Wiggins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JIMEEN WIGGINS,

Plaintiff,

21-CV-77-LJV

v. DECISION & ORDER

PEOPLE INC.,

Defendant.

On January 15, 2021, the plaintiff, Jimeen Wiggins, commenced this action under

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Docket Item 1. About six months

later, Wiggins amended her complaint with the assistance of pro bono counsel

appointed for that limited purpose. Docket Item 18; see Docket Item 19.

In July 2022, the defendant, People Inc., moved for summary judgment on

several grounds, including res judicata. Docket Item 30 (notice of motion); see Docket

Item 34 (memorandum of law). After Wiggins responded, Docket Items 37, 39, and 40,

People Inc. replied, Docket Item 42. Wiggins later moved for People Inc. “to release

finances to [her] as soon as possible” in compensation for her claims, Docket Item 44 at

1, and for this Court to “[b]ring [her] case to a closure,” Docket Item 45 at 1.

For the reasons that follow, this Court grants People Inc.’s motion for summary

judgment. Wiggins’s motion to release finances and to bring the case to closure

therefore are denied as moot.

BACKGROUND1

In August 2016, Wiggins filed a verified complaint with the New York State

Division of Human Rights (“DHR”), alleging that People Inc. had discriminated against

her. Docket Item 33 ¶ 73. Among other things, Wiggins alleged that on January 4,

2016, People Inc. had wrongfully terminated her employment because of her

disabilities, including “problems with [her] left foot (plantar fasciitis, arthritis) and

stress/depression.” Docket Item 30-11 (DHR complaint) at 2-3.2

On July 18, 2018, and October 3, 2018, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Martin

Erazo, Jr., held a public hearing addressing Wiggins’s complaint. Docket Item 33 ¶ 75.

On June 28, 2019, ALJ Erazo issued his recommended findings of fact, opinion, and

decision and order, finding that People Inc. had “presented a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for placing [Wiggins] on unpaid administrative leave” and “for

terminating [her] employment.” Docket Item 33 ¶ 76; see Docket Item 31-11 (Erazo

decision). After giving both sides an opportunity to object and after reviewing the

objections, DHR adopted ALJ Erazo’s findings and issued a final order dismissing

Wiggins’s complaint. Docket Item 33 ¶ 77; see Docket Item 31-12 (DHR notice and final

order dated October 3, 2019).

1 On a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d

Cir. 2011). Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are those that Wiggins does not

contest in People Inc.’s statement of undisputed facts, Docket Item 33. Any disputed

facts are resolved in Wiggins’s favor.

2 Page numbers in docket citations refer to ECF pagination.

The next month, Wiggins filed a verified petition under Executive Law § 298 in

New York State Supreme Court, Erie County, seeking to vacate DHR’s determination.

Docket Item 33 ¶ 78; see Docket Item 31-13 (state court petition). DHR and People Inc.

then moved to dismiss, and on September 28, 2020, New York State Supreme Court

Justice Catherine Nugent Panepinto granted those motions. See Docket Item 31-14

(Justice Panepinto’s email to parties regarding decision). More specifically, Justice

Panepinto explained:

Unfortunately for [Wiggins], she failed to properly serve the verified petition

and to name a necessary party. In addition, as addressed in the papers,

the election of remedies doctrine bars a plenary action. [Wiggins] should

be comforted by the fact that she did properly pursue her issues with the

New York State Division of Human Rights, where a public hearing was held

on July 18, 2018[,] and October 3, 2018, after which the Division’s

Commissioner issued an [o]rder dismissing the allegations of disability

discrimination. Accordingly, [Wiggins’s] [p]etition seeking lost wages and

other damages is hereby [d]ismissed. Respondents are hereby directed to

submit the appropriate [o]rders on [n]otice.

Id. A month later, on October 28, 2020, Justice Panepinto entered an order dismissing

Wiggins’s petition “with prejudice.” Docket Item 33 ¶ 79; see Docket Item 31-15 (order).

On January 15, 2021, Wiggins filed her complaint in this Court. Docket Item 1.

The Court appointed pro bono counsel for the limited purpose of assisting Wiggins in

amending her complaint, see Docket Item 16, and counsel filed an amended complaint

on June 25, 2021, Docket Item 18. The amended complaint, like the DHR complaint

and state court petition, alleges that People Inc. violated Wiggins’s rights by failing to

accommodate her in light of her disabilities and ultimately by terminating her

employment. See id.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court appropriately grants summary

judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“The movant”—that is, the party seeking summary judgment—“has the burden of

showing that there is no genuine issue of fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The movant may satisfy its burden by relying on evidence in the

record, “including depositions, documents, . . . [and] affidavits,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A), or by “point[ing] to an absence of evidence to support an essential element

of the non[-]moving party’s claim,” Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51

F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986));

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

Once the movant has satisfied its initial burden, “the non[-]moving party must

come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”—that is,

that a “rational trier of fact [could] find for the non-moving party” on the “record taken as

a whole.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). If the non-moving party

fails to do so, the court will grant summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the [C]ourt must view the evidence

in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and “draw[] all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239

F.3d 456, 465-66 (2d Cir. 2001). But “conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation

by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.” Kulak v. City of

New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

(explaining that when moving party has met its burden, non-moving party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to

defeat summary judgment).

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must “properly support an[y]

assertion[s] of fact” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (e); Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324. And “[w]hile evidence produced by the party opposing a summary

judgment motion need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial, its content must

nonetheless be admissible.” Davis-Bell v. Columbia Univ., 851 F. Supp. 2d 650, 675-76

(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose

a [summary judgment] motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that

would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to

testify on the matters stated”).

DISCUSSION3

I. RES JUDICATA

People Inc. first argues that res judicata bars Wiggins’s ADA claims because

Justice Panepinto dismissed Wiggins’s state law discrimination claims with prejudice.

See Docket Item 34 at 10-13.

Res judicata—or claim preclusion—“holds that a final judgment on the merits of

an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could

have been raised in that action.” Bank of N.Y. v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905,

918 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 214 F.3d 275, 284 (2d

Cir. 2000)). To establish its entitlement to a judgment based on res judicata, “a party

must show that (1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the

previous action involved the plaintiff[] or those in privity with [her]; [and] (3) the claims

asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.”

Monahan, 214 F.3d at 285. Res judicata is a “flexible doctrine[]” that should not be

“mechanically applied.” United States v. E. River Hous. Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 118, 141

(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation omitted).

Additionally, the “the full faith and credit statute . . . provides in pertinent part that

‘[t]he . . . judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State . . . shall have the same full

faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage

in the courts of such State.’” Joseph v. Athanasopoulos, 648 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2011)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738). Thus, “in determining the res judicata effect of a state court

3 The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the factual background and will

refer only to those facts necessary to explain its decision.

judgment on a plaintiff’s federal statutory claims, the federal court must give that

judgment the same preclusive effect as would the courts of the state rendering that

judgment.” Id. at 62 (italics omitted).

“New York law has adopted a ‘transactional approach’ to claim preclusion.”

McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 2007). The “transactional approach

dictates that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of

the same transaction or series of transaction[s] are barred.’” Russo v. City of New York,

705 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (alterations, citations, and internal

quotation marks omitted). So a prior judgment in a New York State court “precludes a

party from litigating a claim [in federal court] where a judgment on the merits exists from

a prior action between the same parties or their privies involving the same subject

matter, even when the claim is based upon different legal theories or seeks different or

additional relief.” Dekom v. Fannie Mae, 846 F. App'x 14, 19 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary

order) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, there is no question that the state court action involved Wiggins and that

the claims in the state court action arose out of the same set of facts as Wiggins’s

claims here. Compare Docket Item 18 (amended complaint) (alleging that People Inc.

failed to accommodate Wiggins’s disabilities and wrongfully terminated her), with

Docket Item 31-13 (verified state court petition) (seeking “lost wages and pay for pain

and suffering from [the] time of being sent home [from work at People Inc. in] Dec.

2015” and attaching documents related to her disabilities and employment at People

Inc.). So the questions before this Court boil down to (1) whether Wiggins could have

brought her ADA claims in her state court suit, and (2) whether a New York State court

would treat Justice Panepinto’s dismissal as a final judgment on the merits with

preclusive effect.

A. Ability to Raise ADA Claims in State Court Suit

The first question is whether Wiggins’s ADA claims “were, or could have been,

raised in the prior action.” Monahan, 214 F.3d at 285. A plaintiff seeking to bring an

ADA claim must first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Soules v. Conn., Dep’t of

Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., 882 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2018). Wiggins did that here.

But the EEOC did not issue a decision on the charge and give Wiggins notice of her

right to sue until October 20, 2020, see Docket Item 18-3, about a month after Justice

Panepinto issued her decision dismissing Wiggins’s state court action, see Docket Item

31-14.4 So at first glance, it might seem that Wiggins could not have brought her ADA

claims in her state court case.

Nonetheless, the Second Circuit has applied res judicata in similar cases, finding

that a plaintiff could have—for example—sought a stay in the state court action until the

EEOC issued its decision. See Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2d

Cir. 1992); see also Barnes v. Royal Health Care LLC, 357 F. App'x 375, 377 (2d Cir.

2009) (summary order). In Woods, the plaintiff argued that her Title VII claim should be

allowed to proceed because at the time she commenced her earlier lawsuit alleging

claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), she had not yet

4 Wiggins had 90 days from the date of the EEOC notice to “file a lawsuit against

[People Inc.] under federal law based on th[at] charge in federal or state court.” Docket

Item 18-3.

exhausted her Title VII claim. See 972 F.2d at 38-41. The Second Circuit rejected that

argument, finding that the plaintiff “had two available courses she could have followed in

order to avoid the sting of res judicata.” Id. at 41. “As a first alternative,” the court

explained, the plaintiff “could have filed her LMRA claim and then sought a stay in the

district court pending the outcome of her Title VII administrative proceedings.” Id. (citing

Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)). And “[o]nce

administrative review had been completed, [she] could have then joined her Title VII

claim with her LMRA claim by amending the complaint in the LMRA suit.” Id.

Alternatively, the court noted, the plaintiff “could have filed the LMRA action, sought a

right to sue notice on her Title VII claim from the EEOC after 180 days, and then

amended the complaint in her LMRA suit to include the Title VII claim.” Id. (internal

citation omitted).

The fact that Wiggins is proceeding pro se gives this Court some pause in

applying that analysis to her. But the Second Circuit applied the same analysis in a

subsequent case where the plaintiff, like Wiggins, proceeded pro se. See Barnes, 357

F. App’x at 377 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that res judicata did not apply because

“his federal employment discrimination claims were unexhausted at the time he

commenced his state court action” because plaintiff could have “(1) commenced his

state court action and then stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of his Title VII

EEOC charge; or (2) amended his state court complaint to include his Title VII claim

once he received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC”).

So the same analysis applies to Wiggins’s ADA claim here. She could have

either sought a stay in her state court case or requested a notice of right to sue from the

EEOC.5 Thus, the Court finds that Wiggins could have brought her ADA claims in her

state court case.

B. Final Judgment on the Merits

The harder question is whether Justice Panepinto’s decision constituted a final

judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. Justice Panepinto dismissed

Wiggins’s petition for three reasons: (1) because Wiggins “failed to properly serve the

verified petition,” (2) because Wiggins failed “to name a necessary party,” and (3)

because “the election[-]of[-]remedies doctrine bar[red] a plenary action.” Docket Item

31-14 at 2. The Court will briefly address the first two reasons before turning to the

third.

1. State Court Dismissal Based on Failure to Properly Serve the

Petition and Failure to Name a Necessary Party

Dismissals “based upon failure to join a necessary party and improper service

are not final decisions on the merits for res judicata purposes.” Troeger v. Ellenville

Cent. Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 5107119, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016); see Hanrahan v.

Riverhead Nursing Home, 592 F.3d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that dismissal

for failure to join necessary party is not a dismissal on the merits for res judicata

purposes); Martin v. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 373 n.3 (2d Cir.

1978) (citation omitted) (“A dismissal for failure of service of process, of course, has no

5 The Court acknowledges that Wiggins may not have understood that she had

either of those options or the consequence of failing to take them. But as noted above,

the Second Circuit has applied res judicata in a very similar case notwithstanding the

plaintiff’s pro se status. See Barnes, 357 F. App’x at 377.

[r]es judicata effect.”). Therefore, those two reasons for dismissing Wiggins’s claims do

not trigger res judicata.

2. State Court Dismissal Based on Election of Remedies

The dismissal under the election-of-remedies doctrine is a different story,

however. “Under New York’s election[-]of[-]remedies doctrine, ‘a person claiming to be

aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice may elect to seek redress in either an

administrative or judicial forum where different rights and remedies may be pursued.’”

Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc., 2010 WL 2681168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2010) (quoting

Universal Packaging Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts., 270 A.D.2d 586, 587, 704

N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (3d Dep’t 2000)). “These remedies, however, are mutually exclusive,

and ‘[o]nce a complainant elects the administrative forum by filing a complaint with the

Division, a subsequent judicial action on the same complaint is generally barred.’” Id.

(quoting Legg v. Eastman Kodak Co., 248 A.D.2d 936, 937, 670 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (4th

Dep’t 1998)).

“The election-of-remedies bar is not limited to the precise claims brought in the

administrative proceeding[] but extends to all claims arising out of the same events.” Id.

Thus, “[i]f substantially the same facts are involved, then the doctrine of election of

remedies will bar any subsequent court proceedings. The facts need not be perfectly

identical, and merely adding some additional facts and/or re-labeling the claim will not

prevent the application of the doctrine of election of remedies.” Id. (quoting Benjamin v.

N.Y. City Dep’t of Health, 851 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Table), 2007 WL 3226958, at *5 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 23, 2007)). And the election-of-remedies “bar applies even when the

complainant is uncounseled and ignorant of the effects of the election of an

administrative forum.” Id.

Here, Wiggins elected to bring her action before the DHR. That choice in and of

itself does not bar her federal claims under the ADA. See, e.g., Guerrero Toro v.

NorthStar Demolition & Remediation, 366 F. Supp. 3d 449, 474-75 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)

(considering merits of ADA claims but finding that New York State Human Rights Law

claims were barred by election of remedies doctrine). Instead, the question is whether

the landscape changed once Wiggins opted to “pursue[] state judicial remedies.” See

Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 828 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1987). More specifically, did

Justice Panepinto’s dismissal of Wiggins’s state case trigger res judicata with respect to

Wiggins’s federal discrimination claims?

As noted above, res judicata requires “a final judgment on the merits.” See Bank

of N.Y., 607 F.3d at 918 (quoting Monahan, 214 F.3d at 284). But “it is worth noting that

the phrases ‘final judgment’ and ‘on the merits’ are both misnomers.” Byrd v. Town of

DeWitt, 698 F. Supp. 3d 379, 390 (N.D.N.Y. 2023). Rather, “these phrases are just

shorthand ways of describing judicial determinations that carry a preclusive effect on

‘successive’ or ‘subsequent’ litigation.” Id. (quoting Kassenoff v. Kassenoff, 2023 WL

2648844, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023)).

The parties have not cited—nor has this Court been able to find—any decision

addressing the precise question here: whether a dismissal with prejudice under the

election-of-remedies doctrine is a final judgment on the merits that bars a plaintiff from

bringing another lawsuit based on the same facts. So the Court looks to the text of

Justice Panepinto’s decision and analogous caselaw for its analysis.

Justice Panepinto explicitly stated that her decision was “with prejudice.” Docket

Item 31-15 at 2. The New York Court of Appeals has found that “[a] dismissal ‘with

prejudice’ generally signifies that the court intended to dismiss the action ‘on the merits,’

that is, to bring the action to a final conclusion against the plaintiff.” Yonkers

Contracting Co., Inc. v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 375, 380, 712 N.E.2d

678, 681 (1999). So that suggests that another New York court would not entertain a

lawsuit based on the same facts and alleged injuries as those in the lawsuit that Justice

Panepinto dismissed.

Moreover, “[t]he election[-]of[-]remedies bar is jurisdictional,” Higgins v. NYP

Holdings, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 182, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and “while it might seem

strange, the Supreme Court has held that ‘principles of res judicata apply to

jurisdictional determinations—both subject matter and personal,’” Byrd, 698 F. Supp. 3d

at 393 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.

694, 702 n.9 (1982)). So that too suggests that res judicata would apply to a dismissal

based on the election-of-remedies doctrine.

That being said, in the somewhat analogous context of dismissals based on the

statute of limitations,6 the law “remains unsettled” as to whether a dismissal is a final

judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. See id at 395. In Bray v. New York

Life Ins., 851 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit held that “[b]ecause New York

treat[ed] a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds as a final judgment on the merits

for res judicata purposes, [the plaintiff was] precluded from relitigating her sex and race

6 Like the election-of-remedies doctrine, a dismissal based on the statute of

limitations is with prejudice but does not address the underlying merits of the claims.

discrimination claims in federal court.” Id. at 64 (italics omitted). But the Second Circuit

has since called that conclusion into question. See Joseph, 648 F.3d at 67 (concluding

that New York State “Court of Appeals ha[d] not ‘squarely addressed’ whether a New

York court’s judgment dismissing a case based on the expiration of a New York

limitations period should have preclusive effect in another jurisdiction with a longer,

unexpired limitations period”).7 And in the wake of that uncertainty, some district courts

have declined to apply res judicata to statute-of-limitations dismissals. See Byrd, 698 F.

Supp. 3d at 395; King v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2015 WL 4718004, at *22 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 10, 2015). That gives this Court significant pause.

Is the election-of-remedies doctrine like the statute of limitations in that it might

bar a subsequent suit in state court but not federal court? The answer is unclear.

Because this is a close legal issue in an unsettled area of law, the Court declines to

apply res judicata and will address the merits of Wiggins’s claims. See Byrd, 698 F.

Supp. 3d at 395 (addressing merits of claims where res judicata issue was “unsettled”);

see also E. River Hous. Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (explaining that res judicata is a

“flexible doctrine[]” that should not be “mechanically applied”). And the Court finds that

regardless of whether Wiggins’s claims are barred by res judicata, they could not

succeed on the merits for the reasons explained below.

II. MERITS OF WIGGINS’S CLAIMS

A. ADA Claim

7 “The Second Circuit tried to clarify this issue by certifying the question to the

New York Court of Appeals. But the New York Court of Appeals eventually declined to

consider the certified question after the appellant in the federal case withdrew the

appeal.” Byrd, 698 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (citations omitted).

Courts “analyze ADA claims under the burden-shifting analysis established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668

(1973).” Thompson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Prob., 348 F. App’x 643, 645 (2d Cir. 2009)

(summary order) (citing Reg’l Econ. Comm. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown,

294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002)). “A plaintiff alleging disability discrimination carries the

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.” Id. (italics omitted) (citing Ryan v.

Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869 (2d Cir. 1998)). “In order to establish a prima

facie case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the

plaintiff suffers from a disability as defined in the ADA; (3) she could perform the

essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) she

suffered an adverse employment action due to the disability.” Id. (italics omitted) (citing

Ryan, 135 F.3d at 869-70). “Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden

of production shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its decision.” Id. (italics omitted) (citing Reg’l Econ. Comm. Action Program, 294 F.3d at

49). “If the employer meets that burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the

employer’s proffered reason was false and a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citing Reg’l

Econ. Comm. Action Program, 294 F.3d at 49). Moreover, “the ADA requires a plaintiff

alleging a claim of employment discrimination to prove that discrimination was the but-

for cause of any adverse employment action.” Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d

337, 348 (2d Cir. 2019).

Here, Wiggins alleges that People Inc. failed to provide her with a reasonable

accommodation and then fired her because of that request.

1. Reasonable Accommodation

“A reasonable accommodation can never involve the elimination of an essential

function of a job.” Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003). In

other words, if a disability prevents someone from performing the essential functions of

a job, an employer cannot be required to provide an accommodation that relieves the

employee from any of those essential functions. See id.

Wiggins asked to return to work with the accommodation that she not be required

to stand for more than 30 minutes at a time. See Docket Item 18 ¶¶ 57-60. But People

Inc. says that Wiggins’s requested accommodation “was incompatible with the essential

functions of her job, including[] maintaining the physical agility and ability to meet the

needs of clients with varying disabilities; lifting and transferring clients; and responding

to regularly occurring emergency incidents, such as a client choking on food and

behavioral incidents.” Docket Item 34 at 22-23. In fact, Katherine Guas, the Benefits

and Safety Manager for People Inc., submitted an affidavit stating that Guas had

determined—based on conversations with Wiggins’s supervisors—that People Inc.

could not reasonably accommodate Wiggins’s request. See Docket Item 31-8 ¶¶ 7-9.

More specifically, Guas explained that Wiggins’s position of “Primary Instructor”

includes “arrival and dismissal duties, . . . attend[ing] to individual hygiene needs, and

. . . perform[ing] lunch monitoring duties—all of which typically require standing for more

than 30 minutes at a time.” Id. ¶ 9.

Wiggins has not presented anything that might rebut the evidence that her

requested accommodation would prevent her from performing the essential functions of

her job. On the contrary, the job description Wiggins attached to her response supports

People Inc.’s position. See Docket Item 37 at 82 (listing as minimum qualifications

“[a]bility to meet physical requirements of the position when performing the following:

standing, walking, sitting, bending, stooping, squatting, kneeling[,] and climbing” and

“[a]bility to lift and transfer individuals manually and mechanically as required by

prescribed program/plan”).

Moreover, although this Court is not bound by the DHR decision, the Court notes

that ALJ Erazo reached the same conclusion after a full adversary hearing. See Docket

Item 31-11 at 14 (“Respondent could not accommodate Complainant’s medical

restrictions because they interfered with the essential functions of her job. A primary

instructor must maintain the physical agility and ability to meet the needs of clients with

varying disabilities. A primary instructor must lift and transfer clients, monitor their

needs and respond to emergency incidents that occur regularly, such as a client

choking on food or other behavioral incidents.”). And again, Wiggins has not presented

any evidence to the contrary.

For all those reasons, the Court finds that People Inc. is entitled to summary

judgment on Wiggins’s reasonable accommodation claim.

2. Wrongful Termination and Retaliation Claim

The next question is whether Wiggins was terminated in retaliation for requesting

the reasonable accommodation. Wiggins claims that People Inc. “retaliated against

[her] by placing [her] on unpaid administrative leave, and subsequently terminating her

for requesting a reasonable accommodation and for taking protected time off.” Docket

Item 18 ¶ 83. Although People Inc. “does not concede” that Wiggins has met her prima

facie burden on her termination and retaliation claims, its argument focuses on

Wiggins’s failure to rebut its proffered non-discriminatory reasons for termination. See

Docket Item 34 at 16.

More specifically, People Inc. has presented evidence that it fired Wiggins not

because of her request but because of “substantiated allegations that she mistreated” a

client of People Inc. who had “profound intellectual disability, autism, and anxiety.”

Docket Item 34 at 16. A declaration from Britta Kelley—People Inc.’s Director of

Employee Relations—indicates that in October 2015, People Inc. “received a report

from a residential manager with Baker Victory Services, Kevin Jenkins,” stating that

Jenkins had “witnessed [Wiggins] screaming at an individual with profound intellectual

disability, autism, anxiety and other disorders in an inappropriate manner, whom

[Wiggins] was driving home from People Inc.’s day program.” Docket Item 30-3 ¶ 12.

People Inc. then assigned a Quality Improvement Investigator, Merja Kenola, to

investigate the allegations. Id. ¶ 13.

Kelley’s declaration attests that:

Kenola had worked in this capacity since approximately 2002, had prior

training regarding investigative techniques and strategies, and periodically

participated in continuing training programs. As part of her investigation,

Kenola interviewed [Wiggins], the affected individual, Jenkins, and a second

Baker Victory Services staff member who overheard the incident. Based

on the interviews and other information available to her, Kenola determined

that [Wiggins] had engaged in “Other Mistreatment.” . . . Kenola completed

her Investigative Report substantiating the allegations of mistreatment

against [Wiggins] on November 20, 2015.

Id.; see Docket Item 31-7 (Declaration of Merja Kenola, detailing investigation and

attaching report). Kelley further explains that “People Inc. takes any allegation of abuse

or mistreatment of any individual whom it serves very seriously and does not tolerate

such conduct among its employees.” Docket Item 30-3 ¶ 27. Indeed, Wiggins “was one

of seven similarly situated employees whom People Inc. discharged for substantiated

allegations of abuse or mistreatment in 2016.” Id.; see Docket Item 30-9 (chart showing

employees discharged for substantiated allegations of abuse or mistreatment in 2016).

In addition, People Inc. has offered evidence that Wiggins had “on-going

attendance issues for which, less than a year earlier, [she] received probation and

warning that further non-compliance could result in her termination.” Docket Item 34 at

16 (citing Docket Item 30-3 ¶¶ 20-24); see Docket Item 30-2 (Probationary Performance

Memo due to time and attendance issues). Indeed, “immediately preceding her

termination, [Wiggins] had five unplanned call-in absences in less than two months, well

exceeding the limit of two such absences per month or three per quarter, under the

Policies and Procedures applicable to her program.” Docket Item 34 at 16; see Docket

Item 30-2.

Moreover, People Inc. says that Wiggins did not raise her need for an

accommodation until a meeting in December 2015 when People Inc. “review[ed] the

findings of the Quality Insurance investigation and [Wiggins’s] continuing attendance

problems.”8 Docket Item 30-3 ¶ 14; see id. ¶ 6. In other words, by the time Wiggins

raised her request for a reasonable accommodation, the Quality Insurance investigation

already had been completed and her attendance issues were ongoing.

Although Wiggins asserts that the reports of her mistreating clients were “[l]ies”

and “[d]efamation of character,” she does not present any evidence of that beyond her

bald assertions. See Docket Item 37 at 6-7. What is more, Wiggins admitted under

oath at her DHR hearing that in October 2015 she was accused by a staff member of

8 Wiggins previously took approximately three weeks of medical leave in 2015,

but she then “returned to work with no restriction.” Docket Item 30-3 ¶¶ 5-6.

another agency of mistreating an individual and that both she and her accuser were

interviewed as part of People Inc.’s internal investigation:

Q. You gave some testimony earlier about, there was an allegation of

patient mistreatment against you. You recall that occurring sometime in --

on or around October 21st 2015?

A. Around that time. Yes, sir. . . .

Q. Was it your understanding that that matter was investigated by an

investigator from People[] Inc.?

A. Quality assurance met with me, yes. . . .

Q. And you had an opportunity to tell her -- you know, your -- your side of

the story, if you will, about the allegation of mistreatment; correct?

A. Yes.

Docket Item 30-17 at 4-6.

Nor does or can Wiggins dispute that People Inc. received the report about her

conduct from Jenkins or that Kenola interviewed her and other witnesses and concluded

that the allegations were substantiated. In fact, Wiggins admitted she had received a

copy of Kenola’s report during the DHR investigation. Id. at 6. “And while it is possible

to dispute” the conclusions Kenola reached, “to do so would require [this C]ourt to ‘sit as

a super-personnel department’ to reexamine whether [Wiggins]'s performance was

really deficient, something that [the Second Circuit has] stated courts should not do.”

See Ghent v. Moore, 324 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (citing Stern v.

Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 1997)).

Wiggins also does not dispute that she had recurring issues with time and

attendance. In fact, she admits that her supervisor “would talk to [her] about [her]

attendance and write [her] up because” of absences. See Docket Item 37 at 3.

Furthermore, she stated under oath at her DHR hearing that she “thought they

terminated [her] because of [her] time and attendance.” Docket Item 30-13 at 4. So to

the extent that Wiggins now says something different, that cannot create a genuine

issue of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment. See Moll v. Telesector

Res. Grp., Inc., 760 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[F]actual issues that a party creates

by filing an affidavit crafted to oppose a summary judgment motion that contradicts that

party’s prior testimony are not ‘genuine’ issues for trial.”).

In sum, Wiggins has not presented evidence upon which a reasonable jury could

conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that her disability accommodation request

was a but-for cause of People Inc.’s decision to fire her. People Inc. therefore is entitled

to summary judgment on Wiggins’s ADA claim.

B. FMLA Claim

Claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) are subject to a two-year

statute of limitations, or, if the violation is willful, a three-year limitations period. 29

U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1); see Porter v. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., 392 F.3d 530, 531 (2d Cir.

2004). Wiggins commenced this action on January 15, 2021, more than five years after

the alleged FMLA violation. See Docket Item 1. And she has not offered any reason

why this claim is not time-barred. See generally Docket Item 37. The Court therefore

finds that People Inc. is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.

CONCLUSION

For all those reasons, this Court GRANTS People Inc.’s motion for summary

judgment, Docket Item 30. Wiggins’s motion to release finances and to bring the case

to closure, Docket Items 44 and 45, therefore are denied as moot. The Clerk of Court

shall enter judgment and close this case.

This Court hereby certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from

this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore denies leave to appeal as a

poor person. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Wiggins must file any

notice of appeal with the Clerk’s Office, United States District Court, Western District of

New York, within 30 days of the date of judgment in this action. Requests to proceed on

appeal as a poor person must be filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit in accordance with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2026

Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE