Opinion

Maria Amarillas v. Department of Justice

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Jun 8, 2026
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 40.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MARIA AMARILLAS, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DE-0432-23-0087-I-2

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: June 8, 2026

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Samuel Ballard , Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

Patrick D. Gregory , Oakdale, Louisiana, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman

James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

reversed the appellant’s chapter 43 performance-based removal and found that the

appellant established her affirmative defense of disability discrimination based on

a failure to accommodate. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the

agency’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision’s finding that the

appellant proved her affirmative defense of disability discrimination based on a

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

failure to accommodate, and AFFIRM the initial decision’s finding that the

agency proved its charge of unacceptable performance and that the appellant did

not prove her status-based disability discrimination affirmative defense. The

appellant’s removal action is SUSTAINED.

BACKGROUND

The appellant was a GS-11 Legal Administrative Specialist (LAS) for the

agency’s Executive Office for Immigration Review. Amarillas v. Department of

Justice, MSPB Docket No. DE-0432-23-0087-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),

Tab 6 at 21. As part of the appellant’s LAS duties, she was responsible for,

among other things, maintaining Records of Proceeding and other agency record

systems, processing motions in a timely fashion, closing cases, and entering

adjournment codes. Id. at 139. Every 6 months, the LASs were rotated to a

different judge to gain experience working with each judge. Amarillas v.

Department of Justice, MSPB Docket No. DE-0432-23-0087-I-2, Appeal File (I-2

AF), Tab 21, July 26, 2023 Hearing Transcript at 26-27 (testimony of Supervisory

LAS I.Y.). Some of the agency’s judges worked on-site, while others worked

entirely remotely. Id. at 63.

Initially, in October 2020, the appellant began her employment as a GS-9

LAS, and Supervisory LAS I.R. was the appellant’s first-line supervisor from

October 2020 through September 2021. IAF, Tab 10 at 39-40; I-2 AF, Tab 22,

July 27, 2023 Hearing Transcript (HT-2) at 72 (testimony of Supervisory LAS

I.R.). In September 2021, the appellant received a “successful” rating on her

2021 annual performance appraisal, although Supervisory LAS I.R. noted some

concerns with her performance. IAF, Tab 10 at 39-40. In October 2021, the

appellant was promoted to a GS-11 LAS. Id. at 41. Beginning in October 2021,

Supervisory LAS I.Y. was the appellant’s first-line supervisor, and a Court

Administrator was her second-line supervisor. HT-2 at 5 (testimony of

Supervisory LAS I.Y.); I-2 AF, Tab 23, August 7, 2023 Hearing Transcript

(HT-3) at 56 (testimony of the appellant).

From October through March 2022, the appellant’s first-level supervisor

counseled her on various occasions about her performance. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 6

at 160, 162-63, 165-68, 174, 186, 189, 199, 201. In the wake of those

performance problems, on March 10, 2022, the appellant emailed her supervisors

and requested a reasonable accommodation to “stay with [her] current judge or be

placed with an on[-]site judge.” IAF, Tab 10 at 50. That same day, she submitted

a reasonable accommodation request form explaining, among other things, that

her medical condition was aggravated by the “constant turn over by management

who reassigns [her] judges.” IAF, Tab 11 at 15. The appellant also provided an

April 19, 2022 note from her psychiatrist to support her reasonable

accommodation request. IAF, Tab 10 at 13.

In April 2022, the appellant’s supervisors rotated her to work with an

on-site judge, Judge L.S.W. IAF, Tab 6 at 105. On April 22, 2022, the

appellant’s first-level supervisor issued her a mid-year progress review, which

was unsuccessful in Critical Element 1 (Communication), Critical Element 3

(Accountability), and Critical Element 6 (Data and Document Integrity). Id.

at 157. On April 27, 2022, the agency denied the appellant’s accommodation

request based on its determination that it was “not [an] appropriate

accommodation” and offered her alternative accommodations of various computer

applications and functions, a large wall calendar, refresher training, and

alternative lighting. IAF, Tab 11 at 13-14, Tab 16 at 19.

On May 5, 2022, the appellant’s first-level supervisor issued her a 90-day

Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) based on unacceptable performance in the

three critical elements identified during the mid-year progress review. IAF,

Tab 6 at 138-42. On August 12, 2022, the appellant’s first-level supervisor

informed her that she had not successfully completed the PIP as to Critical

Element 1 (Communication) and Critical Element 3 (Accountability). Id.

at 309-10. On October 3, 2022, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal for

unacceptable performance in those two critical elements, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

chapter 43. Id. at 129-34. On December 16, 2022, the agency issued a decision

removing the appellant, effective that day. Id. at 21-33.

The appellant appealed her removal to the Board and raised affirmative

defenses of disability discrimination based on her status as disabled and the

agency’s failure to reasonably accommodate her disability. IAF, Tab 2 at 4,

Tab 10. After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge

issued an initial decision reversing the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 2 at 2; I-2

AF, Tab 27, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 32. He found that the agency established

its charge of unacceptable performance as to both critical elements. 2 ID at 14-21.

He also found that the appellant proved her affirmative defenses of disability

discrimination based on the agency’s failure to accommodate her but did not

prove her affirmative defense of status-based disability discrimination.

ID at 20-32. The administrative judge ordered the agency to afford the appellant

interim relief if either party filed a petition for review. ID at 34-35.

The agency has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1. The appellant has responded, and the agency has replied. PFR File,

Tab 3.

Specifically, the administrative judge found that the agency proved by substantial

evidence that: (1) OPM approved the agency’s performance appraisal system and any

significant changes thereto; (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the

performance standards and critical elements of her position; (3) the appellant’s

performance standards are valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1); (4) the appellant’s

performance during the appraisal period was unacceptable in one or more critical

elements; (5) the agency warned the appellant of the inadequacies in her performance

during the appraisal period and gave her an adequate opportunity to demonstrate

acceptable performance; and (6) after an adequate improvement period, the appellant’s

performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical element. ID at 14-21 (citing

Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 15).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

We decline to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for failure to afford the

appellant interim relief.

In its petition for review, the agency explains that it intended to comply

with the administrative judge’s interim relief order and that it canceled the

appellant’s removal and restored the appellant to her GS-11 LAS position. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 6. The agency further alleges that it inquired, through the

appellant’s attorney at the time, whether the appellant intended to return to duty

with the agency; that, as of the filing of the petition for review, she had not

reported for duty or informed the agency of her intent to do so; and that it

believes she is now employed at another agency. Id. In response, the appellant

does not argue that the agency failed to comply with the interim relief order or

that the agency’s petition for review should be dismissed; instead, she

characterizes the agency’s statements about interim relief as “not germane” to the

agency’s petition for review. 3 PFR File, Tab 4 at 6.

If, as here, the initial decision grants an appellant interim relief, any

petition for review filed by the agency must be accompanied by a certification

that the agency has complied with the interim relief order either by providing the

required interim relief or by satisfying the undue disruption requirements of

5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B). 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a); see Stewart v.

Department of Transportation, 2023 MSPB 18, ¶ 7. An appellant may challenge

an agency’s certification of compliance with the interim relief order, and an

agency’s failure to establish compliance may result in the dismissal of its

petition. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(c); see Stewart, 2023 MSPB 18, ¶ 7. Ultimately,

the Board will exercise its discretionary authority to dismiss an agency’s petition

for review for failure to provide interim relief in light of all the relevant facts and

circumstances. Stewart, 2023 MSPB 18, ¶ 12. Chief among these considerations

The appellant also does not deny the agency’s statement that it believes that the

appellant is employed by another agency.

is whether the agency undertook good faith, diligent, and competent efforts to

satisfy its interim relief obligation. Id.

In the instant case, the agency did not provide a specific certification of

interim relief, but it did provide a description of its efforts to comply with the

interim relief order, including stating that it had cancelled the removal action and

restored the appellant to her position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. The appellant has

not contested the agency’s provision of interim relief and has not responded to

the agency’s legitimate questions about the appellant’s status. PFR File, Tab 4

at 6. Thus, because the agency has undertaken good faith efforts to satisfy the

interim relief order by canceling the removal action and reinstating the appellant

and the appellant has chosen not to respond to the agency’s requests for

information about her availability to return to duty during the interim relief

period, we decline to dismiss the petition for review.

The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant proved her

affirmative defense of disability discrimination under a reasonable

accommodation theory.

As discussed above, the administrative judge found that the agency

established its charge of unacceptable performance as to both critical elements

and that the appellant did not prove her affirmative defense of status-based

disability discrimination. ID at 14-20, 30-32. The parties do not dispute these

findings, and we discern no basis to disturb them. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal

Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (stating that the Board will not disturb an

administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,

drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of

credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services ,

33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). Thus, the sole issue on review is whether

the appellant established her affirmative defense of disability discrimination

based on a failure to accommodate. For the following reasons, we find that she

did not.

To establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, an appellant

must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide her with a reasonable

accommodation. Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13

(2014). An agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known

physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue

hardship on its business operations. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). 4

The agency reasserts on review that the appellant is not entitled to the

accommodation of her choice, but in any event the agency effectively

“informally” granted the appellant’s accommodation request when it allowed the

appellant to work with one judge and no longer participate in the 6-month

rotation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11. The agency also argues that the appellant’s

performance-based removal was warranted because the appellant’s performance

problems predated her reasonable accommodation request and she has not argued

or established that the 6-month rotation had a negative effect on her performance.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13. The administrative judge found that the appellant was

not accommodated because she did not stay with one judge after she requested her

accommodation and that the denial of her request coincided with her performance

decline. ID at 28, 30. We disagree with the administrative judge and conclude

that the appellant did not prove that she could successfully perform in her

position or a vacant funded job even with a reasonable accommodation.

A claim of disability discrimination based on an agency’s failure to

reasonably accommodate that disability requires that the individual be

“qualified.” Haas v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28. A

qualified individual with a disability is one who “can perform the essential

On review, neither party disputes, and we decline to disturb, the administrative

judge’s finding that the appellant is an individual with a disability. ID at 22.

functions of the . . . position that such individual holds or desires” with or

without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Haas, 2022 MSPB

36, ¶ 28; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). To be “qualified,” the employee must satisfy

“the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements” of

the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). As we observed above, the parties do not

dispute the administrative judge’s determination that the agency proved its charge

of unacceptable performance. Nor do the parties contend on review that the

duties the appellant was unable to successfully perform during her PIP were

anything other than essential functions of her position. We therefore turn to

whether the appellant has proven that a reasonable accommodation would have

enabled her to perform acceptably.

The appellant did not prove that she could perform in her position acceptably

with a reasonable accommodation.

As noted above, on March 10, 2022, the appellant emailed her supervisors

and requested a reasonable accommodation to “stay with [her] current judge or be

placed with an on[-]site judge.” IAF, Tab 10 at 50. At the time, the appellant

was assigned to Judge L.F. from December 2021 until April 2022. IAF, Tab 6

at 104. She indicated that she had spoken to him and he was willing to remain as

her judge. IAF, Tab 10 at 50. That same day, she submitted a reasonable

accommodation request form describing her disability as a number of specific

psychiatric disorders. IAF, Tab 11 at 15. She requested an accommodation “to

stay with my current judge or to be assigned to an on[-]site judge” because her

medical condition was aggravated by the constant rotation in the judge to whom

she was assigned. Id.

In April 2022, the appellant was rotated to work with another on-site judge,

Judge L.S.W. IAF, Tab 6 at 105. Following a request for additional information

to support her reasonable accommodation request, the appellant provided an

April 19, 2022 note from her psychiatrist confirming her diagnosis. IAF, Tab 10

at 13, Tab 16 at 14. Her doctor explained that the appellant “has severe anxiety

and mood lability that are usually affected by the unstable environment of going

from one work environment to another” and “has difficulty dealing with the work

situation with an off-site judge and would prefer to be assigned to a specific

judge on site.” IAF, Tab 10 at 13. The doctor expounded that the appellant said

“that at her current position and assignment, she is able to complete her tasks and

assignments diligently because of the stable nature of her work environment,” and

the doctor recommended that the appellant “remain in her current position and

assignment which would help further stabilize her mental health condition.” Id.

At the hearing, the appellant explained in her testimony that it “takes [her] a little

bit [of time] to understand a given judge” and that, with the agency’s rotation

system, by the time she got used to a judge, the agency reassigned her. HT -3

at 101 (testimony of the appellant).

Despite the appellant’s and her doctor’s assertions that she had been

performing well and felt stable while assigned to Judge L.F., on April 22, 2022,

the appellant’s first-level supervisor issued her a negative mid-year progress

review, which was unsuccessful in three critical areas. IAF, Tab 6 at 146-58.

The progress review covered approximately 6 months, the last 4 months of which

she was assigned to Judge L.F. Id. at 146. Notably, the progress review

primarily cited concerns with the appellant’s poor communication and

performance with her first-level supervisor, managers, and staff

members/colleagues and not with judges. For instance, it stated that the appellant

failed to respond to requests and emails from her supervisors and managers on

approximately 18 occasions, did not communicate with her supervisors and

managers when issues arose, and did not update staff members when she covered

for them. Id. at 157. By contrast, there was only one example of the appellant

not responding to a judge’s email. Id. Similarly, the progress review cited

concerns with the appellant’s accountability in meeting deadlines and following

instructions and procedures given by her first-level supervisor and managers,

including when she was covering for another staff member—for instance, failing

to timely cancel a scheduled interpreter after processing a final order. Id.

at 157-58. Lastly, it cited concerns with the appellant properly maintaining

documents and databases, such as not entering and closing motions or closing out

cases, among other things, which the agency asserted are duties and procedures

that are consistent for all LASs and do not change with rotations . Id. at 158; IAF,

Tab 11 at 14. Based on the above, we do not discern a connection between the

performance problems the appellant attributes to the judge rotations and the

documented performance problems involving her permanent first-level supervisor

and managers and her consistent LAS duties prior to the PIP.

During a 6-month rotation from April 2022 until the end of September

2022, the appellant was assigned to Judge L.S.W. IAF, Tab 6 at 105, 345; HT -3

at 99-100 (testimony of the appellant). On May 5, 2022, the appellant’s

first-level supervisor placed her on a 90-day PIP based on her unacceptable

performance in the three critical elements discussed above. IAF, Tab 6 at 138-43.

During the PIP period, despite being assigned to work for a single on-site judge,

the appellant’s performance problems related to communications and instructions

from her permanent supervisors and managers and her consistent LAS duties

continued, as evidenced by her first-level supervisor’s weekly PIP meeting notes

and documents. For instance, the appellant did not cancel interpreters or update

an address properly; did not follow a supervisor’s instruction and, as a result,

miscommunicated the start time for a hearing, which caused a delay for all

courtrooms and impacted scheduled interpreters; and improperly handled a

priority filing. IAF, Tab 6 at 216, 234, 238, 313, 370. Additionally, the appellant

ignored a direct request from her first-level supervisor to acknowledge receipt of

her emails, lacked candor when communicating to her first-level supervisor that

she had spoken to Judge L.S.W. about an issue when she had not, did not follow

up with her first-level supervisor concerning a missing document or properly

address the issue, “forgot” a pending motion to dismiss because she did not enter

it in the agency system, did not read emails from management, did not arrive to

court sufficiently in advance, and was uninformed about an agency process

despite having received training on it by her supervisors. Id. at 242-43, 254,

269-70, 280, 285, 303, 354.

Thus, on August 12, 2022, shortly after the end of the PIP, the appellant’s

first-level supervisor informed her that she had not successfully completed the

PIP as to Critical Element 1 (Communication) and Critical Element 3

(Accountability). Id. at 309-10. After the conclusion of her rotation with Judge

L.S.W. at the end of September, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal in

October 2022 for unacceptable performance in those two critical elements,

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 43. Id. at 129-34. Thus, we agree with the agency

that the appellant was essentially granted her accommodation request to stay with

one on-site judge and not rotate throughout the relevant period at issue in the

proposed removal, which included the entirety of the 90-day PIP period. During

that time, the appellant was nevertheless unable to perform the essential functions

of her position.

Moreover, we agree with the agency that the appellant has not explained

how not being assigned to a new judge every 6 months would have resulted in

improved performance on the problems cited in her proposed removal, such as

lacking candor in her communications with her supervisors, failing to report for

court duty as scheduled, failing to timely cancel scheduled interpreters, failing to

respond to or communicate with her first-level supervisor, failing to process an

order, improperly deleting documents, and not entering motions in the agency’s

records system. Id. at 131-33; PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13. Even if we did not

consider the matters cited in her proposed removal that concerned her

communications or issues with judges, as explained above, the majority of the

appellant’s performance problems leading up to the PIP, during her PIP, and in

her proposed removal involved problems with communications and instructions

from her permanent supervisors and managers and expectations and duties that

remained consistent for all LASs regardless of rotations. Id. Notably, the

appellant did not appear to have serious performance or communication issues

with Judge L.S.W., to whom she was assigned during the PIP period. To the

contrary, the appellant testified that Judge L.S.W. was happy with her

performance and communication and, in May 2022, emailed the appellant’s

first-level supervisor indicating the same. IAF, Tab 6 at 105; HT-3 at 169-71

(testimony of the appellant). Accordingly, we do not discern a connection

between the judge rotations and the documented performance problems at issue in

the appellant’s removal.

In finding that the appellant was “qualified,” the administrative judge

relied on her 2021 performance appraisal, in which she received an overall rating

of “successful.” ID at 23; IAF, Tab 10 at 39-40. He acknowledged that although

the appellant was a GS-9 during that appraisal period, her duties were essentially

the same as those she performed in her GS-11 position at the time she was

removed. ID at 23. However, we disagree with the administrative judge’s

finding that the appellant has established that she is “qualified.”

The administrative judge correctly acknowledged elsewhere in his decision

that the appellant’s performance problems began in her first year with the agency,

as documented in that 2021 appraisal. ID at 2. Specifically, she was advised to

seek additional training, be more attentive when entering and processing

documents and filings in the appropriate “agency file,” and to ask management

for help when she did not know an answer. Id. at 39, 41. Her supervisor also

stated that the appellant “needed periodic supervision from management to

promptly address problems in order to prevent delays.” Id. at 41. Indeed, the

administrative judge specifically credited the testimony of the appellant’s

then-first-level supervisor, Supervisory LAS I.R., stating that if he had known the

extent of the appellant’s performance problems at the time, he would have done

more to prevent her October 2021 promotion. ID at 2-3; HT-2 at 70 (testimony of

Supervisory LAS I.R.). The administrative judge also credited Supervisory LAS

I.R.’s testimony that, during the appellant’s first year, the workload was

diminished in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic; however, when the appellant

began her second year in October 2021 and the workload increased, the

appellant’s performance problems “started to come to light . . . in greater

numbers.” ID at 2-3; HT-2 at 70-79 (testimony of Supervisory LAS I.R.).

Indeed, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant’s unacceptable

performance in two critical elements prior to and during the PIP period justified

the appellant’s placement on a PIP and her removal, which he found was

supported by substantial testimonial and documentary evidence. ID at 3-5, 15.

As established above, the appellant does not specifically challenge that finding on

review, and we decline to revisit it. Thus, we find that the appellant has failed to

show that she could perform the essential functions of the position she held or

that there was a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to do so.

Lastly, the appellant has not identified a vacant position that she desires.

See Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 30 (determining that an appellant failed to prove he

was a qualified individual when he did not identify an alternative position that he

desired). Because we find that the appellant failed to establish that she is a

qualified individual with a disability, the appellant necessarily failed to prove her

affirmative defense of disability discrimination based on the agency’s failure to

reasonably accommodate her. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse

the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant proved her affirmative

defense of disability discrimination based on the agency’s failure to reasonably

accommodate her. Accordingly, the appellant’s removal is sustained.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following

address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following