MENDES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ADAM JOSHUA MENDES, : No. 3:19-CV-2087

:

Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)

:

v. :

:

CO ROBACZEWSKI and :

CO SHERRILL, :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Adam Mendes, an inmate proceeding pro se, initiated

this civil rights action against seven individuals affiliated with the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) on October 24, 2019.

Doc. 1. After about six years of litigation, only two corrections officers,

Defendants Robaczewski and Sherrill1 (collectively “the Defendants”)

remain, along with two causes of action asserted under the Eighth

Amendment of the United States Constitution: (1) a conditions of

confinement claim against Robaczewski alone; and (2) a denial of

medical care claim against both Defendants. Doc. 48 at 3–4.

1 The record does not clarify the Defendants’ first names.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (“the Motion,” Doc. 60), accompanied by a supporting brief

(Doc. 62) and statement of facts (Doc. 63). The Motion is fully briefed

and ripe for decision, and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 73. Docs. 19; 75.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant summary

judgment on Mendes’s Eight Amendment claim for denial of medical

care, and dismiss Sherrill from this action. The Court will deny

summary judgment on Mendes’s Eight Amendment conditions of

confinement claim against Robaczewski. Finally, the Court will grant

dismissal of Mendes’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages.

II. Background

A. The Parties’ Statements of Material Facts

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the Defendants’

statement of facts is accepted in its entirety, as Mendes admitted all of

those factual averments in his own responsive statement of material

facts. Doc. 73. Mendes’s filing also presents averments that fail to

follow summary judgment procedures: (1) two unsupported statements

in Paragraphs 4 and 5, id. at 1; and (2) three “disputed facts,” which

also lack factual support and contain conclusory legal averments. See

id. at 3. For those reasons, neither set of statements may be deemed

admitted.

Litigants who oppose a motion for summary judgment must file

their own statement of facts that: (1) directly and correspondingly

“respond[] to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the [movant’s]

statement”; and (2) “include references to the parts of the record that

support the statements.” M.D. Pa. L. R. 56.1. Without such opposition,

“[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by

the moving party will be deemed to be admitted[.]” Id. This is so

because pro se litigants, like other litigants, must follow the Local

Rules. See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (establishing

that pro se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by

the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”) (quoting Mala v.

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

Here, Mendes’s uncited statements and purported disputed facts

run afoul of the summary judgment procedures on two grounds. First,

all of his factual averment are advanced without any cited support in

the record. “[I]n summary judgment motion practice, ‘[t]he burden

remains on the nonmoving party, not the court, to identify sufficient

facts from the record that show the existence of a genuine issue for

trial.’” Gannaway v. Prime Care Med., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 511, 524

(E.D. Pa. 2015) (second alteration in original) (citing St. Louis v. Morris,

573 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (D. Del. 2008)); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of

Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Bare assertions,

conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.” (citation omitted)).

Here, the two factual premises advanced by Mendes—that “inmates

were permitted out of their cells for the repairs [] due to safety

concerns,” and “that lunch is served after 10:30 a.m.,” Doc. 73 at 1—are

bereft of any supporting citations to the record, as are his purported

“disputed facts.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, they are not included in the

analysis herein.2 See, e.g., Evans v. Columbia Cnty., 711 F. Supp. 3d

256, 278 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (“Where the party asserting a fact has not

pointed to record evidence to support the fact, we do not include that

fact in the statement of material facts[.]”).

2 The Court notes that, even if the factual averments were accepted as true, they

would not alter the rationale or holding set forth herein.

Second, those purported “disputed facts” are assertions of legal

nature, and therefore inappropriate for summary judgment purposes.

See Doc. 73 at 3 (“There exists . . . genuine issue[s] of material fact as to

whether . . . Robaczewski was deliberately indifferent to the risk of

falling debris[,] . . . whether [Mendes]’s injuries constitute a serious

medical need[, and] . . . whether . . . Robaczewski and . . . Sherrill were

deliberately indifferent to [Mendes]’s serious medical needs.”); Wright v.

Ryobi Techs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 439, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (explaining

that “[legal] conclusions[] . . . do not satisfy [nonmovant]’s obligation to

show[] . . . that there are genuine factual issues for trial or his

obligation to respond with facts of record that would contradict the facts

the mov[ant] identified.” (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

321 n.3 (1986))).

Therefore, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the statement of material

facts and exhibits submitted by the Defendants are deemed admitted in

their entirety. See United States ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d

326, 330 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting with approval adoption of “facts that

were not clearly disputed by [nonmovant] with adequate references to

the record.” (citation omitted)). Mendes’s two factual averments and

three legal assertions are not.

B. Factual Background

According to the undisputed facts, Mendes was an inmate at State

Correctional Institution Dallas during the operative period underlying

his complaint. Doc. 63 at 1. On May 14, 2019, the floor above Mendes’s

cell underwent maintenance for a leaky pipe. Id. As the maintenance

team used a jackhammer to reach the pipe, all of the inmates assigned

to the block, including Mendes, were “congregate[d] in the day room” for

about one to three hours, until lunchtime. Id.

After Mendes returned to his cell, he voiced concerns about the

cell’s condition. Id. at 2. Specifically, Mendes observed that his cell was

“covered in a thick layer of dust and small rocks,” which were “small,

flat, and thin; not baseball or rounder-type debris.” Id. (quotation

omitted). He initially explained his concern about returning to the cell

because of the dust and rocks to Robaczewski. Id.3 Mendes then

alerted Sherrill and Robaczewski about the dust in the cell, but Sherrill

3 Although the record does not specifically identify Robaczewski as the corrections

officer with whom Mendes spoke, the parties’ briefs and statements at oral

argument confirmed that Robaczewski’s identity is not in dispute.

“did not acknowledge the condition of his cell,” prompting Mendes to

return to his cell. Id.

While Mendes was cleaning his cell, “a chunk of cement fell from

the ceiling and struck him in the head.” Id. The chunk fell around the

cell toilet, “but the area by the door, window, and the bottom bunk was

safe.” Id. at 3. Mendes was not knocked unconscious or thrown to the

ground, but the impact caused a bleeding wound on his head and a

scratch on his neck. Id. at 2, 4.

Mendes requested medical attention, which he received after no

more than about four hours. The parties appear to dispute whether

Mendes waited closer to two hours or closer to four hours to receive

medical treatment. Compare Doc. 62 at 12 (“two hour delay”) with

Doc. 72 at 15 (“a four-hour period of time”). The medical records

indicate that Mendes estimated the time of the incident to be about

noon, and that he reported to the infirmary at approximately 2:30 p.m.

Docs. 63-2 at 1; 63-4 at 1. But Mendes contends, without supporting

evidence, that he was “left to bleed for a four-hour period[.]” Doc. 72 at

15. Mendes also estimated during his deposition that he was injured

before lunchtime, and that lunch is served “around 11, 12:00.” Doc. 63-

1 at 35. Accordingly, the Court construes the record in the light most

favorable to Mendes, see Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.

2007), and assumes, for purposes of evaluating this motion that he

waited approximately four hours to receive medical attention.

Mendes’s initial demand for medical care was unmet. Doc. 63 at

3. Mendes then went to eat lunch at the dining hall, where he spoke

with Officer Wilson about visiting the infirmary. Id. After the second

shift started at approximately 2:15 or 2:30 p.m., Doc. 63-1 at 35,

another officer visited Mendes’s cell and permitted him to go to the

infirmary. Doc. 63 at 3. Until then, Mendes pressed a tissue over his

wound to prevent it from bleeding. Id.

Mendes arrived at the infirmary around 2:30 p.m. Id. There, a

nurse cleaned Mendes’s wounds, administered a tetanus shot, and gave

him some gauze and pain medicine. Id. at 3–4. The nurse informed

Mendes that his wounds were “too small for stitches,” as they consisted

of a “1 cm abrasion to top of head with scant bleeding and a 2 [inch]

superficial scratch to back of neck.” Id. at 4 (second alteration in

original). The nurse also took photographs of Mendes’s face, head

wound, and neck abrasion. Id. at 5; Doc. 63-6. The record from that

day explains that Mendes’s wound was “[u]ncomplicated” and “[c]lean

without foreign body or signs of infection,” and showed “scant bleeding

to small wound on top of head.” Doc. 63 at 4–5. Further, Mendes

denied losing consciousness and wanted “Motrin for slight H[eadache]

. . . .” Id. at 5.

Two days later, on May 16, 2019,4 Mendes again visited the

infirmary for a headache that he “believe[d] was caused by the May 14,

2019, incident.” Id. During the second visit, Mendes stated that “his

headache was not severe, just annoying,” and received Motrin. Id. The

medical provider that day noted that the “wounds had healed[,] and

referred back to his prior note regarding no loss of consciousness.” Id.

C. Procedural History

Mendes, proceeding pro se, filed his original complaint on October

24, 2019, asserting several causes of action against seven individuals

affiliated with DOC, including two John Does. Doc. 1. After briefing on

the defendants’ subsequent motion to dismiss (Doc. 20), the Court

granted the motion in part, and denied it in part. Docs. 24–25. Of

4 The Defendants clarified that the date listed in their statement of facts, July 16,

2019, Doc. 63 at 5, was a typographical error. Doc. 62 at 5 n.2.

relevance to this memorandum, the Court denied the motion to dismiss

Mendes’s Eight Amendment claims for conditions of confinement and

denial of medical care. Doc. 24 at 14.

Specifically, the Court held that Mendes’s allegation concerning

falling debris in his cell sufficiently pleaded an objectively dangerous

circumstance for purposes of his Eight Amendment conditions of

confinement claim. Id. at 11. The Court also found that the complaint

alleged that Mendes put Robaczewski (then identified as “John Doe

One”) on notice of the cell’s conditions and risk. Id. at 11–12. Similarly,

the Court held that “Mendes alleges a serious medical need because the

failure to treat his injury resulted in pain and suffering.” Id. at 13.

Thus, his allegations “that an injury existed and that the subsequent

treatment four hours later may have resulted in Mendes’s pain and

suffering,” sufficed to survive dismissal when viewing the pleadings in

the light most favorable to Mendes. Id. at 13–14.

On July 15, 2021, after Mendes failed to file an amended

complaint, all defendants except for the two John Does moved to

dismiss for lack of prosecution. Docs. 30–31. On August 16, 2021, the

Court granted the motion to dismiss and terminated the five moving

defendants. Docs. 35–36. Then, on August 24, 2021, Mendes requested

an extension of time to amend his complaint. Doc. 37. The Court

granted the motion and directed Mendes to submit his amended

complaint by January 11, 2022. Doc. 36. Mendes timely mailed his

first amended instrument on January 9, 2022, Doc. 37 at 9, and the

pleading was lodged four days later, asserting claims against only the

two John Doe defendants. Doc. 37.

About two months later, on March 1, 2022, defense counsel

informed the Court that they would not respond to Mendes’s first

amended complaint, because DOC “was unable to identify” the John

Doe defendants, leaving counsel with no ascertainable clients. Doc. 40.

The Court subsequently granted Mendes 90 days to conduct limited

discovery to identify the John Doe defendants. Doc. 42.

On December 11, 2023, Mendes filed his live second amended

complaint, which identified the Defendants by their last names. Doc. 48

at 1. The second amended complaint also presents two claims: (1) a

conditions of confinement claim against Robaczewski alone; and (2)

denial of medical care claims against both Defendants, Robaczewski

and Sherrill. Id. at 3–4. The Defendants timely appeared and

submitted their answer to Mendes’s second amended complaint.

Docs. 53–54; 56.

Following the close of discovery, on October 30, 2024, the

Defendants submitted the Motion and supporting documents. Docs. 60;

62–63. The Motion reasons that the Court should grant summary

judgment for the defendants on all claims and that, should any claim

survive, Mendes be limited to recovering nominal damages. Doc. 60 at

6. Mendes filed his opposing brief and statement of facts on March 11,

2025, and the Defendants timely filed their reply brief. Doc. 74. Oral

argument on the Motion took place on January 30, 2026 (Doc. 80),

rendering the Motion fully briefed and ripe for decision.

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when record materials,

including but not limited to, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Wishkin, 476 F.3d at 184; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). In

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court

must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and must make all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”

Wishkin, 476 F.3d at 184.

A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a fact is

material only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law . . . .” Id. But “a complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions

of [the record], . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “‘[T]he non-moving party must

[then] oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare

assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.’”

Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch.

Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Even where, as here, the movant argues that the non-movant has

failed to produce sufficient evidence to prevail on a claim at trial, the

movant must still satisfy the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“a party seeking

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion[.]”). This means that,

“[w]here the moving party does not have the burden of proof on the

relevant issues,” and they have pinpointed in their motion “deficiencies

in the opponent’s evidence” sufficient to show no reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the non-movant, they are entitled to “judgment as a

matter of law.” Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168,

175 (3d Cir. 1990).

B. Deliberate Indifference under the Eighth Amendment

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not a source of substantive rights but

rather a mechanism to vindicate rights afforded by the Constitution or

a federal statute.” Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 364 (3d

Cir. 2016) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).

Thus, “the basic cause of action requires that a § 1983 plaintiff prove

two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was

committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the

conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v.

Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). For the

Motion’s purposes, the parties do not appear to dispute that the

Defendants were state employees at the time of the incident. The

question is whether they deprived Mendes of his rights under the

Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution

prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

That is, “[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary

standards of decency.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.

1999) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). Therefore,

generally, “[a]n Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official must

meet two requirements: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official must have a sufficiently

culpable state of mind.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d

Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994)).

The first prong “is satisfied when an inmate is deprived of ‘the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Thomas v. Tice,

948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

299 (1991)). That is, an inmate must receive “adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care.” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted) (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 832) (discussing dismissal motions). That, of course, does

not mean that prisons must be “comfortable.” Id. (quotation omitted)

(quoting Rhods v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).

As for the second prong, the plaintiff must prove that the

defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or

safety.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 125. This requires that the

defendant “both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . draw the

inference.” Mammana, 934 F.3d at 373 (quotation omitted) (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Relevant evidence would “show[] that the

risk . . . was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly

noted by prison officials . . . such that defendants must have known

about the risk.” Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 445 (3d Cir.

2020) (footnote and quotation omitted) (first quoting Betts v. New Castle

Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010); and then citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43). Also, “it is enough that the official acted

or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 131 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842).

Conversely, “a defendant can rebut a prima facie demonstration of

[the second prong] . . . by establishing that he did not have the requisite

level of knowledge or awareness of the risk.” Id. at 133 (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837). Also, mere notice or awareness is insufficient. Id. at

140. Instead, the plaintiff needs evidence establishing that the

defendant “believed that the[] allegations were likely to be true, or that

the evidence surrounding the allegations was so strong that he must

have believed them likely to be true.” Id.

1. Conditions of Confinement

The first claim, presented solely against Robaczewski, rests on his

decision to place Mendes in his cell, despite expressed concern about the

cell’s post-maintenance environment. Docs. 48 at 4; 63 at 1–2. For

purposes of the Motion, Robaczewski does not contest the objective

element of Mendes having been subject to a risk of serious harm when

placed in his cell with falling debris. Doc. 62 at 9. Rather, Robaczewski

challenges whether Mendes can establish his subjective knowledge and

disregard of that risk. Id. According to Robaczewski, as the

maintenance activities had ceased and the dust in the cell was settling,

he had no reason to believe that additional pieces of the ceiling would

fall. Id. Robaczewski also avers that Mendes only conveyed his

concerns about the dust in the cell, not about the condition of the

ceiling. Id. at 9–10.

Mendes rebuts that he notified Robaczewski about both the dust

and debris that fell from the ceiling, who declined to inspect the

condition of the cell. Doc. 72 at 12. Mendes specifically avers that he

notified Robaczewski that debris was actively falling from the ceiling,

and flags the absence of evidence in the record evincing Robaczewski’s

subjective intent. Id. at 13. As the record evinces a disputed issue of

material fact concerning Robaczewski’s subjective knowledge of debris

falling from the ceiling, and thus whether he disregarded that risk,

summary judgment is not warranted.

According to Mendes’s testimony, Robaczewski looked at Mendes’s

cell, concluded that there was no substantial risk, and told Mendes to

return to his cell. Docs. 63-1 at 14–15; 72-1 at 15–16. More specifically,

in describing his conversation with Robaczewski, Mendes testified in his

deposition:

There was dust all over the cell. And from the jackhammering

you could tell, like, it had made it worse as far as things

falling. Because before that, only paster, or whatever they

coat the wall with, had fell. Now it was like a thick la[]yer of

dust and just debris, like minor—like little rocks and stuff like

that all in the cell. And I said, hey, the cell’s messed up, the

ceiling looks like it’s falling, it looks like it’s worse. And he

just told me you gotta go in there. There was a big, kind of,

like, confrontation about that because I didn’t really want --

feel comfortable go going in there. And they said you gonna

get written up if you don’t go in there, you gotta go in there, it

looks fine to me.

Docs. 63-1 at 14–15; 72-1 at 15–16 (emphasis added).

Mendes also provides affidavits signed by six other inmates

(Doc. 72-2), five of whom state that Mendes’s cell was in a less-than-

ideal condition. Id. at 3 (“not being suitable for anyone to be in[]”), 4

(“told the working officer that part of the ceiling . . . was falling,” and

“the cell wasn’t ready for anyone to be inside.”), 5–7 (“a lot of dust and

debries everywhere, and pieces of cement coming off the ceiling”).

Mendes’s testimony runs contrary to Robaczewski’s position in the

Motion that Mendes “only reported to Robaczewski his concerns about

the dust,” Doc. 62 at 9; a position that is not supported by any evidence

of record, including deposition testimony from Robaczewski. Likewise,

Robaczewski’s contentions that a reasonable person would not expect

pieces of the cell ceiling would fall, and that he had no subjective reason

to believe such a risk existed, id. at 9–10, are advanced without any

support in the record, and conflict with Mendes’s statement that he put

Robaczewski on notice of the potentially dangerous conditions.

Thus, we are left with Mendes’s sworn testimony, offered as

evidence of Robaczewski’s subjective deliberate indifference, and

bolstered in part by other inmates’ affidavits. Robaczewski’s knowledge

of the cell’s condition and risk were the very factors that the Court

previously identified when deeming the allegations of the complaint

sufficient to survive the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 24 at 11–

12, and are now supported by record evidence on summary judgment.

And to the extent that Robaczewski, during oral argument, offered a

differing interpretation of Mendes’s deposition testimony, and

questioned the credibility of the inmates who submitted affidavits, the

Court is not the appropriate party to make such determinations. Those

factual disputes fall solely in the province of the factfinder, and warrant

denial of summary judgment.

2. Denial of Medical Care

The second claim, asserted against both Robaczewski and Sherrill,

is premised on the allegations that the Defendants failed to send

Mendes to the prison infirmary for medical treatment, resulting in an

approximate four-hour delay before Officer Wilson intervened. Docs. 48

at 4; 63 at 3. Here, the Defendants challenge both the objective and

subjective prongs of Mendes’s Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically,

they contend that Mendes cannot establish that he presented a serious

medical need after being struck by the falling debris, or any significant

delay in care that resulted in injury. Doc. 62 at 10–11.

In response, Mendes asserts that he need only show that his

injury resulted in pain and suffering that required medical attention,

and that the Defendants did not seek prompt medical attention after

being notified of the injury. Doc. 72 at 15. He flags the desire of one

officer to wait for his partner as an impermissible nonmedical reason for

delay. Id. As a reasonable jury could not conclude that Mendes

suffered from an objectively serious medical need, summary judgment is

warranted.

At the summary judgment stage, a viable claim for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need requires that the plaintiff show

“(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials

that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden

Cnty. Corr. Fac., 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse,

182 F.3d at 197). “An inmate’s allegations of medical malpractice or

negligence are insufficient to meet that standard, as are ‘mere

disagreements’ concerning the proper course of treatment.” Whetstone

v. Ellers, 447 F. App’x 286, 288 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (first citing

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); and then citing

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d

Cir. 1987)).

Regarding the objective requirement, a plaintiff may meet this

prong in two ways. First, he may prove a serious medical need by

showing that it was “diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or

. . . so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 347 (citations omitted).

Alternatively, a serious medical need exists if the “denial or delay in the

provision of adequate medical care” results in an “unnecessary or

wanton infliction of pain,” or “causes an inmate to suffer a life-long

handicap or permanent loss.” Id. (collecting cases).

A notable corollary is that “[i]njuries such as cuts, scrapes, [and]

scratches[] . . . simply do not in themselves . . . necessarily call[] for

immediate medical treatment . . . .” Banks v. Beard, 2006 WL 2192015,

at *13 (W.D. Pa. 2006); see also Stankowski v. Farley, 251 F. App’x 743,

748 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“cuts requiring no more than small

bandages do not constitute ‘serious medical needs[.]’” (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))). Nor do minor bleedings caused by

abrasions. See, e.g., Wisneski v. Denning, 2014 WL 1758118, at *22

(W.D. Pa. 2014) (“bruising and abrasions with associated bleeding do

not rise to the level of a ‘serious medical need.’”); Gray v. Wakefield,

2012 WL 4509752, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (relatively minor “[cuts,

bruises, and bleeding] do not constitute a serious medical need.”

(citations omitted) (collecting cases)).

Against that legal framework, Mendes’s minor injuries cannot

meet the objective prong of the analysis. Both parties agree that,

though Mendes’s wound was bleeding, the nurse assessed that it was

“too small for stitches.” Docs. 63 at 3; 73 at 2. They also agree that

Mendes was able to stop the bleeding by pressing a single tissue over

the wound. Docs. 63 at 3; 73 at 2. And the relevant medical records

reveal that Mendes’s injuries consisted of “a tiny abrasion to top of head

with scant bleeding and a 2” superficial scratch to left back of neck.”

Doc. 63-2 at 1 (emphases added). Further, the nurse who tended to

Mendes’s injuries noted that they were “[u]ncomplicated” and “[c]lean

without foreign body or [s]ign of infection.” Doc. 63-3 at 2.

Photographs of the injuries corroborate those records, and yield

the unavoidable conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that

Mendes presented a serious medical need requiring a physician’s

attention. Indeed, Mendes did not even require the attention of a

physician, with his cuts and scrapes addressed solely by the nurse

practitioner. Doc. 63 at 3. Under the current Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence, such minor wounds do not satisfy the objective inquiry of

the deliberate indifference standard. See, e.g., Banks, 2006 WL

2192015, at *13; Stankowski, 251 F. App’x at 748; Wisneski, 2014 WL

1758118, at *22; Gray, 2012 WL 4509752, at *6.

Mendes contends that he suffered “long-term and lasting injuries,

including headaches, blackouts, and loss of balance,” but failed to offer

any supporting medical evidence beyond his own uncorroborated

deposition testimony. Doc. 72 at 15. Namely, he stated that his

headaches, at the time of his testimony, were “not as frequent” and

merely required a regular prescription of Motrin, which he eventually

stopped taking due to financial reasons. Id. at 49–50. Further, he

stated that “[t]he only thing that stayed with [him] is the neck

problem,” where “the back of [his] neck hurts.” Id. at 51.

Mendes does not offer any expert reports or medical records to

corroborate claimed injuries of a more lasting nature, or that the

alleged delay in treatment exacerbated his injuries, and he

acknowledged the absence of such records during oral argument.

Indeed, the records concerning Mendes’s follow-up visit to the

infirmary, which took place on May 16, 2019, show that he complained

only about a headache, which was “just annoying,” “not severe.”

Doc. 63-5 at 1. Moreover, his head and neck abrasions had already

healed. Id. Though the Court is sympathetic toward Mendes’s plight,

no evidence indicates that the alleged delay in medical treatment

caused the claimed neck pain. See Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 347. Also,

“no evidence exists that plaintiff, subsequent to the incident, put in a

sick call slip, or sought additional medical attention.” See Lindsey v.

Brady, 537 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (D. Del. 2008) (citation omitted). Based

on that scant record, no reasonable jury could find that Mendes suffered

either less an “unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain,” or “a life-long

handicap or permanent loss.” See Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 347.

Accordingly, the denial of medical care claim will be dismissed

upon consideration of the objective prong alone. As that claim is the

only one asserted against Sherrill, he will be dismissed from this action.

C. Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Finally, the Defendants request that the Court dismiss Mendes’s

requests for punitive and compensatory damages for any surviving

claims, and limit him to nominal damages, by deeming his injuries de

minimis. Doc. 62 at 12–14. Mendes advances his alleged physical

injuries as sufficient to warrant compensatory damages, and avers that

a jury determination of deliberate indifference on his underlying claim

would equate to a finding of reckless or callous indifference for purposes

of punitive damages. Doc. 72 at 16–17. His de minimis injuries,

however, preclude him from obtaining compensatory damages, and he

offers no record evidence to support his claim for punitive damages.

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1997e provides that “[n]o

Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in jail,

prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury

suffered while in custody without a proper showing of physical injury.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). To meet that standard, a plaintiff must show “a

less-than-significant-but-more-than-de minimis physical injury as a

predicate to allegations of emotional injury.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

523, 536 (3d Cir. 2003). As explained by the Court of Appeals:

We believe that reading 1997e(e) to allow a plaintiff to allege

any physical injury, no matter how minor, would produce an

unintended (indeed absurd) result. Were we not to read

1997(e) as requiring more than a de minimis physical injury,

we would turn its physical injury prerequisite into a mere

pleading requirement, thereby rendering the requirement

meaningless as a practical matter. Another prisoner might be

able to assert an emotional injury by pleading that he received

a paper cut, for example. This result runs counter to

Congress’s intent to curtail frivolous and abusive prisoner

litigation. In so doing, Congress noted that, unlike physical

injuries, emotional injuries are inherently difficult to verify

and therefore tend to be concocted for frivolous suits.

Id. at 535–36 (citations and quotations omitted).

“The Third Circuit has not provided a bright line rule for district

courts to follow when applying this test to prisoner claims.” Hyman v.

Giorla, 2014 WL 881137, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2014). “However, the

prevailing view is that physical injury is an observable or diagnosable

medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care professional. It

is not a sore muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an abrasion, a bruise,

etc., which lasts even up to two or three weeks. . . . Furthermore,

[i]njuries treatable at home and with over-the-counter drugs, heating

pads, rest, etc., do not fall within the parameters of 1997e(e).” In re

Bayside Prison Litig., 2010 WL 4916716, at *3 (D.N.J. 2010) (citation

and quotations omitted).

Although “[d]istrict courts have been hesitant to find that an

identifiable bodily injury was de minimis as a matter of law,” Hyman,

2014 WL 881137, at *6, Mendes’s injuries readily fall within that

categorization. As reflected in the medical records, and corroborated by

his deposition testimony, Mendes suffered a slight abrasion on his head,

and a scratch on his neck, from the debris that fell from his cell’s

ceiling. Doc. 63-2 at 1. Upon arriving at the infirmary, a nurse cleaned

his wound, and gave him gauze, pain medicine, and a precautionary

tetanus shot. Docs. 63-1 at 39–40; 63-2 at 1; 63-3 at 1–2. The nurse

informed Mendes that his abrasion was too small for stitches, as he had

only a “1 cm abrasion to top of head with scant bleeding and a 2 [inch]

superficial scratch to back of neck,” Doc. 63 at 4; a description

corroborated by the nurse’s contemporaneous photographs. See Doc. 63-

6 at 2–4. Two days later, Mendes again visited the infirmary for a

headache, which he deemed “not severe just annoying,” confirmed that

he never lost consciousness, and received Motrin. Doc. 63-5 at 1. By

then, his “very superficial” abrasions had healed, and he displayed “no

cerebellar signs.” Id. Although Mendes claimed to suffer thereafter

from periodic headaches for several months, and a sore neck, Doc. 63-1

at 48, the medical records evince no further treatment or requests for

treatment.

Scratches and abrasions of that nature are the precise type of de

minimis physical injury that falls short of warranting compensatory

damages for mental and emotional injury under Section 1997e(e).

Mendes’s wounds healed within days, received only superficial medical

treatment, and resulted in no demonstrated permanent injury or loss of

functioning. His claims of more lengthy pain and suffering are bereft of

any corroborating evidence. Under those circumstances, the Court may,

and does, find his injuries de minimis as a matter of law. See, e.g.,

Powell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 2019 WL 8510289, at *10 (M.D. Pa. 2019)

(finding injuries de minimis when guard allegedly caused inmate to fall

and strike his head, requiring Motrin), report and recommendation

adopted, 2020 WL 1922639 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Bayside, 2010 WL 4916716,

at *3 (upholding de minimis injury determination when guard allegedly

hit inmate in the hand with a stick, resulting in “pain and swelling in

his pinky finger for approximately two days”); Knight v. Walton, 2015

WL 9243902, at *9 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (finding injuries de minimis when

inmate was repeatedly and forcefully restrained, but that any injuries

“resolved within sixteen days or less and that no treatment was

required beyond a pain reliever”), report and recommendation adopted,

2015 WL 9239003 (W.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 110 (3d Cir.

2016).

Although Mendes deems Section 1997e(e) inapplicable, because he

“failed to advance claims of mental or emotional injury,” Doc. 72 at 16, a

review of the second amended complaint and record concludes

otherwise. In his pleading instrument, Mendes demands “One hundred

thousand Dollars ($1,000,000.00) [sic]” in compensatory damages for

the following claimed injuries:

Plaintiff at the time of the incident suffered a serious head

wound, that bled profusely, for over 4 hours, until finally

treated, cleaned and Plaintiff was then provided Medication

and the injury was photographed. Since the injury Plaintiff

still suffers severe headaches, loss of balance, occasional black

outs, mood swings and loss of memory.

Doc. 48 at 5.

Putting aside the uncertain nature of the precise amount of money

that Mendes seeks, and the absence of record evidence corroborating his

claimed long-term injuries, he does not seek compensatory damages for

any tangible losses. “Compensatory damages for civil rights claims are

governed by general tort law compensation theories, and a plaintiff may

therefore recover compensatory damages if he proves that the

defendant violated his constitutional rights in a way that caused him

compensable injury.” Saunders v. Criley, 2024 WL 4858584, at *6 (M.D.

Pa. 2024) (citing Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d. Cir. 2000)).

Thus, “[c]ompensatory damages may be awarded for, inter alia, ‘out-of-

pocket loss and other monetary harms.’” Id.

Mendes does not, however, seek recovery for any out-of-pocket

medical expenses, claimed lost wages, or other monetary harms.

Indeed, he confirmed in his testimony that, although the prison

infirmary ordinarily charged inmates for Motrin, he received it for free

until he stopped taking it. Doc. 63-1 at 40–41, 48–49. And he did not

believe that he had a paying job at the prison at the time of the

accident, attributing periods of unemployment to his unrelated

psychiatric medication. Id. at 41–44. Thus, Mendes’s claimed

compensatory damages must necessarily be attributed to his alleged

pain and suffering, as he identifies no monetary losses triggered by his

physical injuries. Accordingly, his request for compensatory damages

will be dismissed.

Despite Section 1997e(e)’s limitations, “certain absolute

constitutional rights may be vindicated by an award of nominal

damages in the absence of any showing of injury warranting

compensatory damages.” Allah, 226 F.3d at 250–51. Section 1997e(e)

also does not bar punitive damages, which may be awarded based solely

on a constitutional violation, regardless of any claimed emotional or

mental distress. Scott v. Kauffman, 2023 WL 5004047, at *12 (M.D. Pa.

2023). “Claims seeking nominal or punitive damages are typically not

‘for’ mental or emotional injury but rather ‘to vindicate constitutional

rights’ or ‘to deter or punish egregious violations of constitutional

rights,’ respectively.” Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 533 (quoting Allah, 226 F.3d

at 252).

“[A] jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an

action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be

motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or

callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v.

Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Here, even if Robaczewski exhibited some

measure of negligence when instructing Mendes to return to his cell,

despite its alleged conditions, there is no evidence in the record by

which a reasonable jury could infer that Robaczewski “acted maliciously

or recklessly.” Michel v. Levinson, 437 F. App’x 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2011)

(observing that “punitive damages in general represent a limited

remedy, to be reserved for special circumstances” (quoting Savarese v.

Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir.1989))). Indeed, during oral

argument, Mendes acknowledged his inability to offer such evidence.

Accordingly, his request for punitive damages will be dismissed, and

Mendes will be limited to seeking only nominal damages at trial.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mendes’s Eight Amendment claim

for denial of medical care and claims for compensatory and punitive

damages will be dismissed, along with Sherrill as a defendant. The

Court will deny summary judgment on Mendes’s Eight Amendment

conditions of confinement claim against Robaczewski. A separate Order

shall be issued.

Date: March 31, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo

Phillip J. Caraballo

United States Magistrate Judge