Sgaraglino v. County of Ventura

Filed 6/8/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

FRANKLIN SGARAGLINO et al., 2d Civ. No. B348978

(Super. Ct. No.

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 2023CUPP017970)

(Ventura County)

v.

COUNTY OF VENTURA,

Defendant and Respondent.

Anthony Sgaraglino died by suicide the day after his

discharge from the inpatient psychiatric unit of Ventura County

Medical Center. His parents, Franklin and Linda Sgaraglino,

sued the County of Ventura for wrongful death, asserting the

county hospital negligently released him without medication

despite indications that he was not safe to be discharged.1 The

trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the county,

finding it immune under Welfare and Institutions Code2 section

5113.

When to release a psychiatric patient from an involuntary

commitment is a fraught decision. Recognizing the inherent

tension between safety and freedom, the Legislature set time

1 We refer to Anthony by his first name for ease of

reference. No disrespect is intended.

2 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code unless otherwise specified.

limits on involuntary detentions and immunized psychiatric

facilities and the people who operate them from liability for

release decisions. Here we hold that section 5113 immunizes

hospitals and their operators for the actions of patients, like

Anthony, after they are released. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 6, 2023, Anthony was involuntarily detained at

Hillmont, the inpatient psychiatric unit at Ventura County

Medical Center, under Welfare and Institutions Code section

5150. He was diagnosed with bipolar disorder.

Anthony was discharged three days later. A physician at

Hillmont determined he did not meet the criteria for continued

hospitalization under section 5250. On January 10, 2023,

Anthony took his own life.

In July 2024, appellants, Franklin and Linda Sgaraglino,

filed the operative first amended complaint for wrongful death

against respondent, County of Ventura, asserting a cause of

action for general negligence. Appellants alleged they told county

hospital staff that Anthony was suicidal and tried to have his

commitment continued. Nevertheless, respondent released him

after three days without medication, and despite indications that

he might be suicidal.

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment,

asserting immunity under section 5113. Respondent supported

its motion with a separate statement of undisputed material facts

and a supporting declaration with exhibits.

In opposition, appellants asserted that section 5113 did not

bar claims of gross negligence. Appellants did not file any

responsive separate statement. Instead, they presented the

expert declaration of Dr. Leslie Dobson, a licensed clinical

psychologist, who opined that Anthony had a family and personal

history of mental illness and suicidal ideation. According to Dr.

Dobson, Anthony should not have been released from involuntary

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hospitalization against the wishes of his family without

medication.

The trial court granted the motion, finding section 5113

barred any claim that respondent’s treatment and release of

Anthony fell below the standard of care. The court held there

was no authority supporting appellants’ contention that the

immunity grant did not apply to gross negligence claims.

Because appellants did not file a responsive separate statement,

the court deemed the facts in respondent’s separate statement

undisputed and established. The court overruled respondents’

objection to Dr. Dobson’s declaration as a whole, but sustained

objections to specific statements constituting improper legal

conclusions or references to unpleaded statutory provisions.

DISCUSSION

We agree with the trial court that respondent is immune

from liability for releasing Anthony after his section 5150

involuntary detainment.

Standard of review

We independently review orders granting summary

judgment. (Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc. (2018) 20

Cal.App.5th 427, 431.) Questions of statutory interpretation and

the application of the law to undisputed facts are also subject to

de novo review. (Bitner v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation

(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1058.)

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act

The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.; LPS Act)

governs involuntary detainment of persons with mental illness.

The Legislature enacted the LPS Act “to end the inappropriate,

indefinite and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered

persons, to provide prompt evaluation and treatment and to

protect mentally disordered persons.” (Michael E. L. v. County of

San Diego (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 515, 525 (Michael E. L.); see

also § 5001 [stating legislative intent of LPS Act].)

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Section 5150 permits a person to be involuntarily detained

for 72 hours for evaluation and treatment if that person is a

danger to themselves or others due to a mental health disorder.

(§ 5150, subd. (a).) After 72 hours, the person shall be released,

referred for additional care and treatment on a voluntary basis,

or be placed under the control of a conservator. (§§ 5152, subd.

(b), 5250.) The person can also be certified for 14 days of

intensive treatment if a professional at the facility evaluating the

person “has analyzed the person’s condition and has found the

person is . . . a danger to others or to themselves, or is gravely

disabled” due to the mental health disorder. (§ 5250, subd. (a);

see also § 5152, subd. (b).)

The LPS Act immunizes “certain professionals from civil or

criminal liability for any action by a person released early or at

the end of a particular period of custody.” (Coburn v. Sievert

(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493 [citing statutes granting

immunity] (Coburn).) As relevant here, the facility providing

treatment “shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any action

by a person released at or before the end of the period for which

the person was admitted pursuant to the provisions” of the article

under which the person was detained.3 (§ 5113.)

Respondent supported its summary judgment motion with

a separate statement of undisputed material facts. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) Appellants were obligated to support

their opposition with a separate statement conceding or disputing

each fact asserted by respondent. (Id., subd. (b)(3); Cal. Rules of

Court, rule 3.1350, subd. (f).) They did not do so and instead filed

the declaration of Dr. Dobson. The trial court did not indicate

whether it considered evidence outside the separate statement.

We exercise our discretion to consider the portions of Dr.

Dobson’s declaration to which the trial court did not sustain an

3 A new version of section 5113 was enacted, effective on

January 1, 2026. (Stats. 2025, ch. 691, § 1.) The amendments to

the statute do not affect the outcome of this appeal.

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objection. (See Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020) 53

Cal.App.5th 171, 183.)

Respondent immunized pursuant to section 5113

Summary judgment must be granted if there is no triable

issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

A defendant seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate

that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot

be established or that there is a complete defense. (Id., subd.

(p)(2).) If the defendant meets its burden, plaintiff must show a

triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.)

To show that it is immune from liability and entitled to a

favorable judgment, respondent demonstrated that Anthony was

involuntarily detained at respondent’s psychiatric unit for 72

hours under section 5150. Respondent also showed that after the

expiration of the 72-hour period, Anthony did not qualify for an

additional hold under section 5250. As a result, he was

discharged.

Under section 5113, facilities providing treatment pursuant

to section 5150 are immune from civil liability “for any action by

a person released at or before the end of the period for which the

person was admitted . . . .” Here, appellants seek damages

against respondent for negligence and wrongful death on the

theory that respondent discharged Anthony without medication

and despite indications he was not safe to leave the hospital,

causing him to take his own life. On its face, section 5113

protects respondent from liability for Anthony’s post-release

actions.

Appellants contend that section 5113 does not apply in

cases of gross negligence. The statute, however, contains no

exception for gross negligence. “When the language of a statute

is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for interpretation and

we must apply the statute as written.” (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc.

v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 862.)

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Case law points to immunity as an important part of the

LPS Act’s goal of ending the inappropriate, indefinite and

involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons. In

Michael E. L., a patient was committed to a county mental health

facility under section 5150. (Michael E. L., supra, 183 Cal.App.3d

at pp. 525-526.) The facility released him early despite

indications that he was a danger to his wife. (Id. at pp. 520-521,

522-523.) After his release, the patient killed his wife and then

himself. (Id. at p. 521.) The guardian of the couple’s son sued the

county for negligence on a theory that a county physician should

have warned the wife. (Id. at pp. 521-523, 528.) The trial court

granted the county’s nonsuit motion, and the guardian appealed.

(Id. at p. 521.)

The Court of Appeal in Michael E. L., supra, 183

Cal.App.3d 515 held that the physician and the county were

immune from liability, under section 5154, for releasing the

patient early. The court found that the alleged failure to warn

related to the patient’s “[post-release] activity” for which the

defendants could not be liable under the statute. (Michael E. L.,

at p. 530.) According to the court, the Legislature recognized that

some patients released before 72 hours “may . . . harm . . .

others.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, considering the goal of the LPS Act

to end indefinite commitments, section 5154 provides immunity

for defendants who decide on early release. (Ibid.) The court

stated, “The corollary to the early release and future conduct

uncertainties is the immunity provided in section 5154 — no

liability for any actions by a person released at or before the end

of 72 hours.” (Ibid.)

The immunity provided by section 5113 is nearly identical

to that of section 5154 except that it additionally immunizes

facilities and their operators. (See Michael E. L., supra, 183

Cal.App.3d at p. 524, fn. 5 [recognizing that section 5154 “tracks”

section 5113].) Both statutes provide immunity from civil and

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criminal liability for any action by a person released at or before

the end of 72 hours.

Here, respondent demonstrated that a physician evaluated

Anthony and determined he did not meet the criteria for a section

5250 hold. Since appellants failed to dispute this fact by filing

their own separate statement, it is deemed established and they

cannot now attack the validity of the release decision. In any

event, Dr. Dobson’s declaration that the release decision did not

meet the medical standard of care is irrelevant. That is the very

type of argument foreclosed by section 5113’s immunity

provision. “If evidence that a question of fact exists regarding

compliance with professional standards in evaluation, treatment,

or release were deemed sufficient to create a triable issue of fact

under the subjective belief standard, then summary judgment on

the immunity issue would become virtually unavailable.”

(Coburn, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.)

Finally, appellants’ argument that there is no immunity for

a grossly negligent release decision is unsupported. They cite

Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 69 (Jacobs)

and Gonzalez v. Paradise Valley Hospital (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th

735 (Gonzalez). Neither case deals with section 5113 immunity

for the actions of people released after a section 5150 hold.

Further, neither case even mentions gross negligence. Jacobs

dealt with a general negligence claim after a patient fell while in

the hospital. That type of injury falls outside of any statutory

immunity. (Jacobs, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) In

Gonzalez, the patient escaped and was shot by police. Plaintiff

alleged negligent treatment and conditions of detention. The

Court of Appeal held section 5278 immunity does not extend to

negligent treatment during the confinement. (Gonzalez, supra,

111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 741-742.)

Neither case applies to the facts involving Anthony’s

release or the immunity that covers that decision. Here, the

gravamen of appellants’ first amended complaint is that Anthony

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was released prematurely. To save their claim from immunity,

appellants now attempt to frame the release decision as

“treatment negligence” by analogy to Gonzalez. But even if the

treating psychiatrist ignored indications that Anthony was still

dangerous to himself before he was released, this alleged

negligence relates to the harm that followed from the timing of

his release, not from harm that occurred during his treatment. It

is, therefore, covered by section 5113’s immunity.

Appellants’ new theories of liability are barred on appeal

Appellants now seek to raise theories of liability not

asserted in the trial court or in the first amended complaint.

Appellants argue, for the first time on appeal, there are

triable issues under title 42 United States Code section 1983, the

Bane Act under Civil Code section 52.1, Government Code section

815.6, and the failure to warn others under Tarasoff v. Regents of

University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425. These theories are

forfeited because appellants did not raise them in the trial court

in their opposition to the summary judgment motion.

(Magallanes de Valle v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2022)

80 Cal.App.5th 914, 924.)

Moreover, appellants did not assert these theories in the

operative first amended complaint. “[S]ummary judgment cannot

be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings.” (Bostrom v.

County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663.) “A

party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and

different theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only

be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing

litigant.” (Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 (Ernst);

North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17

Cal.App.4th 22, 29 [applying Ernst to summary judgment].)

Appellants invoke Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736,

742 (Ward), for the proposition that new theories may be raised

for the first time on appeal when they present pure questions of

law on undisputed facts. The exception does not apply here. The

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new theories are not pure questions of law. Each depends on

factual predicates never developed in the pleadings or at

summary judgment. The undisputed facts in the record on

appeal are limited to those in the county’s separate statement —

none of which supports the new theories. Because appellants

failed to plead these theories below, the factual record needed to

support them was never developed, and Ward does not rescue

them on appeal.

Doe defendants do not invalidate summary judgment

Citing Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Dept. (2014)

232 Cal.App.4th 995 (Pierce), appellants contend that granting

summary judgment undermined their right to discover the

identity of unknown defendants. The status of the Doe

defendants is not readily discernible from the record on appeal.

The motion for summary judgment was brought on behalf of only

the county. In granting the motion, the trial did not say it was

dismissing the case in its entirety. At oral argument, however,

both sides agreed that the effect of the court’s ruling is a complete

dismissal against all defendants.

In Pierce, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at page 1021, the Court of

Appeal held that the trial court erred in dismissing the case in its

entirety on demurrer because a cause of action could theoretically

be stated against the Doe defendants. In that case, however, the

plaintiff had amended the complaint to describe the Doe

defendants as “individual members of the San Mateo Gang Task

Force.” (Id. at pg. 1020.) Dismissing the case in its entirety was

error because the basis for sustaining the county’s demurrer did

not apply to the Doe defendants described. (Id. at pg. 1021.)

Here, appellants have not named or described any Doe

defendants. It is impossible to analyze in the abstract whether

there are any potential unnamed defendants who are not

protected by section 5113’s immunity provision. Accordingly, we

take no position on whether appellants may file a valid new

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complaint against defendants not named or described in the

current action.

Because respondent, the only ascertainable defendant, is

immune from liability for the claims in the first amended

complaint under section 5113, summary judgment was properly

granted, and the case was properly dismissed in its entirety.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to

respondent.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

VAN ROOYEN, J.*

We concur:

BALTODANO, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of

the California Constitution.

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Benjamin F. Coats, Judge

Superior Court of Ventura County

_________________________

Figueroa Law Group, James F. Scafide for Plaintiffs and

Appellants.

Clinkenbeard, Ramsey, Spackman & Clark, LLP, Hugh

Spackman and Cathy Anderson for Defendant and Respondent.