Feaster

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

TERRANCE J. FEASTER, : Case No. 1:25-cv-177

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Douglas R. Cole

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

CHRISTOPHER CROW, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER and

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, an Ohio prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint in this Court

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law arising out of alleged events at the Southern Ohio

Correctional Facility (SOCF). (Doc. 6). Plaintiff was incarcerated at SOCF when he commenced

this action (see Doc. 1), but he was subsequently transferred to the Toledo Correctional Institution

(ToCI) (see Doc. 10). He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis by separate Order.

(Doc. 5).

This matter is currently before the Court for a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s Complaint

(Doc. 6) to determine whether the Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary

relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) &

1915A(b). This matter is also before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Verified Status

Report and Exhibits to Be Evidenced to Complaint, which the Court understands to be a motion

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.

to screen the Complaint and to amend the Complaint by adding exhibits D1, D2, E, F1, F2, and

F3. (Doc. 8).

The Court will address Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 8) prior to turning to the screen of his

Complaint. Because Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint on a prior occasion through

the filing of additional exhibits (see Doc. 1 (noting that additional attachments were added on

May 16, 2025)), he requires leave of Court to amend his Complaint a second time. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a) (providing, in relevant part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter

of course”). In light of the liberal policy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 permitting

amendments, see Oleson v. United States, 27 F. App’x 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2001), the Court

GRANTS the motion (Doc. 8) to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to add exhibits E, F1, F2, and F3

to the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). For purposes of clarity, the CLERK OF COURT

is DIRECTED to file those exhibits as attachments to Document 6. In light of the instant Report

and Recommendation and because exhibits D1 and D2 have already been filed with the

Complaint as Doc. 6-4 and Doc. 6-5, the motion (Doc. 8) is DENIED as moot in all other

respects.

Screening of Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

dismiss the Complaint, or any part of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be

construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin

v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004). But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not

within the purview of the district court to conjure up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen.

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor,

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). But the Court is not required to accept factual allegations that are “clearly irrational

or wholly incredible.” Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather,

“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it tenders naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. (internal quotation and quotation

marks omitted). In the end, “basic pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff’s Complaint names four defendants, solely in their individual capacities: SOCF

Corrections Officers Christopher Crow, “Pack,” and Robert Setty, and SOCF Nurse Durham.

(Doc. 6, PageID 90-91).

Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2024, while he was housed in Restrictive Housing at

SOCF, Defendants Crow and Pack were making rounds with the breakfast cart at around 8:15 a.m.

when Plaintiff asked them to check the status of his conduct report hearing, as it was two days

overdue. Id. at 93. Plaintiff alleges that he also initiated a hunger strike and asked to speak to a

mental health counselor. Id. Plaintiff alleges that between 8:30 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. he again

stopped Pack to tell him that no counselor had arrived and that he wanted to go on “watch.” Id. at

93-94. Defendant Pack purportedly thanked Plaintiff for letting him know, left, and returned with

Defendant Crow. Id. at 94. Plaintiff alleges that when Pack and Crow returned, he had a sheet

around his shoulders, with part of it on a shelf that was close by. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he told

Crow and Pack that he felt suicidal and wanted to go on “constant watch.” Crow purportedly

responded that he wanted to search Plaintiff’s cell, to which Plaintiff replied that he had asked for

mental health. Id. Plaintiff states that at that time he was sitting and holding the sheet with both

hands and kept repeating his requests for mental health and for Crow and Park to activate their

body worn cameras (BWC). Id.

According to Plaintiff, Crow then started yelling, “stop that” and “don’t do that,” and then

began deploying his “O.C. mace.” Id. Plaintiff states that the mace hit him in the face “non-stop”

but he moved the sheet away from him, raising his hands as if to surrender. Id. Crow allegedly

told Plaintiff to “cuff up” but never released the depressor and continued to empty the entire can,

which Plaintiff asserts contained 661 grams of mace. Id. Plaintiff indicates that Crow then shook

the can in an effort to spray more. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he complied with Crow’s order to back up and to be cuffed but due to

the fumes, Crow ran to the control booth, leaving Pack and Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he

then passed out from the fumes, waking to find Sergeant King, who is not named as a defendant,

Pack, and an unidentified nurse. Id. at 95. Plaintiff states that King and Pack had their BWC

activated. Id.

It appears from his allegations that Plaintiff was then transported to the SOCF Medical

Department. Id. Plaintiff claims that even though he had been sprayed with mace in the head,

face, chest, torso, and back, Defendant Nurse Durham only used only one saline wipe, which failed

to remove the spray and left chemicals on Plaintiff’s face, chest, torso, back, head, and eyes. Id.

at 96. Plaintiff also states that he was not allowed any fresh air or a shower for three days and that

his skin continued to burn while on constant watch. Id. Plaintiff asserts that when he was released

from constant watch and returned to Restrictive Housing on October 28, 2024, he attempted to

wash off the mace, but the water reactivated the chemicals, which again burned his skin. Id.

Plaintiff says that he requested medical, but his request was not answered. Id. Nurse James, who

is not named as a defendant, allegedly told Plaintiff that medical was backed up. Id.

Plaintiff contends that on November 28, 2024, Defendant Setty, who Plaintiff states is also

named as a defendant in another lawsuit he filed, conducted the use-of-force hearing relating to

the macing incident. Id. at 96. Although Plaintiff concedes that “Lt. Setty did capture most of the

correct depictions captured on BWC and DVR footage,” Plaintiff asserts Setty “deliberately gave

falsehoods to [Plaintiff’s] accounts leading up to [Defendant] Crow deploying” the mace and

“failed to discipline and correct” allegedly false information provided by non-defendant staff

witnesses, one of whom had written out Plaintiff’s statement “with no authority to do so.” Id. at

96-97.

For relief, Platiniff seeks monetary damages and a temporary restraining order (TRO)

against Defendants. Id. at 98.

C. Analysis

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff brings the following five claims, all of which he

asserts are being brought under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution: (1)

excessive force against Defendant Crow; (2) failure to intervene against Defendant Pack; (3)

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Nurse Durham; (4) deliberate

disregard for the truth against Defendant Setty; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress

against each Defendant. (Doc. 6, PageID 93-97). Although Plaintiff purports to bring his fifth

claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress) under the Eighth Amendment, the Sixth Circuit

has held that “intentional infliction of emotional distress, by itself, cannot amount to a

constitutional violation.” Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir. 2005).

The Court therefore evaluates Plaintiff’s fifth claim as a state-law claim. See id.

At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties, the

Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force against

Defendant Crow, failure to intervene against Defendant Pack, and deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need against Defendant Nurse Durham may proceed at this juncture for further

development to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. The Court will determine at a

later stage in the proceedings whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Crow, Pack, or

Nurse Durham is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Thus, the Court will not recommend at this

time to sua sponte dismiss those state-law claims to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages. However, for the reasons set forth below, the Undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s

remaining claims for damages be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b),

and his request for a TRO be denied.

a. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant Setty Should Be Dismissed.

Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted against

Defendant Setty. Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Setty liable under the Eighth Amendment for

his alleged failure to properly investigate and his alleged falsification of certain findings related to

the October 24, 2024 use-of-force incident. (Doc. 6, PageID 96-97). Plaintiff’s allegations against

Setty, however, fail to state a constitutional claim. “There is no statutory or common law right,

much less a constitutional right, to an investigation.” Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th

Cir. 2007); see also Daniels v. Lisath, No. 2:10-cv-968, 2011 WL 2710786, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July

13, 2011). Further, the failure to investigate or correct another person’s alleged constitutional

violation “do[es] not constitute ‘active constitutional behavior’ as required and thus, [is] not

actionable” under § 1983. Frodge v. City of Newport, 501 F. App’x 519, 532 (6th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). As such, an official’s purported

failure to investigate or take corrective action does not constitute personal involvement in the

underlying alleged unconstitutional conduct. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir.

1992); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to

state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Setty.

Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to save this claim with a conclusory

suggestion that Setty’s allegedly improper investigation of the use-of-force incident was in

retaliation for being named as a defendant by Plaintiff in another case (see Doc. 6, PageID 96),

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief. A prisoner’s claim of retaliation is grounded

in the First Amendment. Jones v. Caruso, 421 F. App’x 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Thaddeus-

X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). A retaliation claim has three elements:

(1) the prisoner engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the prisoner

that “‘would deter a [prisoner] of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct’”;

and (3) the prisoner’s protected conduct, at least in part, motivated the adverse action. Id. (quoting

Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007), in turn quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394).

Even assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled protected conduct and

an adverse action,2 Plaintiff has not pled facts suggesting a causal connection between the alleged

adverse action (Setty’s investigation of the use-of-force incident) and the protected activity

(Plaintiff’s earlier filed case). “Not every claim of retaliation by a disciplined prisoner, who either

has had contact with, or has filed a lawsuit against prison officials, will state a cause of action for

retaliatory treatment. Rather, the prisoner must allege a chronology of events from which

retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff clearly disagrees with certain aspects of Setty’s investigation (see Doc. 6, PageID 96),

but Plaintiff offers only a conclusory suggestion that the allegedly deficient investigation was

motivated by Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit. See id. (“Setty who is also in captioned case . . . decided to

conduct the use of force hearing.”). Without any “further factual enhancement,” Plaintiff’s

conclusory allegations are simply insufficient to state an actionable claim for relief. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555-57. See also Robertson v. Mixon, No. 4:23-cv-1026, 2024 WL 729275, at *3 (E.D.

Ark. Feb. 22, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:23-cv-1026, 2024 WL 1289903

(E.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2024) (“Mr. Robertson’s conclusory, speculative assertions that a causal

2Because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts satisfying the third element of a retaliation claim, the Court need not address

the first two elements. See, e.g., Devlin v. Blackmon, No. 05-cv-6081, 2007 WL 1853144, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June

26, 2007). The Court notes, however, that “protected conduct, for the purposes of a First Amendment retaliation

claim, encompasses a prisoner’s efforts to access the courts in direct appeals, habeas corpus actions, and civil rights

claims.” Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 607 (6th Cir. 2002). As for the second element, a plaintiff must establish that

defendants undertook an adverse action that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in

the protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 698; see also Bell, 308 F.3d at 606 (“The relevant question is whether

the defendants’ actions are ‘capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness;’ there is no requirement that the

plaintiff show actual deterrence.”) (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398). Although the Court need not decide the

issue, the Undersigned questions whether an allegedly improper investigation of a use-of-force incident would

constitute an adverse action for purposes of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Islam v. Goord, No. 05-cv-7502, 2006

WL 2819651, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006) (“Blaine’s alleged improper investigation of plaintiff’s complaint

against Riel (e.g., by failing to summon most of his witnesses, treating the two witnesses summoned in an

unprofessional manner, and distorting and omitting material facts) similarly fails to satisfy the adverse action

standard.”).

connection exists between his filing a grievance or lawsuit and each Defendant’s alleged retaliatory

conduct fails to state a plausible constitutional claim for relief.”).

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under either the

First or Eighth Amendments against Defendant Setty.

b. Plaintiff’s Claims against Unnamed Defendants Should Be Dismissed.

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains allegations with respect to some people who are not named

as Defendants. But Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any unnamed Defendants. Because

such individuals are not named as Defendants, and thus are not parties to this case, the Court

declines to analyze Plaintiff’s statements with respect to them and recommends that any purported

claims against them be dismissed without prejudice. See Chapple v. Franklin Cty., No. 2:21-cv-

5086, 2022 WL 856815, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted

as modified sub nom. Chapple v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Officers FCCC 1 & 2, No. 2:21-cv-5086,

2022 WL 16734656 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2022).

c. Plaintiff’s Request for a TRO Should Be Denied.

Finally, in his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks “a Temporary Restraining Order against the

defendants …” for an unspecified reason. (Doc. 6, PageID 98). A request for a TRO is governed

by the same general standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor

Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox. Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n. 2 (1977). In determining whether to

issue a preliminary injunction, this Court must balance the following factors:

1. Whether the party seeking the injunction has shown a “strong” likelihood

of success on the merits;

2. Whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm absent

the injunction;

3. Whether an injunction will cause others to suffer substantial harm; and

4. Whether the public interest would be served by a preliminary injunction.

Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 689-90 (6th Cir. 2014); Overstreet v. Lexington-

Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d

729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)). The four factors are not prerequisites but must be balanced as part of a

decision to grant or deny injunctive relief. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th

Cir. 1985). “[A] district court is not required to make specific findings concerning each of the four

factors used in determining a motion for preliminary injunction if fewer factors are dispositive of

the issue.” Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other

grounds. by Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir. 2015).

“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a trial on the

merits.” S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 848-

49 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). When a prisoner

requests an order enjoining a state prison official, the Court must “proceed with caution and due

deference to the unique nature of the prison setting.” White v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:08-cv-277,

2009 WL 529082, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438

n. 3 (6th Cir. 1984); Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1995)). In deciding if a preliminary

injunction is warranted, the Court must “weigh carefully the interests on both sides.” Lang v.

Thompson, No. 5:10-cv-379-HRW, 2010 WL 4962933, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2010) (citing

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

remedy that should only be granted “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such

relief.” S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC, 860 F.3d at 849 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)); see also Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573.

Here, the Undersigned finds the second factor dispositive of Plaintiff’s request for a TRO.

As noted above, Plaintiff is no longer housed at SOCF, where the named Defendants are employed.

Because Defendants are at SOCF and he is at ToCI, Plaintiff has failed to show that he is likely to

suffer irreparable injury absent the requested injunction. Stated another way, Plaintiff has failed

to allege a harm that is “both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical.”

Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th

Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate irreparable harm is fatal to his request for a TRO.

See Jones, 341 F.3d at 476. Therefore, the Court need not evaluate the other factors. Id. See also

Nat’l Info. & Commc’ns Equip. Network Inc. v. Willigan, No. 06-cv-28, 2006 WL 2711756, at *4

(E.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2006) (“The failure to demonstrate irreparable harm is fatal to Plaintiff’s

motion for preliminary injunction.”).

The Undersigned therefore recommends that Plaintiff’s request for a TRO be denied.

Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed at this juncture for further development on his damages

claims under the Eighth Amendment for excessive force against Defendant Crow, failure to

intervene against Defendant Pack, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against

Defendant Nurse Durham. Plaintiff may also proceed at this juncture on his damages claim under

state law for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Crow, Pack, and Nurse

Durham. The Undersigned recommends that the remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b), and his request for a TRO be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Verified Status Report and Exhibits to Be

Evidenced to Complaint (Doc. 8) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff

seeks to add exhibits E, F1, F2, and F3 to the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 10(c). The CLERK OF COURT is DIRECTED to file exhibits E (Doc.

8, PageID 142-60), F1 (id. at 161), F2 (id. at 162), and F3 (id. at 163-234)

as attachments to Document 6. The motion (Doc. 8) is DENIED as moot

in all other respects.

2. Plaintiff may PROCEED at this juncture for further development on his

damages claims under the Eighth Amendment for excessive force against

Defendant Crow, failure to intervene against Defendant Pack, and

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Nurse

Durham and on his damages claim under state law for intentional infliction

of emotional distress against Defendants Crow, Pack, and Nurse Durham.

3. The United States Marshal SHALL serve a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 6),

summons, the separate Order issued granting the plaintiff in forma pauperis

status (Doc. 5), and this Order and Report and Recommendation upon

Defendants Crow, Pack, and Nurse Durham.

4. Plaintiff SHALL serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered

by counsel, upon Defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading

or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall

include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a

certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was

mailed to defendants or Defendants’ counsel. Any paper received by a

district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or

which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the

Court.

5. Plaintiff SHALL inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address

which may occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s damages claims under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant

Setty be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted;

2. Plaintiff’s damages claims under the First Amendment against Defendant

Setty and Plaintiff’s damages claims against unnamed Defendants be

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff’s request for a TRO against Defendants be DENIED, see Jones,

341 F.3d at 476; and

4. In the absence of any remaining federal claims against Defendant Setty and

the unnamed Defendants, the Court should DECLINE to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress against these Defendants, see 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3).

March 18, 2026 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).