State v. Ramos

[Cite as State v. Ramos, 2026-Ohio-2258.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-T-0049

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Criminal Appeal from the

- vs - Court of Common Pleas

WILLIAM RAMOS,

Trial Court No. 2025 CR 00226

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: June 15, 2026

Judgment: Reversed and vacated

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH

44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, 3435 Kent Road, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-

Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, William Ramos, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County

Court of Common Pleas, convicting him on one count of improperly discharging a firearm

at or into a habitation, in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) and (C), a felony of the second

degree. At issue is whether the jury’s verdict and ultimate conviction were supported by

sufficient evidence. We conclude the State did not meet its burden of production to obtain

a conviction, and therefore the conviction entered by the trial court is reversed and

vacated.

{¶2} On February 23, 2025, Kaitlyn Speakman, Mr. Ramos’ ex-girlfriend, was at

the apartment Mr. Ramos shared with a third party. Ms. Speakman remained friends with

Mr. Ramos even though they were not dating at the time of the incident. That day, Ms.

Speakman attempted to leave Mr. Ramos’ apartment, but he objected. He did not want

Ms. Speakman to leave and would not allow her to take her purse. Ms. Speakman

eventually left the apartment without the purse.

{¶3} Later that evening, Ms. Speakman and a friend, Calvin Johnson, were

“Door-dashing” to make some extra money. Mr. Johnson had a Dodge Charger that he

transported himself and Ms. Speakman to accommodate Door-dash clients. Ms.

Speakman, however, needed her purse to give Mr. Johnson money for driving. They

consequently returned to Mr. Ramos’ apartment to retrieve Ms. Speakman’s purse.

{¶4} Ms. Speakman entered the apartment building, which included six, discrete

units. Mr. Ramos asked Ms. Speakman who she was with and, when she told him Mr.

Johnson drove her to the apartment, Mr. Ramos threatened to shoot both individuals. Ms.

Speakman continued to ask for her purse, but Mr. Ramos refused to return the item. She

tried to leave the apartment but was blocked by Mr. Ramos. She eventually sat down on

a couch, at which point Mr. Ramos retrieved a 12-gauge shotgun and stood at the

threshold of the apartment with the door opened. Ms. Speakman stated she “wasn’t really

shocked when he pulled [the shotgun] out.” Nevertheless, she stated “[a]re you really

going to do this? Like, stop.”

{¶5} Mr. Ramos fired one shot from the 12 gauge in a direction which struck the

outside of the entrance/exit door to the building. Police later found buck-shot evidence in

the wall and/or door frame of the entrance/exit door. Critically, Ms. Speakman testified

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that at the time of the discharge, Mr. Ramos had extended the gun into the common

hallway of the building—not merely standing at the threshold of his apartment unit.

Specifically, Ms. Speakman testified “he went to the door . . . [a]nd then shot off the gun

. . . with his arm out the door to the front door towards the front door.” The gun was

therefore already inside the hallway of the building when the shot was fired. It is

uncontroverted he did not shoot at another apartment, nor did he aim at Ms. Speakman.

{¶6} After discharging the shotgun, Mr. Ramos walked away from the

apartment’s front door, and Ms. Speakman left in the vehicle with Mr. Johnson. An

unidentified individual called police reporting “shots fired” in the apartment building.

{¶7} Officer Tyler George of the Warren Police Department responded to the

call. When he arrived at the building, the officer observed a vehicle leaving the apartment

building. The vehicle was ultimately stopped by another officer. Mr. Johnson was the

driver, and Ms. Speakman was the passenger. Both were questioned about the incident.

{¶8} Officer George proceeded into the apartment building. He located Mr.

Ramos’ apartment and knocked on the door but received no response. The officer

decided to enter the apartment and observed another tenant in the living area. Mr. Ramos,

who was in the shower, eventually appeared. A search of the room in which Mr. Ramos

was staying revealed a 12-gauge shotgun which had a spent shell casing in it.

{¶9} Officer George observed “wadding” and “bullet holes . . . from buckshot or

little BBs” on the inside of the entrance/exit door to the building. There was no evidence

that any shot was fired from outside of the building.

{¶10} Mr. Ramos was indicted on one count of improperly discharging a firearm

at or into a habitation, in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) and (C), a felony of the second

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degree, and two counts of aggravated menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A) and (B),

misdemeanors of the first degree.

{¶11} Mr. Ramos pleaded not guilty to the charges. The State offered a plea

agreement wherein Mr. Ramos would plead guilty to the two aggravated menacing counts

(one against Ms. Speakman and one against Mr. Johnson). The trial court, however,

rejected the proposed plea stating: “No. No. That’s not going to happen when a gun is

used in an apartment where people are living. You’re not pleading to aggravated

menacing in this court.” At this hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss the

discharging-firearms count, arguing the State lacked prima facie evidence to proceed on

that count given the plain language of the statute. The State conceded that the only

evidence it had was Mr. Ramos discharging a firearm from the hallway, outside of his

apartment and not into another apartment from the outside of the building. The trial court

denied the motion.

{¶12} On June 5, 2025, the trial court issued its judgment overruling the joint

motion to dismiss the discharging-firearms count. The trial court acknowledged Mr.

Ramos “fired a shotgun while inside the doorway of the apartment building when the shot

was fired.” The trial court determined that Mr. Ramos “fired the shotgun from inside the

doorway of the apartment, however, he also fired the shot ‘at or into an occupied structure’

as the shot went into the hallway of an apartment building that is occupied by others. An

occupant of the apartment building could have been killed or seriously injured had they

entered that hallway.”

{¶13} On June 6, 2025, the State moved the trial court, in writing, for

reconsideration of its judgment denying the motion for dismissal. The motion was

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apparently orally joined by the defense. In its written motion, the State emphasized that

Mr. Ramos’ “gun was never pointed at an individual. The gun was never pointed at a

specific apartment. The gun was shot from [Mr. Ramos’] premises from inside to the door

leading outside the apartment building.” Under the circumstances, the State submitted

that “the statute, and legislative intent are contrary to the evidence in this case thus the

State reasonably believes it would be unable to legally prove [Mr. Ramos’] guilt by proof

beyond a reasonable doubt at trial as to Count [One] of the indictment.”

{¶14} After holding a hearing on the motion to reconsider, the trial court overruled

the motion. The trial court, from the bench, stated:

I think that’s an issue for the Court of Appeals to deal with,

whether there was legislative intent and whether - - my

personal feeling is that I don’t know what world we live in if we

can shoot out of an apartment into the entry and not have

some sort of culpability in the crime. I don’t know if it fits this

particular statute, but that’s something for the Court of

Appeals to deal with.

{¶15} The matter proceeded to jury trial, at which the State presented evidence

from Ms. Speakman and Officer George. At the conclusion of the State’s case, Mr.

Ramos, via counsel, moved for acquittal on all counts. The trial court granted the motion

as to the aggravated menacing count pertaining to Mr. Johnson. The trial court, however,

overruled the motion on the remaining aggravated-menacing count pertaining to Ms.

Speakman and the improperly-discharging-a-firearm count. Specifically, the trial court

determined:

Regarding the firearm, improperly handling a firearm by

shooting in or at the habitation, this court considers the other

cases that you’ve spoken of as distinctively different because

the majority of those were standalone homes. You know, you

can use a gun and shoot in your own home outside in the yard

or inside. But it’s very different when, one, there’s a tenant in

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his own apartment - - in the apartment that Mr. Ramos is

staying at. I don’t know if he has any legal interest in that

property at all.

He was staying at that bedroom for that day, from what - - is

all the evidence I heard, with his girlfriend. And there was

evidence that he went and took a shotgun, went to the hallway

of his apartment - - of that apartment unit, and then shot into

the hallway of the apartment building, which has six units. And

I consider the hallway of the apartment building also part of

the habitation of the individuals who live there, including the

legal tenant of the property that [Mr. Ramos] was in, as well

as the other units.

He shot at the front door, which is also an exit door. The bullet

was found - - or bullet fragments were found, the wad, at the

exit door. The shotgun was found. It was examined. I think

there’s sufficient evidence for that to go to the jury.

{¶16} After closing arguments and the trial court’s jury instructions, appellant was

acquitted of the aggravated menacing charge against Ms. Speakman but found guilty of

the improperly-discharging-a-firearm count. The trial court ordered a presentence

investigation report and ultimately sentenced Mr. Ramos to an indefinite prison term of

two years and a maximum of three years.

{¶17} This appeal follows.

{¶18} Mr. Ramos assigns the following as error:

{¶19} “Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.”

{¶20} A “sufficiency” argument raises a question of law as to whether the

prosecution offered some evidence concerning each element of the charged

offense. State v. Windle, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.). “[T]he proper inquiry is, after

viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, whether the jury could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation

omitted.) State v. Troisi, 2008-Ohio-6062, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.). “‘Sufficiency of the evidence

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tests the burden of production.’” State v. Rice, 2019-Ohio-1415, ¶ 65 (11th Dist.), quoting

State v. McFeely, 2009-Ohio-1436, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.).

{¶21} Mr. Ramos was indicted for violating R.C. 2923.161, which provides, in

pertinent part:

(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do

any of the following:

(1) Discharge a firearm at or into an occupied structure that is

a permanent or temporary habitation of any individual. . . .

{¶22} Mr. Ramos challenges the State’s failure to produce evidence that he

knowingly, without privilege to do so, discharged a firearm at or into an occupied structure.

After reviewing the caselaw and the statutory language in full context, we agree with Mr.

Ramos.

{¶23} At first, it would appear that Mr. Ramos’ act of firing his shotgun in the

direction of the common area of his apartment residence could meet the requirements of

the prepositions “at” or “into” in the disjunctive phrase “at or into” included in the indicted

charge. A closer examination of the statute in its entirety, however, demonstrates the

legislature’s intention to criminalize the discharge of a firearm when it is shot from the

outside of an occupied structure and therefore the “at or into” element is not (necessarily)

met when one shoots from inside of an occupied structure.

{¶24} Mr. Ramos points out that R.C. 2923.161(A)(2), the subsection immediately

following the section with which he was charged, provides that no person, without

privilege, shall knowingly “[d]ischarge a firearm at, in, or into a school safety zone. . . .”

(Emphasis added.) He underscores that the inclusion of the preposition “in,” under

subsection (A)(2), demonstrates the legislature’s intention to criminalize the discharge of

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a firearm that actually takes place inside a school safety zone. The General Assembly’s

decision not to utilize the word “in” under subsection (A)(1), evinces an intent, therefore,

not to criminalize the discharge of a firearm from inside an occupied structure that would

otherwise meet the other elements of the crime.

{¶25} By using specific language in subsection (A)(2), but omitting that language

from (A)(1), Mr. Ramos argues the legislature unequivocally drafted the statute to

specifically require any charge under subsection (A)(1) be supported by evidence that the

defendant discharged the firearm from outside an occupied structure. In other words, by

employing certain language in one instance, and different language in another, the

legislature indicated different results were intended.

{¶26} “The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to

the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.” State v. Lowe, 2007-Ohio-606, ¶ 9, citing

Brooks v. Ohio State Univ., 111 Ohio App.3d 342, 349 (10th Dist. 1996). “The court must

first look to the plain language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent.” Lowe

at ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 1997-Ohio-310, ¶ 10. We apply a

statute as it is written when its meaning is unambiguous and definite. Portage Cty. Bd. of

Commrs. v. Akron, 2006-Ohio-954, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local

School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 1996-Ohio-291, ¶ 7. “An unambiguous statute must be applied

in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language.” Lowe at ¶ 9,

citing Burrows at ¶ 10.

{¶27} In light of the legislature’s use of different, additional language under

subsection R.C. 2923.161(A)(2) that captures a separate actus reus than that criminalized

under (A)(1), we conclude the latter subsection unambiguously contemplates an actus

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reus that, in most cases, including the instant matter, must occur outside an occupied

structure. See footnote one below. This analysis finds support in other appellate districts.

{¶28} First, in State v. Nash, 2003-Ohio-230 (5th Dist.), the Fifth Appellate District

was faced with a similar argument. In recognizing that subsection R.C. 2923.161(A)(1)

limited its verbiage to the discharge of a firearm “at or into” an occupied structure, and

subsection R.C. 2923.161(A)(2) used the more expansive language of “at, in, or into,” the

court concluded subsection (A)(1) required evidence that the firearm was discharged from

the outside of an occupied structure. Specifically, the court determined:

R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) prohibits an individual from discharging

a firearm “at or into an occupied structure”. In contrast,

subsection (A)(2) of R.C. 2923.161(A)(2) prohibits an

individual from discharging a firearm “at, in or into” a school

safety zone. (Emphasis added). Had the drafters of R.C.

2923.161 intended to prohibit discharging a firearm in a

habitation, they could have, and presumably would have,

included the same language in subsection (A)(1) as in (A)(2).

The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another

(“expressio unius est exclusio alterius”). See, e.g., Green, Inc.

v. Smith (1974), 40 Ohio App.2d 30, 32, 317 N.E.2d 227,

229. Since the word “in” is not contained in R.C.

2923.161(A)(1) and since there is no evidence that appellant

discharged his firearm at or into a habitation, appellant’s

conviction for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a

habitation is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

(Footnote omitted.) Nash at ¶ 17.

{¶29} Similarly, in State v. Moorer, 2008-Ohio-2560 (1st Dist.), the appellate court,

citing Nash with approval, concluded that reading the statute “as a whole” supports the

conclusion that the plain language of subsection R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) requires “the

proscribed conduct of ‘discharging a firearm’ must occur from outside the dwelling that is

first fired ‘at or into.’” Moorer at ¶ 5 and 4 (respectively). The First District observed that it

agreed with the court in Nash that the General Assembly could have included the word

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“in” under subsection (A)(1) but did not. Id. at ¶ 5. As such, the court determined that

criminalizing conduct occurring inside an occupied dwelling was contrary to statutory

intent. See Id. at ¶ 6.

{¶30} “At or into” an occupied structure does not necessarily incorporate an act

that occurs specifically “in” an occupied structure. In light of what R.C. 2923.161 is

designed to criminalize (namely, the knowing discharge of a firearm under specific

circumstances), we conclude that the legislature intended only to prohibit the discharge

of a firearm, in cases such as this one, from the outside of an occupied dwelling.1

{¶31} This plain-meaning, which incorporates a directional reading of the phrase

“at or into,” finds additional persuasive support in Commonwealth v. McCoy, 928 A.2d

306 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d in part, 962 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 2009).

{¶32} In McCoy, the court applied the ordinary meaning of “into—“movement from

outside to inside—and held that the defendant did not discharge a firearm “into” an

occupied structure because he was already inside when he fired. (Justice Antonin Scalia

and Bryan Garner cite McCoy with approval as an application of plain meaning to

directional prepositions. A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts 11–13 (2012)). The directional logic of McCoy applies equally here: the prepositions

“at” and “into” in R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) require the discharge to originate from outside the

occupied structure, and a shot cannot travel “at or into” a structure from a position already

inside it.

1. It is worth pointing out that, had the weapon been discharged into the common area, penetrated the wall

or door, and struck (or was knowingly directed at or into) a different occupied structure, subsection R.C.

2923.161(A)(1) may very well prohibit such conduct. These are not, however, the facts of the underlying

case. Mr. Ramos’ shotgun was fired from the inside of the building near the threshold door of his apartment

toward the exit/entry way of the building. There was simply no evidence that he knowingly fired the weapon

“at or into” another occupied structure.

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{¶33} Further, although not oft-cited, the “whole-statute” canon of construction is

“the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read and construed

as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts.” State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d

205, 212 (Sup.Ct. Minn., 2021). The “whole-statute” canon may be considered without

first finding the underlying statute ambiguous (unlike the in pari materia canon of

construction). State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015). See also State v. Bee,

5 N.W. 3d 713, 720 (Minn. 2024) (“The whole-statute canon recognizes that it is

appropriate to ‘construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to

all of its provisions.’” (Citation omitted.)). A statute must be observed fully. Here, the

“whole statute” demonstrates the legislature did not criminalize an act in the underlying

indictment.

{¶34} This conclusion is not altered by R.C. 2909.01(C)(4), which defines

“occupied structure” to include “a portion of a building” in which any person is present or

likely to be present. The trial court reasoned that the common hallway of the apartment

building qualified as a portion of an occupied structure and that Mr. Ramos therefore

discharged his firearm “at or into” that structure. This reasoning conflates two distinct

elements of the offense. The definition of “occupied structure” governs the nature of the

target—it identifies what qualifies as the structure at or into which the firearm must be

discharged. The prepositions “at or into” govern the actus reus—the directionality of the

discharge in relation to that structure.

{¶35} Even, assuming arguendo, that the common hallway constitutes a “portion

of” the occupied structure for definitional purposes, this does not alter the directional

requirement imposed by the prepositions. Mr. Ramos fired the gun from within the same

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occupied structure he is alleged to have targeted. Indeed, as established by Ms.

Speakman’s testimony, the gun was extended into and discharged from within the hallway

itself—a portion of the structure that the State claims was the target of the discharge. The

breadth of R.C. 2909.01(C)(4), which defines an “occupied structure,” expands what

counts as the target; it does not relocate the shooter. These two components of the statute

operate on separate elements of the offense and the plain-language application of both,

read together, compels the same result.

{¶36} Two final points require attention. In overruling the joint motion to dismiss,

the trial court first stated, “I don’t know what world we live in if we can shoot out of an

apartment building into the entry and not have some culpability in the crime. I don’t know

if it fits this particular statute, but that’s something for the Court of Appeals to deal with.”

{¶37} A court applies the law as written and, even though Mr. Ramos’ actions

were clearly problematic, they simply do not meet the elements of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1)

under these facts. The facts of this case do not fit within this specific statute; it does not,

however, imply that a different charge may have corresponded with the facts of this case.

{¶38} We further note that the controlling factual distinction—the gun’s position

inside the building’s common hallway at the moment of discharge—was not argued with

particularity by either party in the trial court. Mr. Ramos’ appellate brief addressed the

statutory construction question without developing this factual predicate with the

specificity the record supports. Given the manner in which the case was presented and

argued, the trial court’s analysis was understandable on the record before it. The nuanced

factual and statutory distinctions that ultimately control our analysis emerged more fully

in the context of appellate review.

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{¶39} Further, the trial court, after considering defense counsel’s motion for

acquittal, also observed that the cases counsel cited in support of his motion (principally

Nash and Moorer) dealt with standalone homes. The court found this distinction

meaningful because other tenants were in the apartment building at the time of the

conduct, and hence Mr. Ramos’ act of discharging the firearm from inside the building

should be excluded from the scope of the statutory analyses of those cases. We consider,

however, the nature of the residence, whether a standalone home or an apartment, to be

a distinction without difference.

{¶40} As discussed above, the “portion of” language in R.C. 2909.01(C)(4) applies

with equal force to any occupied structure, including standalone homes, which likewise

contain rooms, hallways, and other interior spaces. The multi-unit character of the

apartment building does not render the definitional analysis under R.C. 2909.01(C)(4)

uniquely applicable to Mr. Ramos’ circumstances; the same analysis would govern had

he fired from one room of a single-family dwelling into a hallway within that same

structure. The critical question under R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) is the directionality of the

discharge in relation to the occupied structure—governed by the prepositions “at or

into”—and that question is answered identically regardless of building type.

{¶41} Considering the language of the statute and its subsections, we conclude

the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support the conviction of discharging a

firearm, in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1). Analyzing the plain language of the statute,

Mr. Ramos did not fire the shot “at or into” an occupied structure.

{¶42} Mr. Ramos’ assignment of error has merit.

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{¶43} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is reversed

and the conviction is vacated.

MATT LYNCH, P.J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error

is with merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the conviction is vacated.

Costs to be taxed against appellee.

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,

concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,

concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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