The opinion
J-A08034-26
2026 PA Super 126
C.M.D. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
H.M. :
:
Appellant : No. 2336 EDA 2025
:
Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 0C2400443
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and KING, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 18, 2026
H.M. appeals from the August 15, 2025 final custody order pertaining to
her biological daughter, N.H.B.-F. (“Child”), born in July 2022. On appeal,
H.M. challenges the trial court’s finding that H.M.’s former partner, C.M.D.,
has standing to seek custody of Child. After careful consideration, we affirm
pursuant to Glover v. Junior, 333 A.3d 323, 358 (Pa. 2025) (“Glover”)
(adopting “the doctrine of intent-based parentage” in Pennsylvania).
The trial court authored an apt and comprehensive summary of the
extensive factual and procedural history of this matter, as follows:
C.M.D. and H.M. [(collectively, “the parties”) are both
women] and met on OKCupid around January 2016. See N.T.,
3/18/24, at 66. . . . They began [their] romantic relationship in
Cincinnati,[ Ohio,] but H.M. remained in the closet to her family
in London[, United Kingdom]. See id. at 67. . . . In March 2018,
the parties broke up, before reconciling in late April 2018. See
id. at 68. It is unclear from the record what the status of their
relationship was [through] October 2018. During that—for lack of
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a better term, complicated—period, H.M. began the process of
potentially pursuing reproducing through [assistive reproductive
technology (“ART”)] by purchasing vials of sperm. See id. at 81.
In October 2018, H.M. began living with C.M.D. and in May
2019, H.M. fully vacated her own apartment upon the expiration
of her lease. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 20. Shortly thereafter, H.M.
began the process of egg retrieval for use in future [in vitro
fertilization (“IVF”)] procedures [through the University of
Cincinnati (“UC”)]. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 107-08. [H.M.]
revealed to C.M.D. that she had already bought sperm from a
sperm bank, but she offered to return it if C.M.D. wanted to
participate in choosing the sperm donor. See N.T., 12/19/24, at
219. C.M.D. expressed that she was content with H.M.’s prior
choice of sperm donor and agreed to move forward with that
donor. See id. [Seventeen of H.M.’s] eggs were successfully
retrieved, [six] of them were successfully fertilized with the
[mutually approved] donor sperm, and [two] of the resulting
embryos were viable for future implantation. See N.T., 3/18/24,
at 108-09. The embryos were frozen in September 2019. See
Exhibit P-11. [A]lthough the various medical forms H.M. filled out
for her [first course of] fertility procedures included blanks for
“partner” or “intended parent,” these were left blank. See
Exhibits C-F. In the event of H.M.’s death, [H.M. initially
stipulated that] the embryos were to be entrusted to [her] sister,
not C.M.D. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 136-37.
In 2020, H.M. underwent [intrauterine insemination (“IUI”)]
at UC and became pregnant in September 2020[,] while the
parties were looking for a home to buy together in Philadelphia.
See N.T., 12/12/24, at 172; N.T., 3/25/24, at 31-32. C.M.D.
[took] H.M. to medical appointments and was included in
discussions about the procedures. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 28,
217. Ultimately, the IUI pregnancy resulted in a miscarriage; the
parties buried the remains of the miscarriage together. See N.T.,
12/12/24, at 176.
In November 2020, the parties moved to Philadelphia [and]
into a house they bought together. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 165;
N.T., 3/18/24, at 47. Included in their bid for the house was a
letter to the seller that said, among other things, “Your home
immediately struck us as the home we see ourselves filling with
music and raising a family in” and “We are excited to . . . welcome
more children there.” Exhibit P-10. H.M. put C.M.D. on her health
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insurance as her “domestic partner” and C.M.D. remained insured
under H.M.’s plan until [the end of their relationship.] N.T.,
1/3/25, at 292. Later that same month, they began the
[administrative] process of [transferring the previously frozen
embryos to] Main Line Fertility Center [(“Main Line Fertility”) in
Philadelphia, with the intent of the embryos being implanted into
C.M.D.] See Exhibit P-11 [(listing C.M.D. as the “patient)]. Unlike
the [UC] paperwork, all of the Main Line Fertility paperwork listed
both C.M.D. and H.M. as “Patient” or “Partner (if applicable).” Id.
Furthermore, H.M. changed the legal control of the embryos to
[include both of the parties]. They updated the embryo
disposition terms such that in the event of either’s death, the
embryos were to be entrusted to the “exclusive control” of the
other. See id.; see also Exhibit C. . . . In [the spring of] 2021,
H.M. underwent another round of IVF, [which] did not result in
any viable embryos. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 141-42.
In May 2021, the parties decided to implant one of the two
viable embryos into C.M.D., but it did not result in a successful
pregnancy. See id. at 142; see also N.T., 12/12/24, at 192.
Finally, in October 2021, the other viable embryo was implanted
in H.M.[, which] resulted in a successful pregnancy and[,]
eventually[,] the birth of Child in July 2022. See N.T., 1/3/25, at
143-44. The [successful] implantation procedure required the
consent of both of the parties. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294-98; N.T.,
12/12/24, at 194-95; Exhibit P-12.
During H.M.’s pregnancy, C.M.D. drove H.M. to [her]
doctor’s appointments and came in when possible, although she
was not always permitted to do so due to COVID restrictions.
N.T., 12/12/24, at 196-97. H.M. texted “congratulations” to
C.M.D. when Child’s fetal heartbeat was detected. Id. at 197.
And the healthcare staff at Main Line Fertility held H.M.’s phone to
the ultrasound machine so C.M.D. could listen to the heartbeat.
See id. C.M.D. took over a larger household role while H.M. was
pregnant. See id. at 198. C.M.D. administered progesterone
shots to H.M. in their home. See id. C.M.D. underwent a
months[-]long process to induce lactation. See id. at 202-03.
When C.M.D. was eventually successful in inducing lactation, H.M.
thanked C.M.D. for all she was doing. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 161-
62, 307. During the pregnancy, H.M. gave C.M.D. a Valentine’s
Day card that, among other things, said: “Can you believe our
little family grows both in love and in numbers?” Id. at 315-16;
Exhibit P-40. The parties both scheduled and later took parental
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leave for the birth of Child. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 199, 210.
C.M.D.’s church threw a baby shower for the parties. See N.T.,
1/3/25, at 304.
[The parties also] collaborated on determining Child’s name.
See Exhibit P-15. Child was ultimately given four names, two of
which drew from C.M.D.’s side of the family and two of which met
H.M.’s priorities for simplicity and heritage. See N.T., 1/3/25, at
154-57; N.T., 12/12/24, at 213-15. The parties discussed
whether to put C.M.D.’s name on the birth certificate. See N.T.,
1/3/25, at 152. They ultimately did not do so because of a belief
that they could not legally do so while unmarried. See N.T.,
1/3/25, at 152; N.T., 12/19/24, at 220-21. The parties also
consulted with an attorney about the possibility of C.M.D. adopting
Child, but they ultimately never moved forward with that. See
N.T., 3/25/24, at 66-67.
When Child was born, C.M.D. was in the birthing room with
H.M. and caught Child, cut the umbilical cord, and had skin-to-
skin time in the birthing suite. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 305; N.T.,
12/12/24, at 206. Child drank C.M.D.’s breastmilk in the hospital.
See N.T., 12/12/24, at 208. When Child’s bilirubin levels were
high, C.M.D. alone took Child to a medical appointment while H.M.
was recovering from delivery. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 167. C.M.D.
and H.M. took Child together to subsequent appointments. See
N.T., 1/3/25, at 167, 397-400. C.M.D. also took on an outsized
role in managing the household during H.M.’s recovery. See N.T.,
1/3/25, at 320-21; N.T., 12/12/24, at 207-10. Both of the parties
breastfed Child, although H.M. did the majority of the
breastfeeding. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 307-08; N.T., 12/12/24, at
220-22.
Contemporaneously, C.M.D. sent out a birth announcement,
including H.M., referencing both C.M.D. and H.M. as parents of
Child. See Exhibit P-16. H.M. did not object publicly (to the
recipients of the announcement) or privately (to C.M.D.) to
C.M.D.’s characterization of both C.M.D. and H.M. as parents or
the characterization of Child as “our daughter.” See N.T., 1/3/25,
at 396. H.M. sent out a separate announcement to her family
(who did not know her sexual orientation) that did not reference
C.M.D. See id. at 396. On August 12, 2022, seventeen days
after Child was born, H.M. gave C.M.D. a birthday card which
contained statements like “baby girl has joined us,” “what an
incredible time of parenting, of growing as a family,” “here’s to
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your birthday with [Child],” “you’re an incredible mom,” and
“looking forward to our journeys together as a family.” Exhibit P-
36.
C.M.D.’s family sent several cards to H.M., C.M.D., and
Child[,] which explicitly referred to both H.M. and C.M.D. as
mothers to Child and C.M.D.’s parents as Child’s grandparents.
See Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, and P-4. H.M. did not object to [these
characterizations]. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 32. C.M.D.’s father sent
a family heirloom to Child, a shadowbox made from a piece of
[his] crib. See Exhibit P-5. H.M. did not suggest that this was
odd or that Child was not part of C.M.D.’s family. See N.T.,
3/18/24, at 31-32. C.M.D.’s mother visited to see Child and H.M.
took “family photos” of C.M.D., C.M.D.’s mother, and Child. See
N.T., 12/12/24, at 53-55; Exhibits P-6 and P-7. C.M.D.’s mother
retired, partially, so she would be able to spend more time
supporting H.M. and C.M.D. by providing care for Child. See N.T.,
12/12/24, at 78. H.M. also arranged for a professional
photographer to take family photos of the parties and Child. See
N.T., 1/3/25, at 443-45; C.M.D.’s Exhibit 14. C.M.D.’s mother
referred to C.M.D. as Child’s mother in H.M.’s presence and H.M.
did not correct her. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 451-52. The parties
collaborated on finding a daycare for Child and ultimately chose a
daycare that C.M.D. suggested. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 175; N.T.,
12/12/24, at 274. C.M.D. contributed financially for the daycare
expenses[,] but H.M. chose not to use the contributions. See
N.T., 12/19/24, at 43-44.
In December 2022, due to tension in their relationship,
C.M.D. moved out of their bedroom and into the guest room. See
N.T., 3/18/24, at 111. In May or June 2023, as the relationship
continued to deteriorate, C.M.D. moved out of the house and into
a “carriage house” immediately adjacent. See N.T., 12/12/24, at
161; N.T., 3/18/24, at 68. C.M.D. continued to see Child “almost
daily,” including dropping her off at and picking her up from
daycare and usually spending two hours with Child on Thursday
evenings. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 114, 177; N.T., 12/19/24, at 224;
N.T., 12/12/24, at 159, 226-27. H.M. lived with and cared for
Child in H.M.’s and C.M.D.’s house in Philadelphia. See N.T.,
1/3/25, at 110. Around February 2024, H.M. moved out of the
house with Child. See id. at 116. H.M. refused to disclose to
C.M.D. her new address. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 236-37.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 1-6 (cleaned up).
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C.M.D. initiated these proceedings by filing a custody complaint on
March 7, 2024, wherein she requested shared legal and physical custody of
Child and asserted that she was Child’s “non-biological parent.” See
Complaint for Custody, 3/7/24, at ¶¶ 3, 5. Due to H.M.’s status as a citizen
of the United Kingdom, C.M.D. requested the entry of “an order preventing
Child from leaving the country until a custody order is issued.” Id. at ¶ 15.
The same day, C.M.D. also filed an emergency custody complaint requesting
the same relief. See generally Emergency Complaint for Custody, 3/7/24,
at ¶¶ 1-15. The case was initially assigned to the Honorable Mark B. Cohen
of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“Judge Cohen”).
On March 11, 2024, Judge Cohen held the first custody hearing, at which
both parties appeared with counsel. See N.T., 3/11/24, at 3-5. Therein, H.M.
made an oral motion to dismiss C.M.D.’s complaints based upon her alleged
lack of standing to seek custody of Child See N.T., 3/11/24, at 5. C.M.D.
maintained her standing was based upon the newly announced paradigm of
“parentage by intent” pursuant to Glover v. Junior, 306 A.3d 899 (Pa. Super.
2023) (en banc), affirmed on appeal, 333 A.3d 323 (Pa. 2025).1 See id. at
11. The same day, Judge Cohen entered an interim custody order precluding
H.M. from leaving the Commonwealth. See Order, 3/11/24, at 1.
____________________________________________
1 At the time C.M.D. made these arguments, this Court’s en banc holding in
Glover was on appeal in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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On March 18, 2024, H.M. filed formal preliminary objections asserting,
inter alia, that C.M.D. lacked standing. See Preliminary Objections, 3/18/24,
at ¶¶ 105-57. The same day, H.M. also filed a petition requesting a protracted
hearing on the issue of C.M.D.’s standing to seek custody.
Also on March 18, 2024, Judge Cohen held a second custody hearing.
Therein, C.M.D. expanded upon her initial arguments and asserted that she
had standing to seek custody based upon, inter alia, intent and in loco
parentis. See N.T., 3/18/24, at 6-9. H.M. responded that paternity by intent
was not permitted pursuant to C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2018). See
id. at 10-14. This hearing was largely focused upon whether or not there was
a custody emergency that required immediate action by the trial court. See
id. at 16-22. While Judge Cohen had already entered an order prohibiting
H.M. from leaving Pennsylvania, C.M.D. claimed that H.M. had also been
withholding Child from her. See id. at 16. At the conclusion of the hearing,
Judge Cohen filed an order that, inter alia, scheduled a hearing for March 25,
2024, to permit H.M. to present evidence and argument concerning her
preliminary objections. See Order, 3/18/24, at 1.
On March 25, 2024, the hearing regarding H.M.’s preliminary objections
took place as scheduled. The parties each testified and introduced a number
of additional documentary exhibits into evidence. Thereafter, the trial court
filed a “temporary” order that provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
THE EMERGENCY PETITION FILED MARCH 7, 2024 IS HEREBY
GRANTED. [C.M.D.] IS FOUND TO BE A PARENT TO THE CHILD
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FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE EMERGENCY PETITION, UNTIL OR
UNLESS OTHERWISE DETERMINED AT A FUTURE HEARING.
[C.M.D.] SHALL HAVE PARTIAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF [CHILD]
STARTING FROM PICK UP FROM THE DAYCARE AT 4:30 P.M. ON
MONDAYS AND DROP OFF AT THE DAYCARE ON WEDNESDAY
MORNINGS AT 8:30 P.M. UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT.
[H.M.]’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCETS ONLY ARE OVERRULED AND ARE
OTHERWISE PRESERVED FOR FUTURE HEARINGS.
Order, 3/25/24, at 1.2
On March 27, 2024, this case was transferred to the purview of the
Honorable Rajinderpal Sandher. See Order, 3/27/24, at 1 (unpaginated).
Following Judge Sandher’s appointment, H.M. sought to further litigate the
matter of C.M.D.’s standing. Ultimately, Judge Sandher held that he was
bound by Judge Cohen’s ruling with respect to H.M.’s preliminary objections
pursuant to the rule of coordinate jurisdiction. 3 See Order, 7/15/24, at 1
(unpaginated).
Thereafter, the trial court held protracted custody hearings on
December 12 and December 19, 2024, and January 3, 2025. In pertinent
part, the trial court heard extensive testimony from the parties that largely
____________________________________________
2 On April 8, 2024, H.M. filed an application requesting that the trial court
amend its March 25, 2024 order to permit her to file an immediate
interlocutory appeal. See Application to Amend Order, 4/8/24, at 1-22 (citing
42 Pa.C.S.A.[ § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311). The same day, H.M. also filed a
separate application seeking a stay of the proceedings. The parties each
submitted substantial materials in support and opposition to these requests.
There is no indication that the trial court ever ruled on these applications.
3 H.M. has not challenged this aspect of the court’s holding on appeal.
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pertained to custody issues that are not directly implicated in the instant
appeal. On February 18, 2025, the trial court filed an order that awarded the
parties shared legal custody of Child. See Order (Part 1), 2/18/25, at 3. The
order awarded H.M. primary physical custody while granting C.M.D. partial
physical custody “every other weekend” and overnight on Wednesdays. Id.
at 4. The order also set forth a number of additional custody parameters that
are not relevant to our resolution of this matter. 4
On March 12, 2025, H.M. filed a motion for reconsideration requesting
clarification and revisions of various aspects of the trial court’s custody order
that did not relate to C.M.D.’s standing.5 On March 19, 2025, the trial court
filed an order expressly granting H.M.’s request for reconsideration. See
Order, 3/19/25, at 1 (unpaginated). On March 20, 2025, C.M.D. filed an
answer and cross-motion for reconsideration. On March 27, 2025, C.M.D. filed
a praecipe providing the trial court with a copy of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Glover, which had been issued seven days earlier. See Glover, 333 A.3d
at 325 (filed on March 20, 2025).
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4 H.M. has not challenged these custody parameters on appeal. Nonetheless,
we note that Judge Sandher issued extensive and well-reasoned findings
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). See Order (Part 2), 2/18/25, at 1-10.
5 On March 12, 2025, H.M. filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b)
with respect to the trial court’s February 18, 2025 order. Following the trial
court’s grant of reconsideration, however, H.M. filed a praecipe seeking to
strike the notice of appeal and concise statement of appeal as inoperative.
See Praecipe in Custody Matters, 3/31/25, at 1 (unpaginated).
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On August 15, 2025, the trial court filed an order that resolved the
outstanding matters raised in the parties’ respective requests for
reconsideration. See Order, 8/15/25, at 1. On September 11, 2025, H.M.
timely filed a notice of appeal along with a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) concise
statement. On October 9, 2025, the trial court filed a thoroughly responsive
Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 1-35.
H.M. has raised the following issues for our consideration:
1. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did
the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that C.M.D. had
standing to assert a custody claim as a parent under an intent-
based analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1)?
2. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did
the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that C.M.D. had
standing to assert a custody claim as a parent under an estoppel
analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1)?
3. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did
C.M.D. have standing to assert a custody claim as a parent under
a contract-based analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1)?
4. In a custody dispute involving former same-sex partners, did
C.M.D. have in loco parentis standing to assert a custody claim
under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2)?
H.M.’s Brief at 9-10 (issues reordered for ease of disposition; cleaned up).
Generally, in addressing issues of standing, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Hunt v. Vardaro, 317 A.3d
1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citing In the Interest of K.N.L., 284 A.3d
121, 132-33 (Pa. 2022)). Where our mandate involves reviewing the factual
findings and credibility determinations of the trial court, we will accept them
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insofar as they are supported by the record. See K.N.L., 284 A.3d at 132
(cleaned up). In the context of child custody, we are “compelled to perform
a comprehensive review of the record for assurance the findings and credibility
determinations are competently supported.” Id. at 133 (cleaned up).
Our Supreme Court has delineated the basic legal considerations
relevant to standing disputes in child custody matters, as follows:
The fundamental concept of standing ensures that a party seeking
to litigate a matter has a substantial, direct, and immediate
interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. In the area of child
custody, principles of standing have been applied with particular
scrupulousness[.] This stringent application of standing principles
serves to protect both the interest of the court system by ensuring
that actions are litigated by appropriate parties and the interest in
keeping a family unit free from intrusion by those that are merely
strangers, however well-meaning. . . . The liberty interest . . . of
parents in the care, custody and control of their children is
perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by this
Court. Determining standing in custody disputes is a threshold
issue that must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the
underlying custody action. It is a conceptually distinct legal
question which has no bearing on the central issue within the
custody action-who is entitled to physical and legal custody of a
child in light of his or her best interests.
C.G., 193 A.3d at 898 (cleaned up).
At the statutory level, the Custody Act (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 5322-40, provides that the “parent” of a child is entitled to seek “any form
of physical custody or legal custody.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(1). There is,
however, no statutory definition of who qualifies as a “parent” for these
purposes. See generally 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322 (“Definitions”). “‘Absent a
definition . . ., statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and
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plain everyday sense, and the popular meaning of such words must prevail.’”
C.G., 193 A.3d at 900 (quoting Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc.,
658 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. 1995)). Traditionally, Pennsylvania law has
recognized four paths to parentage and seeking custody: (1) biology; (2)
adoption; (3) equity or estoppel; and (4) contract. See id. at 906.
Of late, however, our statewide jurisprudence has increasingly
recognized “the reality of the evolving concept of what comprises a family
cannot be overlooked,” particularly in “cases that specifically involve the use
of alternative means of conceiving and[/]or reproducing through [ART].” Id.
at 900. Indeed, this Court has observed that “changes in social mores and
increased individual freedom have created a wide spectrum of arrangements,
filling the role of the traditional nuclear family.” J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d
1314, 1320 (Pa. Super. 1996). Until recently, our Supreme Court had declined
to adopt “the broad proposition that parentage can be established by intent in
situations where a child is born with the aid of [ART].” C.G., 193 A.3d at 905.
These considerations culminated in the issuance of Glover, wherein the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court formally endorsed a “fifth pathway to parentage”
in a case involving a “same-sex couple” who conceived a child through the use
of a sperm donor and ART. Glover, 333 A.3d at 327. Specifically, our
Supreme Court held that “parentage may be established by proof of intent
shared by two parties to use ART to conceive and co-parent a child together,
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even without meeting all the formalities of contract law.” Id. at 356. Glover
declined to establish a bright-line rule or create a new presumption:
Instead, it is enough to say that courts undertaking an intent-
based parentage analysis should consider all evidence from all
relevant time periods – including, when applicable, pre-
conception, during conception, during gestation, during birth, and
post-birth – to determine whether the parties jointly undertook
ART intending to conceive and co-parent the child together.
Id. at 357.
Instantly, the trial court undertook a meticulous review of the evidence
adduced by the parties and concluded, inter alia, that Glover applied such
that C.M.D. should be deemed Child’s parent due to the evidence concerning
the parties’ intent to conceive and co-parent Child together. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/9/25, at 17-26. This aspect of the trial court’s holding is the
subject of H.M.’s first claim for relief, wherein she argues that the trial court
misapplied Glover. See H.M.’s Brief at 47-69. Specifically, H.M. maintains
the trial court failed to give appropriate weight to facts that she claims
distinguishes this case from the holding in Glover. See id.
Given the factually intensive nature of our inquiry, a close review of the
facts in Glover is warranted. That case concerned a married same-sex
couple, Chanel Glover and Nicole Junior, who began pursuing conception and
mutually entered into a series of contracts with ART-related medical providers
between February 2021 and August 2021. See Glover, 333 A.3d at 327-28.
The parties collaborated in selecting a sperm donor who resembled Junior.
See id. at 327. Junior also shared in the costs of the ART treatments and
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“assisted” Glover with medical procedures. Id. Ultimately, the child was
conceived in August 2021 utilizing Glover’s egg and the donor sperm. See id.
at 328. The parties in Glover executed affidavits indicating their intent to co-
parent and Junior attested to her intent to adopt the child. See id. The
parties also planned a baby shower together, although it was eventually
cancelled. See id. at 329. The parties’ relationship quickly deteriorated,
which led to Glover filing a complaint in divorce in April 2022, while still
pregnant. See id. Junior filed a petition for special relief for pre-birth
establishment of parentage and an emergency petition seeking the same
relief. See id. Ultimately, the family court filed an order granting her relief,
which “confirmed” Junior as a legal parent under a contractual theory. Id.
Glover appealed. This Court initially reversed but subsequently granted
Junior’s application for en banc review and held that Junior had “established
parentage by three alternative means: (1) a contract-based right; (2)
equitable estoppel; and (3) intent-based parentage.” Id. at 335-36 (citing
Glover v. Junior, 306 A.3d 899, 913-19 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc)). Our
Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal, adopted the theory of intent-
based parentage under Pennsylvania law, and affirmed on that basis alone.
See id. at 357. In holding that Junior was a legal parent based upon the
parties’ shared intent, the Supreme Court emphasized the following:
[T]he record here is replete with evidence to support the lower
courts’ holdings the parties mutually intended to bring [the child]
into the world and raise him together, and that Junior participated
in that process. Among other things, Glover and Junior jointly
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entered into multiple contracts pertaining to the conception and
birth of [the child], and Junior was even listed as a “Co-Intended
Parent” [on one such contract]. Junior played an active role in
selecting the sperm donor, and the couple chose a donor based
on his similarities to Junior. Junior shared equally in the costs of
conceiving [the child] and assisted Glover with the IVF process by
administering injections and attending doctors’ appointments.
They planned a baby shower together and picked out a name for
the baby. But perhaps most cogently, both Glover and Junior
signed affidavits stating their intentions plainly.[6]
Id.
In pertinent part, H.M.’s arguments highlight several factual differences
between the instant circumstances and those in Glover, including: (1) the
absence of affidavits attesting to the parties’ intent; (2) the fact that H.M. and
C.M.D. were not married; (3) C.M.D. did not directly participate in the
selection of the sperm donor; (4) C.M.D. did not contribute to the costs
associated with the ART treatments; (5) C.M.D. was not identified as a co-
parent during H.M.’s initial treatments through UC; (6) H.M. “never agreed”
to C.M.D. adopting Child; and (7) the parties’ conduct following Child’s birth
indicates a lack of shared intent. See H.M.’s Brief at 53-67.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledged that there are
some factual distinctions between this case and Glover. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/9/25, at 25-26. Nonetheless, the court concluded that “the facts
weighing against intent are not only overcome, but overwhelmed, by the facts
____________________________________________
6 As discussed further infra, however, our Supreme Court clarified that its
holding in Glover did not “require” couples in “similar circumstances to
document their intentions in writing.” Glover, 333 A.3d at 357.
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indicating intent to co-parent” in this case. Id. The court detailed its findings,
with extensive and accurate citations to the certified record, as follows:
1. Legal Rights Over the Embryos
[I]t is important to see the evolution of H.M.’s and C.M.D.’s
relationship during H.M.’s “fertilization journey.” H.M. first began
her “fertilization journey” by herself by purchasing sperm without
telling C.M.D. around the time of their first break-up. N.T.,
1/3/25, at 129. If that were when she had become impregnated,
it would be clear she had no intent for C.M.D. to be the other
parent. But H.M. did nothing with the sperm until after C.M.D.
and H.M. got back together and began living together.
After their reconciliation, H.M. went through an egg retrieval
procedure. She then used the sperm to create fertilized embryos.
C.M.D. testified (and H.M. never contradicted her testimony) that
H.M. first offered to return the sperm and allow C.M.D. to be
involved in the selection of the sperm donor but C.M.D. was
content with the sperm donor H.M. had previously chosen. See
N.T., 12/19/24, at 219-20. The fertilization resulted in two viable
embryos, which were kept frozen at [UC]. H.M. alone had legal
control over the embryos and H.M.’s sister was named the
beneficiary of the embryos in the event of H.M.’s death. See N.T.,
1/3/25, at 136-37.
H.M. then attempted to get pregnant via IUI, not IVF,
instead saving her viable embryos for a potential future child. At
this time, C.M.D. was heavily involved in planning to have a child
and in accompanying H.M. to appointments. [See N.T., 12/19/24,
at 28, 217.] C.M.D. and H.M. were also looking for a home to
purchase together in Philadelphia. [See N.T., 12/12/24, at 172;
N.T., 3/25/24, at 31-32.] However, H.M.’s name, alone, was on
all of the fertilization paperwork at [UC]. See N.T., 1/3/25, at
135-36. H.M. did successfully become pregnant via IUI and she
celebrated with C.M.D. and C.M.D. even informed her family that
they were expecting a child. . . . However, this pregnancy resulted
in a miscarriage[,] and the parties buried the remains together.
[See N.T., 12/12/24, at 176.]
After the parties moved to Philadelphia, though, H.M.
transferred her frozen embryos from [UC] to [Main Line Fertility].
Importantly, upon doing so, H.M. changed the legal status of the
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embryos. They were no longer under her control alone but under
both C.M.D.’s and H.M.’s legal control. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294-
98; N.T., 12/12/24, at 194-95; Exhibit P-12. And in the event of
either’s death, the embryos would pass to the other. See N.T.,
12/12/24, at 188-89; Exhibit P-11. Only in the event of the
parties’ simultaneous death would the embryos pass to H.M.’s
sister. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 189.
This change of legal control over the embryos is a clear
manifestation of intent that the embryos and any potential
children would be the children of both C.M.D. and H.M. And, in
fact, when the second embryo was thawed and implanted into
H.M. before becoming Child, both H.M. and C.M.D. had to consent
to that procedure. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294-98; N.T., 12/12/24,
at 194-95; Exhibit P-12. This [c]ourt found it highly improbable
that H.M. would cede such ownership and control over her
embryos to C.M.D., especially requiring C.M.D.’s consent to
implant an embryo into H.M., unless she intended C.M.D. to be
her co-parent.
2. Implantation of an Embryo into C.M.D.
Before the embryo that became Child was implanted into
H.M., the other of the two viable embryos was implanted into
C.M.D. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 142; N.T., 12/12/24, at 192. H.M.
argues that C.M.D. was merely her girlfriend, or a trusted support
person, not a co-parent. See N.T., 3/25/24, at 140-41. And she
tried to explain away the implantation of one of her two viable
embryos into C.M.D. as a decision that she succumbed to because
of C.M.D.’s nagging. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 142-43. H.M. further
testified that she thought of this action as giving away an embryo
and that she never would have considered the resulting child (had
there been one) to be her child. See id. at 143.
This [c]ourt found it incredibly unlikely that someone would
give up an embryo she had worked so hard for and when she had
so few due to mere nagging. This unlikelihood is exacerbated by
the fact that H.M. repeatedly testified as to her desire to have full
biological siblings. See id. at 132, 137. Given the failure of IUI
to this point, these two embryos were potentially the only
opportunities to create H.M.’s own biological children. . . . This
[c]ourt did not find H.M.’s testimony credible on this matter.
3. C.M.D. Breastfed Child
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Early in H.M.’s pregnancy with Child, C.M.D. began a lengthy
process to induce her own lactation due to the biological difficulty
of doing so without becoming pregnant. See N.T., 12/12/24, at
202-03. C.M.D. scheduled consultations with a lactation specialist
and H.M. accompanied her to at least one of these consultations.
See N.T., 1/3/25, at 305. C.M.D. took various hormones for
months to induce lactation and when she eventually produced
colostrum, H.M. photographed the occasion and thanked C.M.D.
for all she was doing. See id. at 307. H.M. testified that she
never expressed any reservations to C.M.D. about C.M.D.’s clear
intent to breastfeed Child. See id. at 162, 428. And Child first
drank C.M.D.’s breastmilk in the birthing suite immediately after
the birth. And C.M.D. continued to breastfeed for the first six
months of Child’s life, albeit in a limited capacity because H.M.
had ample breastmilk and it would cause H.M. pain if Child did not
drink it. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 162-63; N.T., 3/25/24, at 59. H.M.
testified that she in no way endorsed or encouraged C.M.D. to
breastfeed and that H.M. was simply doing her own thing while
C.M.D. did hers. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 161-62.
This court, again, found this testimony not credible. H.M.
had countless opportunities to address the matter and it is not
typical for mere friends and support people (non-parents) to
breastfeed other’s children, let alone to put months of preparation
into being able to do so. And this court found it highly unlikely
that H.M. would not say anything while watching C.M.D. put in this
sort of effort to prepare to breastfeed H.M.’s child unless it was
also intended to be C.M.D.’s child.
4. H.M. Referred to C.M.D. as Child’s Mother
H.M. explicitly called C.M.D. Child’s mother on multiple
occasions, both to C.M.D., herself, and to strangers. On C.M.D.’s
birthday, seventeen days after Child was born, H.M. gave C.M.D.
a birthday cared which included the statements: “baby girl has
joined us,” “what an incredible time of parenting, of growing as a
family,” “here’s to your first birthday with [Child],” “you’re an
incredible mom,” and “looking forward to our journeys together
as a family.” Exhibit P-36. [I]t also contained an outline of Child’s
hand surrounded by the words: “a new precious hand to hold and
to love and to care for.” Id. H.M. also sent C.M.D. a text message
of a bitmoji with a white woman and a black woman holding a
baby (clearly representing C.M.D., H.M., and Child, respectively)
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and the words: “I love that we started a family together.” Exhibit
P-38. H.M. even publicly referred to both C.M.D. and H.M. as
Child’s parents to strangers. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 442-43.
H.M. emphasized “the many years” over which these
presumably few instances of H.M. calling C.M.D. Child’s mother
occurred. See id. at 442. But this court noted that it was
significant that it would have happened multiple times at all given
H.M. and C.M.D. began breaking up just five months after Child’s
birth and were fully separated within a year of Child’s birth. Any
references to C.M.D. as Child’s mother by H.M. are also especially
significant given H.M.’s tendency toward privacy. The parties
were in a romantic relationship for about seven years, C.M.D.
travelled with H.M. to the United Kingdom for H.M.’s family to
meet Child, and yet H.M. was still in the closet to her sister, with
whom she spoke “every day,” the rest of her family, and her best
friend[,] until this litigation caused her sexuality to be revealed.
Id. at 20, 32-33, 45, 90.
H.M. also argued that she felt that terms like “mother” and
“family” were relatively loose terms within C.M.D.’s family and
that her intent was really to call C.M.D. a valued member of her
and Child’s community . . . . Id. at 448. This court did not find
H.M.’s testimony to this effect credible. H.M. put forward no
examples of anyone else to whom she ever said anything vaguely
similar that could be misinterpreted as calling them Child’s
parents. Furthermore, while H.M. repeatedly testified confidently
about her specific thoughts and intent for actions from years
before . . ., her memory consistently became conveniently hazy
and it became “hard to recall exactly” details as to why she
repeatedly referred to herself, C.M.D., and Child as a family or
how C.M.D. behaved as a parent. See id. at 294, 307, 309, 316-
17, 321, 334, 352, 393, 398, 447-48.
5. Two of Child’s Four Names Came from C.M.D.’s
Family
H.M. and C.M.D. collaborated on choosing a name for Child,
as this court recognized that parents often do. However, H.M.
also collaborated with her sister on choosing a name for Child. It
was unsurprising to this court, given that H.M. had not revealed
her relationship with C.M.D. to her sister, that these conversations
were separate and that H.M.’s sister was not aware of C.M.D.’s
involvement in picking Child’s name. Id. at 48. But H.M. was
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clear about what qualities she desired in a name for Child. She
wanted names that related to her black and Islamic heritage but
that were sufficiently simple or common across multiple heritages
that Child would likely not have to repeatedly spell or correct the
spelling and pronunciation of her name. See id. at 154-55.
Ultimately, Child was given four names: a first name, a middle
name, and two last names which were hyphenated. Child’s first
name and one of her last names met the criteria H.M. desired for
Child’s name. The middle name and especially the other last
name, . . . very much did not. See id. at 158. And yet, those
names were given to Child[,] and they came from C.M.D.’s family.
While it is plausible that someone would name their child
after a mere friend, especially a middle name, this court
recognized that passing on of last names is typically a specifically
parental action. The fact that the [last name from C.M.D.’s family]
is so antithetical to H.M.’s preferences (simplicity and
recognizability) otherwise bolsters the notion that Child was given
the name . . . as a symbol of C.M.D.’s parentage. This court
considered why Child then did not receive C.M.D.’s own last name,
but this court observed that H.M.’s family met C.M.D. but did not
know about the parties’ relationship. H.M. told her family that
[Child’s last name drawn from C.M.D.’s family] was “random.” Id.
at 66. Had the name been C.M.D.’s own last name, that would
likely have prompted additional questions.
6. Other Facts Relevant to Intent
This court deemed that any of the five facts above would be
incredibly unusual in a non-parental relationship. . . . With all five
combined, the evidence of H.M.’s intent to co-parent is
overwhelming. While H.M. tried to explain away her behavior at
trial, the explanations fell flat and were simply not credible. In
arguing that C.M.D. was merely her girlfriend, or a trusted support
person, not a co-parent, H.M. sounded to this court like someone
who had chosen to have a child with C.M.D. and then changed her
mind and was desperately trying to convince everyone, herself
included, that it had never been her intent to begin with.
However, the facts above are merely the strongest points in
favor of finding intent. There are many smaller details in the
record that also suggest that C.M.D. and H.M. were co-parents.
They purchased a home together (including a letter in their bid
talking about their desire to raise a family together there). See
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N.T., 12/12/24, at 165; N.T., 3/18/24, at 47; Exhibit P-10. While
pregnant, H.M. gave C.M.D. a Valentine’s Day card on which she
wrote “our little family grows in love and number,” although she
testified that she did not recall what she meant by those words
(this court did not find that testimony credible). See N.T., 1/3/25,
at 317. C.M.D. researched medical providers and accompanied
H.M. on medical visits to the extent possible during the COVID
pandemic. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 196-97. When she could not
go inside with H.M., she was on video calls with H.M. for the
appointments, including having healthcare providers hold up the
phone to the ultrasound so C.M.D. could listen to Child’s
heartbeat. See id. at 197. C.M.D. and H.M. attended a baby
shower explicitly thrown for both of them as parents and H.M.
never stated to C.M.D., or anyone else, that C.M.D. was not a
parent. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 304.
C.M.D. was present . . . at Child’s birth, caught Child, cut
the umbilical cord, and had skin-to-skin time with Child, all
traditional parental behaviors. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 305; N.T.,
12/12/24, at 206-08. C.M.D. took Child alone to a pediatric
appointment while H.M. was recovering from labor and managed
food for the family and other household responsibilities during that
time. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 167, 320-21, 397-400; N.T.,
12/12/24, at 207-10. C.M.D. sent out a birth announcement that
explicitly stated that H.M. and C.M.D. were both parents of Child
and H.M. never objected to that characterization either to C.M.D.
or anyone else. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 396. H.M. arranged for
C.M.D. and H.M. to take what looked to this court very much like
traditional family photos with Child. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 443-45;
Exhibit P-14. . . . The parties jointly made decisions about
pediatricians and daycares. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 176, 308; N.T.,
12/12/24, at 197.
C.M.D. accompanied H.M. on a visit to H.M.’s family with
Child (although she didn’t reveal the nature of their relationship
because H.M. was still in the closet to her family at that time).
See N.T., 1/3/25, at 32-33. H.M.’s sister testified that C.M.D.
acted strangely possessive of Child during this visit (“[L]ike, overly
affectionate with her, giving her lots of hugs and kisses and things
like that.”). Id. at 34. This court considered that such behavior
would seem odd given her assumption that H.M. was a single
parent, but that it would seem very normal if C.M.D. were a parent
to Child.
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H.M. heard C.M.D. refer to herself as Child’s parent and
received cards and a family heirloom from C.M.D.’s family that
explicitly indicated C.M.D.’s belief and C.M.D.’s family’s belief that
C.M.D. was Child’s parent. See Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5,
and P-16. H.M. did not object to the characterization or correct
them. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 396; N.T., 3/18/24, at 31-32. This
court considered it unlikely that someone who intended to be a
single parent would not have a clarifying conversation with a
romantic partner who is very clearly demonstrating that she
believes she will be a co-parent.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 19-25 (emphasis added; cleaned up).
We have comprehensively reviewed the extensive certified record in this
case. Based upon that review, we readily conclude that the trial court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations are fully supported by the evidence, as
evinced by the above-quoted discussion and citations. We recognize that the
respective testimonies and evidence proffered by H.M. and C.M.D. were in
conflict regarding many of the findings rendered by the trial court in this case.
We emphasize, however, that “with regard to issues of credibility and weight
of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and
assessed the witnesses first-hand.” D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa.
Super. 2014). Indeed, our Supreme Court has deferred to the well-supported
“credibility determinations” of the trial court when “faced with conflicting
testimony” in matters concerning a party’s standing to seek child custody.
C.G., 193 A.3d at 910; see also K.N.L., 284 A.3d at 132-33 (same).
Moreover, in her desire to determinably pursue this appeal, many of
H.M.’s arguments challenging the trial court’s findings regarding intent largely
misrepresent the evidence of record and/or misapprehend the gravamen of
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the holding in Glover. For example, H.M. has highlighted the absence of
affidavits attesting to the parties’ intent with respect to Child. See H.M.’s
Brief at 62. We emphasize, however, that Glover explicitly declined to impose
a requirement that such evidence is strictly necessary:
Despite our acceptance of intent-based parentage in the ART
context, we nevertheless encourage couples in similar
circumstances to document their intentions in writing. While not
necessarily dispositive, such writings (like the affidavits in this
case) provide strong evidence of intent should a dispute arise,
even if the writings do not meet the elements of a contract. We
do not foreclose the possibility that partners in a couple could
contract with each other to have a child together. But the point
is that we do not require them to do so, and in any event,
under this intent-based doctrine, the additional elements
required by contract law need not be proved.
Glover, 333 A.3d at 357 (some emphasis added). As detailed in the trial
court’s factual findings above, there is ample evidence speaking to the parties’
intent irrespective of the absence of affidavits like those in Glover.
H.M. has also alleged that the instant case is distinguishable from
Glover since she and C.M.D. were never married. See H.M.’s Brief at 62. We
emphasize, however, that the marriage in Glover had broken down such that
Junior was unable to benefit from marital presumptions for paternity purposes.
See Glover, 333 A.3d at 349. Indeed, this was one of the Supreme Court’s
primary motivations for its adoption of intent-based parentage, i.e., to address
factual circumstances not already covered by Pennsylvania’s existing legal
framework. See id. Moreover, the holding in Glover intentionally declined
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to directly tie the concept of intent-based parentage to marriage by
announcing “a new marital presumption,” reasoning as follows:
Certainly, the fact a couple is married at the time they decide to
conceive a child will typically weigh in favor of finding they
intended to conceive and raise the child together. And we do not
foreclose the possibility that as our common law develops
pursuant to this doctrine, intent in those situations may be
deemed so prevalent as to warrant the adoption of a presumption.
But we need not make that pronouncement today, where
the record contains extensive evidence of the parties’
intent. Instead, it is enough to say that courts undertaking
an intent-based parentage analysis should consider all
evidence from all relevant time periods[.]
Glover, 333 A.3d at 357 (emphasis added).
Contrary to H.M.’s arguments, Glover did not attach outsized
significance to the existence of a marriage in recognizing intent-based
parentage under Pennsylvania law. Instead, Glover directed courts
considering intent-based parentage arguments to view “all evidence”
concerning the controversy, as the trial court clearly did in this case. Id.
Moreover, this line of argument largely ignores that the parties were in a
romantic relationship for seven years, wherein they purchased real property
together and jointly underwent ART procedures that led to the conception and
birth of Child. While not a legal marriage or formalized partnership, this
relationship certainly bears all of the hallmarks of mutual commitment. See,
e.g., id. at 353 n.27 (“[B]iology and marriage are not the only indicia of family
formation that are worth of judicial recognition . . . and our statutes should
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be construed to bring the recognized framework of our domestic relations law
to families as we find them.”) (cleaned up).
We also cannot credit H.M.’s contention that C.M.D. did not participate
in the selection of a sperm donor in this case. See H.M.’s Brief at 63. As
noted above, C.M.D.’s unchallenged testimony on this issue indicated that
H.M. requested C.M.D.’s approval of the donor that she had selected and
offered to select a different donor with C.M.D.’s input. See N.T., 12/19/24,
at 219. C.M.D. approved of H.M.’s selection of a sperm donor and the couple
moved forward with ART procedures based upon that approval. See id. As
such, H.M.’s argument that C.M.D. did not participate in the selection of the
sperm donor that led to Child’s birth simply lacks merit.
Furthermore, the record concomitantly indicates that C.M.D. played a
more direct and substantial role in the parties’ efforts to conceive a child than
the petitioner in Glover by being implanted with one of H.M.’s two viable
embryos. Compare N.T., 1/3/25, at 142; N.T., 12/12/24, at 192 with
Glover, 333 A.3d at 327-28 (indicating that Junior had supported Glover in
their efforts to conceive by administering “various hormone injections” and
attending “obstetrics appointments”). Moreover, C.M.D. also supported H.M.
in very similar ways to the petitioner in Glover by attending appointments
with H.M. while she was pregnant, researching medical providers, and
administering shots of progesterone to H.M. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 196-98.
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To the extent that H.M. has sought to minimize C.M.D.’s participation in the
ART procedures, the certified record belies her claims.
H.M. has also sought to distinguish this case from Glover based upon
C.M.D.’s failure to contribute to the financial costs of the ART procedures that
led to Child’s conception. See H.M.’s Brief at 63, 65. We are mindful,
however, that Glover cautioned Pennsylvania courts to avoid placing too
much emphasis on financial considerations in this particular context, lest the
determination of paternity devolve into a mere transactional inquiry:
[W]hile couples who have a child together generally share the
financial and emotional burdens, they do not do so as a
bargained-for exchange for parentage and parental rights. A
couple’s decision to have a baby together is often profoundly
intimate and may not be so easily reduced to a transaction.
Glover, 333 A.3d at 342 (emphasis in original). Here, the record indicates
that C.M.D.’s lack of financial contributions was largely motivated by the fact
that H.M. was better financially situated to pay for the costs associated with
the ART procedures. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 16; N.T., 3/25/24, at 53-54.
Additionally, Glover noted that couples undergoing ART also expend
significant “emotional” and “physical” resources during the process, in addition
to financial costs. Glover, 333 A.3d at 349. As set forth above, the certified
record indicates that C.M.D. invested significant physical resources in the ART
process that led to Child’s conception by undergoing implantation and
hormone therapy to permit her to breastfeed Child. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 142;
N.T., 12/12/24, at 192, 202-03. Furthermore, C.M.D. also expended
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emotional resources by consistently supporting H.M. during her second
implantation and the resulting pregnancy. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 196-98.
Based upon this evidence, we find no merit in H.M.’s contention that C.M.D.
did not sufficiently contribute to the ART process that led to Child’s conception.
H.M.’s arguments also emphasize that C.M.D. was not listed as a co-
parent or granted legal rights to H.M.’s embryos through UC. See H.M.’s Brief
at 64-65. This argument, however, flatly ignores the undisputed testimony
and evidence of record demonstrating that H.M. subsequently granted C.M.D.
extensive legal rights when the couple began pursuing ART procedures
through Main Line Fertility. See Exhibit P-11. Consequently, C.M.D.’s consent
was necessary in order for H.M. to undergo the implantation procedure that,
ultimately, led to Child’s conception and birth. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 294-98;
N.T., 12/12/24, at 194-95; Exhibit P-12. Contrary to H.M.’s arguments, the
record indicates that C.M.D. was listed as a “patient” or “partner” on the Main
Line Fertility paperwork and granted legal rights to the at-issue embryos.
When viewed in the appropriate light of the entire factual record, H.M.’s limited
focus upon the UC paperwork is unavailing.
H.M. has also argued that she refused to permit C.M.D. to formally adopt
Child. See H.M.’s Brief at 66 (“[H.M.] never agreed to an adoption.”).
Relatedly, she also emphasizes that C.M.D. was not listed on Child’s birth
certificate. See id. Respectfully, we find that H.M. has somewhat
misrepresented the evidence on this particular point. Specifically, the
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evidence credited by the trial court indicates that C.M.D. was not listed on
Child’s birth certificate due to the parties’ mutual concerns about the legality
of having this done. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 393; N.T., 12/19/24, at 220-21.
Furthermore, H.M. testified that the parties considered and pursued the
prospect of adoption by meeting with an attorney who specialized in “second
parent adoption.” N.T., 1/3/25, at 153. H.M. then explained that C.M.D.
indicated that she “would like to go ahead with the second parent adoption,”
to which H.M. gave no response. Id. at 153-54. We view this evidence as
indicating that C.M.D. desired to adopt Child in line with the parties’
expectations prior to and immediately following birth, but that H.M.’s sudden
change of heart prevented that process from occurring. While H.M. may have
never “agreed” to an adoption, that lone fact does not diminish the other
evidence replete through the certified record speaking to the parties’ earlier
intent.
Finally, H.M. also argues that the parties’ conduct following Child’s birth
indicates that there was no shared intent to conceive and co-parent. See
H.M.’s Brief at 53-60. We note that since the holding in Glover related to
establishing pre-birth parentage, the importance of post-birth events was not
directly addressed in that holding. See Glover, 333 A.3d at 329.
Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has noted that post-birth events are relevant
to an inquiry regarding intent-based parentage. See id. at 357. Overall, H.M.
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emphasizes that she was the party responsible for Child’s care following the
breakdown of her relationship with C.M.D. See id.
While H.M. may have been largely responsible for Child’s day-to-day
care once she recovered from giving birth, we also note that this was the same
period of time during which the parties’ relationship swiftly and irretrievably
broke down. See N.T., 12/12/24, at 161; N.T., 3/18/24, at 111, 68. Even
during this period, the record indicates that C.M.D. continued to see Child on
a near-daily basis, contributed to Child’s care by picking her up from daycare,
and spent Thursday evenings with Child. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 114, 177; N.T.,
12/19/24, at 224; N.T., 12/12/24, at 159, 226-27.
We, again, find that H.M.’s arguments fail to account for the entirety of
the factual record. Our review indicates that the totality of the events that
occurred after Child’s birth are strongly indicative of the parties’ shared intent
with respect to parentage. As detailed above, C.M.D. caught Child while she
was being born, cut the umbilical cord, and enjoyed skin-to-skin contact with
Child. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 305; N.T., 12/12/24, at 206. The parties also
collaborated on choosing Child’s name immediately following her birth, which
explicitly incorporated equal aspects of H.M.’s and C.M.D.’s respective families
and concerns. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 47-48, 152-57; N.T., 12/12/24, at 213-
15. C.M.D. breastfed Child immediately following her birth and continued to
do so for the first six months of Child’s life. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 307-08;
N.T., 12/12/24, at 220-22, 208. During this time period, the parties also
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expressed their shared parentage of Child in writing, with C.M.D. sending out
a birth announcement referring to the parties as parents and H.M. sending a
birthday card to C.M.D. referring to C.M.D. as a parent and discussing “our
daughter.” See N.T., 1/3/25, at 396; Exhibits P-16 and P-36. The parties
also collaborated on selecting a daycare for Child and, ultimately, chose a
facility that C.M.D. had suggested. See N.T., 1/3/25, at 175; N.T., 12/12/24,
at 274. The record also reflects that C.M.D. attempted to financially contribute
to the expenses related to the daycare, although H.M. elected not to use those
funds. See N.T., 12/19/24, at 43-44.
Based upon the foregoing evidentiary discussion, we find that the trial
court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations are fully supported by
the evidence of record. As the trial court indicated, there are factual
distinctions between the instant controversy and those in Glover. As
explained in our analysis above, however, we do not believe that the Supreme
Court intended to create such a narrow rule in Glover that parentage by intent
is only available to those litigants whose circumstances perfectly mirror the
unique facts presented in that particular case. Instead, we read Glover as
creating a more generally applicable standard requiring that the record in such
a case must contain sufficient evidence demonstrating that “the parties
mutually intended to bring Child into the world and raise [her] together[.]”
Glover, 333 A.3d at 357. Furthermore, the party seeking to establish
parentage by intent must have “participated in that process.” Id. As set forth
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at length above, we readily conclude that the record in this case fully satisfies
these requirements. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s holding that C.M.D. has
standing to seek custody based upon parentage by intent.
Based upon our resolution of this issue, we need not address the
remaining arguments raised by H.M.
Order affirmed.
Date: 6/18/2026
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