The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in His Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way v. Jrj Pusok Holdings, LLC

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 24-0447

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The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in his Official Capacity as

Director of Right of Way,

Petitioners,

v.

JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC,

Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas

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Argued November 4, 2025

JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Huddle, and

Justice Young joined.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion.

JUSTICE HAWKINS filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice

Sullivan joined, and in which Chief Justice Blacklock joined except as to

Part III(A).

The right to own property is “fundamental, natural, inherent,

inalienable, not derived from the legislature and . . . preexist[s] even

constitutions.”1 The Texas Constitution grants the State the power to

interfere with this right only for public uses, subject to providing

adequate compensation to the landowner. When condemned property is

unnecessary for public use, the former owner has a statutory right to

repurchase the property from the State in defined circumstances. In this

case, we decide whether the State may claim immunity when a

landowner invokes this right.

We conclude it cannot. Repurchase claims derive from

constitutional limits placed on the State’s eminent domain power. The

Legislature placed a repurchase right among provisions authorizing

other suits for which the State lacks immunity. It granted trial courts

the power to determine all issues arising under such claims, expressly

including cases against the State. To the extent immunity exists, the

Legislature has waived it for such claims in the circumstances it has

prescribed.

Property Code Chapter 21 sets forth the criteria a landowner

must satisfy to allege a repurchase claim. As to those criteria, we hold

the State’s initiation of a condemnation suit to determine the value of

property it takes sufficiently establishes a taking “through” eminent

domain. A later settlement to fix that value does not waive the

repurchase right. Further, a landowner may repurchase a portion of the

land taken if only that portion is no longer necessary for public use.

Finally, a county court at law has jurisdiction over a repurchase claim.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals

1 Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).

2

denying the State’s jurisdictional plea as to the landowner’s repurchase

claim.

I

A

Joyce Hutcherson, Rudolph Pusok, and Jimmie Pusok

(collectively, the Landowners) owned acreage in Tomball, Harris

County, Texas. In October 2013, the State notified the Landowners that

it intended to acquire their property for a highway project. The State

offered $496,120, describing the payment as “just compensation . . . in

accordance with State law.” The State outlined the process for accepting

its offer or submitting a counteroffer. It also provided a copy of the

Landowner’s Bill of Rights in accordance with Government Code

Section 402.031 and Property Code Chapter 21.2 The Bill of Rights

states that it “applies to any attempt by the government or a private

entity to take your property.” Pertinently, the Bill of Rights states:

If private property was condemned by a governmental

entity, and the public use for which the property was

acquired is canceled before that property is used for that

public purpose, no actual progress is made toward the

public use within ten years or the property becomes

unnecessary for public use within ten years, landowners

may have the right to repurchase the property for the price

2 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.031(a) (“The attorney general shall prepare

a written statement that includes a bill of rights for a property owner whose

real property may be acquired by a governmental or private entity through the

use of the entity’s eminent domain authority under Chapter 21, Property

Code.”); Tex. Prop. Code § 21.0112(a) (“[T]he entity [with eminent domain

authority] must send by first-class mail or otherwise provide a landowner’s bill

of rights statement provided by Section 402.031, Government Code . . . .”).

3

paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity

acquired the property through eminent domain.3

The Landowners received a final offer from the State in December

2013. The letter repeated the initial offer and further provided: “If this

offer is not accepted within fourteen (14) days from the date of delivery

of this letter, it will be considered as having been rejected. . . . If you

elect to reject this offer, eminent domain proceedings will be initiated by

the State.” The letter included another copy of the Landowner’s Bill of

Rights, as well as a deed the State described as a “proposed instrument

by which the property or property interest would be conveyed to the

State.”

The State petitioned for condemnation in April 2014 with a suit

in a Harris County civil court at law. The State alleged: (1) it intended

to acquire the land for public use; (2) it had sent a copy of the

Landowner’s Bill of Rights; and (3) it had made a bona fide purchase

offer as required by law.

About three weeks later, the State and the Landowners settled on

a value for the condemned land. A special warranty deed conveyed the

property to the State in exchange for $681,705. The deed provides: “The

consideration recited herein represents a settlement and compromise by

all parties as to the value of the property herein conveyed . . . .” The

Landowners agreed not to “seek any additional compensation, damages,

attorney’s fees, or expenses from the State of Texas.” The trial court

granted the State’s motion for nonsuit and dismissed the case in August

2014.

3 Emphasis added.

4

Government officials decided to reroute the highway project,

leaving a portion of the condemned land unused. Counsel for the

Landowners emailed the Department of Transportation, inquiring

whether the State still intended to use that portion of the property. A

representative for the Department’s Right of Way Division responded in

February 2017, stating: “Please see the attached pdf showing what

TxDOT would consider surplus.” When the State refused to sell the

Landowners the identified surplus property, the Landowners assigned

their rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, to pursue a repurchase claim.

B

JRJ sued the State and the Department of Transportation

Director in a different Harris County civil court at law, alleging

violations of JRJ’s repurchase right under Property Code Chapter 21.

The State responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign

immunity and lack of justiciability. The trial court granted the State’s

plea and dismissed the case.

The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of JRJ’s repurchase

claim.4 Relying on a similar case, the court of appeals first held that “a

full reading of Chapter 21, including the purpose of Subchapter E,”

demonstrates the State’s waiver of immunity for repurchase claims.5

4 693 S.W.3d 679, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023). JRJ did

not challenge the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming dismissal

of its additional inverse condemnation and ultra vires claims in this Court. Id.

at 688–89. Accordingly, we do not review those claims. See Tex. R. App.

P. 53.2(g).

5 693 S.W.3d at 683–84 (quoting State v. LBJ/Brookhaven Invs., L.P.,

650 S.W.3d 922, 932 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied)).

5

Second, the court reasoned that the State acquired JRJ’s property

“through eminent domain” because the State compelled the transfer by

initiating a condemnation action.6 Finally, in a supplemental opinion

denying the State’s motion for rehearing, the court of appeals concluded

that the Harris County civil court at law had jurisdiction to decide the

repurchase claim.7 We granted the State’s petition for review, in which

it challenges each of these holdings.

II

We first address whether sovereign immunity bars repurchase

claims, conferred as a landowner’s “right,” when the State designates

property as unnecessary for public use.8

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that “no state can be

sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner

indicated by that consent.”9 Although it is the Legislature’s role to waive

sovereign immunity, “it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define

the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under

what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”10

6 Id. at 685.

7 693 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024).

8 The State properly asserted its immunity defense in a plea to the

jurisdiction. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). Whether a court

has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. City of

Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2020).

9 Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847).

10 Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006).

6

Our analysis begins with an acknowledgment that “the State

derives its authority from ‘the people.’”11 “[T]o waive immunity, consent

to suit must ordinarily be found in a constitutional provision or

legislative enactment.”12 “[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver

of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and

unambiguous language.”13 The Legislature may simply state that

“sovereign immunity is waived” for a particular claim,14 but when it does

not, the rule “cannot be applied so rigidly that the almost certain intent

of the Legislature is disregarded.”15 As always, we consider statutory

language in its full context.16

11 Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. 2003)

(quoting Tex. Const. art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people,

and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for

their benefit.”)).

12 Id.

13 Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034.

14 See, e.g., id. § 554.0035 (“Sovereign immunity is waived and abolished

to the extent of liability for the relief allowed under this chapter for a violation

of this chapter.”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 110.008(a) (“Subject to

Section 110.006, sovereign immunity . . . from liability is waived and abolished

to the extent of liability created by Section 110.005 . . . .”); Tex. Nat. Res. Code

§ 52.035(c) (“The state waives its right to claim sovereign immunity in any

action commenced against the state . . . .”).

15 Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2000)

(quoting City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1995)).

16 See Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 69 (Tex. 2019)

(“Statutes cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to considerations

evidenced in affiliated statutes.” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections

on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1947))).

7

A

Our Constitution recognizes both adequate-compensation and

public-use limits on the State’s eminent domain power.17 Beginning with

the 1876 Constitution, it provided: “No person’s property shall be taken,

damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate

compensation being made . . . .”18 To that end, the Legislature prescribes

a process for adjudicating the “adequate compensation” the State must

pay.19

The past half-century has seen a shift toward strengthening

landowner protections based on the public-use limit to the eminent

domain power. Our early jurisprudence recognized immunity as a

potential defense to suits grounded in the takings clause.20 The law

changed significantly in 1980, however, when our Court recognized

inverse condemnation claims in Steele v. City of Houston.21 We held that

the State has no immunity against condemnation claims when it takes

17 George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas: An

Annotated and Comparative Analysis 63 (1977); see also Repub. Tex. Const. of

1836, Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas

1822–1897, at 1083 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (“Thirteenth. No person’s

particular services shall be demanded, nor property taken or applied to public

use, unless by the consent of himself or his representative, without just

compensation being made therefor according to law.”).

18 Tex. Const. of 1876, art. I, § 17.

19 See Tex. Prop. Code § 21.011.

20 See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 567–68 (Tex. 2012)

(summarizing the history of our eminent domain and inverse condemnation

jurisprudence).

21 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980).

8

property via eminent domain and fails to pay adequate compensation.22

We reasoned that “[t]he Constitution itself is the authorization for

compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of

governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction of

property for public use.”23 From Steele onward, our Court has

acknowledged that “the Takings Clause is self-executing—that it alone

authorizes suit, regardless of whether the Legislature has statutorily

provided for it.”24

In 2003, the Legislature created the first statutory repurchase

right. Appended to the existing Property Code chapter governing

eminent domain, the right applied to property “acquired by a

governmental entity through eminent domain for a public use that was

canceled before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition.”25 Under

this version of the statute, the government was required to notify the

property owner that the property was no longer designated for public

use and offer to sell it “for the fair market value of the property at the

time the public use was canceled.”26

22 Id.

23 Id.; see also State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007)

(“[S]overeign immunity does not shield the State from a claim based upon a

taking under Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, known as the

‘takings clause.’”).

24 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568.

25 Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen.

Laws 4739, 4739 (amended 2011).

26 Id. at 4740.

9

Two years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo

v. City of New London,27 upholding private economic development as a

valid public use under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.28 In

reaching its controversial holding, however, the Court emphasized that

“nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further

restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”29 Over forty states

accepted the invitation and amended their laws. Among these, fifteen

states either created or strengthened the right to repurchase condemned

property no longer intended for public use.30

Texas responded to Kelo in three relevant ways. First, in 2007,

the Legislature proposed expanding the repurchase right and to require

the government to resell the property at the price the government paid

to acquire it, rather than fair market value at the time of repurchase.31

To eliminate any gift clause bar, the Legislature also proposed a

corresponding amendment to the Constitution.32 The Governor vetoed

27 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

28 Id. at 483–84.

29 Id. at 489.

30 See Ala. Code § 11-47-170(c) (2005); Fla. Stat. § 73.013(1)(f)(2) (2006);

Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (2006); Ind. Code § 32-24-1-15 (2006); Iowa Code

§ 6B.56 (2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1144(a) (2006); La. Const. Ann. art. I,

§ 4(H) (amended 2006); Minn. Stat. § 117.226(a) (2006); Nev. Const. art. I,

§ 22(6) (2008); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.211 (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 17

(2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 35.385 (2011); S.D. Codified Laws § 11-7-22.2 (2006);

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-17-1005(a)–(b) (2014); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(d)

(2007).

31 Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

32 Tex. H.J.R. 30, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

10

the statutory amendments, citing cost,33 but the People of Texas

nonetheless voted to amend the Constitution to expressly permit the

repurchase of property “at the price the entity paid at the time of

acquisition” if: “(1) the public use . . . is canceled; (2) no actual progress

is made toward the public use during a prescribed period of time; or

(3) the property is unnecessary for the public use.”34

Second, after the next legislative session, the People of Texas

further amended the Constitution to enshrine additional limits on the

eminent domain power found in Article I, Section 17.35 The limits

focused on the public-use requirement, mandating that a taking must

be for:

(1) the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property,

notwithstanding an incidental use, by:

(A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the

public at large; or

(B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain

under law; or

(2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of

property.36

33 Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j; see also Tex. Leg. Council, Analyses of

34

Proposed Constitutional Amendments 49–55 (2007) (summarizing the history

of Section 52j).

35 Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., § 1.01, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 5655,

5655–56.

36 Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).

11

Whatever power the State enjoyed in 1876, the People curtailed it in

response to perceived abuses of the public use requirement.37

Finally, building on this history, the Legislature succeeded in

amending Chapter 21 in 2011.38 Like the vetoed 2007 amendment, the

2011 amendments require the governmental entity to resell the property

at “the price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity

acquired the property through eminent domain.”39 Bearing this history

in mind, we turn to the statutory framework.

B

Chapter 21, Subchapter A provides that a district court may

decide “all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the

assessment of damages,” in a suit involving a claim for property

“occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority”:

A district court may determine all issues, including the

authority to condemn property and the assessment of

damages, in any suit:

(1) in which this state, a political subdivision of this

state, a person, an association of persons, or a

corporation is a party; and

(2) that involves a claim for property or for damages

to property occupied by the party under the

37 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (acknowledging that states may “impose

‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline”); see KMS

Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 194–200 (Tex. 2019)

(Blacklock, J., dissenting) (connecting the dissenting opinions in Kelo to the

Texas constitutional amendments and describing new limitations on the

takings clause as a “judicially administrable legal standard”).

38 Act of May 6, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws

354, 361–63 (codified at Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.101–.103).

39 Id.

12

party’s eminent domain authority or for an

injunction to prevent the party from entering or

using the property under the party’s eminent

domain authority.40

Subchapter E, Section 21.101 provides that a person whose

property is acquired “through eminent domain,” as well as that person’s

successors and assigns, are “entitled to repurchase the property” under

certain conditions:

(1) the public use for which the property was acquired

through eminent domain is canceled before the property

is used for that public use;

(2) no actual progress is made toward the public use for

which the property was acquired between the date of

acquisition and the 10th anniversary of that date;

(3) the property becomes unnecessary for the public use for

which the property was acquired, or a substantially

similar public use, before the 10th anniversary of the

date of acquisition;

(4) the entity that acquired the property through eminent

domain:

(A) has an obligation to pay ad valorem taxes on the

acquired property;

(B) has received a tax bill from the taxing authority

for the ad valorem taxes on the acquired

property; and

(C) has failed to pay any ad valorem taxes on the

acquired property before the third anniversary of

the date on which the unpaid taxes became due;

or

(5) the entity:

40 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.003.

13

(A) acquired through eminent domain a fee simple

interest in the property;

(B) has an obligation to pay ad valorem taxes on the

acquired property;

(C) has received a tax bill from the taxing authority

for the ad valorem taxes on the acquired

property; and

(D) has failed to pay any ad valorem taxes on the

acquired property before the third anniversary of

the date on which the unpaid taxes became due.41

Finally, “[a] district court may determine all issues in any suit regarding

the repurchase of a real property interest acquired through eminent

domain.”42

The State contends that these statutes confer jurisdiction over

repurchase claims but grant no waiver of immunity to pursue them

against the State. Despite the recent constitutional amendments, the

State argues that repurchase is a statutory right not found in the

Constitution. JRJ responds that the statute authorizes relief associated

with a waiver of immunity—such as damages—for “all issues” in which

the State occupies property “under its eminent domain authority.”43

Such a reading is consistent with the Constitution’s authorization that

the State offer a repurchase price valued as of the time of acquisition.

We generally find waiver “if the Legislature requires that the

[governmental] entity be joined in a lawsuit even though the entity

41 Id. § 21.101(a).

42 Id. § 21.101(c).

43 Id. § 21.003.

14

would otherwise be immune from suit.”44 We also consider whether the

Legislature “provided an objective limitation on the governmental

entity’s potential liability” as well as “whether the statutory provisions

would serve any purpose absent a waiver of immunity.”45

We conclude that the State is not immune from repurchase

claims.46 First, the Legislature nested the repurchase statute within

existing law governing eminent domain—proceedings from which the

State enjoys no immunity.47 Chapter 21 permits district courts to

“determine all issues . . . in any suit . . . in which this state . . . is a party”

and that involves “a claim for property . . . occupied by the party under

the party’s eminent domain authority.”48 The repurchase statute

implements the 2009 constitutional amendments limiting public use,

just as an inverse-condemnation claim fulfills the

adequate-compensation guarantee. As we reasoned in Hidalgo County

44 Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. 2019)

(alteration in original) (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l

Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 844 (Tex. 2009)).

45 Id. (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 844).

46 See Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435

(Tex. 2016) (“The judiciary determines the applicability of immunity in the first

instance and delineates its boundaries. If immunity is applicable, then the

judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.” (citation omitted)).

47 See Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568 (“[T]he Takings Clause is

self-executing . . . it alone authorizes suit, regardless of whether the

Legislature has statutorily provided for it.”).

48 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.003. We also presume that the Legislature acted

with knowledge of our decision in Steele twenty years earlier, in which we held

that no immunity exists against inverse condemnation claims. 603 S.W.2d at

791; see In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. 2012) (“We presume the

Legislature is aware of relevant case law when it enacts or modifies statutes.”).

15

Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County Irrigation District

No. 1,49 the government is not immune from claims on the “back end”

after it takes property without compensation.50 Similarly, the

government is not immune from claims involving condemned property

no longer intended to benefit the public.51 The statute cannot be read

consistently with the Constitution in the absence of a waiver.52

The 2011 statutory amendments make clear that the Legislature

anticipated the State as a defendant in suits to vindicate repurchase

rights. It expressly authorized district courts to “determine all issues in

any suit regarding the repurchase.”53 The State and the dissent reduce

this to jurisdictional language.54 However, the authorization to

“determine all issues” does not only appear in the jurisdictional

49 669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2023).

50 Id. at 187.

51 We have not been asked to determine whether the public-use

requirement is self-executing. The relationship between the statutory

repurchase right, the public-use requirement, inverse condemnation claims,

and eminent domain proceedings forms the background against which the

Legislature acted.

52 See Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 S.W.3d

845, 850 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]e must look at whether a statute makes any sense if

immunity is not waived.” (quoting Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d at 6)).

53 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(c) (emphasis added).

54 The dissent’s reliance on In re Nestle USA, 359 S.W.3d 207 (Tex.

2012), is misplaced. Post at 16 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The statutes involved

in that case granted “exclusive and original jurisdiction” to hear taxpayer

suits. Nestle USA, 359 S.W.3d at 209–10 (emphasis added). In contrast,

Subchapter E authorizes the courts to “determine all issues” in repurchase

claims, and Chapter 21 also expressly contemplates that courts may assess

damages against the State. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c).

16

subchapter; it also appears in Subchapter E—the right of repurchase—

without jurisdictional limitation.55 In amending a chapter in which the

State enjoys no immunity, while mindful of the People’s desire for

heightened scrutiny of the public use requirement, the Legislature

expressly authorized property owners to seek judicial vindication of the

public use limitation in claims against the State.

Further, Chapter 21 objectively limits the government’s liability

for repurchase claims. Mirroring the Constitution, Section 21.103(b)

provides that “the [condemning] entity shall offer to sell the property

interest . . . for the price paid to the owner . . . at the time the entity

acquired the property through eminent domain.”56 The funds the State

expended to acquire the land are returned to the State, and the property

is returned to the landowners upon payment of those funds.

What the State loses is any appreciation in the property’s value

between the time it was condemned and the repurchase.57 But under the

constitutional and statutory framework, the State was never entitled to

profit from its eminent domain authority. The People amended the

Constitution to permit the landowner to recover the loss of that profit,

with supporters aiming to minimize speculative overuse of

condemnation authority.58 Any liability the repurchase right creates for

the government is both limited and purposeful.

55 See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c).

56 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

57 JRJ also seeks damages, fees, and costs; whether it is entitled to any

of these in a repurchase suit is far from certain.

58 See Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j; Tex. Leg. Council, Analyses of Proposed

Constitutional Amendments 51 (2007) (reporting supporters as arguing “[i]f

17

Finally, the repurchase right serves virtually no purpose absent

a waiver of immunity, distinguishing this case from Texas Department

of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley.59 There, we concluded that a

provision requiring compensation for intergovernmental property

transfers “provides a mechanism” for “budgetary protection” between

and among government agencies but does not waive immunity to permit

one governmental unit to obtain a money judgment against another.60

Much like we reasoned in Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Dallas Area

Rapid Transit in connection with another statute, “[t]he obvious purpose

of [the statute]—indeed, its only apparent purpose—is to provide for

rights that can actually be exercised.”61 The subchapter “creating

specific, restricted ‘rights’” for a landowner to repurchase their formerly

condemned property “cannot reasonably be read to tacitly condition

their exercise on a separate waiver of immunity” when it is directly

linked to a constitutional limit on the State’s power.62

the amendment results in giving certain property owners a windfall from any

increase in the value of the property, the amendment is still fair because it

would be a disincentive to governmental entities taking property they may not

need and may indirectly reduce instances in which property is taken through

eminent domain”).

59 146 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2004).

60 Id. at 643–44.

61 369 S.W.3d at 850.

62 Id. Section 21.102 supports this reading by providing that once

condemned property becomes surplus, the condemning entity “shall” contact

the original owner by certified mail and inform the owner of its right to

repurchase the property.

18

The State and the dissent contend that the repurchase statute is

effective even if the State is immune because some private entities

exercise condemnation authority.63 Initially, however, the repurchase

statute applied only to “property . . . acquired by a governmental

entity”—not by private entities.64 It was not until 2011 that the

Legislature expanded the right to allow landowners to repurchase land

condemned by private entities.65 The Legislature’s later expansion did

not disavow the repurchase right first granted to curb State overreach

in exercising its constitutionally prescribed authority.

Our approach coheres with our reasoning in Texas A&M

University–Kingsville v. Lawson.66 In that case, the statute governing

the underlying claim provided a legislative waiver of immunity.67 The

parties settled, but the plaintiff later sued for breach of the settlement

agreement.68 In rejecting the university’s immunity defense, a plurality

of the Court held that “a governmental entity that settles a suit in which

it lacks immunity cannot claim immunity in a subsequent suit to enforce

the settlement.”69 Similarly, the Landowners in this case ceded their

63 Post at 23–24 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

64 Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen.

Laws 4739, 4739.

65 Act of May 6, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws

354, 361.

66 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.).

67 Id. at 518–19, 521.

68 Id. at 519.

69 Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2019) (citing

Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 522–23).

19

property to the State’s eminent domain power—a power subject to a

public-use limitation. This limitation carries forward in the same way a

waiver of immunity from the underlying claim carried forward in

Lawson.

We cannot ignore Chapter 21’s constitutional overlay, requiring

that the State take property only for public use.70 Over time, this matter

became one of such importance that the People twice amended our

state’s Constitution.71 We hold the State is not immune from Chapter 21

repurchase claims.72

III

We next turn to whether JRJ alleges a repurchase claim

satisfying Chapter 21’s criteria. The State first contends that it did not

acquire the property “through eminent domain,” as required by

70 Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).

71 See In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 158 (Tex. 2024) (“‘Our

guiding principle when interpreting the Texas Constitution is to give effect to

the intent of the voters who adopted it,’ which requires sensitivity to the full

context of the constitutional language and history.” (internal citation omitted)

(quoting Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police & Fire Pension Sys., 594 S.W.3d

309, 313 (Tex. 2020))). Relying on precedent from 1897, the dissent contends

that the State need honor the public use requirement only at the moment of

condemnation. Post at 18–20 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing City of San

Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 434 (1897)). This ignores the obligations

found in the recent amendments to the Texas Constitution limiting State

power with respect to public use.

72 Our holding in this case does not authorize repurchase suits outside

Chapter 21’s strictures. See City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 236

(Tex. 2011) (“The constitution waives immunity for suits brought under the

Takings Clause, but this does not mean that a constitutional suit may be

brought in every instance. . . . When the Legislature creates [an eminent

domain] statutory procedure, recourse may be had to a constitutional suit only

where the procedure proves inadequate . . . .” (citation omitted)).

20

Chapter 21, because it later settled upon the value of the condemned

property with the Landowners. The State next contends that Chapter 21

does not apply when only a portion of the property is no longer necessary

for public use. We address these arguments in turn.

A

A right of repurchase belongs to “[a] person from whom a real

property interest is acquired by an entity through eminent domain for a

public use.”73 The State concedes that it acquired the property for public

use, and it does not dispute that JRJ meets one of the five predicates for

seeking repurchase. The State argues, however, that its acquisition was

not “through eminent domain,” as Chapter 21 requires, because the

Landowners settled with the State on a value for the land after the State

filed suit.

“Through” means “by way of”; “passage into and out of a

treatment, handling, or process”; or is “a function word to indicate

means, agency, or intermediacy.”74 “Eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent

power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,

esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable

compensation for the taking.”75 The logical reading of “through eminent

73 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(a) (emphasis added). The statute’s extension

of the repurchase right to a landowner’s assigns addresses the State’s

argument in its jurisdictional plea that JRJ lacks a justiciable interest.

74 Through, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged

(Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2021); Through, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/through (last visited June 5,

2026).

75 Eminent Domain, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

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domain” is “by means of the State’s power to take private property for

public use.”76

The State and the dissent posit that property is not acquired

“through eminent domain” absent a final judgment adjudicating the

property’s value.77 When analyzing statutes, we presume the

Legislature chose its words with care and that “words not included were

purposefully omitted.”78 The State’s interpretation essentially swaps the

language the Legislature uses—“eminent domain”—for language it did

not use—“condemnation judgment.”79 Eminent domain is not a process

that the State “goes through.”80 Rather, eminent domain is the State’s

power.

A settlement as to the property’s value does not alter the State’s

acquisition of it “through eminent domain.” The deed in this case

acknowledges the Landowners conveyed the property as a result of “ED

proceedings.” The Landowners did not sell the property in an arm’s

length transaction on the open market; rather, the Landowners

surrendered their property in concession to the State’s coercive power.

76 See Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 500 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. 2016) (“If

an undefined term has multiple common meanings, it is not necessarily

ambiguous; rather, we will apply the definition most consistent with the

context of the statutory scheme.”).

77 Post at 25–27 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

78 In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008).

79 See KMS Retail Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d at 183 (“We must enforce the

statute ‘as written’ and ‘refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.’”

(quoting Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014)

(plurality op.))).

80 Post at 26 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

22

Once the State invokes its eminent domain power, landowners

need not proceed to a judgment as to adequate compensation to preserve

their repurchase right.81 The State’s forced transfer via a condemnation

suit is an exercise of its power to obtain the property “through eminent

domain.”82

B

The State next contends that the right of repurchase does not

apply when only a portion of the condemned property is no longer

necessary for public use. Under Section 21.101(a), a landowner is

“entitled to repurchase the property.”83 The phrase “the property” is

used consistently throughout Subchapter E to refer to the “real property

interest . . . acquired by an entity through eminent domain.”84 The State

observes that Section 21.101(a) does not expressly permit the

repurchase of a portion of the property. Neither, however, does the

statute reference “the entire property.” A portion of property is

accurately described as “property.”85 We decline to adopt an

interpretation that limits the right in a manner the Legislature did not

indicate.

81 See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Tex.

1997) (emphasizing that Texas law favors settlement).

82 We do not address whether other kinds of State action sufficiently

invoke the State’s eminent domain power.

83 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(a).

84 See, e.g., id.; id. §§ 21.102, .1021, .103.

85 See Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “real

property” as “[l]and and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it,

excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land”).

23

This case illustrates the repurchase right in practice. The

Department used ninety-seven percent of the condemned property for a

highway project. By the Department’s admission, the remaining three

percent of the property became surplus within ten years of its

acquisition.86 Once the State identifies that condemned property is no

longer required for public use—as it did in this case—the State must

notify the landowner of its repurchase right.87

The State argues that it is difficult to calculate a price for a partial

repurchase. We are not persuaded. The State offered to sell the surplus

portion in this case at its current fair market value, indicating it is

capable of valuation.88 Section 21.103(b) provides the rule for

determining the repurchase price: “the price paid to the owner by the

entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent

domain.”89 The State can apply this statutory directive to calculate an

offer price on portions of land it deems unnecessary for public use.

86 A repurchase right exists if “the property becomes unnecessary for

the public use for which the property was acquired, or a substantially similar

public use, before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition.” Tex. Prop.

Code § 21.101(a)(3).

87 Id. § 21.102(3).

88 The dissent refers to the State’s offer to sell the property at today’s

fair market value. Post at 17–18 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The State’s offer

aligns with the statute before the post-Kelo constitutional amendments rather

than the current version, which requires it to be valued at the time the State

takes the property. Compare Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2,

sec. 21.103(b), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4739, 4740 (“[T]he governmental entity

shall offer to sell the property interest to the person for the fair market value

of the property at the time the public use was canceled.” (emphasis added)),

with Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

89 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

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IV

Finally, we address the trial court’s jurisdiction. Chapter 21

provides that “[d]istrict courts and county courts at law have concurrent

jurisdiction in eminent domain cases.”90 The State contends that a

repurchase claim is not an “eminent domain case.”

Article V of the Texas Constitution vests judicial power in various

courts, including this Court, district courts, county courts, and “such

other courts as may be provided by law.”91 “County courts at law are

among ‘such other courts as may be provided by law.’”92 The Legislature

expressly granted such courts concurrent jurisdiction in eminent

domain cases.93 In placing repurchase claims within Chapter 21, and in

granting county courts at law jurisdiction over “eminent domain cases,”

the Legislature made it plain: first, a repurchase claim is a species of an

eminent domain case; and second, county courts at law have concurrent

jurisdiction to hear such a case. Chapter 21 does not parse jurisdiction

depending on the types of claims found within it. Instead,

Sections 21.003 and 21.101(c) grant power to the district courts, each

stating that “[a] district court may determine all issues” in suits

Chapter 21 governs.94 Section 21.001 then grants county courts at law

90 Id. § 21.001.

91 Tex. Const. art. V, § 1.

92 Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. 2023)

(quoting Tex. Const. art. V, § 1).

93 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.001.

94 Id. §§ 21.003, .101(c).

25

commensurate power.95 Together, these provisions vest district courts

and county courts at law with concurrent jurisdiction over eminent

domain cases and to hear and decide “all issues” pertaining to them.96

* * *

The State has no immunity from Chapter 21 claims to repurchase

condemned property no longer necessary for public use. The State’s

exercise of eminent domain power in a condemnation suit is property

acquired “through eminent domain,” regardless of the parties’ later

agreement upon the value of the property taken. Further, Chapter 21

permits the repurchase of a portion of condemned property no longer

necessary for public use. Finally, district courts and county courts at law

have concurrent jurisdiction to hear repurchase claims if other statutory

requirements are met. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court

of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Jane N. Bland

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 12, 2026

95See Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Reese, 146

S.W.2d 519, 524–25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1940, no writ) (noting that the

county court was historically the exclusive tribunal for initiating and executing

condemnation proceedings and listing Texas precedent).

96 Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c). Harris County Civil Courts at Law

have a jurisdictional limit requiring that the amount in controversy not exceed

$325,000. Tex. Gov’t Code § 25.1032(c). The parties may address the

applicability of this statute on remand.

26