Dcpp v. H.V.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-3362-23

A-3391-23

A-3710-23

A-3789-23

A-3791-23

A-3850-23

A-3898-23

A-4045-23

A-0097-24

A-0102-24

A-0103-24

A-0271-24

A-1801-24

A-1802-24

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

June 16, 2026

v.

APPELLATE DIVISION

H.V.,1

Defendant-Respondent,

and

W.D., deceased,

1

We use initials to protect privacy of the families' identities. R. 1:38-

3(d)(12).

Defendant.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF I.V.,

a minor,

Appellant.

_________________________

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.K.L.H., deceased,

Defendant,

and

T.T.H., SR.,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF T.T.H.,

JR. and C.C.P.H., minors,

Appellants.

_________________________

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

A-3362-23

2

v.

A.D.,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

A.H., deceased,

Defendant.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF A.R.H.

and A.H., minors,

Appellants.

_________________________

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.J., deceased and

R.A., deceased,

Defendants.

________________________

IN THE MATTER OF C.J.

and A.K.A., minors,

Appellants.

________________________

IN THE MATTER OF M.V.

A-3362-23

3

________________________

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.L.P. and B.J.W.,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF J.C.P.,

J.E.P., and J.M.P., minors,

Appellants.

__________________________

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S.D., deceased, B.S., and

A.M.,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF M.M.,

a minor,

Appellant.

__________________________

A-3362-23

4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.G., JR., D.P., and H.G.,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

R.F.,

Defendant.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF J.G., III

and I.G., minors,

Appellants,

and

H.G., a minor,

Respondent.

__________________________

Argued April 14, 2026 – Decided June 16, 2026

Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County,

Docket No. FN-19-0011-23, Monmouth County,

Docket Nos. FN-13-0056-22 and FN-13-0147-22,

Somerset County, Docket No. FN-18-0124-22,

A-3362-23

5

Hudson County, Docket No. FC-09-0184-20, Ocean

County, Docket No. FN-15-0045-23, Bergen County,

Docket No. FN-02-0021-23, and Cumberland County,

Docket No. FN-06-0087-23.

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant I.V. in A-3362-23

(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, of counsel and on

the briefs; Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the

briefs).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellants T.T.H. and C.C.P.H. in

A-3391-23 and A-3850-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis

Pollock, of counsel and on the briefs).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellants A.R.H. and A.H. in A-

3710-23 and A-3898-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis

Pollock, of counsel; Jennifer M. Sullivan, Assistant

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellants C.J. and A.K.A. in A-

3789-23 and A-3791-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis

Pollock, of counsel and on the briefs; Todd Wilson,

Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant M.V. in A-4045-23

(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, of counsel; Neha

Gogate, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel

and on the briefs).

A-3362-23

6

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellants J.C.P., J.E.P., and

J.M.P. in A-0097-24, A-0102-24, and A-0103-24

(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, of counsel and on

the briefs).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant M.M. in A-0271-24

(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, of counsel and on

the briefs; Neha Gogate, Assistant Deputy Public

Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellants J.G., III and I.G. in A-

1801-24 and A-1802-24 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis

Pollock, of counsel; Daniel L. J. Adamek, Assistant

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Adrienne Kalosieh, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for respondent H.V. in A-3362-23

(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney;

Adrienne Kalosieh, of counsel and on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

respondent A.D. in A-3710-23 and A-3898-23

(Richard Foster, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel

and on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

respondent J.L.P. in A-0097-24, A-0102-24, and A-

0103-24 (T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender,

of counsel and on the brief).

Adrienne Kalosieh, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for respondent H.G. in A-1801-24

and A-1802-24 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender,

A-3362-23

7

attorney; Adrienne Kalosieh, of counsel and on the

brief).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child

Protection and Permanency in A-3362-23 (Jennifer

Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet

Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of

counsel; Michelle McBrian, Deputy Attorney General,

on the briefs).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child

Protection and Permanency in A-3391-23 and A-3850-

23 (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney;

Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Wesley Hanna, Deputy Attorney General,

on the briefs).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child

Protection and Permanency in A-3710-23 and A-3898-

23 (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney;

Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Julia B. Colonna, Deputy Attorney

General, on the briefs).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child

Protection and Permanency in A-3789-23 and A-3791-

23 (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney;

Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Wesley Hanna, Deputy Attorney General,

on the briefs).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child

Protection and Permanency in A-4045-23 (Jennifer

Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet

Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of

A-3362-23

8

counsel; Nicholas Dolinsky, Deputy Attorney General,

on the brief).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child

Protection and Permanency in A-0097-24, A-0102-24,

and A-0103-24 (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney

General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Wesley Hanna, Deputy

Attorney General, on the briefs).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent in A-0271-24 (Jennifer

Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet

Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of

counsel; Nicholas Dolinsky, Deputy Attorney General,

on the briefs).

Leah A. Schmidt, Deputy Attorney General, argued

the cause for respondent in A-1801-24 and A-1802-24

(Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet

Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of

counsel; Wesley Hanna, Deputy Attorney General, on

the briefs).

Randi Mandelbaum argued the cause for amici curiae

Rutgers Child Advocacy Clinic, and Advocates for

Children of New Jersey (Rutgers Child Advocacy

Clinic, and Advocates for Children of New Jersey,

attorneys; Randi Mandelbaum, Mary E. Coogan, Jared

M. H. Flanery, and Meghan K. Knapp, on the briefs).

Mitchell Y. Mirviss (Venable LLP) of the District of

Columbia and Maryland bars, admitted pro hac vice,

argued the cause for amici curiae Children's Advocacy

Institute, Children's Rights, Facing Foster Care in

Alaska, Juvenile Law Center, Lawyers for Children,

Legal Aid Society, National Center for the Rights of

Abused Children, National Foster Youth Institute, and

Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public

A-3362-23

9

Interest in A-1801-24 and A-1802-24 (Mitchell Y.

Mirviss, attorney; Mitchell Y. Mirviss, Jessie F.

Beeber (Venable LLP) of the New York bar, admitted

pro hac vice, and Stephanie P. Diu (Venable LLP) of

the New York bar, of counsel; Patrick J. Boyle and

Michael A. Guerra, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, JR., C.J.A.D.

In these fourteen appeals, which were calendared back-to-back, argued

together, and consolidated for purposes of issuing a single opinion, we are

asked to determine whether the Division of Child Protection and Permanency

(Division), in its capacity as representative payee designated by the Social

Security Administration (SSA), can use the fourteen minors' Supplemental

Security Income (SSI) or Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance

(survivor) benefits (collectively, Social Security benefits) to reimburse itself

for the maintenance costs incurred for the minors' care and custody.

The eight Family Part courts issued orders dismissing the minors'

motions to terminate the Division's reimbursement practice. The courts, in

various ways, determined that: (1) they lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because the issue was preempted by the Social Security Act (the Act); (2) the

Division's practice does not violate state law; (3) the minors' due process rights

were not violated by the Division's failure to notify them of its intent to use

their Social Security benefits for reimbursement; and (4) the minors' equal

A-3362-23

10

protection rights were not violated when the Division used their Social

Security benefits for reimbursement but did not seek reimbursement from

minors without Social Security benefits. We affirm the dismissal orders but

take a different path in doing so.

We disagree with the trial courts' determination that federal law

preempts state court review. Several states, including New Jersey through

N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7, have enacted laws specifying how, if at all, their

administrative agencies can use the Social Security benefits of minors under

state care and custody for reimbursement of maintenance costs, and the

Supreme Court of the United States has approved of such practices. Because

Congress's intent to fully occupy the field is not clear from federal law, and

family law is an area of law traditionally regulated by states, state courts can

review the minors' claims against the Division.

We, however, agree with some of the trial courts' determinations that the

Division's actions did not violate state law. Until the recent enactment of

N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7, effective December 1, 2026, state law has not prohibited the

Division's reimbursement efforts. See L. 2025, c. 162 § 1. And although

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-30 requires the State to bear the cost of maintenance for

children under its care and custody, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 allows the Division to

apply funds—other than earned income, the corpus of a trust, devise or

A-3362-23

11

intestate share, insurance proceeds or a personal injury award—to offset

maintenance expenses for a child under its custody, care, guardianship, or

placed in a resource family home. We hold that SSA representative payee

accounts are not trust accounts and are not excluded as a permissible source of

reimbursement.

Furthermore, we conclude that the minors' due process and equal

protection claims lack merit. The Division's failure to provide advance notice

of its intent to file a representative payee application does not violate the

minors' due process rights because the risk of erroneous deprivation is low, the

current procedures afford sufficient notice, and additional procedures would

not affect a minors' eligibility for benefits. As for the equal protection claim,

the minors do not show that they are similarly situated to the proposed

comparator groups because the alleged distinctions are created by the Act not

the Division. Moreover, the Division's policy survives rational basis scrutiny

as the State has a legitimate interest in the policy which is rationally related to

the classification it has created.

I.

We briefly summarize the undisputed factual and procedural background

involving each minor appellant:

I.V., A-3362-23: Survivor Benefits

A-3362-23

12

I.V. was born on May 6, 2008 to H.V. (mother) and W.D. (father).

Following W.D.'s death in January 2020, I.V. began receiving survivor

benefits under the Act. On July 19, 2022, the trial court issued an order

approving I.V.'s removal and granting the Division's application for ongoing

care, custody, and supervision of I.V. H.V. consented to the trial court's order,

and the Division placed I.V. in the care of L.L. (maternal grandmother).

In October of 2022, the SSA granted the Division's application to be

appointed I.V.'s representative payee. About two months later, the SSA denied

L.L.'s application to become I.V.'s representative payee, stating "it would be

best for [I.V.] to have his checks sent to another payee." The Division later

used I.V.'s survivor benefits to offset maintenance costs for his care.

Subsequent efforts by I.V. to prevent the Division from using his

survivor benefits to offset maintenance costs and to have L.L. or H.V. become

his representative payee culminated in an April 24, 2024 court order denying

I.V.'s reconsideration motion. The court reiterated its denial of I.V.'s

requested relief in its August 9, 2023 order dismissing his motion without

prejudice because he had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Act.

The court noted in its oral decision that the Division "was not acting in [I.V.'s]

best interests" and that the funds "should be held in trust for [I.V.]" but it was

A-3362-23

13

constrained by the procedural requirements under the Act. On May 15, 2024,

the court issued an order and oral decision terminating the litigation.

T.T.H., JR. and C.C.P.H., A-3391-23 & A-3850-23: Survivor Benefits

T.T.H., Jr., born October 28, 2008, and C.C.P.H., born July 10, 2011, are

the sons of D.H., their mother, who died in October 2021. Three days after

D.H.'s death, the trial court granted the Division's request for custody and care

of the children at an order to show cause hearing. The minors' father had

previously been ordered not to have contact with them.

On January 23, 2022, the SSA approved the Division's application to

serve as the minors' representative payee. The Division applied the funds to

their maintenance expenses and held any excess money on their behalf in

interest-bearing accounts.

On July 9, 2023, T.T.H., Jr. and C.C.P.H. filed a motion seeking that the

court: require the Division to cease using their survivor benefits to reimburse

maintenance costs and return all funds; prevent the Division from objecting to

the maternal grandmother's application to serve as their representative payee;

and compel an accounting of the survivor benefits it received.

On January 12, 2024, the trial court issued an order and statement of

reasons denying the minors' motion, finding that "federal preemption

prevent[ed] [it] . . . from granting the [requested] relief." Three months later,

A-3362-23

14

the court denied their reconsideration motion and granted the minors'

application for a stay of the disbursement of any SSI funds pending appeal.

On June 24, the court issued an order and oral decision terminating

litigation and granting Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) to the maternal

grandmother.

A.R.H. and A.H., A-3710-23: Survivor Benefits

A.R.H., born January 16, 2008, and A.H., born September 2, 2013, are

the children of A.D., the mother, and A.H., the father. A.H. passed away in

September 2018, and A.D. was designated as the representative payee of the

minors' survivor benefits.

On January 26, 2022, the Division removed the children from their

mother's care due to physical abuse and substance abuse issues and placed

them with a paternal uncle. Two days later, the court issued an order and oral

decision placing the children in the Division's custody.

On June 29, the SSA approved the Division's application to serve as the

minors' representative payee. The minors subsequently moved to enjoin the

Division from using their survivor benefits to reimburse maintenance costs,

return the benefits that had been applied to maintenance costs, and provide an

accounting of the benefits received.

A-3362-23

15

On May 30, the trial court issued an order and written decision denying

the minors' motion, finding that their arguments were preempted by federal

law, and dismissing their due process and equal protection arguments based on

Guardianship Estate of Keffeler v. State (Keffeler III), 88 P.3d 949 (Wash.

2004). Three weeks later, the court issued an order terminating litigation

because the minors were placed in the care of their maternal grandparents.

C.J. and A.K.A., A-3789-23 & A-3791-23: Survivor Benefits

C.J., born September 27, 2007, and A.K.A., born April 6, 2009, share a

mother but have different fathers. Their mother passed away in May 2022.

On June 27, 2022, the trial court granted the Division's application for

custody and care of the minors. A few months later, the SSA approved the

Division's application to serve as the minors' representative payee.

On April 29, 2024, the minors moved to have the Division cease using

their survivor benefits to reimburse maintenance costs, objected to the

maternal grandmother's appointment as representative payee, requested the

return of the benefits, and asked for an accounting of the benefits received.

The trial court denied the motion in a June 4 order and a statement of reasons

finding that it lacked jurisdiction over federal claims but granted the minors'

accounting demands. Two weeks later, the trial court issued a written order

terminating litigation and granting KLG to the maternal grandmother.

A-3362-23

16

M.V., A-4045-23: Survivor Benefits

M.V. was born on August 28, 2018. His father passed away almost two

months before his birth.

On February 25, 2020, M.V. was removed from his mother's custody due

to her substance abuse. Three months later, the SSA approved the Division's

application to serve as the minor's representative payee.

A February 22, 2022 court order placed M.V. under the Division's

guardianship, which was affirmed on appeal. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. T.M., No. A-2072-21 (App. Div. Apr. 11, 2023) (slip op. at

17).

Following a court-ordered accounting of the Division's use of the

survivor benefits, M.V. moved on December 21, 2023, to compel the Division

to return $15,870 it withdrew from his payee account while he was in

placement. On July 11, 2024, the trial court issued an order and oral decision

denying M.V.'s motion, finding that he failed to show there was "an excess of

funds that should have been set aside for [him] in a[n] [interest bearing

account]" since the monthly reimbursement cost was $763 and exceeded the

monthly SSI benefits of $411. Although the trial court didn't address federal

preemption, it reasoned that the Division's actions complied with the Act.

A-3362-23

17

That same day, the trial court terminated the litigation because M.V. was

adopted by his paternal aunt.

J.C.P., J.E.P., and J.M.P., A-0097-24, A-0102-24 & A-0103-24: SSI

Benefits

J.C.P., J.E.P., and J.M.P. are triplets with multiple disabilities born on

February 19, 2013. The SSA found them eligible for SSI benefits on January

24, 2023.

On November 18, 2022, the trial court approved the Division's emergent

removal and placed the children in the Division's custody. Two months later,

the SSA approved the Division's request to serve as the minors' representative

payee in place of their mother. At a permanency hearing on April 10, 2024,

where the Division sought to have the triplets adopted by their resource

parents, the minors requested that the court bar the Division from using the

children's SSI benefits to offset maintenance costs.

On July 29, 2024, the trial court issued an order and oral decision

denying the minors' motion to: bar the Division from using their SSI benefits

to offset maintenance costs; place the SSI benefits in an account; and require

the Division to provide notice to the court and minors prior to using SSI

benefits for reimbursement. The trial court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction

to hear federal claims. The court also terminated the litigation and ordered

A-3362-23

18

that the Division retain legal custody of the minors, and the resource parents

retain physical custody of them.

M.M., A-0271-24: Survivor Benefits

M.M. was born on August 15, 2006. Her mother passed away on

September 29, 2018.

On July 19, 2022, the Division obtained custody of M.M. and placed her

in a non-relative resource home. Two months later, the SSA approved the

Division's request to become the M.M.'s representative payee.

On June 7, 2024, the trial court denied M.M.'s motion to stop the

Division from using her survivor benefits for reimbursement purposes but

granted her request that the Division provide an accounting of her survivor

benefits and required the Division to assist her in becoming her own

representative payee. The trial court reasoned that the Division's practice "no

matter how abhorrent it may seem," was authorized under New Jersey law.

The trial court also denied M.M.'s request for the Division to open a separate

account as moot.

J.G., III and I.G., A-1801-24 & A-1802-24: SSI benefits

On December 5, 2017, H.G., the paternal grandmother, obtained care

and custody of J.G., III, born June 16, 2006, and I.G., born July 26, 2009, who

are disabled and were removed from their mother's care due to concerns of

A-3362-23

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neglect. In June 2023, the Division emergently removed the children from

H.G.'s home and placed them in the Division's custody. Four months later, the

Division's application to the SSA to become the minors' representative payee

was approved.

On April 16, 2024, H.G. moved for the court to order the Division to pay

over $6,000 of her past bills because she was dependent on the children's SSI

benefits. The court issued a written order and oral decision requiring the

Division to pay H.G.'s mortgage, car payment, and utility costs. The Division

moved for a stay and reconsideration of the order; the court reversed its order

in part rescinding the requirement to pay H.G.'s car loan.

On April 19, the trial court issued a written order requiring the Division

to provide "particularized accounting" of its use of the children's SSI funds.

After J.G., III and I.G. were reunited with H.G., on March 15 and June 6,

respectively, the Division notified the SSA that it was no longer the children's

legal custodian, relinquished its payee status, and returned the children's

conserved funds to the SSA.

On June 7, J.G., III and I.G. filed a motion seeking: (1) the Division to

repay the SSI funds it used to offset maintenance costs; and (2) provide a final

accounting of its use of the children's SSI benefits. After a motion hearing on

September 3, the trial court issued a written order and oral decision on

A-3362-23

20

September 20, denying the minors' motion without prejudice. The trial court

reasoned that because the minors' arguments were preempted by federal law, it

lacked jurisdiction to hear the federal claims, and the Division's actions were

permitted under New Jersey law. On January 6, 2025, the court issued an

order and oral decision terminating the litigation because the children were

returned home and conditions had been remediated.

II.

To avoid a repetitive and unnecessary recitation of each trial court's

decision, we summarize them except to highlight a particular court's reasoning.

In denying the minors' requests to cease the Division's use of their Social

Security benefits and to refund those benefits, seven of the eight trial courts

found that they lacked jurisdiction due to federal preemption. Because 42

U.S.C. § 405(a) vests in the SSA Commissioner the exclusive "authority to

make rules and regulations . . . necessary or appropriate to carry out such

provisions" of the Act, the trial courts determined that our state courts have no

lawful authority under New Jersey law to monitor the Division's use of Social

Security benefits as the minors' representative payee. Federal preemption was

also evident when the United States Supreme Court recognized that "a

[representative] payee must expend funds 'only for the use and benefit of the

beneficiary,' in a way that the payee determines 'to be in the [beneficiary's]

A-3362-23

21

best interest.'" Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Est.

of Keffeler (Keffeler II), 537 U.S. 371, 376 (2003) (second alteration in

original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2035(a), 416.635(a)). Six of the eight trial

courts also relied on a Maryland Court of Appeals decision, In re Ryan W., 76

A.3d 1049, 1061-63 (Md. 2013), which held that amendments to the Act

enhancing the "'monitoring of institutional representative payees'" and giving

federal remedies for the misuse of Social Security benefits indicate federal

preemption over "'disputes regarding the allocation of benefits by

representative payees.'"

Six of the eight trial courts dismissed the minors' argument—that the

Legislature's intent to prohibit the Division's reimbursement policy could be

gleaned from the amendment to N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4. part of the Child Placement

Bill of Rights (CPBR). That amendment, effective January 16, 2024, requires

the Division to notify a child in its care of the Division's "intent to file for

federal benefits on the child's behalf." N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4(z). The amendment

was considered by the six courts as merely authorizing them to enforce the

Division's obligation to provide notice to a child under its care, custody, and

supervision.

Two trial courts viewed the primary issue as a failure to exhaust the

administrative remedies provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), and three viewed the

A-3362-23

22

issue as one of misuse. One court cited an Indiana Court of Appeals decision,

Randall v. Woodson, 212 N.E.3d 691, 693, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), where a

trust beneficiary sued an individual acting as representative payee to recover

misused Social Security benefits, and the court found the claims preempted by

42 U.S.C. § 1383, which is "directed at preventing, identifying, and rectifying

the misuse of benefit funds by representative payees." Id. at 695.

Trial courts that addressed the merits of the minors' claims determined

that the Division's reimbursement policy did not violate state law. Although

the policy was considered unfair to the minors, there was no law preventing it.

In fact, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22, was seen as conferring to the Division the control

over the minors' assets and the ability to use them to cover their maintenance

costs.

As for the trial court that addressed the state constitutional equal

protection and due process claims, it relied on the Washington Supreme

Court's opinion in Keffeler III. The equal protection claims were dismissed

because "there was only one group of foster children" and the Division was

using the Social Security benefits "lawfully under state and federal laws and

regulations." Keffeler III, 88 P.3d at 954. Therefore, the trial court reasoned,

the minors were not treated differently from others under the Division's care

and custody who have assets from jobs or inheritance that are used to offset

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23

maintenance costs. The court did not directly address the minors' due process

claims regarding failure to provide notice of the Division's reimbursement

measures, but relied on the reasoning in Keffeler III, which held that the

"federal notice sent to beneficiaries and their guardians is sufficient to fulfil

any procedural due process rights the children may have." 88 P.3d at 956.

III.

Our resolution of these appeals turns on: (1) whether state courts have

jurisdiction to decide if the Division can use minors' Social Security benefits

to reimburse the agency for the maintenance costs of their care, custody and

supervision; and if so, (2) whether the Division's reimbursement actions

violate state law or constitutional due process and equal protection rights. We

address these issues in turn.

IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Arguments

The minors aver that the trial courts erred in holding that the courts lack

jurisdiction over their Social Security benefits claims. They emphasize that a

family court's inherent equitable parens patriae authority allows it to intervene

and override the Division's policy of using Social Security benefits to offset

maintenance costs. See Hoefers v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590, 607-08 (App.

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24

Div. 1994). They contend that the Child Placement Review Act, N.J.S.A.

30:4C-50 to -65, and the CPBR authorize the family court to intervene and

protect the child's best interests, which is the situation here.

The minors2 assert that the Act does not preempt New Jersey law

because they are not claiming the Division misused their Social Security

benefits, which falls under the purview of the SSA and not state court. The

dispute here, the minors contend, is whether New Jersey law prohibits the

practice. The minors contend that the trial court misinterpreted 42 U.S.C. §

405(a) as preempting New Jersey law because although the Act's regulations

govern the designation of representative payees and the scope of their

fiduciary duties, the regulations are silent on whether a state can utilize Social

Security benefits to reimburse itself for a minor's maintenance costs. See 42

U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a).

The minors 3 also argue that there are no federal statutes or regulations

providing an equitable remedy for the Division's actions in utilizing SSI

benefits to offset maintenance costs. For instance, the minors allege

"restitution against state or local government agencies who serve as

2

M.V. did not address federal preemption in his brief.

3

M.V. did not address federal remedies for misuse of SSI benefits in his brief.

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25

representative payees" is precluded per 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(7)(A), which

governs misuse of funds. Thus, the minors contend the Division's

reimbursement policy should be reviewable by a state court to prevent the

Division from being immune from liability and to hold the Division

accountable to the minors.

Lastly, the minors contend the courts' reliance on Keffeler II and Ryan

W. are misplaced because those cases are distinguishable from the present

matter. They note that the state statutes implicated in Keffeler II and Ryan W.

expressly required the Division to use Social Security benefits to offset

maintenance costs, whereas here, they argue New Jersey law, prior to the

enactment of N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7, prohibited it. Moreover, the minors argue

Keffeler II is distinguishable because it focused on whether maintenance costs

amounted to an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal

process" under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), whereas here, the minors challenge the

Division's maintenance costs based on New Jersey law. 537 U.S. at 382. The

minors contend that the Supreme Court's analysis in Keffeler II affirming

Washington State's reimbursement practice was dicta, and its discussion on the

best interests of the child implicated Chevron4 deference to the SSA, which has

4

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

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since been overruled in Loper Bright Ent. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),

and is thus not binding. The minors add that, to the extent the Supreme Court's

approval is relevant, it indicates "consideration of state law is essential to the

ultimate determination on this issue."

Amici Rutgers Law School Child Advocacy Clinic and Advocates for

Children of New Jersey present no argument regarding federal preemption.

Amici Child-Advocacy Organizations 5 agree with the minors' contention that

the Act does not preempt New Jersey law and that the minors are not required

to exhaust federal remedies before bringing a claim in state court.

The Division contends that "[c]ongressional intent to preempt state

jurisdiction and fully occupy the field in this case is 'clear and manifest.'" See

Health Maintenance Org. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Whitman, 72 F.3d 1123, 1127

(3rd. Cir. 1995). It argues that the minors' claims are subject to federal

preemption because they constitute allegations of misuse of benefits , which,

under the Act's comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme, are expressly

resolved by the SSA and, thereafter, federal court. Thus, minors must exhaust

the administrative remedies set forth in the SSA.

5

These organizations are comprised of the Children's Advocacy Institute,

Children's Rights, Facing Foster Care in Alaska, Juvenile Law Center,

Lawyers for Children, Legal Aid Society, National Center for the Rights of

Abused Children, National Foster Youth Institute, and Nebraska Appleseed

Center for Law in the Public Interest.

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The Division asserts that other states' laws addressing their use of Social

Security benefits do not invite federal preemption because the laws were

"carefully crafted to fall well within the benefit use permitted under federal

law" and do not "attempt to confer jurisdiction onto state courts to resolve

claims of benefit misuse," which is the case here. The Division argues that

despite its parens patriae role over the minors, state court jurisdiction is not

conveyed over allegations that it misused their Social Security benefits as their

representative payees. State court jurisdiction, according to the Division, is

not conferred by the requirement under N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4(z) that minors be

notified of the Division's plan to be appointed as representative payee of their

Social Security benefits. The Division rebuts the minors' claim that the Act

provides no remedy, arguing that it explicitly precludes liability from

governmental agency payees like the Division, pointing to 42 U.S.C. §§

405(j)(5), 1383(a)(2)(E), which it argues requires the SSA to "repay[] the

funds to the beneficiary in full in the case of misuse by an agency payee

regardless of whether the SSA recoups the misappropriate[d] funds."

The Division counters the minors' claims that the Supreme Court's ruling

in Keffeler II approving of Washington State's reimbursement policy is dicta

and overruled by Loper Bright. It argues that the Court "analyzed the statutory

text and related rules and regulations" out of "its own volition." The Division,

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quoting Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 486 (2019) (internal citation

omitted), argues that Chevron deference was "premised on the theory that a

statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the

agency to fill in the statutory gaps.'" In Keffeler II, the only "ambiguity the

Court resolved concerned the proper interpretation of the phrase 'other legal

process.'" See Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 383. By contrast, the agency contends,

the Court's findings on benefit use, payee accounting, beneficiary rights and

best interests, were based on its own independent analysis of the laws

governing the SSA and not the SSA Commissioner's ruling.

Social Security Benefits

The SSA Commissioner has the "full power and authority to make rules

and regulations and to establish procedures . . . necessary or appropriate to

carry out" the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a). Here, there are two distinct Social

Security benefits––SSI and survivor benefits––that the minors are entitled to

which the Division received as their appointed representative payee and used

to reimburse maintenance costs expended for their care.

Nine of the minors receive survivor's benefits under Title II, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 401-34, from "the earnings record of an insured person . . . who has died"

because they are the dependent child of an insured decedent, are unmarried,

and under the age of eighteen or permanently disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

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404.350(a); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). SSI benefits under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§

1361-71, are "for aged, blind, or disabled individuals, including children

whose income and assets fall below . . . $2,000." Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 375

(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-82; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c)). SSA regulations

provide that a representative payee, approved by the SSA, may receive the

"[survivor] and SSI benefits directly, [and] may distribute them 'for [a

beneficiary's] use and benefit' to another individual or entity. . . .'" Id. at 376

(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(1)(A), 1383(a)(2)(A)(ii)

(I)). Anyone may contest the appointment of a representative payee and is

"entitled to a hearing by the Commissioner of Social Security, and to judicial

review of the Commissioner's final decision." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(a)(2)(B)(xi) ,

405(j)(2)(E)(i). Judicial review shall be in a federal district court. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (incorporating § 405(g) by reference).

A representative payee must use the benefits "in a manner and for the

purposes he or she determines, under the guidelines . . . to be in [the

beneficiary's] best interests." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2035(a), 416.635(a).

Regulations allow payments to be used for "the beneficiary's current

maintenance." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2040(a)(1), 416.640(a). "Current

maintenance" is defined as including "cost incurred in obtaining food, shelter,

clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items." Ibid.

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30

"If the Commissioner . . . or a court of competent jurisdiction determines

that a representative payee has misused any individual's benefit paid to such

representative payee," certification for payment of benefits must be revoked.

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(1)(A), 1383(a)(2)(A)(iii). Misuse of benefits is defined as

"any case in which the representative payee receives payment . . . for the use

and benefit of another person and converts such payment, or any part thereof,

to a use other than for the use and benefit of such other person." 42 U.S.C. §§

405 (j)(9), 1383 (a)(2)(A)(iv). "[U]se and benefit" is not defined. See ibid.

Both Titles II and XVI provide that "[i]n any case in which a representative

payee that . . . is not an individual . . . misuses all or part of an individual's

benefit paid to such representative payee," the SSA Commissioner must

reimburse the individual or their alternative payee the amount that was

misused. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(5), 1383(a)(2)(E).

A representative payee must provide an annual accounting. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(j)(3)(A), 1383(a)(2)(C)(i). This includes a state institution that serves

as a representative. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(3)(B). If it is determined that a

payee has misused benefits, the Commissioner is mandated to "promptly

revoke" payment to the offending payee. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(1)(A),

1383(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Analysis

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The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI

of the United States Constitution. Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982). State law is preempted when "Congress

explicitly or implicitly [sets forth] its intent to regulate a specific area to the

exclusion of the states" or when "a state regulation actually conflicts or is

incompatible with federal law." Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 408

N.J. Super. 83, 107 (App. Div. 2009). "Express preemption is 'determined

from an examination of the explicit language used by Congress.'" Giordano v.

Giordano, 389 N.J. Super. 391, 395 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Gonzalez v.

Ideal Tile Importing Co., 184, N.J. 415, 419 (2005)).

Express preemption is not at issue here. Rather, the question is whether

the Act's statutes and regulations provide implied preemption, which can take

the form of field or conflict preemption. See ibid. Field preemption occurs

"'where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable

the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'" Ibid.

(quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).

Conflict preemption arises "'where compliance with both federal and state

regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle

to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

Congress.'" Ibid. That aside, there is a "presumption against preemption in

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areas of traditional state regulation such as family law," which can only be

overcome when "Congress has made clear its desire for pre-emption."

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).

We conclude there is no implied federal preemption that precludes state

courts from adjudicating the minors' claims. The minors argue the Division's

reimbursement policy, which uses their Social Security benefits to offset the

state's maintenance costs, is prohibited by state law. Contrary to the minors'

argument, the trial courts and the Division frame the minors' contentions as

alleging misuse of benefits. The minors, however, do not allege the Division's

reimbursement practice violates 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a) or 416.635(a), which

require that a payee use Social Security benefits for the beneficiaries' "use and

benefit," or violates 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (j)(9), 1383 (a)(2)(A)(iv), which define

benefits misuse.

The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Keffeler II clearly indicates

that the Division's reimbursement policy is not preempted by federal law. The

Court's explicit approval of the Washington Department of Social and Health

Services' reimbursement regulation, and its reversal of the Washington

Supreme Court's holding that the regulation was preempted by federal law ,

demonstrates that Congress has left some room for states to manage Social

Security benefits received as appointed representative payee for minors under

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33

their care, custody, and supervision, so long as the states' laws or regulations

do not conflict with the Act. See Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 375, 390-91.

Turning to the minors' contention that the trial courts and Division rely

on non-binding dicta from Keffeler II, the Court reasoned "the case boil[ed]

down to whether the [State's] manner of gaining control of the federal funds

involv[ed] 'other legal process,' as [42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a) and 1383(d)(1)] use[]

that term." 537 U.S. at 383. 42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a) and 1383(d)(1) protect SSI

and survivor benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other

legal process." Id. at 382. After analyzing the regulations, which afforded

deference to the SSA "Commissioner's interpretation of her own regulations,"

the Court concluded that the State's reimbursement policy did not constitute an

"other legal process" as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a) and 1383(d)(1).

Id. at 386-87. Beyond that conclusion, the Court addressed the view of the

minors and Washington Supreme Court that the reimbursement policy was

"antithetical to the best interest of the beneficiary foster child." Id. at 389. It

found that the policy was in the best interest of the child. 6

6

The Court cited three reasons for its conclusion. First, it found that the

Commissioner's interpretation of the Act's requirement "that a beneficiary's

'interest . . . would be served' by the [representative payee's] appointment [,]"

aligned with the "basic objectives of the Act." Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 389-90

(quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(1)(A), 1383(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)). Second, it found

that prohibiting the practice was "demonstrably antithetical . . . to the best

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There is some merit to the minors' claim that the Court's approval of the

Washington State policy is non-binding, as its resolution of the disputes did

not require a finding on whether the policy was in the best interest of the

minors. However, "the legal findings and determinations of a high court's

considered analysis must be accorded conclusive weight by lower courts."

State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 183 (2011) (relying on 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate

Review § 565 (2007) for the proposition that "matters in the opinion of a

higher court which are not decisive of the primary issue presented but which

are germane to that issue . . . are not dicta, but binding decisions of the court").

While the Court did rely in part on deference to the agency's interpretation of

"'interest,'" it also provided its own independent reasons for approving the

policy beyond the Commissioner's interpretation. Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 389-

91. Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine whether Loper Bright's rejection

of Chevron deference affects Keffeler II's authority. Keffeler II does not stand

for the proposition that state laws regarding the use of Social Security benefits

____________________

interest of many foster care children" because their "eligibility for benefits"

would be "lost if their assets cre[pt] above . . . $2,000." Id. at 390 (citing 42

U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(1)(B), (3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c)). Third, it found

that prohibition of the policy would discourage many states "from accepting

appointment as representative payees by the administrative costs of acting in

that capacity" thereby leaving many children without access to the benefits.

Id. at 391.

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received by representative payees for children are preempted by federal law.

Additionally, Keffeler's independent analysis—particularly concerning how

the policy aligns with the Act's intent and the risk of children becoming

ineligible for benefits if their savings exceed the $2,000 cap—suggests

guidance that such policies do not conflict with the Act. Id. at 390-91.

We disagree with the trial courts' rulings and Division's argument that

the minors must exhaust administrative remedies before relying on the SSA to

invalidate the Division's practice. They point to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which

states that the review of "any final decision" of the [SSA] Commissioner "shall

be brought" in federal court. (Emphasis added). Indeed, the Maryland Court

of Appeals in Ryan W., which the trial courts and the Division rely on, held

that the "use of the word 'shall' suggests strongly that the jurisdiction of the

federal courts is exclusive" and therefore concluded that "Maryland's state

courts are without concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes

over the allocation of a child's [survivor] benefits by a duly appointed

representative payee." 76 A.3d at 1060. However, the minors are not

contesting the "final decision" of the SSA Commissioner. Instead, they are

contesting a policy decision by the Division regarding how to use the minors'

Social Security benefits under New Jersey law even if the reimbursement

policy satisfies the "use and benefit" requirement under the Act.

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As noted, Keffeler II demonstrates Congress has left open such an

avenue for state courts to adjudicate the minors' claim. The exhaustion of

remedies requirement should serve the interests of justice. Abbott v. Burke,

100 N.J. 269, 297 (1985). One such interest is to "ensure that claims will be

heard, as a preliminary matter, by a body possessing expertise in the area." Id.

at 297-98 (quoting City of Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255, 265 (1979)).

As the minors' claims are based in state law, state courts possess the required

expertise.

We add that while we are not bound by precedential decisions rendered

in other jurisdictions, we note a number of courts have held that states have the

authority to enact laws and regulations directing its agencies to either use

minors' Social Security benefits to offset minors' maintenance costs, to

conserve them, or some combination of both practices. 7 And as noted, our

Legislature has enacted N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7 and -8, effective December 1, 2026,

7

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-468(B)(1) (department "[m]ay not use the

child's federal benefits . . . to reimburse [itself] . . . for any of the costs of the

child's care)"; 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/5.46(d)(1) & (d)(2) (mandating the

department to conserve a certain percentage of the child's federal benefits after

the age of fourteen and to "[e]xercise discretion in accordance with federal law

and in the best interests of the youth when making decisions to use or conserve

the youth's benefits that are less than or not subject to asset or resource limits

under federal law"); Md. Code, Fam. Law § 5-527.1(c)(1) to (2) (mandating

the department to "use or conserve the benefits in the child's best interest" and

that a certain percentage is conserved and "not used [for] reimburs[ment]"

after the age of fourteen).

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prohibiting the Division from using the minors' Social Security benefits for

maintenance reimbursement. See L. 2025, c. 162 §§ 1-2 (codified at N.J.S.A.

9:6B-7 and -8). Consequently, any interpretation of the enactments would be

subject to review in our state courts. See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 2 (giving

the Superior Court original general jurisdiction); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S.

911, 916 (1997) (holding that even federal courts are bound by the

constructions of a statute "rendered by the highest court of the [s]tate").

Defendants do not dispute our courts' ability to adjudicate claims under the

new enactments, and there is no meaningful difference between future claims

brought under the enactments and the minors' current claims with respect to

our state courts' subject matter jurisdiction.

V.

STATE LAW CLAIMS

Given our conclusion that there is no federal preemption preventing our

state courts from deciding whether the Division can use minors' Social

Security benefits to reimburse the agency for their maintenance costs, we now

address whether the Division's reimbursement policy violates state law.

Arguments

The minors contend that state law does not allow the Division to recoup

maintenance costs of their care through the agency's receipt of their Social

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Security benefits as their representative payee and therefore seek return of the

funds. The minors assert that New Jersey law requires the Division to pay the

maintenance cost of foster children under its care. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-30

(stating that the "cost of maintenance . . . shall be borne by the State at the rate

of 75% of the per capita cost of maintenance and by the county at the rate of

25% of the per capita cost for the entire year"). Further, the minors argue that

New Jersey's statutory scheme does not permit the Division "to transfer its

financial responsibility to provide maintenance to a child in foster care." See

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-29.1 (eliminating the Division's ability to seek reimbursement

for child support costs from parents); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 (allowing the

Division to seek reimbursement unless the funds are subject to certain

exceptions).

Regarding N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22, the minors maintain that this provision

prohibits the Division's reimbursement policy because Social Security benefits

are the corpus of a trust, which cannot be used as a source of funding for

reimbursement. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 provides the Division with

"discretion . . . to apply funds" other than earned income, the corpus of a trust,

devise or intestate share, insurance proceeds or a personal injury award, to

offset maintenance expenses for a "child under its custody or care or ward

when the child is in a resource family home." The statute's use of a broad

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term, "the corpus of any trust," according to the minors, implies "that any type

of trust is meant to fit within the meaning of the statute." They contend a trust

is formed when the SSA transfers the benefits to the Division as trustee, and

the Division must use the property to benefit them, the beneficiary. See N.

Carolina Dep't of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr.,

588 U.S. 262, 265-66 (2019).

The minors claim that the January 30, 2025 amendment 8 to N.J.S.A.

30:4C-29.1—which eliminated the duty of legally responsibly persons to pay

for maintenance and vacated all pending support obligations—indicates that

the Legislature did not intend to allow the Division to utilize a minor's Social

Security benefits for reimbursement purposes. Allowing the Division to

recoup maintenance costs through Social Security benefits, while prohibiting

parental liability, "lack[s] common sense" and creates absurd results, they

contend.

Amici Rutgers Law School Child Advocacy Clinic and Advocates for

Children of New Jersey reiterate the minors' arguments and add that although

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 allows the Division to seek reimbursement when it has

custody or guardianship, only guardianship vests the Division with control

over "the person and property of a child" under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2(e), whereas

8

See L. 2025, c. 5.

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40

custody is limited to a "continuing responsibility for the person of a child"

under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2(d). Thus, amici argue that, even if representative

payee accounts are not trust accounts and are a permissible source for

reimbursement under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22, the Division's reimbursement powers

are limited to guardianship cases.

The Division contends that "a holistic view" of Chapter 4C of Title

Thirty, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1 to -105, which contains most of the child welfare

statutes relevant to this appeal, allowed it to use Social Security benefits to

recoup maintenance costs. For example, it points to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-31 ––

authorizing the Division to seek financial assistance –– and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-13

–– restricting the Division's care and maintenance to "the limits of legislative

appropriations." The Division also notes that the 1985 amendments of

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2r and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-29.1 to -29.2 expanded its authority to

recoup maintenance expenses by allowing it to bring child support actions and

impose liens on "legally responsible person."

The Division views the amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-29.1 as only a

"limited change" that altered how it may collect child support but did not

affect its longstanding practice of using Social Security benefits for

reimbursement. The Division asserts its reimbursement policy protects the

minors' benefits because the Act requires that a minor use their SSI benefits

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41

for maintenance and that their income and resources not exceed $2,000 per

month. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(1)(B) to (a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100,

416.1323-24. Barring the Division's reimbursement policy could disqualify

minors from SSI benefits because their income and resources "would rapidly

accrue beyond the $2,000 cap."

The Division refutes the minors' argument that the agency holds their

Social Security benefits as a corpus of a trust, which under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22

cannot be used to reimburse maintenance costs. The Division avers that

"common law trusts are fundamentally unlike Social Security benefits," which

are the "product of a Congressional enactment." See United States v. Jicarilla

Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 174-78 (2011) (finding that the federal

government's trust obligations to Indian tribes are governed by federal statute,

not common law). The Division maintains that representative payee accounts

are distinct from trusts because the Social Security benefits are housed in

collective savings or checking accounts, instead of trust funds, and a payee

does not legally own the funds but only manages them. This is confirmed by

the SSA's Programs Operations Manual System (POMS), 9 which explicitly

9

Soc. Sec. Admin., SI 01120.200 Information on Trusts, including Trusts

Established Prior to January 01, 2000, Trusts Established with the Assets of

Third Parties, and Trusts not Subject to Section 1613(e) of the Social Security

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42

states that representative payee accounts are not trust accounts because the

payee does not have legal title to the account.

The Division points out that the Third Circuit recognized that the SSA

does not treat the corpus of trust instruments as Social Security benefits. See

Sable v. Velez, 388 Fed. Appx. 235, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that

Congress amended the SSA in 1999 to prevent SSI applicants from

circumventing resource requirements by placing their income in trusts).

Analysis

For several reasons, we reject the minors' and amici's argument that the

Division's reimbursement policy is prohibited by state law. Even though

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-30 requires the State to bear the maintenance costs for children

in its care and custody, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 provides the Division with "full and

complete . . . custody and control" over "the person and property of children in

its custody or care," as well as the "discretion . . . to apply funds" other than

earned income, the corpus of a trust, devise or intestate share, insurance

proceeds or a personal injury award, to offset maintenance expenses for a

____________________

[hereinafter SI 01120.200], https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501120200

(last visited May 27, 2026).

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"child under its custody or care or ward when the child is in a resource family

home."

Contrary to the minors' contentions, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 grants the

Division broad authority over care, custody, and guardianship, that includes

seeking reimbursement, and the provision carries narrow exceptions for

reimbursement. The statute's plain language permitted the Division to seek

reimbursement until N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7 was amended, effective December 1,

2026, to bar the Division's policy unless Social Security benefits had to be

expended to maintain them. See Wunsch v. CTE Republicans for Englewood

Cliffs, 483 N.J. Super. 231, 245 (App. Div. 2025) (omissions and alterations in

original) (quoting State v. Higginbotham, 257 N.J. 260, 280 (2024))

("[S]tatutory construction begins with an examination of the plain language of

the statute, 'ascrib[ing] to the . . . words their ordinary meaning and

significance.'"); Cupido v. Perez, 415 N.J. Super. 587, 594 (App. Div. 2010)

(citing Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 200 N.J. 413, 418 (2009))

(holding that we "'apply to the statutory terms the generally accepted meaning

of the words used by the Legislature'").

We find it instructive that the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7 to bar

the Division's reimbursement policy unless Social Security benefits need to be

expended to maintain them. The sponsors explained the enactment was needed

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to "prohibit[] the [Division] from utilizing the . . . [Social Security] benefits of

a child under the [D]ivision's custody to offset the State's costs to care for the

child" and "ensure that the child's financial resources be preserved to either

pay for the child's unmet needs while in an out of home placement, or save for

the child's future use." Sponsors' Statement to S. 3153, (May 6, 2024).

Contrary to the minors' contention, as the Division aptly points out,

using their SSI benefits to reimburse the State for maintenance costs may help

preserve a minor's eligibility for benefits given that disability benefits are

subject to a $2,000 asset cap. Indeed, in amending N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7, the

Legislature recognized that reimbursement is justified when it seeks to

preserve SSI eligibility and allowed the Division to offset SSI benefits for

maintenance costs to "maintain the child's eligibility for . . . [SSI] benefits and

to avoid a violation of federal asset or resource limits under the [SSI]

[p]rogram."

We also agree with the Division that the minors' contention that N.J.S.A.

30:4C-22 prohibits the Division's reimbursement policy because the Social

Security benefits constitute the "corpus of any trust" is without merit. The

Division's acquisition of the minors' benefits is not held in a legally cognizable

trust. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that the elements of a trust

are:

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(1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is

subject to duties to deal with it for the benefit of one

or more others; (2) one or more beneficiaries, to

whom and for whose benefit the trustee owes the

duties with respect to the trust property; and (3) trust

property, which is held by the trustee for the

beneficiaries.

[Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt. f (A.L.I.

2003).]

Comment a adds that a trust "includes public funds and public and private

pension-fund arrangements in trust form" but does not clarify what constitutes

a public fund. Id. § 2 cmt. a. Additionally, the Restatement states that a

trustee "must have legal title" because "[w]ithout legal title the trustee holds

nothing in trust." Id. § 3 cmt. b.

At first glance, SSA regulations imply that payee accounts operate like

trusts. For example, 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a) states that representative payees

must use benefits "in a manner and for the purposes he or she determines,

under the guidelines . . . to be in [the beneficiary's] best interests." However,

on close examination, the SSA, through POMS, explicitly provides that payee

accounts are not trusts. See SI 01120.200. The policy unambiguously states

that although payee accounts are "'in trust for'" accounts and their "title may

misleadingly suggest that the representative payee is the legal owner of the

account principal," payee accounts are "not a trust." Ibid. The policy also

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notes that a representative payee "does not necessarily have the legal authority

to establish a trust or transfer funds into a trust for the disabled individual." 10

Considering the enactment of N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7, concluding that

representative payee accounts are trusts would lead to absurd consequences .

See H.K. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 379 N.J. Super. 321, 328

(App. Div. 2005) (holding courts should avoid interpretation of a statute or

regulation that leads to absurd results). The statute only allows the Division to

utilize SSI benefits for reimbursement if it would preserve a minor's SSI

eligibility. N.J.S.A. 9:6B-7. Thus, ruling that a representative payee account

constitutes a trust would completely bar the Division from utilizing SSI

benefits for reimbursement, even when failure to seek reimbursement would

disqualify a minor from receiving the benefits. This would create absurd

results by contradicting the plain meaning of the statute and subverting the

Legislature's intent to allow the Division to seek reimbursement when it would

preserve a child's SSI eligibility.

Lastly, we are unpersuaded by amici Rutgers Law School Child

Advocacy Clinic and Advocates for Children of New Jersey's assertion that

10

Soc. Sec. Admin., SI 01120.203 Exceptions to Counting Trusts Established

on or after January 1, 2000, https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501120203

(last visited May 27, 2026).

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even if N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 authorizes reimbursement, it applies only to

instances where the Division has guardianship. Guardianship vests "control

over the person and property of a child," N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2(e), and custody

only contemplates "continuing responsibility for the person of a child ," 30:4C-

2(d). N.J.S.A. 30:4C-22 is clear and unambiguous—it allows the Division to

reimburse itself for maintenance costs when it has "care, custody, or

guardianship." Accordingly, the Division's use of the minors' Social Security

benefits to reimburse maintenance costs is permissible.

VI.

DUE PROCESS

Arguments

The minors contend that the Division's application to serve as their

representative payee and use of their Social Security benefits violates their

right to procedural due process under the Federal Constitution and New Jersey

Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2; see N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 1.

Citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995), the minors allege that the

Division's policy of applying to become representative payee frustrated their

right to counsel and, in turn, deprived them of property without receiving

adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard. They claim that under the

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Mathews11 test for procedural due process violations, the current procedures

significantly deprive the minors of their rights, and requiring the Division to

notify them of its intent to apply for representative payee status would not

impose significant administrative or fiscal burdens. The minors maintain that

this is consistent with our state law recognizing an individual's right to a

hearing when an agency's actions may affect his or her rights, duties, or

privileges. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.R., 314 N.J. Super.

390, 411 (App. Div. 1998).

The Division argues that the minors' due process argument fails "because

the SSA issues the notice of the appointment pursuant to federal law and

regulation," see 42 U.S.C. § 205(j)(2)(E)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030(a), and

New Jersey law did not require that the Division notify the minors of its

application to become a representative payee at the time it was filed. As such,

"rather than seeking reimbursement from the Division," the minors should

have proceeded through the SSA's administrative process.

Analysis

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty,

11

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

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or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Our

state constitution affords individuals a right to fundamental fairness that

includes safeguards which are analogous to federal due process principles.

N.J. Const. art. 1, § 1; N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J.

Super. 426, 464-65 (App. Div. 2003). "Due process requires adequate notice

and a fair opportunity to be heard" and is a "flexible concept" that "calls for

such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." M.Y.J.P.,

360 N.J. Super. at 464. To determine whether a due process violation has

occurred, New Jersey courts apply the Mathews test, which considers (1) the

private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of

any additional safeguards, and (3) the value of the government interest and any

fiscal or administrative burdens that additional procedures would require. 424

U.S. at 335.

We favor the Washington Supreme Court's ruling in Keffeler III that the

Division's failure to provide advance notice of its representative payee

application did not violate procedural due process. 88 P.3d at 954-56. The

Court there reasoned that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because

the notice required under the Act "notifie[d] the beneficiary . . . of the

appointment prior to any payment" and allowed the beneficiary to challenge

the determination. Id. at 955 Moreover, the Court reasoned that additional

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procedures were unnecessary because a representative payee's identity does not

affect a minor's eligibility for benefits, representative payees must comply

with state and federal law in using benefits, and the SSA Commissioner

conducts an adequate investigation of potential payees prior to appointment.

Id. at 956

Even if we disagree with Keffeler III and find under the Mathews test

that the Division violated due process, the minors' due process argument fails

because the issue is now moot. "'An issue is moot when the decision sought in

a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing

controversy.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.C., 423 N.J. Super.

259, 263 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.

A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 252, 261 (App. Div. 2009)). Since we have found that

the Division's reimbursement policy does not violate New Jersey law, any

issues regarding due process are essentially moot. That is, requiring the

Division to provide advance notice or undergo a hearing would not change the

outcome of this case. Hence, we dismiss the minors' due process arguments.

VII.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Arguments

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The minors contend the Division's reimbursement policy violates their

rights to equal protection under the federal and state constitution. U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 2; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1. They assert their Social Security

benefits are a fundamental property right, not entitlements, because the

benefits had already been paid by the SSA to the minors at the time the

Division sought reimbursement. They maintain the policy treats them

"differently than similarly situated foster children[:] (i) with private

rep[resentative] payees, (ii) with other types of property or assets[;] and (iii)

without assets."

The minors argue that the Division uses their Social Security benefits

"for maintenance costs, while foster youth with other assets and foster youth

without assets received care for free." They contend the reimbursement policy

does not further a valid state interest and "is not essential to the State's

financial security" because the same practice is not applied to "foster youth

with other types of resources." Further, they allege that the reimbursements do

not have "any demonstrable impact on the Division's budget, [or] [its] ability

to care for foster youth," and is "recognized as income to the State" rather than

"reconcil[ing] [it] with the money the Division took from [the minors]."

Amici support the minors' contentions. Rutgers Law School Child

Advocacy Clinic and Advocates for Children of New Jersey argue the

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"arbitrary dispossession of the monetary benefits of vulnerable foster youth

[by the Division] constitutes an even more severe breach of state constitutional

property rights" than the traditional focus on eminent domain and regulatory

takings. They contend the reimbursement policy is "not rationally related to a

legitimate state purpose" because if discontinued "there would be no reduction

in care for the foster youth" since N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27 requires funding for the

minors' maintenance. Amici emphasizes that the policy "only amounts to

approximately 1% of the federal funding for state foster care programs" which

"would not jeopardize the Division's ability to provide maintenance to all

foster youth" were it to stop.

The Division contends the minors' comparison with other foster children

is misguided. Relying on Keffeler III, it argues foster children who are not

eligible for Social Security benefits differ from those––such as the minors––

that do. The Division stresses the "correct analysis . . . involve[s] evaluating

all foster youth receiving Social Security benefits to determine whether the

agency-[representative] payee invidiously discriminated against a particular

youth or subset of youth from the beneficiary group." It further contends there

is no evidence of invidious discrimination, which is required for an equal

protection violation. David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 315 (1985) (holding that

"the equal protection clause forbids only invidious discrimination"). Lastly,

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the Division maintains that the minors' contention is wrong because it treats

"all property and assets the same, even though Congress classified and treated

Social Security benefits differently." And to the extent that it treats children

differently, the Division argues that the SSA requires that, as representative

payee, it must apply funds to support a "beneficiary's current maintenance."

Analysis

Different standards under the federal and state constitutions govern

equal protection violations. In UAW v. Murphy, our court recently analyzed

the different standards, stating:

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment commands that no State shall "deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws," meaning that all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike within statutory

classifications. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyer v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Legislation is generally

presumed to be valid under the Equal Protection

Clause if a statute's classification is "rationally related

to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 440 (citing

Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)).

However, that federal "rational basis" approach

is qualified by what are known as "tiered" levels of

scrutiny. Under the Equal Protection Clause, if the

classification affects what the United States Supreme

Court has proclaimed to be a "fundamental right," or if

the law at issue invidiously harms a "suspect class" of

persons, then a higher level of judicial "strict scrutiny"

applies. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2005) (applying

strict scrutiny to classifications that infringe on the

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fundamental right to vote) . . . . As a further nuance

of the federal tiers, for some classifications such as

illegitimacy and gender, the United States Supreme

Court has adopted a test of "intermediate scrutiny."

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (applying

intermediate scrutiny classifications based on

illegitimacy); see also United States v. Virginia, 518

U.S. 515 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to

require a public military academy to accept women).

Our New Jersey Supreme Court has eschewed

the federal Equal Protection "tiered" approach in

construing the analog state constitutional right. In

several instances, our courts have construed the New

Jersey state constitutional principles of equal

protection more expansively than their federal

counterpart. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91

N.J. 287, 292-93 (1982) (regarding the termination of

funding for medically necessary abortions); see also

Planned Parenthood [of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer], 165

N.J. [609,] 643 [(2000)] (invalidating certain parental

notification laws for abortions); State v. Gilmore, 103

N.J. 508, 522-23 (1986) (invalidating the

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury

selection). "Although conceptually similar, the right

under the State Constitution can in some situations be

broader than the right conferred by the Equal

Protection Clause." Doe[, 142 N.J. at 93].

This more expansive approach for equal

protection is in keeping with our robust tradition of at

times affording greater independent constitutional

protection to persons in this State and not analyzing

state constitutional claims in "lockstep" with federal

precedents. See, e.g., Usachenok v. Dep't of the

Treasury, 257 N.J. 184, 195-96 (2024) (free speech of

employees); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 438 (2017)

(sentencing of young offenders to lengthy, cruel and

unusual, custodial terms); State v. Hempele, 120 N.J.

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182, 195 (1990) (warrantless search and seizure of

curbside trash).

....

[T]he New Jersey equal protection balancing test

considers three aspects: (1) "the nature of the affected

right"; (2) "the extent to which the governmental

restriction intrudes upon it"; and (3) "the public need

for the restriction." [Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99

N.J. 552, 568, (1988)] (citing Right to Choose, 91 N.J.

at 308-09).

[483 N.J. Super. 414, 441-42, 443 (App. Div. 2026).]

With that said, it is well established that social welfare policies are

subject to rational review. See Barone v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 107 N.J. 355,

364-65 (1987) (applying rational basis review to the New Jersey

Pharmaceutical Assistance Act that required receipt of Social Security benefits

to be eligible for benefits under that statute).

As a threshold issue, we conclude that the minors and the comparator

groups identified by the minors and amici are not similarly situated.

"[P]ersons are similarly-situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they

are alike in 'all relevant aspects.'" Radiation Data, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't

Prot., 456 N.J. Super. 550, 562 (App. Div. 2018) (emphasis in original)

(quoting Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3rd. Cir. 2008)). The

claim that the minors are being treated differently than other foster children

who have other assets or have no assets, but are not required to reimburse the

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Division for maintenance costs is misguided. The minors are not similarly

situated to other foster groups because the minors qualify for either SSI or

survivor benefits, while the other foster children do not. This classification is

not created by the Division but by federal law.

The minors are more akin to the subgroup of foster children who receive

Social Security benefits but have a private payee that is not the Division. A

distinction exists, but it is not sufficient to say they are not similarly situated

for purposes of constitutional analysis. The distinction between foster children

with the Division as appointed representative payee and those with a private

representative payee is not a classification created by the Division. Rather, it

is established by the SSA Commissioner, who designates the representative

payee according to regulations that delineate an order of preference, placing

agencies like the Division as the last to be appointed. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.2021(c), 416.621(c). These groups may not be similarly situated because

42 U.S.C. § 407 prohibits the Division from "directly compel[ling] the

beneficiary or other any other representative payee to pay Social Security

benefits over to the State." Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 389. As such, even if it

wanted to, the Division could not apply its policy to the private payee

subgroup. It is not clear, however, that this is a sufficient distinction to

conclude the two groups are not similarly situated. Nonetheless, even if the

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proposed groups are similarly situated, the equal protection arguments still

fail.

The minors and amici argue that the interest being implicated is a

fundamental property right. They contend the Social Security benefits are not

entitlements because when the Division applies its reimbursement policy, it

has already received the benefits, which converts the money to the minors'

property, thereby implicating a different set of rights.

Given that social welfare policies are subject to rational review, neither

the minors nor amici have provided any case law to persuade us differently.

See Pleasure Bay Apartments v. City of Long Branch, 66 N.J. 79, 93

(1974) (quoting David, 45 N.J. at 314-15) ("The constitutionality of a

legislative classification is presumed, and one who assails the classification

must carry the burden of showing its arbitrariness.").

Even when an individual's monetary interest is implicated, the United

States Supreme Court has not always found the implication of a fundamental

right in the equal protection context. For example, in Armour v. City of

Indianapolis, a group of homeowners brought a federal equal protection claim

against the city for adopting a policy denying them reimbursement of the

homeowners' payments for sewer improvement projects. 566 U.S. 673, 676

(2012). The city had a policy of charging homeowners the cost of sewer

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improvement projects which could be paid in a lump sum or in installments.

Id. at 676-78. The city later abandoned this policy because it felt the payments

had become too burdensome and forgave amounts due by homeowners for the

sewer program beginning from a certain date going forward. Id. at 678. The

homeowners who paid the full amount prior to the policy change were denied a

refund. Id. at 679. The Supreme Court found that the matter did not implicate

a fundamental right because "[i]ts subject matter [wa]s local, economic, social,

and commercial." Id. at 681. It reasoned the amount homeowners paid was

essentially a tax classification and "[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude

in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes." Id. at 680

(alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of

Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)).

While the Division's reimbursement policy does not involve a tax per se,

Armour demonstrates that a government's decision affecting individuals'

monetary interests differently based on categories it creates does not

necessarily impact a fundamental right. Moreover, the minors' Social Security

benefits are unlike other property, which an individual typically has control of,

because there are SSA restrictions on how the benefits can be spent. As such,

the minors have not established that there is a fundamental interest or that they

are a protected class, and rational basis review applies.

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Applying the same analysis to the minors' New Jersey equal protection

claim leads to the same result. The first factor of our state balancing test—

"the nature of the affected right," Greenberg, 99 N.J. at 567—suggests the

interest is not substantial. The minors have no fundamental substantive right

to Social Security benefits. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)

(holding that there is no accrued property right in Social Security benefits in

the due process context). They receive the benefits through the legislative

action of Congress to provide for their welfare. The remaining analysis,

factors two — "the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon

[the right]," — and three — "the public need for the restriction," Greenberg, 99

N.J. at 567, — are subject to and easily survive rational basis review.

The Division had a valid interest in the reimbursement policy, and there

is no evidence that the Division's classification was invidious or arbitrary. See

Armour, 566 U.S. at 681 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S.

307, 313 (1993)) (noting that if "there is any reasonably conceivable state of

facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification," rational review

is satisfied). As noted, the classification results from the categories which

naturally result from compliance with the Act. The Act provides who is

eligible for federal benefits, who can be appointed as representative payee, that

payments must be used for the use and benefit of the beneficiary, which

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includes current maintenance, and it prohibits the Division from compelling

the beneficiaries or other payees to pay the benefits to the State. See supra

Section II. A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION – Social Security Benefits.

Furthermore, as the Court in Keffeler II explained, the Division has a

financial interest in the reimbursement policy as it subsidizes the cost of the

minors' maintenance care. 537 U.S. at 390-91. Amici's claim about the fiscal

impact of the reimbursement policy is unfounded and erroneous. While the

income that the reimbursement policy recoups for the Division's maintenance

costs represents a small amount of the Division's budget, it is not insignificant.

In fact, the source amici relies on recognizing that the federal funding stream

gives states "a strong incentive to seek out the children's Social Security

benefits." Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 27

Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, 1806, 1807 (2006). The New Jersey Office of

Legislative Services determined that ending the reimbursement policy would

cause the State's revenue to decline "by about $500,000" and increase " [s]tate

expenditures by about $170,000." Legis. Fiscal Estimate for First Reprint of

S. 3153 (Nov. 6, 2024).

It is undisputed that the State has "parens patriae responsibility to

protect the welfare of children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L.,

191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). The reimbursement policy with respect to minors

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receiving SSI benefits promotes the welfare of these children by ensuring that

they do not lose their benefits if their assets exceed $2,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1382;

20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c); Keffeler II, 537 U.S. at 390.

In sum, the Division's reimbursement policy has a legitimate interest that

is rationally related to the recoupment of the minors' maintenance costs, and

the policy withstands scrutiny under both the state and federal equal protection

clauses.

Affirmed.

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