Sally Wood v. Health Care Authority for Baptist Health, an affiliate of UAB Health System, d/b/a Baptist Medical Center South; and University of South Alabama, by and through its division, USA Health University Hospital (Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-24-900511).

Rel: June 12, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,

300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other

errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

_________________________

SC-2025-0132

_________________________

Sally Wood

v.

Health Care Authority for Baptist Health, an affiliate of UAB

Health System, d/b/a Baptist Medical Center South; and

University of South Alabama, by and through its division, USA

Health University Hospital

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court

(CV-24-900511)

McCOOL, Justice.

SC-2025-0132

Sally Wood appeals from the Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment

dismissing her action against the Health Care Authority for Baptist

Health, an affiliate for UAB Health System, d/b/a Baptist Medical Center

South ("Baptist"); and University of South Alabama, by and through its

division, USA Health University Hospital ("USA") (referred to

collectively as "the defendants"). We reverse the trial court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

According to the complaint, in October 2022, Wood was a passenger

in a vehicle driven by Tracy Horn and owned by Buna Palmer. While

traveling in Montgomery County, Horn drove on the wrong side of the

road and collided with an oncoming vehicle. Wood was seriously injured

in the collision. Wood was initially treated for her injuries at Baptist

Medical Center South, and then she was transferred to USA Health

University Hospital for further treatment.

On November 4, 2022, USA filed a hospital lien in the Mobile

Probate Court in the amount of $51,403.92. See § 35-11-370 et seq., Ala.

Code 1975. On November 14, 2023, Baptist filed a hospital lien in the

Montgomery Probate Court in the amount of $125,726.30. The liens

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secured payment for Wood's treatment from any settlement or recovery

she might receive on account of her injuries.

Palmer had an insurance policy that provided $25,000 in liability

coverage and $50,000 in underinsured-motorist coverage. In July 2023,

Wood reached a settlement in principle with Palmer's insurance company

for $75,000. The $50,000 from the underinsured-motorist coverage was

paid to Wood in July 2023, and it is currently being held in trust by

Wood's attorney. Concerning those proceeds, Wood signed a release with

the insurance company, releasing the insurance company from further

liability but promising to satisfy all liens and subrogation interests, as

required by law, from the proceeds. The $25,000 from the liability

coverage has not been paid to Wood. It appears that a settlement for that

amount has been agreed to in principle, but no release or settlement

agreement has been signed, and the insurance company is retaining

those proceeds until all liens have been satisfied.

In April 2024, Wood filed in the trial court a "complaint for

interpleader and declaratory relief," and she amended the complaint in

June 2024. In the complaint, Wood asked the trial court, "pursuant to

Rule 22 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure," to either declare that

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the defendants' liens are invalid or to determine the fair and reasonable

amounts that the defendants are owed for their services. The complaint

stated that Wood "stands ready to tender the funds to the court or to hold

funds in trust and tender them to the parties dependent upon and

pursuant to court order."

USA moved the trial court to dismiss Wood's complaint for lack of

jurisdiction. USA argued that it was entitled to State immunity under

Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 because it is an

agency of the State of Alabama.

Wood responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing that "[the trial

court] maintains jurisdiction over an interpleader dispute concerning the

amount or validity of the liens at issue." Wood also filed a supplemental

response, arguing that, if State immunity does apply and she cannot

challenge the liens, she would be denied due process under the Alabama

Constitution and the United States Constitution.

After holding a hearing, the trial court ordered the case to

mediation. However, the case did not settle in mediation.

On January 14, 2025, the trial court dismissed Wood's claims

against Baptist and USA. The trial court found:

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"Defendant University of South Alabama, by and

through its division, USA Health University Hospital

(Defendant USA) is a state entity.

"Defendant USA is immune from an interpleader and

declaratory action, and therefore this court has no jurisdiction

over Defendant USA.

"The Court further finds that Defendant USA is a

necessary party to the action, and that the action cannot

proceed solely against Defendant Baptist Health, d/b/a

Baptist Medical Center South (Defendant Baptist).

"Therefore, Defendant USA's Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against Defendant USA and

Defendant Baptist are DISMISSED with prejudice. No costs

taxed to any party, all costs incurred to be born by the party

that incurred them."

(Capitalization in the original.) Wood appealed to this Court.

Standard of Review

"A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a

presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d

297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This Court must accept the allegations

of the complaint as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke

Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002).

Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we

will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail

but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So.

2d at 299."

Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ala. 2003). Further,

"[m]atters of subject-matter jurisdiction are subject to de novo review."

DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011).

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SC-2025-0132

Discussion

On appeal, Wood argues that, contrary to the trial court's holding,

her interpleader claim does not implicate State immunity and that, thus,

the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over her claim and erred

in dismissing it. We agree.

In Ex parte Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, [Ms. SC-

2025-0240, Dec. 12, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2025), a patient who

received medical services at a state-university hospital brought an action

challenging a hospital lien asserted by the state university's board of

trustees. The patient's original complaint included an interpleader claim

seeking to deposit disputed settlement funds with the court so that

competing claims to those funds could be adjudicated. However, after the

board moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was entitled to

State immunity, the patient amended her complaint to remove the

interpleader claim and to proceed only on various tort, contract, and

constitutional claims. After the trial court denied the board's motion to

dismiss, the board petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.

This Court held that State immunity barred the patient from

pursuing the tort, contract, and constitutional claims, and, thus, we

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directed the trial court to grant the board's motion to dismiss. Id. at ___.

However, concerning the interpleader claim, this Court stated:

"[W]e note that, consistent with § 14 immunity principles,

Alabama courts have repeatedly entertained suits that

resolve hospital liens asserted by UAB Hospital through the

procedural mechanism for interpleader found in Rule 22, Ala.

R. Civ. P.

"Through interpleader claims, Alabama courts have

long adjudicated disputes over liens filed by state-run

hospitals without treating immunity as a jurisdictional bar.

For example, in Ex parte University of South Alabama, 761

So. 2d 240, 242 (Ala. 1999), this Court reviewed the merits of

an interpleader case involving a hospital 'operated by the

University of South Alabama.' Likewise, in Roberts v.

University of Alabama Hospital, 27 So. 3d 512, 514 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2008), the plaintiffs interpleaded two drafts that had

been issued by a liability insurer, and the trial court added a

hospital asserting a lien as a defendant and adjudicated the

lien's validity and amount. Other decisions reflect the same

practice. See, e.g., Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. University

of Alabama Hosp., 953 So. 2d 413 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)

(entertaining a declaratory-judgment action regarding a

hospital lien); Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Richards,

405 So. 3d 267, 271 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (relying on Roberts

to note that interpleader provides a proper avenue for

resolving hospital-lien disputes).

"These precedents show that Alabama courts

understand interpleader as a proper procedural vehicle for

litigating the validity and amount of hospital liens, even when

state-owned universities are the defendants. And even if the

defendant in some of those cases did not expressly raise an

affirmative immunity defense, this Court's failure to raise

subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu reinforces the point.

See, e.g., Puckett v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 408 So.

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3d 730, 733-34 (Ala. 2024) (Cook, J., dissenting) ('Although

the applicability of State immunity was not expressly decided

in the above-mentioned cases, we have held that State

immunity is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and that

appellate courts are " 'duty bound to notice ex mero motu the

absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.' " ' (quoting Baldwin

Cnty. v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003), quoting in

turn Stamps v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941,

945 n.2 (Ala. 1994))).

"The availability of interpleader is pivotal in the present

case. [The plaintiff] herself first recognized it as the proper

path for obtaining the relief she desired when she included an

interpleader claim in her original complaint and then

maintained that claim all the way through the hearing on the

Board's motion to dismiss. At that stage, she possessed a clear

procedural vehicle by which the trial court could have

exercised jurisdiction to resolve the validity and amount of the

lien.

"However, for reasons unknown to this Court, [the

plaintiff] chose to set that mechanism aside when she

withdrew her motion to deposit the settlement funds and then

amended her complaint to remove her interpleader claim. By

doing so, she relinquished a well-established avenue that

would have allowed the trial court to adjudicate her claim in

a manner that would not have run afoul of § 14."

Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes

omitted).

In the present case, Wood's attempt to litigate the validity and

amount of the hospital liens through an interpleader claim under Rule

22, Ala. R. Civ. P., did not implicate State immunity and, thus, did not

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SC-2025-0132

deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Further, unlike the plaintiff in Ex

parte Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, Wood has not

abandoned her interpleader claim. Therefore, the trial court erred in

granting USA's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and not allowing

Wood to pursue her interpleader claim.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, this Court holds that the trial court had

jurisdiction over Wood's interpleader claim and, consequently, erred in

dismissing the claim. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment,

and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Stewart, C.J., and Wise and Cook, JJ., concur.

Bryan, J., concurs in the result.

Shaw, J., dissents, with opinion, which Sellers and Parker, JJ., join.

Mendheim, J., dissents, with opinion.

9

SC-2025-0132

SHAW, Justice (dissenting).

The Alabama Constitution of 2022 states: "That the State of

Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."

Ala. Const. 2022, art. I, § 14. Section 14 "affords the State and its

agencies an 'absolute' immunity from suit in any court." Haley v.

Barbour Cnty., 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004). The University of South

Alabama ("USA") is an agency of the State and is absolutely immune

from suit: "USA is a State institution of higher learning and, as a matter

of law, is a State agency entitled to the absolute immunity of § 14." Ex

parte University of S. Alabama, 183 So. 3d 915, 919 (Ala. 2015). See also

Sarradett v. University of S. Alabama Med. Ctr., 484 So. 2d 426, 426 (Ala.

1986) ("[T]he operation of a hospital by a state university falls within the

realm of sovereign immunity.").

Sally Wood commenced a declaratory-judgment and interpleader

action naming as a defendant USA Health University Hospital, which is

a division of USA. Thus, a State agency -- essentially the State itself --

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has been made a defendant in a court of law. This violates § 14.1 Haley,

supra, and Ex parte University of S. Alabama, supra.

This does not mean that it is impossible to file suits over State

funds; there are "exceptions" to State immunity that may provide means

to resolve such disputes. See generally Ohio Valley Conference v. Jones,

385 So. 3d 948 (Ala. 2023) (discussing numerous such "exceptions" and

suits). But those suits require State officials to be named as defendants,

not the State or its agencies. Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So.

2d 17, 22 (Ala. 2007) (noting that any "exceptions" to § 14 immunity

"extend only to suits naming the proper State official in his or her

representative capacity" (emphasis added)). See also Alabama Dep't of

1It is true that prior caselaw in hospital-lien suits against State

agencies have failed to recognize the absolute immunity afforded by § 14.

Any argument that those decisions provide precedent that § 14 does not

apply to those suits is refuted by the decision in Ex parte Town of

Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1210 (Ala. 2006) (explaining why prior

decisions failing to recognize that an attorney-fee award against the

State is barred by § 14 cannot be deemed as precedent allowing such

awards, namely because the issue was "not decided by the courts and

made part of the opinion of the case"). See also Ex parte James, 836 So.

2d 813, 818 (Ala. 2002) ("Arguments based on what courts do not say,

logically speaking, are generally unreliable and should not be favored by

the judiciary; this is especially true when the judiciary is faced with, as

we are here, a contrary constitutional mandate ….").

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Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831, 841 (Ala. 2008) (noting that

"only State officers ... and not State agencies" may be named as

defendants in suits under the "exceptions" to § 14 immunity).

If this Court were to create a new "exception" to the Constitution

for declaratory-judgment and interpleader suits involving hospital liens,

such suits could be maintained only against State officials and not the

State or its agencies. Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 841 (holding that the

"exception" to § 14 allowing certain declaratory-judgment suits applies

only to suits against State officers and not against State agencies).

Naming the State or one of its agencies as a defendant is contrary to the

clear text of the Constitution.

Sellers and Parker, JJ., concur.

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MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

On January 14, 2025, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered an

order dismissing Sally Wood's action against the University of South

Alabama ("the University") and "Baptist Health, d/b/a Baptist Medical

Center South" ("Baptist Health"). I agree with Justice Shaw that, based

on our State-immunity precedents, the circuit court did not err in

dismissing Wood's action against the University.

I note that the circuit court also dismissed the action against

Baptist Health , stating the following in the January 2025 order:

"The Court further finds that [the University] is a

necessary party to the action, and that the action cannot

proceed solely against [Baptist Health].

"Therefore, [the University's] Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against [the University] and

[Baptist Health] are DISMISSED with prejudice."

(Capitalization in original.)

On appeal, Wood has made no argument that the circuit court erred

by dismissing her claims against Baptist Health based on the application

of Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P. Specifically, Wood has not argued that the

circuit court erred by dismissing the action because, even assuming the

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dismissal of the University was proper, she should have been permitted

to substitute the proper state officials for the University so that her

action could proceed against them and Baptist Health. While this Court

may raise the absence of a necessary party under Rule 19 ex mero motu,

see Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 892

So. 2d 369, 371 (Ala. 2004), in the present case the action is not at risk of

proceeding in the absence of a necessary party and, when the January

2025 order was entered, the same claims Wood alleged against the

University in the present action were pending, as Wood's counterclaims,

in an action commenced against her by the University in the Mobile

Circuit Court.

I further note that, even if this Court were to conclude that the case

should be remanded to allow Wood to add the proper state officials as

defendants in lieu of the University, I would not presume that the circuit

court might err regarding the application of Ala. Code 1975, § 35-11-370

et seq., despite the absence of any binding precedent from this Court

addressing State immunity in that context. Unlike the main opinion, I

cannot conclude that dicta from Ex parte Board of Trustees of the

University of Alabama, [Ms. SC-2025-0240, Dec. 12, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___

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(Ala. 2025) -- which in turn based its rationale on (1) a dissenting opinion

from a case that was affirmed without an opinion, see Puckett v. Board

of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama, 408 So. 3d 730, 733-34 (Ala. 2024) (Cook,

J., dissenting), which has no precedential value, see Rule 53(d), Ala. R.

App. P., and (2) precedents not addressing the issue whether State

immunity bars an action under Ala. Code 1975, § 35-11-373 -- reflect a

precedential ruling, much less a rationale, of this Court. See Ex parte

Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1210 (Ala. 2006) (Even if raised

by the parties, a jurisdictional issue "not decided by the courts and made

part of the opinion of the case" has no precedential effect.); see also

Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144-45 (2011)

("When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in

a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no

defect existed. … The Court would risk error if it relied on assumptions

that have gone unstated and unexamined."). And given the complexities

of the hospital-lien issue, including questions whether a state-agency-

operated hospital is authorized to file a lien under the plain language of

Ala. Code 1975, § 35-11-370 (stating that "[a]ny person, firm, hospital

authority, or corporation operating a hospital in this state shall have a

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lien …."), see also Ala. Code 1975, § 1-1-1(10) (stating that "person"

"[i]ncludes an individual, corporation, partnership, company, or other

business entity"), and the potential separation-of-powers concerns that

may be implicated by an overly broad construction of a trial court's power

under § 35-11-373 in relation to any lien held by a state-agency-operated

hospital "for all reasonable charges for hospital care, treatment, and

maintenance," § 35-11-370, surely a fully developed record and some

rationale beyond "well we have done it before" would be necessary to

address the issue.

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