decision on the merits. Relevant pleadings are the Petition (ECF No. 3), the State Court Record

(ECF No. 8) and the Return of Writ (ECF No. 10). Although Magistrate Judge Bowman, to whom

this case was originally referred, set a reply date of twenty-one days after the Return was filed

(Order for Answer, ECF No. 4), that deadline passed on February 27, 20261, and no reply has been

filed. The case is therefore ripe for decision on the pleading already filed.

The Magistrate Judge reference in the case was recently transferred to the undersigned to

help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in the District (ECF No. 11).

1 The deadline was extended three days under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6 because Petitioner was served by mail.

Litigation History

On August 26, 2021, a Franklin County grand jury returned an indictment charging

Petitioner with one count of purposeful murder, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.02(A);

one count of felony murder, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.02(B); one count of

domestic violence, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2919.25; one count of tampering with

evidence, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2921.12; and one count of having weapons while

under disability, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2923.13. Both of the murder charges and the

tampering with evidence charge contained accompanying firearm specifications. The charges

arose from the August 19, 2021, death of Alyse Sharrae Edwards (Indictment, State Court Record,

ECF No. 8, Ex. 1).

A trial jury found Jackson not guilty of purposeful murder, but guilty of felony murder and

tempering with evidence. The trial judge found Jackson guilty of having weapons under disability

which was tried to the Court. He then sentenced Jackson to be imprisoned for eighteen years to

life (Judgment Entry, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 6).

Jackson appealed to the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals, pleading the single

assignment of error that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against

the manifest weight of the evidence (Appellant’s Brief, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 9,

PageID 80). The Tenth District affirmed, State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-2721 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.

Jul. 18, 2024); and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise further appellate jurisdiction,

State v. Jackson, 175 Ohio St. 3d 1518 (Oct. 29, 2024).

On October 25, 2024, Jackson filed a pro se Application to Reopen his appeal pleading two

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 15). The

Tenth District denied the Application as untimely. Id. at Ex. 17. Jackson did not appeal to the

Ohio Supreme Court.

On August 4, 20252, Jackson filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pleading

one ground for relief, albeit with two sub-claims:

Ground One: The trial court erred and deprived Petitioner of due

process of law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Ohio Constitution by

finding him guilty of murder and tampering with evidence, as those

verdicts were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

(Petition, ECF 3, PageID 38-43).

Respondent argues the second branch of Ground One is not cognizable in habeas corpus.

That is, a claim that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence does not state a

claim under the United States Constitution. The Magistrate Judge agrees. A weight of the

evidence claim is not a federal constitutional claim. Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir.

1986). The manifest weight sub-claim should be dismissed.

On the other hand, the insufficiency of the evidence sub-claim does state a claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment. An allegation that a verdict was entered upon insufficient evidence states

a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);

Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th

Cir. 1990)(en banc). In order for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of the

crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

2 Respondent concedes the Petition was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d).

[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the

testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 205 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Jackson). This standard “must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the

criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324). This rule was

recognized in Ohio law at State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991). Of course, it is state law

which determines the elements of offenses; but once the state has adopted the elements, it must

then prove each of them beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra. A sufficiency challenge

should be assessed against the elements of the crime, not against the elements set forth in an

erroneous jury instruction. Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016).

In cases such as Petitioner’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and filed after

enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214)(the “AEDPA”), two levels of deference to state decisions are required:

In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner

challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to

convict him, we are thus bound by two layers of deference to groups

who might view facts differently than we would. First, as in all

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine

whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.

Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, re-

evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for

that of the jury. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th

Cir. 1993). Thus, even though we might have not voted to convict a

defendant had we participated in jury deliberations, we must uphold

the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the

prosecution. Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier

of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appellate

court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). When reviewing a claim for sufficient

evidence, a federal habeas court must apply a twice-deferential standard.” Parker v. Matthews,

567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012) (per curiam). In a sufficiency of the evidence habeas corpus case, deference

should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and then to the appellate

court's consideration of that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652

(6th Cir. 2008); accord Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)(en banc); Parker v.

Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012). Notably, “a court may sustain a conviction based upon nothing

more than circumstantial evidence.” Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 595 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2010).

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal

habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial

deference. First, on direct appeal, "it is the responsibility of the jury

-- not the court -- to decide what conclusions should be drawn from

evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's

verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier

of fact could have agreed with the jury." Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.

S. 1, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2, 181 L. Ed. 2d 311, 313 (2011) (per curiam).

And second, on habeas review, "a federal court may not overturn a

state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge

simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The

federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was

'objectively unreasonable.'" Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S.

___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651, (2012)(per curiam); Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43

(2012) (per curiam). The federal courts do not make credibility determinations in reviewing

sufficiency of the evidence claims. Brooks v. Tennessee, 626 F.3d 878, 887 (6th Cir. 2010).

When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a

federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is

contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the

United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011);

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002); Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000). Deference is also due under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)

unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals decided Jackson’s sufficiency claim as follows:

{¶ 14} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a

verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of

adequacy. Id. The relevant inquiry for an appellate court is whether

the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Mahone, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-545, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 38,

citing State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37.

{¶ 15} Here, the jury found Jackson guilty of one count of murder

and one count of tampering with evidence, and the trial court found

Jackson guilty of one count of having a weapon while under

disability.4 R.C. 2903.02(B) states that “[n]o person shall cause the

death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s committing

or attempting to commit an offense of violence.” This offense is

known as “felony murder,” and felonious assault is an example of

an offense of violence. Under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), “[n]o person

shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another.” As

to the offense of tampering with evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) states

investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted,

shall * * * [a]lter, destroy, conceal, or remove any * * * thing, with

purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such

proceeding or investigation.”

{¶ 16} Jackson does not directly challenge the evidentiary

establishment of any specific element of these offenses; instead, he

argues Edwards’ death was the result of their physical struggle for

control of the firearm after Edwards angrily confronted Jackson for

suggesting their third child, like the other two, would be removed

from her care. Jackson acknowledges his DNA was found on the

firearm, but he explains this was because he picked up the firearm

and placed it in the toilet after Edwards was shot. Relatedly, he

asserts the absence of gunshot residue on his hands indicates he was

not near the firearm when it discharged, and therefore he did not pull

the trigger. When viewed in favor of the prosecution, however, the

evidence demonstrated all the elements of murder and tampering

with evidence.

{¶ 17} The evidence showed that Edwards was fatally shot one time

in the abdomen. Jackson testified that, although he was physically

struggling with Edwards when she was shot, he did not pull the

trigger of the firearm in Edwards’ possession. He suggests the

firearm may have been jostled enough to cause it to discharge the

projectile, without anyone pulling the trigger, or Edwards herself

pulled the trigger. But testimony indicated that it would be very

unlikely for the weapon to fire unless the trigger was pulled.

Immediately after being shot, Edwards begged for aid from others

in the area, knocking on the neighbor’s door and saying “help” to

someone entering the apartment building. This reasonably indicated

she was trying to get away from Jackson after being shot. Although

no gunshot residue was found on Jackson’s hands, this fact did not

necessarily establish that he did not fire the weapon, as the evidence

also demonstrated that his DNA was found on the weapon, gunshot

residue is easily washed off, and, immediately after the shooting,

Jackson placed the fired weapon inside the covered water tank

behind the apartment’s toilet. Thus, the jury reasonably found that

Jackson knowingly pulled the trigger and shot Edwards, killing her.

Further, Jackson’s placement of the firearm in the water tank

reasonably demonstrated his intent to hide the weapon used to shoot

Edwards, clearly a piece of physical evidence that would be

pertinent to an investigation of her death. In sum, the evidence

reasonably established all the elements of felony murder and

tampering with evidence.

{¶ 18} Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson’s

convictions.

State v. Jackson, supra.

The Tenth District applied the appropriate standard under Jackson v. Virginia: was there

sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to prove every element

of the offenses in suit? The Magistrate Judge concludes the Tenth District’s application of Jackson

v. Virginia was reasonable and is therefore entitled to deference.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the

Petition be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this

conclusion, it 1s also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that

the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not

be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

March 18, 2026.

s/ Michael R. Merz

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report

and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is recetved. Such

objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a

memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s

objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections

in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #