Farah Naz v. Chris Wright

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 16, 2025 Decided June 9, 2026

No. 23-5237

FARAH NAZ,

APPELLANT

v.

CHRIS WRIGHT,

SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:22-cv-01730)

Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on

the briefs was Cody F. Marden, appointed by the court.

Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew M.

Graves, U.S. Attorney, and Brian P. Hudak and Jane M. Lyons,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Fithawi Berhane, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, entered an appearance.

2

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, KATSAS, Circuit Judge,

and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge KATSAS.

SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: Farah Naz alleges that her

former employer, the Department of Energy, unlawfully

discriminated and retaliated against her in a series of actions

culminating in her firing. She brought a pro se lawsuit against

the Department. The district court dismissed her suit,

concluding that her complaint failed to state a discrimination

or retaliation claim.

While we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the

retaliation claim, we vacate the dismissal of the discrimination

claims and remand for further proceedings. Under our

precedents, a court reviewing a pro se plaintiff’s lawsuit

generally must consider filings beyond just the complaint when

deciding whether to dismiss the action. The district court in

this case carefully treated with Naz’s discrimination claims,

including by considering allegations in her opposition to the

government’s motion to dismiss; but it appears that the court

did not take account of a potentially dispositive factual

allegation in the opposition. We thus vacate the dismissal and

remand the case to permit the district court to assess in the first

instance whether the allegation in Naz’s opposition supports a

different disposition of her discrimination claims, or whether

there is some basis—such as breach of a court rule enforceable

against a pro se plaintiff—for disregarding the allegation.

3

I.

A.

The following facts are drawn from the plaintiff’s

complaint and from “documents either attached to or

incorporated” into it. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial

Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because this case

comes to us from the grant of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

complaint, we assume the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations

to be true. And because she brought her complaint pro se, we

give the complaint and other relevant filings a “liberal[]”

construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(citation omitted).

Farah Naz is a Muslim woman of Pakistani origin. From

January 2017 to January 2021, she worked as an economist in

the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Consumption and

Efficiency Analysis. That office “projects industrial-energy-

consumption trends and publishes its analyses in [Department]

publications.” Naz v. Granholm, 2023 WL 6389130, at *1

(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2023). Naz’s responsibilities included

writing papers. When she began her tenure, her direct

supervisor was Kelly Perl and her second-level supervisor was

James Turnure. At the outset, Naz enjoyed a “cordial and

productive relationship” with Perl. Compl. ¶ 5 (J.A. 16).

About nine months after she began working at the

Department, Naz testified in support of the Equal Employment

Opportunity (EEO) complaint of Christopher Dickerson, a

colleague with whom Naz had a “close relationship.” Compl.

¶ 6 (J.A. 16). Dickerson accused Perl of race discrimination,

and Naz testified about what she perceived to be “rampant race

discrimination that pervades” the Department. It is unclear

4

what ultimately happened with Dickerson’s complaint, but his

employment with the Department ended in March 2018.

In April 2018, Naz experienced a “sea change” in her

working conditions and relationships. Compl. ¶ 8 (J.A. 16).

Perl went from “cordial” to “hostile, antagonistic, and

unproductive,” threatening to fire Naz and screaming at her for

what Naz considered ordinary conduct. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12 (J.A.

16–17). On one occasion, Perl told Naz that “non-native

people” like her often “have difficulty writing” and inquired

whether she had “attended school in the United States.”

Compl. ¶ 11 (J.A. 16). Naz surmises that the “sea change”

came about because Perl had learned of Naz’s testimony

against Perl in support of Dickerson’s EEO complaint.

Naz asked Turnure for a transfer to a different supervisor.

Turnure encouraged her to “explore other opportunities” and

organized a meeting between Naz, Turnure, and a number of

other individuals. Compl. ¶ 15 (J.A. 17). Before the meeting,

though, Perl told Naz’s colleagues that they should refuse to

meet with her because she would spend “[their] valuable time

complaining.” Compl. ¶ 16 (J.A. 17). It appears that the

transfer request was never granted.

In June 2018, Naz submitted a paper discussing the subject

of irrigation in California. Perl told Naz that her paper was

deficient in various ways: citations were missing, references

in the bibliography were not in proper form, and the conclusion

needed to be rewritten. Naz was surprised, as she had

submitted a paper in May 2017 in a “substantially similar style

and manner” and had received no criticisms. Compl. ¶ 27 (J.A.

18). Later that year, Naz asked Perl to nominate her for an

award, but Perl declined to do so. Perl also denied Naz various

training opportunities.

5

By November 2018, Perl had concluded that Naz’s writing

deficiencies were serious enough to warrant placing her in a

performance plan. Naz reiterated her transfer request, but to no

avail. In early December, Perl placed Naz on a 90-day

performance plan. As a result of that action, Naz was unable

to telework or benefit from alternative work schedules. In

response, Naz filed an EEO complaint against Perl and accused

Perl of discriminating and retaliating against her.

In January 2019, Naz resubmitted her California irrigation

paper. Perl again gave her a “deficient and untimely”

performance review in response. Perl also continued to deny

Naz training opportunities and to direct slights at Naz,

including commenting that Naz frowned too much during a

meeting.

In March 2019, Peter Gross replaced Perl as Naz’s

supervisor. Despite the change, Naz’s difficulties persisted.

As it turned out, Gross allegedly knew about Naz’s EEO

complaint against Perl and was close with Turnure. Turnure—

relatedly, Naz alleges—decided to reinstate the performance

plan that Perl had previously imposed. The plan indicated that

Naz’s writing deficiencies continued to present a problem.

As Naz’s supervisor, Gross gave Naz inconsistent

directions and “micromanage[d]” and “bull[ied]” her. Compl.

¶¶ 65–66 (J.A. 21). He also denied her an “automatic” grade

increase owed to all employees at her level. Compl. ¶ 71 (J.A.

21). Together with Turnure, Gross denied Naz the opportunity

to telework or participate in alternative work schedules because

of her performance plan. And he allegedly prevented Naz from

completing her work by scheduling meetings on her “busy

working days,” sending her distractingly “long emails,” and

giving her “unrealistic deadlines.” Compl. ¶¶ 74–76 (J.A. 21).

6

In October 2019, Naz filed another EEO complaint, this time

against Gross for retaliating and discriminating against her.

As for the issues that had been raised about Naz’s

performance, Gross “constantly criticized” her work as

“deficient and inaccurate,” even though she thought it was

“completed adequately.” Compl. ¶¶ 58, 62 (J.A. 20). She also

received a “Fails to Meet Expectations” rating for two of the

four elements of her 2019 performance evaluation, eventually

leading to Gross’s placing her in a performance plan the

following year. Compl. ¶¶ 69, 73 (J.A. 21).

In August 2020, after determining that Naz’s performance

would not improve, Gross issued her a notice of removal. Naz

was given a chance to submit oral and written responses to the

notice and appear before her supervisor, though her meeting

with Gross resulted in her being humiliated and belittled. In

January 2021, the Department terminated Naz’s employment.

B.

In June 2022, Naz, proceeding pro se, brought this action

against the Department. Her complaint alleges unlawful

discrimination based on her race, gender, sex, religion, and

national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation, all in violation

of Title VII. She claims that the Department discriminated

against her by terminating her employment and failing to

promote her based on her protected characteristics, and that the

7

Department retaliated against her because of her testimony in

support of Dickerson and her various EEO complaints.

The Department moved to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim. The district court granted the

Department’s dismissal motion.

With respect to Naz’s claims of discrimination, the district

court found “no facts in the complaint from which an inference

of discrimination could be drawn.” Naz, 2023 WL 6389130, at

*3. The court acknowledged the complaint’s allegation that

Perl had said to Naz in April 2018 that “non-native people” like

Naz often “have difficulty writing.” Id. at *4 (quotation marks

omitted). “But at the time of her termination,” the court

reasoned, “Naz had transferred away from Perl and had been

working under a different supervisor, Gross, for nearly two

years.” Id. And “the complaint does not allege that Perl was a

decisionmaker in Naz’s termination,” whereas “the apparent

decisionmakers, Gross and Turnure, had ample justification to

fire Naz based on her record of poor performance over time”

as recounted in the complaint’s allegations. Id. Relatedly, the

court concluded that Naz failed to state a claim of

discriminatory non-promotion because she did not adequately

allege a causal connection to discrimination as opposed to

performance problems. Id. Finally, with respect to Naz’s

retaliation claim, the court similarly held that Naz failed to

allege “the presence of a causal link” between her protected

EEO activities and the adverse actions she allegedly suffered.

Id. at *5.

Naz now appeals. The government moved for summary

affirmance, and Naz opposed the government’s motion in a pro

se filing. A panel of this court denied the government’s motion

and appointed an amicus curiae counsel to present arguments

in favor of Naz’s position in her appeal. Naz notified the court

8

that she would rely on appointed amicus’s briefing and would

not submit additional briefing of her own.

II.

A.

We review the district court’s dismissal of Naz’s

complaint de novo. King v. Jackson, 487 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C.

Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). In

assessing whether that standard is met, we must draw all

reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Maljack

Prods., Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.3d 373,

375 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Because Naz is a pro se plaintiff, we hold her to “less

stringent standards than” those applicable to “formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). So, “when weighing

whether a pro se plaintiff has stated a claim”—the question we

face here—“courts must treat technical deficiencies in the

complaint leniently and scrutinize the entire pleading to

determine if any legally cognizable claim can be found.”

Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531, 538

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). And our “court has explained

the liberal standard extends to consider[ing] supplemental

material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise

claims being urged—including facts set forth in a plaintiff’s

opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). In that regard, “[w]e have previously held that

a district court errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s

complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, including filings responsive

9

to a motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Richardson v.

United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

In view of those governing standards, we must vacate the

district court’s grant of dismissal as to Naz’s discrimination

claims. In explaining the dismissal of Naz’s claim of

discriminatory termination, the court took cognizance of the

complaint’s allegation that Naz’s initial supervisor Perl

remarked to Naz that “non-native people” like Naz “have

difficulty writing.” The court did not doubt the statement’s

discriminatory character, but explained that, by the time of

Naz’s termination, she had been working for a different

supervisor, Gross, for close to two years. The court observed

that the complaint did not allege that Perl played a

decisionmaking role in Naz’s termination, and that the evident

decisionmakers, including Gross, had ample basis to terminate

Naz based on concerns about her performance. Naz, 2023 WL

6389130, at *4. Similarly, with respect to Naz’s claim of

discriminatory non-promotion, the court reasoned that, per her

allegations, she was placed on performance plans that

disqualified her for a promotion due to legitimate,

performance-related concerns. See id. at *3–*4.

The court’s analysis understandably assumes that, if there

were an allegation that a decisionmaker such as Gross had

made seemingly discriminatory statements like the one

allegedly made by Perl—especially in some proximity to the

relevant decisions—the complaint might have stated claims of

discriminatory termination and non-promotion. In fact, there

was such an allegation. Naz alleged that, in May or June 2019,

she asked Gross—who by then had become her supervisor—

whether during the month of Ramadan, he could adjust the start

time of their weekly team meetings by 30 minutes and grant

her a flexible work schedule to accommodate her religious

10

observance. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Naz v. Granholm,

No. 22-cv-1730 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2023), Dkt. No. 23. But

“instead of accommodating m[y] request,” Naz alleges, Gross

“bluntly replied to me that [the Department] is a workplace, not

a religious institution, and he does not believe in Islamic

religious extremism.” Id.

That allegation, which we must credit at this stage,

supports Naz’s claims of discrimination based on her religion.

And Gross’s alleged statement took place within a year of his

placing Naz on a performance plan and little more than a year

before he gave Naz notice of her removal. Cf. Morris v.

McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 669–70, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(reversing grant of summary judgment to employer based in

part on statement suggesting discriminatory attitude that was

made two to three years before challenged suspension).

The district court’s opinion, though, does not expressly

take account of Naz’s allegation about Gross’s statement.

Granted, Naz did not include the allegation in her complaint,

instead stating it in her opposition to the Department’s motion

to dismiss. But as noted, our precedents generally call for

considering a pro se plaintiff’s allegations in an opposition to a

dismissal motion even if they are not in the complaint. See

Spence, 109 F.4th at 537–48; Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. And

here, the district court thoughtfully gave Naz the benefit of that

treatment as a pro se plaintiff when it addressed a separate

argument advanced by Naz later in her opposition: the court

“address[ed] the argument that Naz’s placement on several

performance-related plans disqualified her from promotion to

which she otherwise would have applied,” even “though this

argument is not explicit in the complaint but is instead

contemplated by Naz’s response to the motion to dismiss.”

Naz, 2023 WL 6389130, at *4 (citing Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss

at 65). But the court did not appear to consider Naz’s allegation

11

earlier in the same document about Gross’s pointed rebuff of

her request for a religious accommodation. And because that

allegation has relevance to whether Naz states a claim of

discrimination, we must vacate the district court’s dismissal in

that regard.

On remand, the district court can take that allegation into

account or could seek to explain why it may be disregarded.

That kind of assessment is more appropriately conducted by the

district court in the first instance. While our precedents

generally require consideration of a pro se plaintiff’s

allegations in an opposition to a motion to dismiss, the decision

from which we drew that expectation “do[es] not suggest that

a District Court must cull through every filing of a pro se

litigant to preserve a defective complaint.” Richardson, 193

F.3d at 549; see Brown, 789 F.3d at 152 (citing Richardson,

193 F.3d at 548, for the proposition that a pro se complaint

should be considered in the context of “all filings”). If, for

instance, accounting for a pro se plaintiff’s filing would

substantially prejudice the defendant, there may be cause for

disregarding it. See Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. And here, Naz’s

opposition is a lengthy document including many attachments.

District courts retain discretion to manage their dockets,

enforce standing orders, and apply local rules governing party

submissions in a manner consistent with the obligation to give

appropriate leeway to pro se parties. Cf. Oviedo v. Washington

Metro. Area Transit Author., 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir.

2020) (“While we liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se

litigants do not have a license to ignore the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

district court can give consideration to such matters on remand

if it opts to do so.

12

B.

We recognize that the court-appointed amicus who

supported Naz did not, in its briefing before us, specifically

point to the allegation in Naz’s opposition about Gross’s

reaction to her request for a religious accommodation. Naz,

though, had pointed our court to that exact allegation: she

reiterated and relied on it in her pro se filing opposing the

Department’s motion for summary affirmance. See Opp. to

Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 7, Naz v. Wright, No. 23-5237 (D.C.

Cir. Feb. 2, 2024). While amicus did not repeat that particular

reference in its briefing, it made a fulsome argument that Naz’s

allegations of discrimination, including based on her religion,

were sufficient to state a claim. We are unaware of any

precedent suggesting that a party who argues that allegations

suffice to survive a motion to dismiss must reference every

single allegation supporting that showing or else risk forfeiture

of an unmentioned allegation. See Flyers Rights Educ. Fund.,

Inc. v. FAA, 864 F.3d 738, 748 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A] party

cannot forfeit or waive recourse to a relevant case just by

failing to cite it.”); cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,

535 (1992) (“Once a federal claim is properly presented, a

party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties

are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.”).

And that notion has particular salience in a case involving a pro

se party, one who in fact drew our court’s attention to the

precise allegation in issue.

Our dissenting colleague nonetheless would disregard

Naz’s allegation that Gross, when explaining his refusal of her

request to accommodate her observance during Ramadan, said

“he does not believe in Islamic religious extremism.” Our

colleague does not suggest that, if that allegation is considered,

Naz still failed to state a claim of discrimination based on her

religion. Instead, our colleague would overlook the allegation

13

because appointed amicus did not specifically reference it.

According to our colleague, “party-presentation principles”

thus require disregarding the allegation. Dissenting Op. 1. We

disagree.

It is true that appellate courts “essentially [sit] as arbiters

of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before

them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983);

see Dissenting Op. 3. Here, the relevant “legal question[]

presented” by Naz and appointed amicus is whether her

allegations adequately stated a discrimination claim, including

based on her religion. On that score, amicus, upon observing

that Naz “is a member of multiple protected classes” including

due to her “religion (Islam),” argued that she “faced a torrent

of criticism and discrimination”—some of which “explicitly

implicated [her] protected characteristics”—and that Gross

“continued the pattern of discrimination” after becoming her

supervisor. Amicus Opening Br. 19–21. To be sure, in the

course of that argument, amicus did not specifically point to

Gross’s alleged comment about “Islamic religious extremism”

(although Naz, as noted, did when opposing summary

affirmance). Our taking note of that allegation, though,

amounts not to “raising a new issue” unraised by a party, but to

“adducing additional support” for an already-raised issue,

“much like citing a case” uncited by the parties. Koch v. Cox,

489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007). After all, “not all legal

arguments bearing upon the issue in question will always be

identified by counsel, and we are not precluded from

supplementing the contentions of counsel through our own

deliberation and research.” Carducci, 714 F.2d at 177.

Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that the allegation

about Gross’s “Islamic religious extremism” remark appears in

Naz’s opposition to the Department’s dismissal motion, not her

complaint. Dissenting Op. 5–8. In our colleague’s view, it is

14

unfair to expect the government to account for allegations

raised outside the complaint, especially because of the length

of Naz’s opposition and because the government ostensibly had

no cause to anticipate that our court might consider allegations

made in it. Those concerns have no purchase in the context of

this case.

To start, our precedents, as explained, establish that the

“liberal pleading standard” applicable to pro se litigants

generally calls for considering “facts set forth in a plaintiff’s

opposition to a motion to dismiss” when assessing whether to

grant a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Spence, 109 F.4th

at 537–38; see Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. And there is no

uncertainty about whether we ought to apply that

understanding in this appeal or about the fairness to the

government of doing so: the government itself says we should.

The government’s initial submission to our court in this

appeal was its motion for summary affirmance. At the outset

of that document, the government explained that the relevant

“facts are derived from Naz’s complaint and her opposition to

the government’s motion to dismiss and are assumed true.”

Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 2, Naz v. Wright, No. 23-5237 (D.C.

Cir. Dec. 15, 2023) (emphasis added). In keeping with that

understanding, the government’s motion repeatedly

referenced—on nearly every page—Naz’s opposition and its

attachments. Id. at 2–4, 6–12, 17–18. The government thus

consistently referred to facts alleged in her “complaint and

opposition,” id. at 6, 10–11 (emphasis added), and it even

invoked “new allegations” made “in her opposition” in its own

support, id. at 8–9. At one point, after noting that Naz “alleged

that she was subjected to discriminatory termination of

employment” including “because she is . . . a Muslim,” the

government said: “while Naz’s complaint and opposition to

the motion to dismiss enumerate manifold allegations against

15

individuals affiliated with the Agency, neither contain[s]

factual, nonconclusory allegations plausibly linking Naz’s

termination—or any other personnel action by the Agency—to

her protected characteristics.” Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added).

That is an affirmative invitation to identify allegations in Naz’s

opposition that fill the asserted void. The allegation in her

opposition about Gross’s “Islamic religious extremism”

remark does just that.

In these circumstances, there could be no unfairness to the

government in relying on that allegation: having urged us to

affirm the district court on the premise that the allegations in

Naz’s opposition should be considered, the government could

hardly object to our pointing to an allegation in that document

that cuts in the other direction. Indeed, because the government

has affirmatively invited reliance (and has even itself relied) on

the allegations in Naz’s opposition, disregarding a salient

allegation in that document would disserve—not promote—the

principle of party presentation. After all, the “party

presentation principle is supple, not ironclad.” United States v.

Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020); see Al-Tamimi v.

Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (deviating from

general rule that argument omitted from appellant’s opening

brief is forfeited because appellant had previously raised the

argument in support of summary reversal and there was no

unfairness to appellee).

Our dissenting colleague submits that it is unfair to the

district court to rely on Naz’s allegation about Gross’s “Islamic

religious extremism” remark because the allegation appears in

an “obviously non-compliant” filing. Dissenting Op. 8–9.

District courts undoubtedly face substantial burdens when

confronted with voluminous, overlength, and scattershot

filings by pro se litigants, as the court did here. But rather than

reject Naz’s opposition, the district court, as the government

16

explains, “permitted [her] to file” it and then “clarified that it

considered [the] opposition when deciding the Agency’s

motion to dismiss.” Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 18. Even if the

court need not have done so, it thoughtfully gave Naz the

benefit of that consideration as a pro se plaintiff. And because

Naz’s opposition, as the government acknowledges, is thus part

of the record properly before us, there is no basis to disregard

a seemingly material allegation set forth in it. Considering

Naz’s opposition respects the district court’s choice to accept

it, as does remanding to enable that court to decide in the first

instance how (and whether) to engage with the opposition’s

allegation about Gross’s “Islamic religious extremism” remark.

C.

Finally, while that allegation, as explained, potentially

bears on Naz’s claims of discriminatory termination and non-

promotion, it has no evident relevance to the district court’s

grounds for dismissing her retaliation claim. As to that claim,

the district court carefully explained why Naz failed to

adequately allege causation. Naz, 2023 WL 6389130, at *4–

*5. We see no basis to set aside the court’s persuasive analysis

in that regard.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of the retaliation claim, but we vacate the dismissal

of the discrimination claims and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part: Farah Naz worked as an economist for the Department

of Energy. After she received poor performance reviews for

over two years, the Department terminated her employment.

Naz sued pro se, alleging unlawful retaliation and

discrimination. The district court dismissed the case for failure

to state a claim. My colleagues correctly affirm the dismissal

of the retaliation claims, and they find no fault with how the

district court analyzed the discrimination claims as pleaded in

the complaint.

Nonetheless, my colleagues vacate the dismissal of the

discrimination claims, based on a contestable argument raised

neither by Naz nor by the amicus curiae whom we appointed

to support her position. Specifically, my colleagues conclude

that the district court erred in not plucking an allegation out of

Naz’s 148-page opposition to the government’s motion to

dismiss, deeming that allegation to be part of Naz’s complaint,

and then considering whether it tipped the balance against

dismissal. Rather than inject that contention into this appeal, I

would instead apply ordinary party-presentation principles,

which compel an affirmance.

I

The complaint here alleges the following: Naz is a Muslim

woman of Pakistani origin. In January 2017, she began work

as an economist for the Department of Energy. Initially, her

direct supervisor was Kelly Perl, who in turn was supervised

by James Turnure. In March 2019, Peter Gross replaced Perl

as Naz’s direct supervisor. Beginning in April 2018, these

three supervisors consistently criticized Naz’s performance.

Among other things, they found her writing unsatisfactory,

gave her low evaluations, and placed her on performance

improvement plans. The Department fired Naz in January

2021.

2

Proceeding pro se, Naz filed this lawsuit under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act. She alleges that agency officials

retaliated against her for (1) testifying against Perl in an

internal investigation in October 2017 and (2) filing her own

complaints against Perl in December 2018 and Gross in

October 2019. Naz further alleges that the agency unlawfully

discriminated in firing her and denying her a promotion. The

government filed a motion to dismiss or for summary

judgment. In response, Naz filed a 148-page opposition,

together with over 1,000 pages of attached exhibits.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court

explained that the retaliation claims rested entirely on the

asserted temporal proximity between Naz’s protected activity

and her extended difficulties at work. J.A. 318–19. In the

court’s view, temporal proximity was not enough to support a

plausible inference of retaliation: Naz’s testimony against Perl

occurred six months before any of her difficulties began, and

she filed her own complaints well after supervisors had already

documented substantial concerns with her written work. Id. at

317–18. As for discrimination, the district court noted that the

complaint contained only one allegation touching on a

protected characteristic—that Perl had made a disparaging

comment about the writing skills of “non-native people” in

April 2018. Id. at 315. According to the court, that comment

did not support a plausible inference that different

decisionmakers fired Naz because of her national origin or race

more than two years later. Id.

Naz appealed, again pro se. This Court appointed an

amicus to brief and argue the appeal in support of her position.

Naz declined to file a brief or to participate in the argument,

instead relying entirely on the presentation of her amicus.

3

II

The district court dismissed this case on the ground that

Naz’s complaint does not support plausible inferences of

unlawful retaliation or discrimination. In this Court, the

amicus contends that the complaint does support such plausible

inferences. My colleagues rightly affirm as to the retaliation

claims. And they take no issue with the district court’s analysis

of the discrimination claims as pleaded in the complaint. Yet

they nonetheless vacate the dismissal of the discrimination

claims on a different ground not properly raised by Naz or her

amicus—that the court erred by not considering a factual

allegation made by Naz in opposing the government’s motion

to dismiss. In my view, that decision is mistaken.

At every turn, my colleagues rest on the premise that

ordinary procedural rules must be tempered for pro se litigants.

In many contexts, we do read pro se filings charitably. But

where a pro se appellant is supported by a court-appointed

amicus, we have never relaxed the basic rule that the appellant

or the amicus must distinctly identify each ground on which

reversal is sought. In such cases, we routinely decline to

consider points not raised in the briefs, e.g., Harris v. Dep’t of

Transp. FMCSA, 122 F.4th 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2024); United

States v. O’Neal, 844 F.3d 271, 277 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2016); points

first raised in a reply brief, e.g., Palmieri v. United States, 896

F.3d 579, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 2018); or points developed in only

skeletal fashion, e.g., Rudometkin v. United States, 140 F.4th

480, 491–92 (D.C. Cir. 2025); Abdelfattah v. DHS, 787 F.3d

524, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For good reason: As then-Judge

Scalia explained, “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed

boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters

of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before

them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Moreover, abandoning ordinary preservation rules in cases like

4

this puts the appellee at quite an unfair disadvantage; it must

respond to an amicus brief prepared by a skilled legal adversary

and, on top of that, it must scour the record to identify and

proactively address any unbriefed issues that a panel might

raise on its own as a basis for reversal or vacatur.

My colleagues respond that the amicus did raise the

relevant points with enough specificity, in contending that

Naz’s “allegations of discrimination” were “sufficient to state

a claim.” Ante at 12. My colleagues invoke an asserted rule

that a district court “generally” must consider allegations made

by a pro se plaintiff in opposing a motion to dismiss. Id. at 11.

Given that asserted rule, my colleagues claim to be just

measuring pleading sufficiency against all of the relevant

allegations. Id. at 12. And, they say, a court may consider

“unmentioned allegation[s]” in support of a raised claim—or

indeed “‘any argument in support of that claim.’” Id. (quoting

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992)).

For several reasons, I cannot agree. To begin with,

regardless of whether items are labeled as claims, arguments,

or allegations, this Court routinely applies forfeiture principles

to bar consideration of points that are sufficiently distinct from

ones that an appellant has properly teed up. See, e.g., United

States v. All Assets Held at Credit Suisse (Guernsey) Ltd., 45

F.4th 426, 433–34 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“argument” forfeited

because not raised below); POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777

F.3d 478, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“argument” forfeited due to its

skeletal presentation). Likewise, we have confirmed that Yee

does not restrict forfeiture to points that are labeled as claims

rather than as arguments. See United States v. Little, 123 F.4th

1360, 1369–70 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Here, the allegation that my

colleagues invoke as the basis for vacatur (whether labeled as

a claim or argument) seems to me quite distinct from those

pressed by Naz or her amicus. As the district court explained,

5

the complaint seeks to rest discrimination claims on a single

disparaging comment about “non-native people” allegedly

made by Perl in April 2018. J.A. 315 (district-court opinion);

see id. at 16 (complaint). In his brief, the amicus likewise

highlights that sole comment in arguing that the complaint

states a discrimination claim. Brief of Court-Appointed

Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20, Naz v. Wright,

No. 23-5237 (July 29, 2024). In contrast, my colleagues seek

to construct a discrimination claim from a different comment

about “Islamic religious extremism” allegedly made by Gross

no sooner than May 2019. Ante at 10; see ECF Doc. 23, at 7

(Feb. 2, 2023) (opposition to motion to dismiss). That

statement, made at a different time by a different

decisionmaker, suggests a different kind of discrimination—

disparate treatment because of religion as opposed to national

origin or race. And in Title VII cases, pressing a claim about

one kind of discrimination does not suffice to preserve claims

about a different kind. See, e.g., Haynes v. D.C. Water & Sewer

Auth., 924 F.3d 519, 527–28 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Moreover, the allegation invoked by my colleagues

appears only in the opposition to the dismissal motion, and the

distinction between factual allegations made in a pleading and

those made in other filings is important. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8 requires the plaintiff’s “pleading”—i.e., the

complaint itself—to contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also id. Rule 7(a)(1) (“complaint” is the

“[o]nly” pleading “allowed” for the plaintiff absent court

order). Likewise, Rule 12(b) makes clear that defenses attach

to “claim[s] for relief in any pleading” (emphasis added). And

Rule 15 sets forth the requirements for filing amended or

supplemental pleadings. There is no general principle that pro

se plaintiffs may flout these rules by making new factual

allegations in their district-court briefs. To the contrary,

6

“[w]hile we liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se litigants

do not have a ‘license’ to ‘ignore the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.’” Oviedo v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir.

2020) (quoting Moore v. USAID, 994 F.3d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir.

1993)); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993) (Supreme Court has “never suggested that procedural

rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to

excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).

My colleagues counter with Richardson v. United States,

193 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Brown v. Whole Foods

Market Group, Inc., 789 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 2015), where we

reversed district courts for dismissing pro se complaints

without considering allegations made while opposing a

dismissal motion. Ante at 8–9. Neither case establishes that

such allegations are generally like those made in the complaint

itself, much less that we should raise that contention ourselves.

In Richardson, we reversed only because (1) the plaintiff

“could have amended his claim as of right” when he opposed

the motion to dismiss, (2) the district court “clearly understood

that [the plaintiff] both recognized the need for and attempted

to make a change to his original complaint,” and (3) allowing

the attempted amendment would not prejudice the government.

193 F.3d at 548–49. Under those circumstances, we concluded

that the district court should have treated the new allegations as

“an amendment to [the] complaint” under Rule 15. Id. at 549.

Our holding was narrow; we stressed that it rested on “[t]hese

factors, taken together,” and we disclaimed any suggestion

“that a District Court must cull through every filing of a pro se

litigant to preserve a defective complaint.” Id. In turn, Brown

merely applied Richardson. See 789 F.3d at 152. Moreover,

the amicus in Brown affirmatively urged this Court to consider

new factual allegations raised in the eleven-page brief opposing

dismissal. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae on Behalf

of Appellant at 6–9, Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., No.

7

13-7156 (July 8, 2014). And the defendant, specifically citing

those allegations, argued only that they failed to state a claim.

Brief of Defendant-Appellee Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.

at 10–12 (Aug. 20, 2014). So both parties invited us to consider

the new allegations.

In this case, the district court was not required to consider

new factual allegations made by Naz in opposing the dismissal

motion. None of the considerations flagged in Richardson is

present here. First, by obtaining a 45-day extension of time to

file her opposition, Naz lost her opportunity to amend the

complaint as a matter of right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B);

Sevier v. Lowenthal, 302 F. Supp. 3d 312, 324 (D.D.C. 2018).

Second, neither the opposition itself, nor anything else filed by

Naz, alerted the court to “the need for” any specific “change to

[her] original complaint.” Richardson, 193 F.3d at 549. Third,

forcing the government to engage new allegations in the

opposition—a disjointed, rambling 148-page document,

stacked on top of some 1,063 pages of exhibits—would be

highly prejudicial. That filing violates many basic procedural

rules. Treated as an opposition, it exceeds the 45-page limit by

more than 200 percent. See D.D.C. Civ. R. 7(e). Treated as a

motion to amend, it gives no sense of what proposed material

is new, and it fails to reproduce the original and proposed

amended pleadings. See id. Rule 7(i). Treated as an amended

complaint, it contains no “short and plain statement” of any

claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and it improperly attaches

hundreds of pages of exhibits that are not “essential to

determination of the action,” D.D.C. Civ. R. 5.1(e). Despite

my colleagues’ contrary suggestion, we have never said that all

these rules must give way to an overarching “obligation to give

appropriate leeway to pro se parties.” Ante at 11. These

problems may explain why the able amicus in this case—the

same lawyer who prevailed in Brown by focusing this Court on

new allegations in the brief opposing dismissal there—did not

8

ask us to consider the same document here. And because

neither Naz nor her amicus asked us to consider factual

allegations raised in the opposition, the government lost the

opportunity to explain why, in all likelihood, doing so would

be inappropriate in this case.

My colleagues find no prejudice to the government

because its motion for summary affirmance referenced Naz’s

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Ante at 14–15. But the

opening merits brief presents the appellant’s case and provides

the focus for “argumentative back and forth” as the briefing

progresses. Entergy Ark., LLC v. FERC, 134 F.4th 576, 581

(D.C. Cir. 2025). Requiring an appellee to respond not only to

the opening brief but also to its own prior submissions—

especially ones that an appellant and her supporting amicus

have chosen not to address—frustrates this adversarial process.

It also is hard to square with yet another well-established

forfeiture rule, that a party cannot incorporate into its opening

brief, by reference or impliedly, “an argument made at an

earlier stage of the litigation.” See Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916

F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

My colleagues also note that Naz mentioned the relevant

allegation in opposing the government’s motion for summary

affirmance. Ante at 12. But Naz referenced the allegation in a

single paragraph containing no record citations in a document

running over three-hundred pages. See Response in Opposition

to Motion for Summary Affirmance at 7, Naz v. Wright, No.

23-5237 (Feb. 2, 2024). And the allegation was never

mentioned where it matters—in an opening merits brief.

One final consideration involves fairness to the district

court. My colleagues take no issue with how that court

evaluated the complaint that was properly before it. Yet they

fault the court for not plucking out of an obviously non-

9

compliant, 148-page opposition one factual allegation that

takes up about one page of that document. Ante at 9–11; see

ECF Doc. 23, supra, at 7. This case seems to me clearly one

where the district court should not be required to “cull through

every filing of a pro se litigant to preserve a defective

complaint.” Richardson, 193 F.3d at 549. Or to quote Judge

Easterbrook, it is not one where we should make the district

court behave “like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in” bloated

and procedurally improper filings. Albrechtsen v. Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir.

2002) (cleaned up). My colleagues note that the district court

did charitably choose to consider one allegation made by Naz

only in opposing the dismissal motion. Ante at 10–11, 15–16;

see J.A. 316. But it hardly “respects the district court’s choice,”

ante at 16, to conclude that, because that court chose to

consider one allegation made in the opposition, it therefore

needed to slog through more than a thousand additional pages.

In fairness, I should note that my colleagues do not

foreclose the district court on remand from rejecting the

opposition as procedurally improper many times over. Ante at

11 (“the district court can give consideration to such matters on

remand if it opts to do so”). Nonetheless, I would not have

ordered the court to consider that question, in a case where

neither Naz nor her amicus asked us to rule on that basis.

* * * *

The amicus here sought reversal on the ground that the

complaint stated claims on which relief could be granted. I

would apply ordinary party-presentation principles, reject that

contention, and affirm across the board. I would thus not

remand based on the dubious and unpreserved contention that

the district court was required to consider a distinct allegation

buried in a procedurally improper opposition brief.