The opinion
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2026 PA Super 126
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
STEVEN AHMAD WIGGS :
:
Appellant : No. 641 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County
Criminal Division at No: CP-50-SA-0000026-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J.,
NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2026
The very narrow issue in this case is whether Appellant, a constable,
could be cited for violating section 4571(d) of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”)1
____________________________________________
1 Section 4571 provides in pertinent part as follows:
§ 4571. Visual and audible signals on emergency vehicles.
(a) General rule.--Every emergency vehicle shall be equipped
with one or more revolving or flashing red lights and an audible
warning system. Spotlights with adjustable sockets may be
attached to or mounted on emergency vehicles.
(b) Police, sheriff, fire and coroner or medical examiner
vehicles.--
(1) Police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police
vehicles may in addition to the requirements of subsection (a) be
equipped with one or more revolving or flashing blue lights. The
combination of red and blue lights may be used only on police,
sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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due to having flashing red and blue lights mounted on his vehicle, when such
lights are only permitted on specified “emergency vehicles,” as defined in the
MVC.2 This issue of statutory interpretation only requires us to apply the clear
and unambiguous language of the MVC to the facts at hand. Respectfully, I
believe the Majority has improperly applied the rules of statutory construction
it relies upon. The Majority’s approach ignores plain statutory definitions and
cherry-picks inapplicable exceptions, thwarting legislative intent. Since the
MVC permits Appellant to equip his vehicle with red and blue emergency lights
under sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC, I would vacate Appellant’s judgment
of sentence on that ground.
____________________________________________
****
(d) Vehicles prohibited from using signals.--Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this section, no vehicle other
than an emergency vehicle may be equipped with revolving or
flashing lights or audible warning systems identical or similar to
those specified in subsections (a) and (b).
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4571.
2 Although the short title of Title 75 is the “Vehicle Code,” referring to it as
“the Motor Vehicle Code” is consistent with the conventions of both this Court
and our Supreme Court, as evidenced by countless published opinions. See
e.g., Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 335 A.3d 1158, 1162 (Pa. 2025);
Commonwealth v. Chisebwe, 310 A.3d 262, 265 (Pa. 2024).
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Constables are “police officers” as defined by section 102 of the MVC
On June 15, 2021, Appellant was serving as a constable. Red and blue
lights were mounted on the roof of his vehicle as he drove through Perry
County. While on patrol, a state trooper pulled over Appellant and cited him
for a violation of section 4571 of the MVC. This statute provides that the type
of visual warning system Appellant had installed is only authorized for
“emergency vehicles.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4571(d). An “emergency vehicle” is
defined under section 102 of the MVC to include a “police vehicle.” 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 102. In turn, a “police officer” is defined in that same section as
“[a] natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations
of law.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Majority, in its limited discussion of section 102, insinuates that
constables are not “police officers” under that provision because they have
common law arrest powers, and more limited arrest powers than other types
of peace officers. See Maj. Op., at 10-14. Yet, the Majority recognizes that
a constable’s authority to “make arrests for violations of law” does not arise
from the common law, as it does for sheriffs and ordinary citizens. See id.,
at 11. The Majority begrudgingly seems to agree that, under a strict and plain
reading of section 102, a constable satisfies the MVC’s definition of a “police
officer.” See id.
Indeed, in section 102, the MVC defines a “police officer” as someone
who has statutory authority (“by law”) to make arrests, which constables
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notably have, see 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7158(1)-(3), and sheriffs and ordinary
citizens notably lack. See 16 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 13701-13715 (Sheriff); see also
Kopko v. Miller, 892 A.2d 766, 773-74 (Pa. 2006) (emphasizing that sheriffs
have common law power “to make warrantless arrests for breaching of the
peace committed in their presence,” but holding that, due to the absence of
“legislative authority” to make arrests, they are not authorized to conduct
wiretapping under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5781).
As was made evident by the General Assembly, the powers and duties
conferred upon constables are limited to those which are legislatively granted.
See 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7151 (“Constables shall perform all duties authorized or
imposed on them by statute.”). A number of statutory powers are expressly
granted to constables, many of which involve the use of force to carry out the
law. See generally 44 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101-7178. Constables are authorized
“to carry or use firearms in the performance of any duties.” 44 Pa.C.S.A. §
7148 (emphasis added). Constables are statutorily authorized to oversee and
preserve the peace at elections held in their jurisdictions (44 Pa.C.S.A. §
7152), and investigate complaints of a violation of law when directed to do so
by a court (44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7157).
Constables also are statutorily authorized to make warrantless arrests
in their boroughs for observed violations of law, such as breaches of the peace,
and “any unlawful act tending to imperil the personal security or endanger the
property of the citizens.” 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7158. Constables are permitted,
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“upon view,” to make a warrantless “arrest” of any person who “[v]iolates any
ordinance of the borough for which a fine or penalty is imposed.” Id. They
may also direct traffic, and motorists are required to comply. See 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3102.3
Accordingly, Appellant could mount red and blue emergency lights on
his vehicle because he was authorized by law to make arrests for violations of
law. This qualified Appellant as a “police officer,” as that term is unequivocally
defined in section 102 of the MVC, making his vehicle a “police vehicle” and
therefore an “emergency vehicle” for purposes of section 4571.
Although our inquiry should end there, I am compelled to elaborate
further on why I believe the Majority’s treatment of these statutory provisions
is in error.
“Clear and free from all ambiguity”
“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Our Supreme Court has likewise mandated that, “where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court may not add
matters the legislature saw fit not to include under the guise of construction.”
____________________________________________
3 The MVC’s definition of “police officer” is not an anomaly. A constable’s
statutory authority to make arrests falls perfectly in line with the definition of
a “police officer” in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which define
such an individual as “any person who is by law given the power to
arrest when acting within the scope of the person's employment."
Pa.R.Crim.P. 103 (emphasis added).
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Mohamed v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 40 A.3d 1186, 1194–95
(Pa. 2012); see also A.S. v. Penn. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 903 (Pa.
2016) (“It is only when statutory text is determined to be ambiguous that we
may go beyond the text and look to other considerations to discern legislative
intent.”).
The provisions now being examined, sections 102 and 4571, are plain
and unambiguous. As the Majority apparently concedes, see Maj. Op., at 12-
13, a constable must fit the MVC’s definition of a “police officer” because he
or she is “authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law,” 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 102, and this authorization is derived not from common law, but rather from
legislative enactment. See generally Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d
1036, 1041 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that ordinary citizens and sheriffs are not
“police officers” under this definition because their arrest power is derived
solely from common law, rather than “some form of legal authorization”).
Section 4571 contains no alternative definitions or express exclusions of
individuals who may qualify as a “police officer.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4571.
Nothing in the context of section 4571 or the MVC as a whole would “clearly”
suggest that, with respect to that specific statute, “police officer” was intended
to have a different meaning than the one provided in section 102. Section
4571 does not state that a “police vehicle” must be owned by any particular
entity or operated by any one of the many types of police officers in the
Commonwealth. See e.g., 53 Pa.C.S.A. 2162 (Municipal Code definitions
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section recognizing over a dozen types of “police officer,” each of which has
its own duties, training requirements, and statutory authorization).
I note further that an individual need not have plenary arrest powers to
qualify as a “police officer” under the MVC’s definition in section 102; all that
is needed is some degree of arrest powers, as authorized by law, and it cannot
seriously be disputed that constables have such authorization. A constable,
then, is a “police officer” for the purposes of section 4571, and his vehicle is
a “police vehicle,” which may have red and blue emergency lights mounted on
it.
The Majority attempts to shift the focus away from this plain reading by
determining – without citation to any legal authority – that section 4571 only
“pertains to certain classes of vehicles, not to the categories of drivers.” Maj.
Op., at 10. In so doing, the Majority relegates Appellant’s vehicle to the status
of a “constable vehicle,” a term which appears nowhere in the MVC. The
Majority further distinguishes between “police vehicles” and “privately-owned
vehicles.” Finally, the Majority differentiates police officers from constables
by classifying the latter as “independent contractors.” See Maj. Op., at 7-9.
By pivoting away from the plain text of sections 102 and 4571 in this
manner, the Majority overlooks that these are penal statutes, which must be
strictly construed. Unless the MVC says otherwise, it is ultimately the status
of the person who drives the vehicle which necessarily determines whether
emergency lights are authorized. See generally Commonwealth v.
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Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that status of constables
as “not employees of the Commonwealth” was the dispositive fact which
refuted contention that constable’s personal vehicle was an exempt
“government vehicle” for purposes of the window tinting statute, section 4524
of the MVC).
The language of sections 102 or 4571 contains no clear context which
would lead one to surmise that “police vehicle” can refer to anything other
than a vehicle operated by a “police officer” while carrying out official duties.
The MVC’s list of emergency vehicles simply provides that a “police vehicle” is
one of the types of vehicle that falls into that category for purposes of the
title. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.
The General Assembly could have easily stated that a “police vehicle”
qualifies as such depending on its public ownership, just as it did with various
other types of conveyance in the same list which were described in that
fashion. See generally id. The absence of a public ownership requirement
for a “police vehicle” establishes that its omission was intentional. See Mimi
Investors, LLC v. Tufano, 397 A.3d 1272, 1286 (Pa. 2023) (declining to
construe a statute as impliedly containing a scienter requirement, in part
because “the Legislature employed the language of scienter in several other
material provisions of [the Pennsylvania Securities Act], further reinforcing
the notion that the absence of scienter language in Section 1-401(b) was
intentional.”).
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Moreover, it makes perfect sense why “constable vehicle” is not
expressly enumerated as an “emergency vehicle” in sections 102 or 4571 – it
would have been redundant because constables fit the MVC’s general
definition of “police officer” in section 102. Assuming, as we must, that a
constable is a “police officer,” and that thier vehicle is a “police vehicle,” there
was no need for “constable vehicle” to be listed separately.
As to a constable’s employment status, I question the import of the
Majority’s reference to them as “independent contractors.” A constable is an
elected official who holds a public office limited by term. See generally 44
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101-7178 (Constables). Our Supreme Court, in In re Act 147
of 1990, found it relevant that constables are “independent contractors” only
insofar as that status meant they are not “employees” of the judicial branch,
making them belong instead “analytically to the executive branch of
government[.]” In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985, 990 (Pa. 1991).
In that same opinion, our Supreme Court stated that “[t]he constable
is a police officer.” Id., at 990 n.3 (emphasis added). The Court explained
that, as an executive branch member, “[i]t is the constable's job to enforce
the law and carry it out, just as the same is the job of district attorneys,
sheriffs, and the police generally[.]” Id., at 990. This description of constables
doing the job of “the police generally” directly contradicts the Majority’s
suggestion that a person’s status as an “independent contractor” somehow
makes them not a “police officer.” See id.
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Thus, Appellant should prevail under a straightforward application of
statutory and decisional law, and the lack of ambiguity in these provisions
makes it improper for the Majority to engage in any further statutory
interpretation or construction. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). By affirming the
judgment of sentence, the Majority has declined to “effectuate the intention
of the General Assembly” and disregarded the letter of the MVC “under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id.; see also Mimi, 297 A.3d at 1285 (“It is
only upon a finding that a statute's terms are ambiguous that we turn away
from the text to ascertain legislative intent by other means.”).
The Rule of Lenity
Only an ambiguity in the language of sections 102 and 4571 would
justify the Majority’s resort to applying rules of statutory construction to
ascertain legislative intent. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1921(b), 1933. In the event
of such an ambiguity, the Majority would be foreclosed from adopting an
interpretation that is unfavorable to Appellant.
“[W]hile statutes generally should be construed liberally, penal statutes
are always to be construed strictly, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1), and any
ambiguity in a penal statute should be interpreted in favor of the
defendant.” Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512, 516 (Pa. Super.
2021) (en banc) (emphasis added). “A statute is ambiguous when there are
at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.” A.S., 143 A.3d at 906.
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To determine whether statutory language is plain or ambiguous, it must be
read in the specific and general context in which it is used. See id.
“In reading the plain language, ‘[w]ords and phrases shall be construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage,’ while any words or phrases that have acquired a ‘peculiar and
appropriate meaning’ must be construed according to that meaning.”
Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005) (citing 1
Pa.C.S.A. 1903(a)).
Here, the statutory language in section 102 and 4571 is clear and
unambiguous, in that they would authorize Appellant to mount emergency
lights on his vehicle. Appellant is a constable who is “authorized by law to
make arrests for violations of law,” making him a “police officer,” as that term
is defined in the MVC. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.
Under sections 102 and 4571, a “police vehicle” is categorized as an
“emergency vehicle” on which red and blue emergency lights may be
mounted. The MVC provides no further guidance as to how these specific
provisions are to be construed. Significantly, these statutes do not specifically
exclude constables or their vehicles from qualifying as a “police officer” or a
“police vehicle,” respectively. These provisions also coincide with the
statement by our Supreme Court that a “constable is a police officer.” In re
Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d at 990 n.3. It was therefore reasonable for
Appellant to interpret the MVC as authorizing him to mount emergency lights
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on his vehicle, and the rule of lenity requires this Court to adopt that
reasonable interpretation in the event of an ambiguity.
The Majority ignores the rule of lenity even in its opinion where it
supposes, “in the alternative,” that the statutes under review are ambiguous.
See Maj. Op., at 22. The law is clear, though, that if sections 102 and 4571
are found not to be explicit, then Appellant’s reasonable interpretation must
be adopted.
The Majority applies rules of construction, not interpretation
Even if we were permitted to ignore or go beyond the plain meaning of
the statutes now under review, disregard the rule of lenity, and apply rules of
statutory construction, the Majority’s reasoning still does not hold up to
scrutiny.
In its opinion, the Majority states repeatedly that sections 102 and 4571
of the MVC are both clear and unambiguous. Yet the Majority is only able to
glean the General Assembly’s supposed intent by assuming that the General
Assembly meant something other than what its enactments state. These are
irreconcilable positions.
Among the rules of construction employed by the Majority are
consideration of the other statutes upon the same or similar subjects, the
consequences of particular interpretations, and the object to be attained by
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the statutes’ enactment. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)(4)-(6).4 The General
Assembly has mandated that its intention may only be ascertained by such
considerations “[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit[.]” 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(c). This Court has no authority, or need, to utilize those rules of
construction for statutory language, like that in sections 102 and 4571, which
is so patently clear. See id.5
____________________________________________
4 The Majority concedes that it has discussed a slew of unrelated statutes in
the MVC “to emphasize the differences in how [constables and police officers]
are trained given Appellant’s equation of the two positions[.]” Maj. Op., at
23-24 (emphasis added). Despite the Majority’s protests, I cannot help but
read its extensive analysis of other statutes as applying several rules of
construction. A central theme of the Majority’s opinion is that the General
Assembly intended to prohibit constables from mounting emergency lights
because they “exist in a league of their own,” Maj. Op., at 18, due to
differences in their training and responsibilities from other types of peace
officers. See generally id. The Majority thereby has considered the
consequences of Appellant’s interpretation (treating constables as police
officers), and the supposed object to be attained by the statutes’ enactment
(maintaining a distinction between constables and police officers). Support
for the Majority’s contention that constables lack authorization to mount
emergency lights under sections 102 and 4571 is based entirely on unrelated
authority (consideration of other statutes).
5 The Majority cites Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2013),
and the line of cases cited therein, to presume that since sheriffs, sheriffs’
deputies, and ordinary citizens do not qualify as “police officers” under the
MVC, neither do constables. See Maj. Op., at 10-12. However, the facts of
Marconi are distinguishable, and its holding was much more limited than the
Majority suggests. The case concerns whether sheriffs have an “enforcement”
power of “police officers” under the MVC, i.e., the authority to investigate
suspected violations through temporary sobriety checkpoints under section
6308(b). See Marconi, 64 A.3d at 402, 410-11. The Marconi Court’s
holding hinged on the fact that that sheriffs have not been statutorily
authorized to establish and conduct sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of
enforcing the MVC, and their common law arrest power did not afford them
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The lynchpin of the Majority’s analysis is that section 4571 of the MVC
was intended to prohibit constables from mounting emergency lights on their
vehicles because, elsewhere in the MVC, constables are sometimes
enumerated separately from police officers. See Maj. Op., at 12-19. The
Majority infers that, for the purposes of section 4571, constables cannot be
treated as police officers in accordance with the MVC’s general definition of
“police officer” in section 102, and a constable’s vehicle therefore cannot
qualify as a “police vehicle.” As previously discussed, the Majority concludes
that “constables” have not been specifically authorized in section 4571 to
mount red and blue flashing lights on their vehicles:
____________________________________________
that specific authority. See id., at 413-14. That is, sheriffs were not
authorized “by law” – statutory law – to enforce or investigate violations of
the MVC in that specific manner.
The present case does not concern a constable’s investigative or enforcement
authority under the MVC, or a constable’s authority to intrude upon a citizen’s
right to privacy – those issues already have been resolved. See
Commonwealth v. Roose, 710 A.2d 1129, 1130 (Pa. 1998) (holding that
constables have no authority to enforce the MVC because “such authority
cannot be derived from the common law[.]”). Our narrow inquiry here is
whether, pursuant to sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC, constables may
mount emergency lights on their vehicles, and this does not implicate the
scope of a constable’s authority to enforce the law or investigate crimes.
Moreover, a constable has arrest power which is legislatively derived, and
under the MVC, motorists are required to comply with a constable’s lawful
orders or directives. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102. Thus, the present case is
materially distinguishable from Marconi and like cases in which an individual
could not exercise certain powers as a “police officer” due to their limited
common law authority to investigate or enforce a criminal statute pursuant to
the MVC. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Dobbins, 934 A.2d 1170, 1178-
1179 (Pa. 2007) (citing cases); Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032,
1050-1052 (Pa. 2019) (citing cases).
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The absence of express authorization in § 4571(b)(1) for
constable vehicles to use red and blue flashing lights is dispositive,
as our High Court has explained that the omission of a particular
alternative from a statute indicates that the legislature intended
to exclude it.
Maj. Op., at 7.
The Majority treats this supposed omission of “constables” from section
4571 as the smoking gun which proves their lack of authorization to mount
emergency lights. But a smoking gun, it is not. Again, constables are
expressly authorized in section 4571(b)(1) to mount emergency lights on their
vehicles because they satisfy the MVC’s definition of “police officer.” See 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 102.
Perhaps seeing the difficulty of its position – applying the rules of
construction to unambiguous statutes – the Majority purports only to apply
the doctrine, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, as a tool of statutory
interpretation. However, I am unpersuaded that the Majority has truly
managed to avoid the fundamental problem with its approach.
This doctrine of interpretation provides that "the inclusion of a specific
matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters." Thompson v.
Thompson, 223 A.3d 1272, 1277 (Pa. 2020). The doctrine has been applied
in cases where, for example, one statute has expressly included a provision
which has been omitted from a related statute:
[T]he Legislature explicitly authorized trial courts to sentence
juvenile offenders to “life imprisonment without parole” for first-
degree murder convictions under Section 1102.1(a) and excluded
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this specific language from Section 1102.1(c) which relates to
second-degree murder convictions, we decline to add language
which the Legislature did not see fit to include. Had the
Legislature intended to authorize trial courts to sentence
juvenile offenders convicted of second-degree murder to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, it would
have expressly done so.
Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa, 256 A.3d 440, 448 (Pa. Super.
2021) (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the present matter does not involve any omission
of language in sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC. A constable already fits the
MVC’s express definition of a “police officer” without the addition of any other
language, so under a plain reading of sections 102 and 4571, a “police vehicle”
must then encompass a constable’s vehicle, making it an “emergency vehicle.”
The express enumeration of “police vehicle” in section 4571, absent some
clear indication to the contrary, includes vehicles operated by constables in
the course of their duties.
The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius might arguably have
come into play in the present case if the General Assembly had decided to
restrict the use of emergency lights with greater specificity than it did in the
MVC. By way of example, the General Local Government Code defines a
“police officer” as
(1) A full-time or part-time employee assigned to criminal or
traffic law enforcement duties of any of the following:
(i) A police department of a county, city, borough, town or
township.
(ii) Any railroad or street railway police.
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(iii) Any campus or university police department, including
the State System of Higher Education and its member
institutions.
(iv) The Capitol Police.
(v) The Harrisburg International Airport Police.
(vi) An airport authority police department.
(2) A deputy sheriff of a county of the second class.
(3) A security officer of a first class city housing authority or a
police officer of a second class city housing authority.
(4) A county park police officer.
The term excludes persons employed to check parking meters or
to perform only administrative duties and auxiliary and fire police.
53 Pa.C.S.A. 2162.
Constables do not fit into any of the enumerated categories in this list,
so it could be argued that, under the doctrine, their omission could be read as
intentional exclusion.
With respect to the MVC, the General Assembly could have easily
defined a “police officer” in such a manner – had it wanted to. Rather than
apply a detailed list based on an individual’s specific employer, title, or duties,
see id., our legislature instead chose to define “police officer” broadly in a
way that obviously includes constables. The General Assembly could have
also decided to expressly exclude constables, but it did not do so. See e.g.,
id. (excluding “persons employed to check parking meters or to perform only
administrative duties and auxiliary and fire police.”). Since constables satisfy
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an express definition of “police officer” in the MVC, the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius is simply not germane to the present case.6
The Majority’s method of comparing sections 102 and 4571 of the MVC
to other provisions of that title is more akin to the rule of construction,
“Particular controls general” (1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933). The rule is unavailing,
though, because it only applies where a statute is ambiguous, and further,
application of the rule does not support the Majority’s holding.
If a specific legal rule irreconcilably conflicts with a general one, then
the specific rule prevails only as an exception in a particular context, and only
if the exception was enacted after the enactment of the general rule:
Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with
a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall
be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If
the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the
special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as
an exception to the general provision, unless the general
provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest
intention of the General Assembly that such general
provision shall prevail.
____________________________________________
6 The Majority cites approvingly to Mimi Investors, Mimi Investors, LLC v.
Tufano, 397 A.3d 1272, 1286 (Pa. 2023), but the case does not support its
application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In Mimi, our Supreme
Court reasoned that, under the doctrine, it could not read a scienter element
into section 1-401(b) of the Pennsylvania Securities Act (PSA), which prohibits
making a material misrepresentation when selling or purchasing securities.
See Mimi, 297 A.3d at 1285 (citing 70 P.S. § 1-401). The central basis of
Mimi’s holding was that, “[c]ritically, there are no terms in Section 1-401(b)
related to scienter, and there are no general provisions of the PSA that
otherwise supply a scienter element.” Id., at 1285 (emphasis omitted). Here,
conversely, there is a general provision in the MVC which supplies a definition
of “police officer,” making Appellant’s vehicle a “police vehicle,” absent any
clear language or context to the contrary.
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1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933 (emphasis added); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1936
(“Whenever the provisions of two or more statutes enacted finally by different
General Assemblies are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of final
enactment shall prevail.”). This is consistent with section 102 of the MVC,
which makes its general definitions subject to “additional definitions contained
in subsequent provisions of this title which are applicable to specific provisions
of this title,” as well as “clear” context. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.
As the Majority notes, some provisions of the MVC list constables and
police officers separately. See e.g., 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1376(b)(1), (5); 3102;
6309. However, these references in a few isolated and unrelated sections of
the MVC do not signify a legislative intent to preclude constables from being
equated with police officers in all other parts of the MVC. The general
definitions of section 102 could not be abrogated, sub silentio, in that manner,
and full effect may be given to sections 102 and 4571 as I have outlined
above. The General Assembly’s express enactments are the clearest
manifestation of its intent, and exceptions are not meant to swallow general
rules. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1921, 1933, 1936.
It is worth reiterating that under section 102 of the MVC, a general
proposition for the entire title is that a constable is a “police officer,” subject
to specific exclusions or the clear context of a particular section. Neither the
MVC as a whole, nor section 4571, contain any exclusions or alternative
definitions, and the Majority is unable to cite any.
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Even if we could reasonably construe sections 102 and 4571 as being in
conflict, the general definition of a “police officer” in section 102 would still
have to prevail over an implicit exception in section 4571. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §
1933. At the time Appellant was stopped on June 15, 2021, the version of
section 4571 then in force was effective as of December 18, 2018. See 2018,
Oct. 19, P.L. 547, No. 83, § 2, effective in 60 days [Dec. 18, 2018]. The
version of section 102 then in force was effective as of a later date, on
February 1, 2021. See 2020, Nov. 1, P.L. 1064, No. 106, § 1, effective in 90
days [Feb. 1, 2021].
It follows that the broader statute, section 102, must trump section
4571 even under the Majority’s flawed construction. The same is true as to
all of the purportedly inconsistent MVC sections cited by the Majority in which
police officers and constables were listed separately. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§
1376; 3102; 6309; 6309.1 (enacted in 2017; 2015; 2005, and 2005,
respectively).7
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7 This is not meant to suggest that I agree that these separate statutes
represent an implied modification of the general definition of “police officer”
in section 102 of the MVC. The statutes cited by the Majority are all unrelated
to section 4571 and have no bearing on its construction. I would add that one
of those statutes, section 1376, concerns the surrender of registration plates
and cards upon suspension or revocation. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1376. The
statute states that these materials may be surrendered to:
(1) A designated department employee.
(2) Members of the Pennsylvania State Police.
(3) Local police officers.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Absurd or Unreasonable Results
The Majority attempts to undermine the reasonableness of Appellant’s
interpretation by suggesting that it would lead to an “absurd” outcome, but I
believe the opposite is true. According to the Majority, the General Assembly
has, on the one hand, explicitly authorized constables to direct traffic, issue
orders to motorists, and make warrantless arrests; but on the other hand, the
Majority supposes that the General Assembly also has implicitly deprived
constables of the right to mount red and blue emergency lights.
Our caselaw recognizes that emergency lights may often be the only
reasonable and narrowly tailored means available for law enforcement “to
render assistance or mitigate the peril” of a motorist. See Commonwealth
v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 631 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “It is
undeniable that emergency lights on police vehicles in this Commonwealth
serve important safety purposes, including ensuring that the police vehicle is
visible to traffic, and signaling to a stopped motorist that it is a police officer,
as opposed to a potentially dangerous stranger, who is approaching.” Id., at
621.
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(4) Sheriffs or deputy sheriffs.
(5) Constables or deputy constables.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1376(b). Under the Majority’s logic, the separate enumeration
of “Pennsylvania State Police” and “local police officers” in subsections (2) and
(3) means that either one group or the other is not a class of “police officer”
for purposes of the entire MVC. Of course, this is an untenable construction.
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Motorists are required to “comply with any lawful order or direction of”
a constable, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102, and constables “shall perform all duties
authorized or imposed on them by statute,” 44 Pa.C.S.A. § 7151. A
constable’s statutory obligation to perform its duties of traffic control, and to
make arrests, will necessarily implicate the concerns raised in Livingstone.
See id. Accordingly, it is the Majority’s interpretation of sections 102 and
4571 which leads to a patently absurd result. The General Assembly would
not have expressly authorized constables to carry out numerous law
enforcement and traffic-related tasks if it had implicitly intended to deprive
constables of the means of performing those duties safely. See id.8
Conclusion
A constable is authorized “by law” to make arrests for violations of law,
satisfying the definition of “police officer” in section 102 of the MVC.
Constables must therefore be classified as “police officers” for the purposes of
section 4571 in that title, and a constable’s vehicle must in turn be classified
as a “police vehicle,” which can be equipped with emergency lights.
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8 The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) urges motorists
on its website to acknowledge that the “flashing red and blue lights” of
emergency vehicles “assist [them] to move quickly through traffic and to
answer emergency calls.” https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dmv/driver-
services/pennsylvania-drivers-manual/online-drivers-manual/special-
circumstances-and-emergencies (last visited March, 31, 2026). PennDOT also
stresses that constables have a role in responding to emergencies, and that
“all drivers must obey the[ir] direction[.]” Id.
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In upholding the trial court’s contrary ruling, I believe the Majority has
improperly employed our rules of construction. The MVC and our rules of
construction are clear on these points, and even if there were an interpretation
of the statutes that might not favor Appellant, that would both violate the rule
of lenity and lead to absurd results. Thus, I must respectfully dissent.
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