Hall

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID HALL, CASE NO. 1:24-CV-01902-JRA

Petitioner, JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DARRELL A. CLAY

WARDEN TOM WATSON, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner David Hall, a prisoner in state custody, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF #10). The District Court has jurisdiction under § 2254(a) and the matter

is referred to me to prepare a Report and Recommendation. (Non-document entry of Apr. 11,

2025). Respondent Warden Tom Watson, as Warden of North Central Correctional Institution

(hereinafter, the State), filed the Return of Writ with the state court record. (ECF #12). Mr. Hall

filed a traverse and the State responded with a sur-reply. (ECF #17, 18).

Challenging the decision of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC)

to aggregate his sentence, Mr. Hall asserts one ground for relief. As outlined below, I recommend

the District Court DISMISS the petition as procedurally defaulted; alternatively, if the petition is

not defaulted, I recommend the District Court DENY the petition as meritless. Finally, I

recommend the District Court DENY a certificate of appealability.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 20, 1975, a Cuyahoga County jury convicted Mr. Hall of purposeful murder

in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.02. (ECF #12-1 at PageID 55). The trial court sentenced

Mr. Hall to 15 years to life in prison (hereinafter, “the 1975 sentence”). (Id.). He was released on

parole in 1984, declared a parole violator in 1988, and returned to prison in 1989. (See id. at

PageID 443). He was paroled again in 1990. (Id.).

While on parole the second time, Mr. Hall was indicted for new felony offenses. (Id. at

PageID 568). In April 1992, a Cuyahoga County jury found him guilty of felonious assault but not

guilty of kidnapping. (Id. at PageID 565-66). The trial court imposed an 11-to-15-year sentence

(hereinafter, “the 1992 sentence”). (Id. at PageID 61). The court’s journal entry imposing sentence

did not refer to Mr. Hall’s 1975 sentence. At that time, former Revised Code § 2929.41(B)(3)

required defendants to serve any sentence for a new felony committed while on parole consecutive

to the sentence for which the defendant was on parole. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.41(B)(3)

(1992). The Ohio Adult Parole Authority (APA) revoked parole and ODRC recalculated Mr.

Hall’s prison term to reflect the 1975 and 1992 sentences be served consecutively consistent with

§ 2929.41(B)(3), resulting in an aggregate sentence of 26 years to life. (See ECF #12-1 at PageID

443).

Fifteen years later, in 2007, Mr. Hall filed two petitions in state court for writs of habeas

corpus under Revised Code §§ 2725.01, et seq. (Id. at PageID 62, 96). Both petitions contended

Mr. Hall was being wrongly held on an expired sentence—the 1992 sentence. (Id. at PageID 65, 99).

He reasoned certain errors in the revocation of his parole resulted in waiver of ODRC’s authority

to hold him on the 1975 sentence. (Id. at PageID 66-67, 100-01). The state court consolidated the

petitions (Id. at PageID 135, 137) and granted the State’s motion to dismiss on two grounds. First,

because Mr. Hall did not attach the necessary paperwork to the petition, including a copy of his

commitment papers for the 1975 sentence as Revised Code § 2725.04(D) required. (Id. at PageID

195). Second, because even if Mr. Hall had submitted that paperwork, habeas relief was

unwarranted because Mr. Hall did not receive a final discharge from parole on the 1975 sentence

and thus remained subject to a maximum life term. (Id. at PageID 196). Mr. Hall appealed the

rulings to the Third District Court of Appeals. (Id. at PageID 202, 204). That court dismissed both

appeals for want of prosecution and denied Mr. Hall’s later motion for reconsideration. (Id. at

PageID 214, 216, 220). Mr. Hall did not appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

In April 2018, Mr. Hall filed in state court a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus

arguing, as he did in his first and second petitions, that he was being held on an expired sentence,

ODRC was not authorized to aggregate his sentences, and his continued custody violates his right

to protection against double jeopardy. (Id. at PageID 364-74). The state court denied the petition,

explaining that a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief if his maximum sentence expired, but

because Mr. Hall remained subject to an indeterminate 15-year-to-life sentence, he had not shown

his maximum sentence was expired. (Id. at PageID 438-39). The state court also determined Mr.

Hall’s petition was procedurally defective and subject to dismissal because he did not attach a copy

of all commitment papers as per Revised Code § 2725.04(D). (Id. at PageID 439).

Mr. Hall again appealed the dismissal to the Third District. (Id. at PageID 606). That court

affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Hall’s petition as procedurally defective because Mr. Hall did not

comply with the statutory requirements for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at

PageID 662-67). Mr. Hall appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, but it denied jurisdiction. (Id.

at PageID 671, 699).

FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION

Mr. Hall raises one ground for habeas relief:

Petitioner is being unlawfully held in that his sentence of 11 to 15 years [the 1992

sentence] has expired and Respondent has no intervening justification for holding

Petitioner beyond the expiration of his completed sentence, in violation of

Petitioner’s right to due process.

(ECF #10 at PageID 12).

Similar to the claims in his three state habeas petitions, Mr. Hall asserts to this Court that

ODRC lacked authority to hold him under the 1975 sentence. But unlike his state petitions

(where he argued errors in the revocation proceedings acted to waive ODRC’s authority to enforce

the 1975 sentence), here he argues APA never reinstated the 1975 sentence inasmuch as it never

held a revocation hearing in relation to parole for the 1975 sentence. (ECF #17 at PageID 722). In

addition, Mr. Hall argues ODRC has no authority to hold him on the 1975 sentence because the

trial court in 1992 did not impose the 1975 sentence and order it served consecutive to the 11-to-

15-year sentence. (ECF #10 at PageID 14, ECF #17 at PageID 723).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs Mr. Hall’s

habeas petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). AEDPA recognizes that “[s]tate courts

are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights” so AEDPA acts as a “formidable barrier

to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v.

Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). AEDPA “dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-

court rulings which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell v.

Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (citation and quotation omitted). Habeas courts review the last-

explained state-court judgment on the federal claim at issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805

(1991).

Under AEDPA, habeas relief cannot be granted for a person in custody pursuant to a state

conviction unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For the purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” means

“the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state

court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). It includes “the holdings,

as opposed to dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

Comity principles also require federal courts to defer to a state court’s judgment on issues

of state substantive and procedural law. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986); Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982). Federal courts must accept a state court’s interpretation of its statutes

and rules of practice. Duffel v. Dutton, 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1986).

The standard is intended to be difficult to meet and reflects the view that habeas corpus is

a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” not a substitute for

ordinary error correction through appeal. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011); see also

Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 133 (2022) (describing habeas as an “extraordinary remedy,

reserved for only extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system and different in kind

from providing relief on direct appeal”) (cleaned up). To obtain “habeas corpus from a federal

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington,

562 U.S. at 103.

PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

Before a federal court may review a petitioner’s habeas claims on the merits, the petitioner

must overcome several procedural barriers. These barriers, including the exhaustion of state

remedies and procedural default, limit a petitioner’s access to review on the merits of a

constitutional claim. See Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001). Federal habeas review is

limited to federal constitutional claims that a state court decided on the merits. When a state court

does not review those claims or denies review on procedural error, the federal district court

generally may not review them. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730-31 (1991); Bonnell v.

Mitchel, 301 F.Supp.2d 698, 722 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2004).

There are two avenues by which a petitioner may procedurally default a claim. Williams v.

Andersons, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006). One way a procedural default occurs is if a petitioner

“fails to comply with state procedural rules in presenting his claim to the appropriate state court.”

Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). To determine whether that failure bars review

of a habeas claim, courts in the Sixth Circuit ask four questions: (1) whether there is a state

procedural rule applicable to petitioner’s claim and whether petitioner failed to meet that rule;

(2) whether the state court enforced the procedural rule; (3) whether the procedural rule is an

adequate and independent state ground on which the state can bar review of the federal

constitutional claim; and (4) whether the petitioner can show cause for his failure to follow the

rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error. Id. If the answer to the

first three questions is yes and the petitioner has not shown cause or prejudice, explained below,

the claim is procedurally defaulted, barring habeas review. Id.

The other way a claim can be procedurally defaulted is if a petitioner does not raise it in

state court and pursue it through the state’s “ordinary appellate review procedures.” Williams,

460 F.3d at 806 (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999)). To have a habeas claim

considered on the merits, a petitioner must present that federal claim at “each and every level” of

the state courts. See Baston v. Bagley, 282 F.Supp.2d 655, 661 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Issues not

presented at each and every level [of the state courts] cannot be considered in a federal habeas

corpus petition.”). If a petitioner did not first raise his federal habeas claim before the state courts

and state law would no longer allow the petitioner to raise the claim in state court, the claim is

procedurally defaulted. Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.

But a procedural default may not be the end of a habeas claim. A petitioner can overcome

a procedural bar by showing either (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice because of the

alleged violation of federal law or (2) not considering the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. Success here does not entitle a petitioner to

habeas relief; it only allows a federal court to consider the merits of a claim (subject to the standard

of review above) when the claim would otherwise be procedurally defaulted. See Martinez v. Ryan,

566 U.S. 1, 10 (2012); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Habeas petitioners cannot rely on conclusory assertions of cause and prejudice to overcome

procedural default. Rather, “the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on

whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded

counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; see also

Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 2012). Neither a petitioner’s pro se status nor

any ignorance of the law and procedural filing requirements are enough to show cause to

overcome procedural default. Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2004).

To show prejudice sufficient to overcome procedural default, a petitioner must show more

than mere errors in the state trial creating a possibility of prejudice. Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.

Rather, he must show the alleged errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Id. There is no prejudice where

the petitioner does not show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Ambrose v. Booker, 801 F.3d 567, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2015).

Alternatively, a petitioner may overcome a procedural bar by asserting a convincing claim

of actual innocence. In Coleman, the Supreme Court held:

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claim in state court

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas

review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.

501 U.S. at 750. A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. at 748. Actual innocence

means “factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623

(1998). As the Sixth Circuit recently summarized,

This means that a petitioner may not pass through the equitable gateway by simply

undermining the state’s case. Rather, he must demonstrate that he factually did not

commit the crime. Of course, dismantling the state’s case is relevant and helpful to the

petitioner because it leaves a vacuum to be filled by an exonerative explanation; but

it is not sufficient in and of itself.

Hubbard v. Rewerts, 98 F.4th 736, 743 (6th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct.

1201 (2025).

To demonstrate actual innocence, the petitioner must show that in light of new reliable

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). When a petitioner presents

new evidence the reviewing habeas court must assess the likely impact of that evidence on

reasonable jurors in light of the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 331-332 (“the District Court

must assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of

guilty adduced at trial”).

ANALYSIS

The State argues Mr. Hall procedurally defaulted his claim in the state courts and,

alternatively, his claim is meritless. (ECF #12 at PageID 46).

A. Procedural Default

As mentioned above, a petitioner procedurally defaults by “fail[ing] to comply with state

procedural rules in presenting his claim to the appropriate state court.” Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138.

Mr. Hall’s petition is procedurally defaulted because he did not follow Ohio’s procedural rules in

presenting his claim to Ohio’s courts. In all three state court habeas petitions, Mr. Hall did not

attach copies of his commitment papers as Revised Code § 2725.04(D) requires, necessitating the

trial court dismiss each petition. (ECF #12-1 at PageID 195, 197, 439). Mr. Hall’s failure to adhere

to the rule and the state court’s enforcement of the rule satisfies the first and second prongs of

Maupin. That rule is also an independent and adequate basis on which the state can foreclose

review of a federal constitutional claim, satisfying the third prong. See Davis v. Warden, Chillicothe

Corr. Inst., No. 1:13-cv-198, 2014 WL 116666, *12 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2014) (when an Ohio court

rejects a petitioner’s claim for state habeas relief because his petition does not comply with Revised

Code § 2725.04(D), that claim is procedurally defaulted on habeas review), report and

recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 1302615 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014).

As to the last prong, Mr. Hall does not explicitly rebut the State’s argument or allege any

circumstances that might constitute cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default. Nor does

Mr. Hall allege or present new evidence showing he is actually innocent of the convicted offenses.

Under Maupin, absent cause and prejudice or actual innocence, the claim is procedurally

defaulted. See 785 F.2d at 138. As such, Mr. Hall has not overcome procedural default, and the

District Court may not review the merits of his claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31.

For those reasons, I recommend the District Court DISMISS the claim as procedurally

defaulted.

B. Merits Review

Even if the Court finds no procedural default, Mr. Hall is not entitled to habeas relief. To

receive federal habeas relief, Mr. Hall must show he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Claims that a state court erred in

interpreting or applying state law do not justify habeas relief. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law“); see also Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“Today we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). For the reasons set forth below,

Mr. Hall has not shown he is in custody in violation of federal constitutional law.1

First, no Supreme Court case law establishes a state prisoner’s federal due process rights are

violated when he remains in custody past his maximum state prison term. Unpublished Sixth

Circuit case law suggests such action could result in a constitutional violation, but the issue

presented here concerns the computation of a prison term under state law and is not reviewable

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Kipen v. Renico, 65 F.App’x 958, 959 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Incarcerating a

prisoner after the expiration of his maximum sentence may result in a constitutional violation.

However, the actual computation of [petitioner’s] prison term involves a matter of state law not

cognizable under [§ 2254].”) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68); see also Howard v. White, 76 F.App’x 52,

53 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding petitioner’s challenge to the state court’s interpretation and

application of state sentencing laws and guidelines is a matter of state concern and is not

cognizable on federal habeas review).

Mr. Hall’s claim appears to be based on his interpretation of Ohio sentencing law. Detailed

above, Mr. Hall was convicted of murder in 1975 and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15

years to life in prison. (ECF #12-1 at PageID 55). In 1990, the APA released him on parole. (Id. at

PageID 444). In 1992, while on parole, Mr. Hall was convicted of felonious assault and sentenced

to 11 to 15 years in prison. (Id. at PageID 59, 61). In December 1992, the APA revoked his 1990

1 To the extent Mr. Hall asserts a tort claim for false imprisonment (see ECF #17 at

PageID 721-22), such a claim fails for multiple reasons. First, “claims raised for the first time in a

traverse are not properly before a district court.” See Royster v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst.,

No. 18-3362, 2018 WL 8138770, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2018). Second, there is no indication

Mr. Hall fairly presented the claim to the state courts. And third, a civil tort judgment “lacks the

authority to set aside a criminal conviction or its accompanying sentence.” See In re Campbell,

874 F.3d 454, 461 (6th Cir. 2017).

parole. (Id. at PageID 447-48). Under the authority of former Revised Code § 2929.41(B)(3),

ODRC aggregated the 1975 and 1992 sentences, resulting in a sentence of 26 years to life in

prison. (ECF #12-1 at PageID 443, 451). The version of Revised Code § 2929.41(B)(3) in effect at

the time provided that “[a] sentence of imprisonment shall be served consecutively to any other

sentence of imprisonment . . . [w]hen it is imposed for a new felony committed by a probationer,

parolee, or escapee.” Though Mr. Hall does not explicitly challenge the state court’s application of

Revised Code § 2929.41(B)(3), he does claim the 1975 sentence is “expired” because the trial court

did not order the 1992 sentence be served consecutively to the 1975 sentence and contends the

ODRC does not have the authority to make that determination. (ECF #17 at PageID 723-25)

(citing state case law). These are matters of state concern not cognizable on federal habeas review.

Though Mr. Hall twice references that he was denied due process of law because ODRC

aggregated his sentences (see ECF #10 at PageID 14; ECF #17 at PageID 725), these brief

invocations to due process do not convert his arguments about a misapplication of Ohio

sentencing law into a federal due-process claim—let alone one that was presented to the state courts

and properly preserved for habeas review. See McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681-82 (6th Cir.

2000) (holding allegations of a denial of fair trial and due process did not turn an argument about

Ohio’s rape-shield law into a federal constitutional claim).

Habeas relief may be available if an alleged error of state law subjected the petitioner to a

“fundamentally unfair criminal process.” Williams, 460 F.3d at 816 (6th Cir. 2006). But “the

category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness is defined very narrowly,” and includes

only state rulings that “offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience

of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007)

(cleaned up). When the petitioner raises a claim that state law error resulted in fundamental

unfairness, the petitioner bears the burden of showing “the principle of procedure violated by the

rule (and allegedly required by due process)” is fundamental. Id. To the extent Mr. Hall’s claim can

be construed as alleging the misapplication of state sentencing laws was fundamentally unfair, he is

still not entitled to habeas relief because the record does not reflect that he is being held beyond

the expiration of his maximum sentence.

As noted above, Mr. Hall insists the 1975 sentence “expired” when he was sentenced to 11-

to-15 years of imprisonment in 1992 because the trial court did not explicitly order the new

sentence be served consecutively to the 1975 sentence. Ohio case law interpreting former Revised

Code § 2929.41(B)(3) firmly establishes that the provision is self-executing and automatically

applies to impose consecutive sentences by operation of law. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, No. 00 CA

160, 2001 WL 950685, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2001) (concluding that former Rev. Code

§ 2929.41(B)(3) “is self-executing and does not require that the trial court specifically state that the

new sentence be served consecutively with the old sentence(s)”); State v. Steen, No. 93CA490, 1994

WL 322963, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 1994) (finding “[a]lthough the judgment entry from

Athens County did not explicitly make its sentence consecutive to those of Vinton and Ross

Counties, the terms of R.C. 2929.41 are self-executing”); State ex rel. Foster v. Ohio State Adult Parole

Auth., No. 91 AP–1109, 1992 WL 193719, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1992) (“[a]bsent a specific

indication to the contrary by the trial court, sentences imposed for crimes committed by parolees

are served consecutively with sentences upon which parole is subsequently revoked”). The state

court’s interpretation is binding on federal habeas review. See Duffel, 785 F.2d at 133.

Here, Mr. Hall was convicted in 1992 of an offense while on parole, triggering consecutive

sentences under then Revised Code § 2929.41(B)(3). The trial court did not need to explicitly

order the 1992 sentence be served consecutive to the 1975 sentence to effectuate a consecutive

sentence because § 2929.41(B)(3) automatically requires sentences be served consecutively. Thus,

under Ohio law, Mr. Hall’s 1975 sentence remained in effect after he was sentenced in 1992 and

did not “expire.” As such, Mr. Hall remains subject to a maximum term of life and has failed to

show that he is being held beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence.

Thus, if the District Court determined the petition was not procedurally defaulted, then I

would recommend the District Court DENY the petition as meritless.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus

unless a judge issues a COA and specifies the issues that can be raised on appeal. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c). “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). When a district court has determined a petitioner’s

constitutional claim to lack merit, the petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong” before receiving

a COA. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the district court denies a habeas

petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim,

a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling. Id. A showing that the appeal would succeed on the claim is not needed to grant a COA.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).

Mr. Hall has not made a substantial showing that he was denied any federal constitutional

right. Jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the claim is procedurally defaulted and

otherwise meritless. I thus recommend the District Court DENY Mr. Hall a COA on his single

claim for relief.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For these reasons, I recommend the District Court DISMISS the petition as procedurally

defaulted or, alternatively, DENY the petition as meritless. I further recommend the District

Court DENY Mr. Hall a certificate of appealability.

Dated: April 29, 2026

LWT

DARRELL A. CLAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OBJECTIONS, REVIEW, AND APPEAL

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Civ. R. 72.3(b). Properly asserted

objections shall be reviewed de novo by the assigned district judge.

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or

waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, either to the district judge or in a

subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or

whether the party responds to the Report and Recommendation. Berkshire v.

15

, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be specific and not

merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the Report and

Recommendation; “a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to

object.” , 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.

1991). Objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the

arguments in briefs submitted to the Magistrate Judge. “A reexamination of the

exact same argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific

objections ‘wastes judicial resources rather than saving them and runs contrary to

the purpose of the Magistrates Act.’” , No. 1:17-cv-186, 2018 WL

3018175, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) (quoting , 932 F.2d at 509). The

failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the interest of

justice. , 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).