Shine

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROSA ISABEL SHINE, : NO. 4:24-CV-02039

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (CAMONI, M.J.)

FRANK BISIGNANO,1 :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking

judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying Plaintiff Rosa Shine’s claim for disability and disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court

has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)

(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference). For the reasons stated

herein, the Court will vacate the decision of the Commissioner and

remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May

7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No

further action is needed to continue this suit by reason of the last

sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On July 16, 2021, Shine applied for disability benefits under Title

II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability as of June 29, 2021.

Transcript, doc. 12-3 at 10. Following an initial denial, Shine submitted

an appeal, requesting a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ). Doc. 12-4 at 37. The ALJ conducted the hearing and determined

that Shine is not disabled. Doc. 12-2 at 31, 44.

Shine filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the

Appeals Council denied. Id. at 2. The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became

the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pending before

this Court is Shine’s action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s

decision. Complaint, doc. 1. This case is fully briefed (docs. 15, 17, 18) and

ripe for resolution. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United

States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, including

entry of final judgment. Doc. 9.

B. The Disability Determination Process

To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”),

a claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment which can . . .

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

Under the Act, a claimant is disabled “only if his . . . impairments are of

such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in

any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.” § 423(d)(2)(A). An impairment is one that “results from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are

demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques.” § 423(d)(3).

Social Security regulations provide a “five-step sequential

evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through

step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show

that the claimant can perform substantial gainful employment other

than the claimant’s past relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d

1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5

(1987)).

At the first step, the claimant must establish that he has not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged

disability. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At the second step, claimant must

establish that he suffers from a “severe medically determinable . . .

impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . (“impairment . . .

must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at

least 12 months”).” § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the claimant

must provide evidence that his impairment “meets or equals one of our

listings in appendix 1.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates

his impairments meet those listings, he is considered to be disabled. See

id.; § 404.1520(d). If he cannot establish severity of impairment at the

third step, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four in which the ALJ

determines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

allows the claimant to continue his previous employment.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite”

impairments. § 404.1545(a)(1). To prevail on step four, claimant’s

“impairment(s) must prevent [him] from doing . . . past relevant work.”

§ 404.1520(f). At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden to

demonstrate that the claimant’s RFC and his “age, education, and work

experience . . . [allows] adjustment to other work.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If

the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden, the claimant’s claim is

granted. See § 404.1520(g).

C. The ALJ’s Decision

Here, the ALJ determined that Shine “has not been under a

disability, . . . from June 29, 2021, through the date of this decision.” Doc.

12-2 at 31. The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the

five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); see Doc. 12-2 at 20-31.

At step one, the ALJ determined that Shine “has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since June 29, 2021, the alleged onset date.”

Doc. 12-2 at 20. At step two, the ALJ found that Shine has the following

severe impairments: diabetes, polyneuropathy, and degenerative disc

disease. Id. at 21. At step three, the ALJ determined that Shine “does not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in” 20

C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. Id. at 23.

Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Shine has the

following RFC:

[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)

except she can occasionally perform pushing and/or pulling

motions with the right upper extremity, such as operating

levers and hand controls. She can occasionally reach overhead

and frequently reach in other directions with right upper

extremity. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,

use ramps and climb stairs. She can perform jobs that do not

require crawling or climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolding. She

can tolerate occasional exposure to vibration. She can perform

jobs that do not require exposure to workplace hazards, such

as unprotected heights and dangerous, moving machinery.

Id. at 25.

At step four, the ALJ determined that Shine is not under a

disability because she “is capable of performing past relevant work as a

mail room clerk.” Id. at 30.

D. Issues on Appeal

Shine raises two issues on appeal:

1. The ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence

based on a flawed analysis of the Plaintiff’s mental health

conditions at step two.

2. The decision does not contain an adequate evaluation of the

medical opinion evidence pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c,

resulting in an RFC that is not supported by substantial

evidence.

Pl.’s Br., doc. 15 at 17.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the

findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial

evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d

198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.

Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an

existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient

evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a

large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565

(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ

ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by

the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an

adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may

be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of

drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent

[the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial

evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In

determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.

Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the

record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third

Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions

for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the

ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not

only supports [a contrary] conclusion but compels it.” Immigr. &

Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Shine is

disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Shine is not

disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based

upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.

12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been

held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial

evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa.

1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim

requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright

v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of

review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he

court has plenary review of all legal issues decided by the

Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate

whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to

enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for

his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

Shine argues that the ALJ erred at step two in finding her mental

impairments not severe, and at the RFC stage by not adequately

evaluating the medical opinion evidence. Doc. 15 at 17.

The ALJ did not err at step two because the ALJ provided a

reasonable explanation for finding Shine’s mental impairments to be

non-severe and causing no more than a mild limitation. See 12-2 at 23.

But the ALJ erred at the RFC stage when he failed to mention, let alone

articulate his analysis of, Shine’s mental impairments. See id. at 29

(discussing Dr. Minora’s medical opinion). Because the ALJ failed to

include any discussion of Shine’s mental health impairments at the RFC

stage, the Court will vacate the decision and remand the case to the

Commissioner.

A. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step two

determination.

The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of

groundless claims. Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d

Cir. 2003). At step two, the claimant has the burden to show that

impairments qualify as severe. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146. To meet that

burden, a claimant must present more than her own testimony and

medical diagnoses, and present evidence that claimed conditions

significantly limited the ability to do basic work activities or impaired

capacity to cope with the mental demands of working. Salles v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2007), citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c). However, a step two error is not a valid basis for remand

when an ALJ concludes in favor of a claimant and progresses to a later

step. Orr v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 805 F. App’x 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2020).

Here, the ALJ did not err at step two in finding Shine’s mental

impairments not severe. The ALJ explained in detail that Shine had no

formal mental health treatment, had normal mental status exam

findings in the record, and had normal activities of daily living. See doc.

12-2 at 21-22. That explanation, with detailed citations to mental status

exam findings (see id. at 22), sufficed to support the ALJ’s finding that

Shine suffered no more than mild limitations, and thus her mental

impairments were non-severe. Id. at 23; Mercado v. Kijakazi, 629 F.

Supp. 3d 260, 282 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (“Where an ALJ has clearly articulated

the evidence supporting his decision, it is not our province to substitute

our own judgment as to the severity of the plaintiff’s impairments.”).

Because Shine failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, and the

ALJ did not find, that the mental impairments caused limitations that

significantly limited her ability to do basic work, the ALJ’s step two

determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Salles, 229 F.

App’x at 145.2

B. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC

determination.

When assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-

severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a)(2). At the RFC stage, an ALJ may not simply disregard

impairments by relying on his step two determination finding them to be

non-severe. Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342, 355 (M.D. Pa. 2016); see

also Gunn v. Kijakazi, 705 F. Supp. 3d 315, 331 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (collecting

authorities and finding that even mild limitations in the relevant

domains of mental functioning must be included in an RFC assessment).

Here, the ALJ failed to support his RFC assessment with

substantial evidence. First, the ALJ does not discuss Shine’s mental

impairments or any resulting functional limitations. See doc. 12-2 at 25-

30. Other than noting Shine’s allegation of anxiety and depression (id. at

2 Even assuming arguendo that the ALJ erred in finding Shine’s mental

impairments as non-severe, such error was harmless because the ALJ

found several other severe impairments and progressed to later steps in

the five-step analysis. Doc. 12-2 at 21, 25; Orr, 805 F. App’x at 88.

25), the ALJ references mental impairments only once to conclude that

the ALJ considered “the record as a whole, including the . . . mental

examinations.” Id. at 29. Such a conclusory statement is insufficient to

demonstrate that the ALJ considered all significant evidence. Carter v.

Apfel, 220 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (M.D. Pa. 2000). The ALJ “essentially

eliminated mental health related limitations without explanation—he

does not explain why mental health related limitations drop out of the

RFC completely,” when he previously discussed office visits and opinions

related to the mental impairments at step two. Kich, 218 F. Supp. 3d at

357.

Second, the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinion evidence

because the ALJ failed to include any discussion of the examiners’

assessment of Shine’s mental impairments. See doc. 12-2 at 28 (Dr.

Tedesco), 29 (Dr. Minora). Shine correctly points out that the treating

physician and state consultative examiners opined as to Shine’s mental

impairments, which the ALJ did not mention. Docs. 15 at 18; 12-3 at 12-

13, 19; 12-7 at 552-553. Because the ALJ failed to discuss any mental

health impairments or their functional limitations or articulate the

reasoning for excluding them in the RFC assessment, the Court cannot

conclude that the absence of mental health related limitations in the RFC

is supported by substantial evidence. Kich, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 358. The

case, therefore, must be remanded for further consideration. See id. at

359 (remanding because the ALJ found mild limitations from mental

impairments at step two but excluded any related limitations in the RFC

and did not discuss probative evidence supporting medical source

opinions regarding limitations).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision will be VACATED, and

the case REMANDED to the Commissioner to fully develop the record,

conduct a new administrative hearing, and appropriately evaluate the

evidence pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

An appropriate order follows.

Date: March 30, 2026 s/Sean A. Camoni

Sean A. Camoni

United States Magistrate Judge