in order to afford due process rights to a tenant of public housing, the eviction must be a result of a state action
How later courts described this case
- in order to afford due process rights to a tenant of public housing, the eviction must be a result of a state action
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[Cite as New Sunrise Properties v. Robertson, 2026-Ohio-2232.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
NEW SUNRISE PROPERTIES, INC. C.A. No. 24CA012184
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
LILLIAN ROBERTSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 23CV209802
v.
THE MENTAL HEALTH AND
RECOVERY SERVICES BOARD OF
LORAIN COUNTY
Defendant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 15, 2026
STEVENSON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Lillian Robertson appeals a judgment of the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment of New Sunrise Properties, Inc. (“New
Sunrise”). This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} New Sunrise is the owner of apartment units, and it houses tenants that receive
subsidized housing under a federally funded Shelter Care Plus Program (“Shelter Plus”). Shelter
Plus provides housing assistance to individuals deemed chronically homeless and disabled. It is
2
funded by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). HUD
directs Shelter Plus funding to the Lorain County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board (the
“MHARS Board”), who then directs the funds to New Sunrise pursuant to a Housing Assistance
Payment (“HAP”) contract. New Sunrise applies the subsidy to the rent of those tenants who are
Shelter Plus recipients.
{¶3} Ms. Robertson qualified for the Shelter Plus program and signed a one-year lease
to reside in a New Sunrise apartment on November 3, 2020. Ms. Robertson was required under
the lease to annually apply for recertification to continue receiving the Shetler Plus subsidy in the
next rental year. A recertification is an “[a]nnual [r]eview of family income, expenses, assets and
composition.” Ms. Robertson recertified in October 2021, and she continued to receive the Shelter
Plus subsidy for the 2021-2022 rental year.
{¶4} New Sunrise sent Ms. Robertson written recertification notices as the subsidy
renewal date approached in 2022. It sent renewal notices on July 6, 2022, August 11, 2022, and
September 30, 2022. Ms. Robertson recalls receiving recertification notices in 2022. She contends
that she never received the July 6, 2022, notice but admits that she received the August 11, 2022,
notice and that she “tried to recertify but [] couldn’t get a ride from anyone[.]” The August 11,
2022, notice scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2022, to process Ms. Robertson’s
recertification.
{¶5} Ms. Robertson also admits that she received the September 30, 2022, final notice
from New Sunrise. New Sunrise informed Ms. Robertson in the final notice that her Shelter Plus
subsidy “is set to expire 10/31/22” and that, despite “multiple letters[,]” speaking “verbally on
multiple occasions[,]” “arrang[ing] transportation[,]” and going “to [her] home in an effort to get
[her] to comply” with recertification, she has “refused to cooperate.” The final notice stated that
3
“[c]ooperation with the recertification is a condition of continued program participation.” The
notice gave Ms. Robertson a chance to “immediately submit [her] income sources and sign the
required paperwork” and it informed her that, if she failed to do so, her subsidy would terminate
“effective November 1, 2022 and you will be responsible for the full market rate rent on that unit
which is $732.00.” The final notice included a phone number for Ms. Robertson to call and discuss
the matter. Ms. Robertson did not respond to the final notice, and she was no longer a Shelter Plus
recipient as of November 1, 2022.
{¶6} Lindsay Kochheiser is the Shelter Plus manager at New Sunrise who sent the
recertification notices to Ms. Robertson. Ms. Kochheiser testified that, because Ms. Robertson
“had failed to appear at several appointments that were made for her Shelter Plus Care
recertification[,]” she went to Ms. Robertson’s apartment in October, 2022, “with [Ms.
Robertson’s] case worker in an attempt to get her to sign [the recertification] paperwork[.]” She
testified that she had all of the necessary paperwork with her at the visit and that Ms. Robertson
“failed to cooperate.” Ms. Robertson does not dispute that a caseworker came to her apartment to
address her subsidy recertification.
{¶7} There is no dispute that Ms. Robertson did not complete the recertification process
by the deadline for the 2022-2023 rental year and that she lost her Shelter Plus subsidy. Mindy
Wright, the Manager of Housing and Compliance at New Sunrise, explained that Ms. Robertson
was “no longer a [Shelter Plus] participant” when she failed to “comply with the program” by
recertifying. Ms. Wright notified Ms. Robertson in an October 26, 2022, letter that, effective
November 1, 2022, she would “be responsible for the full rent in the amount of $732” because she
had failed to recertify her Shelter Plus subsidy. Ms. Robertson continued living in the apartment
without making any rental payments.
4
{¶8} New Sunrise filed an eviction action against Ms. Robertson for non-payment of rent
in December 2022. New Sunrise later dismissed this first eviction action without prejudice.
{¶9} Counsel for Ms. Robertson sent New Sunrise a reasonable accommodation letter
on February 3, 2023, wherein she requested that she complete her Shelter Plus recertification. Ms.
Robertson did not submit any medical documentation in support of her reasonable accommodation
request. She also sent a reasonable accommodation letter to the MHARS Board.
{¶10} New Sunrise responded to Ms. Robertson’s reasonable accommodation request on
March 2, 2023, stating that recertification is a Shelter Plus requirement. New Sunrise explained
that Shelter Plus is administered by the MHARS Board and that, “[a]s such, the determination as
to whether [she] will be permitted to complete her recertification late or to reinstate retroactively
is not a rule or policy that New Sunrise can alter or change.” It informed Ms. Robertson that it
would “engage in the interactive process” and “will complete any recertification forms required
by the Shelter Care Plus Program and submit the same to the MHARS Board to determine if a
recertification is warranted.” New Sunrise stated that “[i]f [the] MHARS Board determines that
the subsidy will be retroactively reinstated, [it] will accept the payments[.]”
{¶11} The MHARS Board denied Ms. Robertson’s reasonable accommodation request on
March 9, 2023. It stated that “Ms. Robertson did not adhere to her responsibilities for
recertification, and therefore her subsidy has expired” and it “consider[ed] [the] matter closed.”
Ms. Robertson appealed the decision of the MHARS Board, and the trial court dismissed the
appeal. This Court reversed the judgment of the trial court on the basis that it had not determined
whether the October 26, 2022, notice of lease termination was a final order under R.C. 2506.01(A).
Robertson v. Mental Health, Addiction, and Recovery Servs. Bd. of Lorain Cty., 2025-Ohio-224,
¶ 9 (9th Dist.).
5
{¶12} New Sunrise served Ms. Robertson with a “THIRTY (30) DAY TERMINATION
NOTICE” for “NON-PAYMENT OF RENT” on April 14, 2023. This notice informed Ms.
Robertson that she had “defaulted in payment of rent and/or damages . . . under [her] Lease/Rental
Agreement” and that $4,392.00 was due. Ms. Robertson was informed that she had “ten (10) days
after service of this Notice,” until “April 24, 2023 at 4:00 p.m.” to pay the amount due and that
her “lease will terminate on May 15, 2023” if the amount due remained unpaid. This notice further
informed Ms. Robertson that she “may discuss the proposed termination of your tenancy with the
Resident Manager in person within ten (10) days after service of this Notice” and that “[i]f you are
[a] disabled person, you have the right to request a reasonable accommodation to participate in
any such meeting or hearing.” Ms. Robertson did not contact the Resident Manager or otherwise
respond to this notice. A three-day notice to leave premises for non-payment of rent was served
upon Ms. Robertson on May 16, 2023.
{¶13} New Sunrise filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Ms. Robertson in
June 2023. Ms. Robertson filed an answer and counterclaim against New Sunrise and a third-party
complaint against the MHARS Board. New Sunrise and the MHARS Board moved for summary
judgment after the case was transferred to the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. The trial
court granted New Sunrise’s motion for summary judgment and is holding the MHARS Board’s
motion for summary judgment in abeyance. Ms. Robertson appeals the judgment of the trial court
granting New Sunrise’s motion for summary judgment, asserting three assignments of error for
this Court’s review.
II.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO NEW SUNRISE PROPERTIES BECAUSE IT
6
LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION DUE TO NEW SUNRISE’S
PREMATURE SERVICE OF THE R.C. 1923.04 NOTICE BEFORE MS.
ROBERTSON’S RENT SUBSIDY WAS PROPERLY TERMINATED.
{¶14} Ms. Robertson argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction when it granted New Sunrise’s motion for summary judgment. We
disagree.
{¶15} A landlord or property owner’s compliance with federal notice requirements is a
jurisdictional prerequisite for invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Hampton Court,
LLC v. French, 2025-Ohio-1522, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.), citing Olentangy Commons Owner LLC v.
Fawley, 2023-Ohio-4039, ¶ 52 (10th Dist.); Garden Spires Urban Renewal, LP v. Yanford, 2020
WL 6494641 (Sup. Ct. NJ, App. Div. Nov. 5, 2020). “The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law that we review de novo.” Kacyon v. Moore, 2025-Ohio-5030, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). Under
a de novo standard, “appellate courts do not give deference to the trial court’s determination and
independently examine the record.” Id.
{¶16} Ms. Robertson argues in her first assignment that New Sunrise did not comply with
the parties’ lease or 24 C.F.R. 578.91(b)/(c) when it terminated her Shelter Plus subsidy. She does
not challenge New Sunrise’s eviction notices in this assignment of error. She argues, rather, that
her Shelter Plus subsidy was improperly terminated and that she was prematurely served with
eviction notices. She argues that, because the eviction notices were premature, the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction when it granted summary judgment. New Sunrise argues that it
complied with all notice requirements under the lease and 24 C.F.R. 578.91(b)/(c). It points out
that it did not terminate Ms. Robertson’s Shelter Plus subsidy and that the subsidy was not renewed
due to Ms. Robertson’s failure to recertify. Assuming without deciding that failure to provide these
7
notices would deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction under R.C. 1923.04, Ms. Robertson’s
argument is not persuasive.
Notice Requirements
Lease
{¶17} The lease agreement between Ms. Robertson and New Sunrise addresses the notice
that is required when a subsidy is removed and provides in relevant part:
16. Removal of Subsidy:
...
b. The Landlord agrees to give the Tenant written notice of the proposed
termination. The notice will advise the Tenant that, during the ten calendar days
following the date of the notice, he/she may request to meet with the Landlord to
discuss the proposed termination of assistance. If the Tenant requests a discussion
of the proposed termination, the Landlord agrees to meet with the Tenant.
25 C.F.R. 578.91
{¶18} Shelter Plus is funded by HUD and HUD regulations are found in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Specifically, 25 C.F.R. 578.91(b) and (c) address the notice that is required
when program assistance is removed and provides:
(b) Due process. In terminating assistance to a program participant, the recipient or
subrecipient must provide a formal process that recognizes the rights of individuals
receiving assistance under the due process of law. This process, at a minimum, must
consist of:
(1) Providing the program participant with a written copy of the
program rules and the termination process before the participant begins to
receive assistance;
(2) Written notice to the program participant containing a clear statement of
the reasons for termination;
(3) A review of the decision, in which the program participant is given the
opportunity to present written or oral objections before a person other than
the person (or a subordinate of that person) who made or approved the
termination decision; and
8
(4) Prompt written notice of the final decision to the program participant.
(c) Hard-to-house populations. Recipients and subrecipients that are providing
permanent supportive housing for hard-to-house populations of homeless persons
must exercise judgment and examine all extenuating circumstances in determining
when violations are serious enough to warrant termination so that a program
participant’s assistance is terminated only in the most severe cases.
The HUD contract between New Sunrise and the MHARS Board mirrors 25 C.F.R. 578.91(b)(2)-
(4).
Analysis
{¶19} Ms. Robertson does not dispute that she signed a lease with New Sunrise; that she
received a copy of the lease; that she was required under the lease to annually apply for
recertification of her Shelter Plus subsidy; and, that she did not apply for recertification by the
October 31, 2022 deadline. Ms. Kochheiser testified that she sent recertification notices to Ms.
Robertson on July 6, 2022, August 11, 2022, and September 30, 2022. Ms. Kochheiser also went
to Ms. Robertson’s apartment with Ms. Robertson’s case worker and the recertification paperwork
to complete recertification. New Sunrise had also arranged transportation for Ms. Robertson to
complete recertification. Ms. Robertson has acknowledged that she received recertification notices
from New Sunrise and that her case worker had been at her apartment to discuss recertification.
{¶20} New Sunrise’s written notices informed Ms. Robertson that it was time for her
annual recertification review; that “[c]ooperation with this recertification is a condition of
continued program participation[;]” and that her presence at a recertification appointment was
“mandatory.” The notices informed Ms. Robertson of the documentation and information that she
needed to bring with her to the recertification meeting.
{¶21} The September 30, 2022, “Final Notice” that New Sunrise sent informed Ms.
Robertson:
9
Your Shelter Plus Care subsidy is set to expire 10/31/22. We have sent you multiple
letters with appointment dates and spoken to you verbally on multiple occasions in
an effort to have you sign your annual Shelter Plus Care documents. We have
arranged transportation with your Caseworker and even on another occasion come
to your home in an effort to get you to comply. To date you have refused to
cooperate.
...
Cooperation with the recertification is a condition of continued program
participation. Please be aware if you fail to immediately submit your income
sources and sign the required paperwork your assistance will terminate effective
November 1, 2022 and you will be responsible for the full market rent on that unit
which is $732.00.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice please call the office at
(440) 365-9600 Ext. 27.
{¶22} We conclude that New Sunrise complied with all notice requirements under the
parties’ lease. New Sunrise provided written notice that Ms. Robertson’s Shelter Plus subsidy was
not going to renew due to her failure to recertify and this notice was given at least ten days before
the expiration of the subsidy. New Sunrise provided the phone number that Ms. Robertson could
call to discuss the final notice. It stated in its final notice that Ms. Robertson could still recertify
provided she “immediately submit [her] income sources and sign the required paperwork[.]”
{¶23} We conclude that New Sunrise also complied with 25 C.F.R. 578.91(b). There is
no dispute that the Shelter Plus program requirements included New Sunrise’s lease with Ms.
Robertson; that New Sunrise provided a copy of the lease to Ms. Robertson; and that the final
notice informed Ms. Robertson that her subsidy was not going to be renewed due to her failure to
recertify. The September 20, 2022, letter was titled “Final Notice” and it gave Ms. Robertson ten
days to recertify her subsidy. See Schroeder Co. v. Coates, 2007-Ohio-2956, ¶ 40 (6th Dist.) (court
found no error in landlord’s final notice terminating subsidy housing). Ms. Robertson did not
contact New Sunrise or request a review by the stated deadline as provided in 25 C.F.R.
10
578.91(b)(3) and, because she did not request a review, there was no further decision for New
Sunrise to issue as provided in 25 C.F.R. 578.91(b)(4).
{¶24} There is no evidence in the record that New Sunrise took action to terminate Ms.
Robertson’s Shelter Plus subsidy. The undisputed evidence is that Ms. Robertson knew that she
had to annually recertify her subsidy and that she failed to do so. Because New Sunrise did not
move to terminate the subsidy during the rental period, we conclude that 25 C.F.R. 578.91(c) does
not apply.
{¶25} Further, the notice that would apply to the June 2023 eviction under R.C. 1923.04
was the May notice to leave premises. Ms. Robertson was served with the notice to leave premises
after she had already received the 30-day termination notice for non-payment of rent, which gave
her 10 days to pay the amount due or to contact “the Resident Manager” to “discuss the proposed
termination of [her] tenancy[.]” The evidence in the record is that Ms. Robertson requested a
reasonable accommodation in February, 2023. There is no evidence in the record that she
responded to either the April or May 2023 notices or to otherwise suggest that the trial court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction proceedings. For the reasons set forth above,
Ms. Robertson’s first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT
NEW SUNRISE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN
NEW SUNRISE FAILED TO PROVIDE MS. ROBERTSON WITH DUE
PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF 24 C.F.R. 578.91 AND THE 14TH
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PRIOR TO
COMMENCING THE EVICTION.
{¶26} Ms. Robertson argues in her second assignment of error that New Sunrise’s October
26, 2022, “Final Notice” of the nonrenewal of her Shelter Plus subsidy and its April 14, 2023, 30-
day notice to vacate did not comply with “due process protections, including giving her a written
11
notice containing a clear statement of the reasons for termination.” She contends that these notices
failed to “provide [her] with the opportunity to present objections to an impartial party and receive
a final written decision.” For the reasons set forth below, Ms. Robertson’s second assignment of
error is overruled.
{¶27} This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio
Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56
when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse
to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R.
56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must
resolve any doubt in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356,
358-359 (1992). “A trial court does not have the liberty to choose among reasonable inferences in
the context of summary judgment, and all competing inferences and questions of credibility must
be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Jones v. Soto, 2023-Ohio-3107, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.).
{¶28} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth the nature of the burden-shifting paradigm
of a motion for summary judgment as follows:
[A] party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party
cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the
basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the
nonmoving party’s claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden
under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party
has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to
specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which
affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the
motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving party has
satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal outlined in
12
Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial
and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against the nonmoving party.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293-293 (1996).
{¶29} The notices at issue in Ms. Robertson’s second assignment of error were attached
to New Sunrise’s forcible entry and detainer complaint filed in June, 2023. The trial court noted
in its judgment that Ms. Robertson had not “objected to the notices provided by New Sunrise” or
“otherwise articulate[d] any basis as to why those notices could be insufficient[.]” Because Ms.
Robertson had not objected to these notices, the Court found that “New Sunrise met its initial
burden for summary judgment as to its eviction claims against [Ms.] Robertson.”
{¶30} Assuming without deciding that Ms. Robertson’s argument regarding New
Sunrise’s October 26, 2022, and April 14, 2023 notices are properly before this Court, we conclude
that Ms. Robertson’s second assignment of error is without merit. As set forth under our first
assignment of error analysis, New Sunrise issued notices in compliance with the lease and federal
requirements. New Sunrise notified Ms. Robertson that her Shelter Plus subsidy was not going to
renew due to her failure to recertify and that, starting on November 1, 2022, she would be
responsible for the full rent in the amount of $732.
{¶31} Further, Ms. Robertson’s due process argument against New Sunrise exists only if
New Sunrise acted as a state agency and terminated Ms. Robertson’s subsidy. See Bowling Green
Manor Ltd. Partnership v. Kirk, 1995 WL 386476, * 3 (6th Dist. June 30, 1995), citing Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (in order to afford due process rights to a tenant of
public housing, the eviction must be a result of a state action). There is no dispute that Ms.
Robertson did not recertify her Shelter Plus subsidy and that is why the subsidy was not renewed.
There is no evidence in the record that New Sunrise moved to terminate the subsidy or decided
13
that it would be terminated. The trial court found that Ms. Robertson became responsible for the
full rent when she failed to recertify because “New Sunrise stopped receiving rent payments from
the [MHARS] Board[.]” It further found that “[t]here has been no suggestion that New Sunrise
somehow refused rent payments from the [MHARS] Board on behalf of [Ms.] Robertson or
otherwise prevented the Board from paying [Ms. Robertson’s] rent.” We cannot say that the trial
court erred in these findings.
{¶32} Ms. Robertson’s second assignment of error is, accordingly, overruled.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT
NEW SUNRISE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF MS. ROBERTSON, THE NONMOVING
PARTY.
{¶33} Ms. Robertson argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it found that there are no issues of material fact and granted summary judgment
in favor of New Sunrise. We disagree.
{¶34} As previously set forth, summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56(C) when
(1) no genuine issue of material fact remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party,
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving
party. Temple, 50 Ohio St.2d at 327, citing Civ.R. 56(C). The facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d at 358-359. This Court reviews a summary judgment order do novo.
Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 105.
14
{¶35} Ms. Robertson argues that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding her
reasonable accommodation request and that, therefore, the trial court erred when it granted
summary judgment in favor of New Sunrise. New Sunrise maintains that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that summary judgment was properly granted.
{¶36} New Sunrise is required under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) “to provide
reasonable accommodations to a tenant with a disability when necessary.” Norwich Apts. II v.
Sanders, 2020-Ohio-4540, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.), citing 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619. A tenant must demonstrate
the following to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation:
(1) she suffers from a disability within the meaning of FHA; (2) the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known of the disability; (3) the requested
accommodation may be necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy
the dwelling; (4) the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused
to make the accommodation.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted). Id. at ¶ 21, quoting Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v.
Spencer, 415 F.Appx. 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2011). While the FHA “‘requires housing providers to
make reasonable accommodations for renters’ disabilities,’” courts have recognized that the FHA
“‘does not undermine the nature of their transaction or so fundamentally alter their relationship
that it removes eviction as a remedy for nonpayment of rent.’” Norwich Apts. II at ¶ 24, quoting
Dempsey v. Hous. Operations Mgt., Inc. 2016 WL 73072, *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2016).
{¶37} Upon review of the undisputed evidence, we cannot say that the trial court erred
when it found that Ms. Robertson failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether New Sunrise failed to make a reasonable accommodation. In her February 3,
2023, reasonable accommodation letter to New Sunrise, Ms. Robertson asked New Sunrise to
dismiss its eviction action. She asked New Sunrise to dismiss its eviction action so she could
“[a]djust medications in consultation with her medical provider[.]” The trial court did not
15
determine whether this request was reasonable, nor did it have to make such a determination,
because New Sunrise had dismissed its December, 2022 eviction action. That is the only eviction
action that had been pending at the time of the February 3, 2023, reasonable accommodation
request. New Sunrise did not file another eviction action until June 14, 2023. Ms. Robertson did
not request a reasonable accommodation to the April 14 notice attached to that eviction.
{¶38} Even if her February 3 accommodation request applied to the June 14, 2023
eviction, summary judgment would still be appropriate. In her February 3 reasonable
accommodation request, Ms. Robertson sought “to complete her recertification.” It is undisputed
that, by that time, Ms. Robertson’s subsidy had not been renewed because she failed to timely
recertify even though New Sunrise had sent her multiple recertification letters; a New Sunrise
employee went to Ms. Robertson’s apartment with Ms. Robertson’s case worker to complete the
recertification; and New Sunrise had arranged transportation for Ms. Robertson.
{¶39} The trial court found that Ms. Robertson’s February 2023 request to recertify her
subsidy did not “constitute a ‘reasonable accommodation’ because it was the [MHARS] Board
that stopped paying [Ms.] Robertson’s rent to New Sunrise[.]” The undisputed evidence supports
this finding.
{¶40} There is no dispute that Shelter Plus is a federal program that is funded by HUD.
HUD directs the federal funds to the MHARS Board who then directs the funding to New Sunrise
to apply to the rent of Shelter Plus recipients. There is no evidence in the record that New Sunrise
could force the MHARS Board to reinstate Ms. Robertson’s subsidy or pay her rent. New Sunrise
explained to Ms. Robertson when it responded to her request, stating:
The requirement for [you] to submit to annual recertification as a condition of
receiving a rental subsidy is not a policy or rule of New Sunrise. This requirement
is a rule of the Shelter Plus Program that is administered by the MHARS Board. As
such, the determination as to whether [you] will be permitted to complete [your]
16
recertification late or to reinstate retroactively is not a rule or policy that New
Sunrise can alter or change.
New Sunrise informed Ms. Robertson that it would still “complete any recertification forms
required . . . and submit the same to the MHARS Board” but, again, it was up to the “MHARS
Board to determine if a certification is warranted.” There is no evidence in the record to dispute
this contention or to suggest that New Sunrise could force the MHARS Board to accept an untimely
recertification. There is no evidence in the record that New Sunrise failed to participate in any
attempt to recertify Ms. Robertson. It is further undisputed that Ms. Robertson has not paid any
rent to New Sunrise since the MHARS Board stopped sending her subsidy to New Sunrise due to
the failure to recertify.
{¶41} For the reasons set forth above, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it
granted New Sunrise’s motion for summary judgment. Ms. Robertson’s third assignment of error
is overruled.
III.
{¶42} Ms. Robertson’s assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment of New Sunrise is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
17
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
SCOT STEVENSON
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
MARIA A. SMITH, ELIZABETH A. ZAK, and KAREN P. WU, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
JAMES N. TAYLOR, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.