Rehn v. City of Seattle

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELISABETH REHN, No. 25-4844

D.C. No.

Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:23-cv-01609-RAJ

v.

MEMORANDUM*

CITY OF SEATTLE, a lawful municipal

corporation in the State of Washington;

RILEY CAULFIELD; SETH WAGNER;

YOUNGHUN KIM,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

JOHN DUUS, JASON DRUMMOND,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 9, 2026

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and MATSUMOTO, District

Judge.**

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The Honorable Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Plaintiff, Elisabeth Rehn, sued Defendants, City of Seattle, and Seattle Police

Department Officers, Seth Wagner, Younghun Kim, and Riley Caulfield, after the

officers mistakenly entered the wrong building in response to a 911 call and forcibly

entered Rehn’s apartment with weapons drawn. The officer defendants had

observed broken glass matching the reported struggle prior to their mistaken entry.

The correct building, which adjoined the building they entered, had a separate

entrance. Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at

summary judgment. Reviewing de novo and viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, Rehn, Martinez v. High, 91 F.4th 1022, 1027 (9th

Cir. 2024), we reverse.

Rehn claims that the officers’ warrantless entry into her apartment constituted

unreasonable search and that their entry with weapons drawn constituted

unreasonable seizure. Even assuming a reasonable jury could find the officers

committed these constitutional violations, the unlawfulness of their actions was not

clearly established.

We turn first to the warrantless entry. In the context of a mistaken entry into

a home, the constitutionality of the search turns on whether the mistake was

“objectively understandable and reasonable.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,

88 (1987). But Garrison held that entry into the wrong apartment because of a

reasonable mistake is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. This Circuit has

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not published an opinion addressing when a police officer’s mistaken entry into the

wrong apartment constitutes unreasonable search.

“In the absence of binding precedent clearly establishing the constitutional

right, we look to whatever decisional law is available, including relevant decisions

of other circuits, state courts, and district courts.” Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853,

868 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If a “robust

consensus” makes the unlawfulness of the actions clear, officials are not entitled to

qualified immunity. Id. at 874.

The district court relied on decisions from the Eleventh Circuit, Hartsfield v.

Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 951–52 (11th Cir. 1995), and Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, Alvarado v. City of Philadelphia, 719 F. Supp. 3d 420, 425–26 (E.D.

Pa. 2024), in determining that the unlawfulness of the search was clearly established.

But these cases are not enough to constitute a “robust consensus.” See Moonin, 868

F.3d at 872–74 (relying on decisions of four Circuits in addition to district courts);

see also Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1034 (9th Cir. 2015) (relying on decisions

of four Circuits). Moreover, the facts underlying Hartsfield, which involved “an

entry by law enforcement into the wrong residence to execute a presumably valid

search warrant for a nearby house,” are not similar enough to the facts underlying

the mistaken entry into Rehn’s apartment. 50 F.3d at 951. The Eleventh Circuit had

limited its conclusion that “a warrantless search of a residence violates the Fourth

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Amendment, unless the officers engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error” to

situations where “probable cause and exigent circumstances” were “absent.” Id. at

955. Here, officers were responding to exigent circumstances, including numerous

911 calls reporting a domestic dispute, suicidal ideations, the use of knives, and risk

of defenestration. These serious circumstances also distinguish this case from Miller

v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), on which Rehn relies, where the police entered

the apartment of a man suspected of selling heroin. Id. at 302–04.

We turn next to the excessive force claim. Even assuming a reasonable jury

can view the evidence, including Caulfield’s body-worn-camera footage, and find

that he pointed his firearm in Rehn’s direction, it was not clearly established that

doing so for only a few seconds in the process of conducting an initial sweep would

constitute unreasonable seizure.

This Court’s prior decisions, upon which Rehn relies, did not clearly establish

the unlawfulness of Caulfield’s conduct. In Thompson v. Rahr, the officers had

“point[ed] a loaded gun at an unarmed suspect’s head, where that suspect had already

been searched, was calm and compliant, [and] was watched over by a second armed

deputy.” 885 F.3d 582, 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2018). In Motley v. Parks, this Court

specifically noted, “[w]hile it may have been reasonable for [the officer] to have

drawn his firearm during the initial sweep of a known gang member’s house, his

keeping the weapon trained on the infant, as he was alleged to have done, falls

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outside the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard.” 432 F.3d

1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005).

The same is necessarily true for Wagner and Kim’s entry into the apartment

with their weapons drawn (a firearm and a less-lethal weapon, respectively). The

body-worn-camera footage shows they only held their weapons at a low-ready

position and never pointed or raised their weapons in Rehn’s direction.

REVERSED.

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