Carter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LAWARN CARTER, AIS # 263347, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-CV-906-WKW

) [WO]

PAMELA BUTLER, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Lawarn Carter, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. # 1.) Petitioner

challenges his 2008 conviction for trafficking cocaine and the resulting life sentence

imposed by the Circuit Court of Pike County, Alabama. See State v. Carter, CC-

2008-000068.00 (Pike Cnty. Cir. Ct.). As ordered (Doc. # 11), Respondent, through

the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, timely filed an Answer

to the petition, as well as records of the state-court proceedings. (Doc. # 15.)

Although Petitioner was directed to file a reply (Doc. # 16), he did not do so.

Based upon a review of the parties’ submissions, an evidentiary hearing is not

warranted. See Rule 8, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief

because his petition is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the

petition will be dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, Petitioner will be denied a

certificate of appealability.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), federal district courts have the authority to

consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an individual in state

custody pursuant to a state-court judgment but “only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

This provision limits authority, rather than conferring it, with habeas jurisdiction

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 787 (11th

Cir. 2004). Under § 2241, federal district courts have the power to grant writs of

habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions,” § 2241(a), when a state-

convicted prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution, ” § 2241(c)(3).

The “in-custody” requirement mandates that the habeas petitioner must “be ‘in

custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is

filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (per curiam). Furthermore,

§ 2241(d), referred to as a “venue provision,” “gives the petitioner ‘the option of

seeking habeas corpus either in the district where he is confined or the district where

the sentencing court is located.’” Dobard v. Johnson, 749 F.2d 1503, 1509–10 (11th

Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

Petitioner was in custody under a state-court judgment when he filed this

petition. Additionally, at the time of filing, Petitioner was incarcerated in a state

prison located in the Middle District of Alabama under conviction and sentence of a

state court in this district. Accordingly, this court has subject matter jurisdiction to

consider his petition, and venue is proper.

III. BACKGROUND

A. State Court Trial Proceedings and Direct Appeal

In March 2008, Petitioner was indicted for trafficking cocaine in violation of

Alabama Code § 13A-12-231. (Doc. # 15 at 1; Doc. # 15-1 at 26–27.) On December

16, 2008, following a trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. (Doc. # 15-1 at 101–

02.) On January 6, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to

life imprisonment. (Id. at 107–08.) On February 4, 2009, Petitioner timely filed a

pro se notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA). (Id.

at 111.)

On appeal to the ACCA, Petitioner argued: (1) that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for a continuance (Doc. # 15-3 at 17); (2) that statements of

police officers at trial, indicating his prior history, were prejudicial and served to

bias the jury (id. at 22); (3) that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the police

officers’ testimony during the trial resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel (id.

at 25); and (4) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of

acquittal (id. at 27). The ACCA affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in an

unpublished memorandum on March 19, 2010. (Doc. # 15-4 (Ex. D).) A certificate

of judgment was issued on April 7, 2010. (Doc. # 15-5 (Ex. E).)

B. Post-Conviction Remedies in State Court

On March 16, 2011,1 Petitioner filed his first Petition for Relief from

Conviction or Sentence pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure. See State v. Carter, CC-2008-000068.60 (Pike Cnty. Cir. Ct.), ECF No.

3. After an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition was denied on

June 12, 2015. Id., ECF No. 52. Thereafter, Petitioner appealed the denial of his

Rule 32 petition to the ACCA. Id., ECF No. 55. By unpublished memorandum

dated March 11, 2016, the ACCA affirmed the lower court’s denial of the Rule 32

petition. Id., ECF No. 70. A certificate of judgment was issued on March 30, 2016.

Id., ECF No. 71.

On January 27, 2023,2 Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 petition. See State v.

Carter, CC-2008-000068.61 (Pike Cnty. Cir. Ct.), ECF No. 2; (Doc. # 15-6 at 6–

1 Although Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition was not docketed in the circuit court until April 12,

2011, Petitioner stated “Mar. 16, 2011” as the date the petition was being mailed. See State v.

Carter, CC-2008-000068.60 (Pike Cnty. Cir. Ct.), ECF No. 3 at 7; see also Ex parte Allen, 825

So. 2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002) (“Alabama courts have held that a pro se incarcerated

petitioner/appellant is considered to have ‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition

for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to prison officials for mailing.”).

2 Although Petitioner’s second Rule 32 petition was stamped as filed with the circuit clerk’s office

on February 13, 2023, Petitioner stated in his petition that he placed it with prison officials for

mailing on January 27, 2023. (Doc. # 15-6 at 13); see Ex parte Allen, 825 So. 2d at 272.

22.) The Pike County Circuit Court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s second Rule

32 petition on July 16, 2024, stating that his claims were “successive and without

merit.” (Doc. # 15-6 at 39.) Petitioner appealed the circuit court’s summary

dismissal of his second Rule 32 petition. (Id. at 41.) The ACCA affirmed the circuit

court’s summary dismissal of Petitioner’s second Rule 32 petition in an unpublished

memorandum decision dated June 20, 2025.3 (Doc. # 15-8 (Ex. H).)

On July 7, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for rehearing and brief in

support with the ACCA. (Doc. # 15-9 (Ex. I).) The ACCA overruled Petitioner’s

application for rehearing on July 25, 2025. (Doc. # 15-10 (Ex. J).) Petitioner then

filed a petition for writ of certiorari, dated August 5, 2025, with the Alabama

Supreme Court. (Doc. # 15-11 (Ex. K).) On October 10, 2025, the Alabama

Supreme Court issued a certificate of judgment, denying Petitioner’s petition for writ

of certiorari with no opinion. (Doc. # 15-12 (Ex. L).)

C. The Instant Federal Habeas Petition and Respondent’s Answer

On October 28, 2025,4 Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. # 1.) Petitioner alleges two grounds for relief.

3 A certificate of judgment was issued on October 10, 2025, after the Alabama Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari. (Doc. # 15-13 (Ex. M).)

4 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2009). Absent evidence to the contrary, the court must “assume that a prisoner delivered a

filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310,

1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Petitioner signed his petition under penalty of perjury and

First, he claims that the trial court failed to swear in or administer the initial oath to

the jury. (Doc. # 1 at 5, 8.) Second, he asserts that the State failed to prove the chain

of custody for the drug evidence. (Id. at 6–8.)

On February 10, 2026, Respondent was ordered to file an answer to

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition. (Doc. # 11.) Thereafter, Respondent timely

filed an answer and exhibits (Doc. # 15), contending that the petition should be

dismissed with prejudice because (1) it is time-barred; (2) Petitioner did not exhaust

state-court remedies before filing his petition; (3) Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted; and (4) Petitioner’s claims are meritless. By Order issued

on March 10, 2026, Petitioner was directed to file a reply to Respondent’s answer.

(Doc. # 16.) The deadline for Petitioner to file a reply expired on March 31, 2026,

and to date, Petitioner has not filed a reply as ordered.

IV. DISCUSSION

Respondent presents multiple grounds for dismissal, including untimeliness,

failure to exhaust, procedural default, and lack of merit. However, because the

petition clearly is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), this issue is decisive,

rendering it unnecessary to address the other grounds.

dated it “10-28-2025.” (Doc. # 1 at 16.) Therefore, even though his habeas petition was not

received and docketed by the court until November 17, 2025, his petition is deemed filed on

October 28, 2025.

A. The AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitation period begins when the state-court

judgment is considered final, as defined by the AEDPA. See Gonzalez v. Thaler,

565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012). The AEDPA specifies two alternative dates on which a

state-court judgment becomes final: (1) at the “conclusion of direct review” or

(2) upon the “expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A).5

In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court established that § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s text

“consists of two prongs” with distinct applications:

For petitioners who pursue direct review all the way to th[e United

States Supreme] Court, the judgment becomes final at the “conclusion

of direct review”—when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits

or denies a petition for certiorari. For all other petitioners, the judgment

becomes final at the “expiration of the time for seeking such review”—

when the time for pursuing direct review in this Court, or in state court,

expires.

565 U.S. at 150.6 Petitioner falls within the second category of Gonzalez

petitioners—those whose judgment of conviction “becomes final at the ‘expiration

5 The petition contains no facts that trigger the application of § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D).

6 The issue in Gonzalez centered on identifying when a judgment becomes final under

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) if a state petitioner forgoes review in a state’s highest court. 565 U.S. at 150.

There, the state petitioner pursued a direct appeal to the intermediate state appellate court but did

not seek discretionary review in the state’s highest court. See id. at 138. The Supreme Court held

of the time for seeking such review’ . . . in state court.” Id. (quoting

§ 2244(d)(1)(A)).

After the Pike County Circuit Court imposed a life sentence on January 6,

2009, Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal with the ACCA. (Doc. # 15-1 at 111.)

On March 19, 2010, the ACCA affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in an

unpublished memorandum decision. (Doc. # 15-4 (Ex. D).) Petitioner had 14 days,

starting on March 22, 2010,7 to file an application for rehearing with the ACCA. See

Ala. R. App. P. 40(c); see also Ala. R. App. 40(d)(1) (“In all criminal cases except

pretrial appeals by the state, the filing of an application for rehearing in the [ACCA]

is a prerequisite to certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court.”). It does not

appear from Respondent’s answer or the court’s independent review of the state

court trial proceedings that Petitioner filed an application for rehearing or attempted

to file petition for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court without first

filing an application for rehearing. The 14-day deadline for Petitioner to file an

that the judgment became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking discretionary

review in the state’s highest court expired under the state court’s filing deadlines. See id. at 150

(“We . . . agree with the Court of Appeals that because [the petitioner] did not appeal to the State’s

highest court, his judgment became final when his time for seeking review with the State’s highest

court expired.”).

7 Under Rule 26(a) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[i]n computing any period of

time prescribed by these rules, by an order of court, or by any application statute, the day of the

act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.”

The ACCA issued its unpublished memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence on Friday, March 19, 2010. Therefore, the computation of the 14-day deadline for

Petitioner to file an application for rehearing with the ACCA began the following Monday—March

22, 2010.

application for rehearing expired on April 5, 2010.8 Therefore, Petitioner’s

judgment of conviction became final on April 6, 2010, and the one-year limitation

period under § 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run the next day––April 7, 2010. See Green

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247 n.3 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The limitation

period [under § 2244(d)(1)(A)] began to run the day after the conviction and

sentence became final . . . .” (citing San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th

Cir. 2011) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1) applies to the

calculation of the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period and explaining that the

limitation period therefore begins to run from the day after the day of the event that

triggers the period))).

On March 15, 2011––23 days before the expiration of the one-year limitation

period––Petitioner timely filed his first Rule 32 petition. See State v. Carter, CC-

2008-000068.60 (Pike Cnty. Cir. Ct.), ECF No. 3. Petitioner’s timely filing of his

first Rule 32 petition stopped the one-year clock. After an evidentiary hearing,

Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition was denied on June 12, 2015. Id., ECF No. 52.

Petitioner appealed to the ACCA. Id., ECF No. 55. By unpublished memorandum

8 Fourteen days from Monday, March 22, 2010 (including March 22, 2010) makes the date of the

expiration of the deadline for Petitioner to file an application for rehearing with the ACCA Sunday,

April 4, 2010. However, under Rule 26(a) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[t]he

last day of the period shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which

event the period extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday.” Therefore, Petitioner had until 11:59 p.m. on Monday, April 5, 2010, to file an

application for rehearing with the ACCA.

dated March 11, 2016, the ACCA affirmed the lower court’s denial of the Rule 32

petition. Id., ECF No. 70. A certificate of judgment was issued on March 30, 2016.

Id., ECF No. 71. Starting on March 14, 2016,9 Petitioner had 14 days––until March

28, 201610––to file an application for rehearing with the ACCA. See Ala. R. App.

P. 40(c); see also Ala. R. App. 40(d)(1) (“In all criminal cases except pretrial appeals

by the state, the filing of an application for rehearing in the [ACCA] is a prerequisite

to certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court.”). Petitioner did not file an

application for rehearing. Therefore, the one-year clock started running again on

March 29, 2016.

Accounting for the tolling of the one-year limitation period during the

pendency of Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition, Petitioner had 23 days left on the

clock when it restarted on March 29, 2016. The one-year limitation period thus

9 The ACCA’s decision affirming the lower court’s denial of Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition was

issued on Friday, March 11, 2016. Pursuant to Rule 26(a) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate

Procedure, the computation of the 14-day deadline for Petitioner to file an application for rehearing

with the ACCA began the following Monday—March 14, 2016.

10 Fourteen days from Monday, March 14, 2016 (including March 14, 2016) makes the date of the

expiration of the deadline for Petitioner to file an application for rehearing with the ACCA Sunday,

March 27, 2016. But see Ala. R. App. P. 26(a) (“The last day of the period shall be included,

unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period extends until the end

of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday . . . .”). Therefore, Petitioner had

until 11:59 p.m. on Monday, March 28, 2016, to file an application for rehearing with the ACCA.

expired on April 20, 2016.11 Consequently, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition, filed

in October 2025, is untimely.

B. Statutory Tolling, Equitable Tolling, and Actual Innocence

An otherwise untimely petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be considered

only if the petitioner demonstrates either entitlement to tolling or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. As explained below, Petitioner has not identified facts

establishing that either statutory or equitable tolling applies, or that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice occurred.

1. Statutory Tolling

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year limitation period is tolled during

the pendency of “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” A properly filed

state-court application must be pending during § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s one-year limitation

period for tolling to occur. The one-year limitation period was tolled during the

pendency of Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition, which he filed 23 days before the

limitation period expired. That is, the one-year clock, which began to run on April

11 The Eleventh Circuit calculates the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

using the “anniversary method,” rather than counting exactly 365 days, “which means the

limitation period expire[s] on the anniversary of the date it began to run.” Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t

of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247 n.3 (11th Cir. 2017). To illustrate, applying the anniversary method,

the Green court explained that the judgment became final on November 22, 2010; the one-year

limitation period began to run on November 23, 2010; and, absent tolling, it “expired on the

anniversary of the date it began to run—November 23, 2011.” Id.

7, 2010, stopped on the date that Petitioner timely filed his first Rule 32 petition––

March 15, 2011. The one-year clock remained stopped during the entire pendency

of Petitioner’s first Rule 32 petition, including his appeal to the ACCA. After the

ACCA affirmed the circuit court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition, Petitioner did not

file an application for rehearing with the ACCA within the allotted 14 days. The

day after the deadline for Petitioner to file an application for rehearing with the

ACCA expired (i.e., March 29, 2016), the one-year clock, which had 23 days

remaining on it, restarted. The one-year limitation period expired on April 20, 2016.

On January 27, 2023, more than 6 years after the limitation period’s

expiration, Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 petition. But “[a] state court petition

. . . that is filed following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that

period because there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199

F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Accordingly, Petitioner’s filing of

his second Rule 32 petition did not toll the long-expired limitation period under

§ 2244(d)(2), and the already expired limitation period was not (and could not be)

statutorily tolled based on Petitioner’s belated filing of his second petition.

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s one-year limitation period applies

where a petitioner “shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely

filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Equitable tolling is “an extraordinary remedy” and, thus, is “limited

to rare and exceptional circumstances and typically applied sparingly.” Thomas v.

Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1162, 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “The petitioner

bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is warranted.” Hunter v. Ferrell,

587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Petitioner has not alleged that extraordinary circumstances prevented him

from filing his § 2254 petition on time or that he pursued his rights diligently during

the years between the state-court judgment’s finality and the filing of this petition.

The § 2254 form petition requires Petitioner to address the one-year limitation period

if the challenged state-court judgment became final over a year ago. In this space,

Petitioner wrote, “N/A, State Exhausted.” (Doc. # 1 at 15.) Furthermore, Petitioner

failed to file a reply brief as ordered. The merits-focused arguments in his petition

do not satisfy the standard for equitable tolling because the standard focuses “on the

circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition, rather than the

circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of

Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Simply put,

Petitioner’s arguments fail to explain why he filed his petition late, and he has not

alleged extraordinary circumstances or that he pursued his rights diligently so as to

warrant equitable tolling.

3. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice: Actual Innocence

Even where there is no basis for tolling, a petitioner can overcome

§ 2244(d)(1)’s one-year limitation period where he can show a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). The

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception requires a showing that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a

gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a

procedural bar, . . . or . . . expiration of the [AEDPA] statute of limitations.” Id.

at 386.

The actual innocence exception “is exceedingly narrow,” Rozzelle v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1013 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), and requires

a petitioner “(1) to present new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial, and

(2) to show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the new evidence,” id. at 1011

(cleaned up). Additionally, a petitioner must show “factual innocence, not mere

legal insufficiency.” Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir.

2008) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)); accord McKay

v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner has not raised a claim of actual innocence to excuse his untimely

filing. He has not alleged that there is any evidence, let alone new and reliable

evidence, that would demonstrate that he did not commit the offense for which he

was convicted, such that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. Instead, Petitioner simply argues (1) that the State failed to prove

the chain of custody for the drug evidence and (2) that the trial court failed to

administer a proper/adequate oath to the petit jury. (Doc. # 1 at 8.) As to his second

claim, Petitioner contends that this failure implicated the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. (Id.)

The arguments presented by Petitioner suggest, at most, legal insufficiency

rather than factual innocence. See Johnson, 513 F.3d at 1334. Moreover, even

though Petitioner argues that the alleged failure to properly administer the oath to

the jury implicated the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]here is no

exception to the limitation period in § 2244(d) for claims alleging lack of jurisdiction

by the state trial court.” Smith v. Giles, 2017 WL 4021125, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July

12, 2017), R&R adopted, 2017 WL 4019425 (M.D. Ala. Sep. 12, 2017); see also

Brown v. Patterson, 2012 WL 3264896, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2012) (“[The

petitioner] argues that his claim challenging the validity of his sentence presents a

jurisdictional claim which is not governed by the one-year period of limitation

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, neither the statute nor federal

case law makes such an exception for alleged jurisdictional issues arising under state

law.”), R&R adopted, 2012 WL 3264556 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 9, 2012).

V. CONCLUSION

Petitioner did not file this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus

within the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and he

has not shown his entitlement to statutory or equitable tolling or that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice occurred so as to excuse his § 2254 petition’s untimeliness.

Therefore, the petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus does not have an automatic right

to appeal a district court’s denial of the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts, “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Petitioner has

not shown, “at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether [this] court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see § 2253(c). Therefore, Petitioner

will be denied a certificate of appealability.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner Lawarn Carter’s 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 petition is DISMISSED with prejudice and that Petitioner is DENIED a

certificate of appealability.

Final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 30th day of April, 2026.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE