Wigglesworth

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

CHARLES WIGGLESWORTH,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5:24-cv-467-KKM-PRL

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________________

ORDER

Charles Wigglesworth, a Florida prisoner, timely1 filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state-

court convictions for attempted sexual battery on a child under twelve

and attempted lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve.

(Doc. 1.) Having considered the petition, (id.), the response in opposition,

1 A state prisoner has one year from the date his judgment becomes final to file

a § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This one-year limitation period is

tolled during the pendency of a properly filed state motion seeking collateral

relief. See id. § 2244(d)(2). Wigglesworth was sentenced on January 11, 2021,

and he did not file a direct appeal. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, 40–49.) His convictions thus

became final on February 10, 2021, when the thirty-day appeal deadline

expired. The limitation period started the next day. It ran for 333 days until

January 10, 2022, when Wigglesworth moved for postconviction relief under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Id. at 1.) This filing stopped the

clock. The postconviction court denied relief, and the appellate court affirmed.

(Id. at 241–67; see also id., Ex. E.) The mandate was issued on September 4,

2024, leaving thirty-two days to seek federal habeas relief. (Id., Ex. H.) One

week before the mandate was entered, however, Wigglesworth filed his federal

habeas petition. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Therefore, the petition is timely.

(Doc. 6), and the reply, (Doc. 10), the petition is denied. Because

reasonable jurists would not disagree, a certificate of appealability also

is not warranted.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from Wigglesworth’s sexual abuse of his two minor

stepchildren. In March 2020, Wigglesworth touched and digitally

penetrated the younger victim’s vagina “while tucking her into bed.”

(Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 30, 73–75.) Later that evening, he performed the same

acts “while consoling her after a nightmare.” (Id. at 30–31, 73–75.) The

disclosure of this abuse led the older victim to reveal that Wigglesworth

had inappropriately touched her vagina three years earlier. (Id. at 30–

31, 75–76.) Wigglesworth admitted to law enforcement that he had

“rubbed [the younger victim’s] vagina on the outside for five to ten

seconds.” (Id. at 154.)

For his abuse of the younger victim, Wigglesworth was charged

with two counts of sexual battery on a child under twelve and two counts

of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve. (Id. at 30–31.)

For his abuse of the older victim, he was charged with one count of lewd

or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve. (Id. at 31.) Each sexual

battery count carried “a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.” Peters

v. State, 861 So. 2d 1236, 1237 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Each count of lewd

or lascivious molestation carried “a mandatory minimum sentence of

twenty-five years’ imprisonment.” Rochester v. State, 140 So. 3d 973, 973

(Fla. 2014).

Wigglesworth ultimately agreed to plead nolo contendere to

attempted sexual battery on a child under twelve and attempted lewd or

lascivious molestation of a child under twelve. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 34–38.)

In exchange, he received an agreed-upon sentence of twenty years’

imprisonment, followed by ten years of sex offender probation. (Id. at 40–

49, 60.) At the time of sentencing, he was thirty-one years old. (Id. at 30,

40–49.) Wigglesworth did not appeal his convictions, but he did seek

postconviction relief under Rule 3.850. (Id. at 1.) The postconviction court

rejected his claims after an evidentiary hearing, and the appellate court

affirmed without explanation. (Id. at 241–67; id., Ex. E.) This federal

habeas petition followed. (Doc. 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER SECTION 2254

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354,

1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief under the AEDPA can be granted

only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “The power of the

federal courts to grant a writ of habeas corpus setting aside a state

prisoner’s conviction on a claim that his conviction was obtained in

violation of the United States Constitution is strictly circumscribed.”

Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022).

Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be

granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established

Federal law” encompasses the holdings only of the United States

Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). This section “defines two

categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas

relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id.

at 404. First, a decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413.

Second, a decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. The AEDPA

was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-

court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694. As a result, to obtain relief under the

AEDPA, “a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75 (2003) (stating that “[t]he state court’s application of clearly

established federal law must be objectively unreasonable” for a federal

habeas petitioner to prevail and that the state court’s “clear error” is

insufficient).

When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its

decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific

reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are

reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). But the habeas

court is “not limited by the particular justifications the state court

provided for its reasons, and [it] may consider additional rationales that

support the state court’s determination.” Jennings v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 55 F.4th 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2022). When the relevant state-

court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision—such as

a summary affirmance without discussion—the federal court “should

‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 584 U.S.

at 125. The state may “rebut the presumption by showing that the

unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds

than the lower state court’s decision.” Id.

For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), “it is not enough to show that

‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding

in question.’” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1525 (2022)

(quotations omitted). “An unreasonable determination of the facts occurs

when the direction of the evidence, viewed cumulatively, was too

powerful to conclude anything but the petitioners factual claim.” Teasley

v. Warden, Macon State Prison, 978 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). A state court’s

findings of fact are presumed correct, and a petitioner can rebut the

presumption of correctness afforded to a state court’s factual findings

only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Even where a petitioner succeeds in rebutting the presumption, he

must show that the state court’s decision is “based on” the incorrect

factual determination. Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th

1025, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022). This is because a state court decision may

still be reasonable “even if some of the state court’s individual factual

findings were erroneous—so long as the decision, taken as a whole,

doesn’t constitute an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ and isn’t

‘based on’ any such determination.” Id. (quoting Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J.,

concurring)).

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Wigglesworth alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under the

Sixth Amendment. Under the well-known, two-part standard articulated

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to succeed, he must

show both deficient performance by his counsel and prejudice resulting

from those errors. Id. at 687.

The first part “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The lynchpin of this analysis is

whether counsel’s conduct “was reasonable considering all the

circumstances.” Id. at 688. A petitioner establishes deficient performance

if “the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. A court “must

judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of

the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id.

“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Id.

The second part requires showing that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. “An error by counsel, even if

professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment

of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id.

at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

“The question [on federal habeas review of an ineffective assistance

claim] ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher

threshold.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). Consequently, federal

petitioners rarely prevail on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

because “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both

highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly

so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotation and citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One—Failure to Pursue Double Jeopardy Claim

Wigglesworth argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

“advise” him of a “valid double jeopardy claim.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) As noted

above, the prosecution alleged that in March 2020, Wigglesworth touched

and digitally penetrated the younger victim’s vagina “while tucking her

into bed,” and then committed the same acts “while consoling her after a

nightmare.” (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 30–31, 73–75.) For the digital

penetration, Wigglesworth was charged with two counts of sexual

battery. (Id. at 30–31.) For the touching, he was charged with two counts

of lewd or lascivious molestation. (Id.)

Wigglesworth contends that double jeopardy would have barred his

convictions for lewd or lascivious molestation because they arose from the

same “criminal episode” as the sexual battery—that is, his “digital[]

penetrat[ion]” of the younger victim’s vagina “while simultaneously

touching the exterior of the vagina by the same hand.” (Doc. 1 at 5.)

According to Wigglesworth, counsel should have “advise[d] him of his

potential double jeopardy claims” and moved to dismiss the lewd-or-

lascivious-molestation counts. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 17.)

Counsel addressed these allegations at the evidentiary hearing. He

testified that, after reviewing the evidence and discussing the case with

Wigglesworth, he believed “the best way to proceed . . . was to . . .

negotiate” a plea deal. (Id. at 185–86.) As counsel noted, Wigglesworth

faced a “minimum mandatory [of] life in prison” if convicted of sexual

battery. (Id. at 193.) Counsel was “concerned with the prospect of going

to trial” because Wigglesworth—a former sheriff’s deputy—had admitted

to law enforcement that he rubbed the younger victim’s vagina. (Id.

at 182.) To avoid “exposure to an awful lot of jail time,” counsel began

plea negotiations with the prosecutor. (Id. at 184.) Wigglesworth agreed

with this “strategic decision.” (Id.)

Because the case was in a plea posture, counsel thought that

pursuing a double jeopardy claim would not have been “productive.” (Id.

at 192.) First, even if the lewd-or-lascivious-molestation charges had

been dismissed, Wigglesworth still would have faced two counts of sexual

battery, each carrying a mandatory sentence of “life in prison.” (Id.)

Second, filing a motion to dismiss could have negatively impacted the

plea negotiations. (Id.) Thus, counsel believed that raising a double

jeopardy claim “would have wasted time . . . because it wouldn’t have

gotten us anywhere.” (Id.)

The postconviction court rejected Wigglesworth’s ineffective

assistance claim, finding that he “failed to meet his burden under

Strickland.” (Id. at 245.) It credited counsel’s testimony that a “motion to

dismiss based on double jeopardy” would not have been “beneficial.” (Id.)

As the court explained, regardless of whether the motion succeeded,

Wigglesworth “would still be facing life.” (Id.) And “filing a motion to

dismiss during plea negotiations would not have been productive to reach

a resolution that kept [Wigglesworth] away from a minimum mandatory

life sentence.” (Id.) Moreover, “if the plea negotiations failed, the double

jeopardy issue could be raised either pre-trial or after conviction before

sentencing if the jury found [Wigglesworth] guilty.” (Id.) Thus, the court

held that counsel was not deficient for failing to pursue a double jeopardy

defense. (Id.)

This ruling was reasonable. “[J]udicial scrutiny of an attorney’s

performance is appropriately highly deferential because the craft of

trying cases is far from an exact science; in fact, it is replete with

uncertainties and obligatory judgment calls.” Bolender v. Singletary, 16

F.3d 1547, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994). This principle of deference applies with

equal force in cases involving plea deals because “[t]he art of negotiation

is at least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy, and it presents

questions further removed from immediate judicial supervision.” Premo

v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125 (2011). To prevail on his ineffective assistance

claim, Wigglesworth must “show that no reasonable jurist could find that

his counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable

professional conduct.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 975 F.3d 1165, 1176

(11th Cir. 2020).

Wigglesworth cannot make this showing. Counsel made a

reasonable, strategic decision to forgo a double jeopardy claim. He

believed that—given the evidence against Wigglesworth and the

possibility of a mandatory life sentence—“the best way to proceed . . . was

to . . . negotiate” a plea deal. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 185–86.) In counsel’s

view, pursuing a double jeopardy claim would not have been “productive”

because (1) even if successful, Wigglesworth still would have faced a

mandatory life sentence for the sexual battery counts, and (2) filing a

motion to dismiss could have jeopardized the plea negotiations. (Id.

at 192.) Counsel ultimately succeeded in negotiating a twenty-year plea

deal on lesser charges, thus avoiding the mandatory life sentence

Wigglesworth faced if convicted at trial. (Id. at 34–38.) “Giving great

deference to [counsel’s] decision,” a fairminded jurist could agree “that it

was not an unreasonable strategy for [counsel] to pursue the plea deal in

lieu of a motion” to dismiss based on double jeopardy. Norris v. United

States, No. 24-13306, 2025 WL 2700443, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025).

Even apart from these strategic considerations, Wigglesworth’s

double jeopardy argument is meritless. For that reason, too, counsel was

not deficient for failing to pursue it.2 See Freeman v. Atty. Gen., 536 F.3d

1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[a] lawyer cannot be deficient

for failing to raise a meritless claim”).

“Florida courts apply the ‘same elements’ test from Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), to determine whether multiple

2 The postconviction court did not address the merits of Wigglesworth’s double

jeopardy argument. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 244–45.) But, in reviewing the

reasonableness of the court’s decision, I am “not limited by the particular

justifications [it] provided” for finding that counsel was not ineffective.

Jennings, 55 F.4th at 1292. Instead, I “may consider additional rationales that

support [its] determination.” Id.

convictions violate double jeopardy.” Simpson v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 7 F.4th

1046, 1056 (11th Cir. 2021). Under Blockburger, two offenses are

different for double jeopardy purposes “if each requires proof of an

additional fact which the other does not.” United States v. Smith, 532

F.3d 1125, 1128 (11th Cir. 2008). “[I]f an offense requires proof of an

element that the other offense does not, [a court] need look no further in

determining that the prosecution of both offenses does not offend [double

jeopardy].” United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2017).

“The Blockburger test is applied by analysis of the elements of the offense

charged, not by focusing on the evidence” in the record. United States v.

Boldin, 772 F.2d 719, 726 (11th Cir. 1985).

Wigglesworth could have been convicted of both sexual battery and

lewd or lascivious molestation because each offense requires proof of facts

that the other does not. Sexual battery “requires proof of either

penetration or oral, anal, or vaginal union with the sexual organ of

another, while establishing lewd or lascivious molestation requires proof

of intentional touching of the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks,

or the clothing covering those areas.” Roughton v. State, 185 So. 3d 1207,

1210 (Fla. 2016). Likewise, “[l]ewd or lascivious molestation requires

proof that the touching was done with a lewd or lascivious intent, while

sexual battery may be committed without any proof of a specific sensual

intent.” Id. Thus, even if Wigglesworth’s touching and penetration

constituted a single act, counsel had no basis to raise a double jeopardy

claim because “[e]ach offense requires proof of an element that the other

does not.”3 Id.; see also Kramer v. State, 313 So. 3d 207, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA

2021) (defendant’s “convictions for two counts of sexual battery and one

count of lewd or lascivious molestation do not violate double jeopardy”).

B. Grounds Two and Three—Misadvice about Gain Time and

Prison Visitation

Wigglesworth faults trial counsel for misadvising him about two

aspects of his prison sentence. (Doc. 1 at 7–8.) First, counsel mistakenly

told him he would be “eligible for gain time.” (Id. at 7.) Based on this

advice, Wigglesworth believed he could earn enough gain time to reduce

his prison term by fifteen percent, resulting in a seventeen-year sentence

3 The defendant in Roughton “was convicted of both sexual battery on a person

under twelve . . . and lewd or lascivious molestation [of] a person under twelve

. . . for the single act of placing his mouth on the seven-year-old victim’s penis.”

185 So. 3d at 1208. The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant’s

“separate sentences for . . . sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation

arising from a single act [did] not violate the prohibition against double

jeopardy.” Id. at 1210.

rather than a twenty-year sentence. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 138.) This belief

turned out to be mistaken. After his arrival in prison, the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC) informed Wigglesworth that he was

ineligible for gain time because of his conviction for attempted sexual

battery, a disqualifying offense under the gain time statute. (Doc. 7-1, Ex.

A, at 139; see also State v. Fureman, 161 So. 3d 403, 407–08 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2014); Fla. Stat. § 944.275(4)(e)1.)

Second, counsel “misadvised” Wigglesworth that his biological

daughter would be allowed to visit him in prison if the trial court

approved the request. (Doc. 1 at 8.) This, too, turned out to be mistaken.

Under Florida law, any inmate convicted of “attempting to commit a sex

act on . . . a child under the age of 16 years[] shall not be allowed visitation

with anyone under the age of 18 years, unless special visitation is

approved by the warden.” Fla. Stat. § 944.09(1)(n). This statute does not

give trial courts “the power to outright grant permission for special

visitation.” Singletary v. Benton, 693 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA

1997); see also Singletary v. Carpenter, 705 So. 2d 110, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA

1998) (finding “no legislative authority permitting the intervention of

criminal trial judges” in FDOC decisions about whether “prisoners

convicted of enumerated sex offenses may enjoy visitation with minors”).

According to Wigglesworth, the FDOC has not allowed his biological

daughter to visit him in prison. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 145–46.)

The postconviction court rejected Wigglesworth’s ineffective

assistance claim for lack of “prejudice.” (Id. at 246–47.) The court agreed

that counsel’s advice was mistaken. (Id.) And it acknowledged that

Wigglesworth might have been “concerned with gain time and visitation

with his newborn child” when he agreed to plead nolo contendere. (Id.

at 246.) Nonetheless, Wigglesworth “failed to show prejudice” because he

“ultimately decided to plea, not based on [counsel’s] misadvice, but rather

because he wanted to be able to come home” at a definite future date

rather than risk a life sentence. (Id. at 246–47.)

This ruling was reasonable. To show prejudice in the plea context,

a petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from

[the petitioner] about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s

deficiencies.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). Instead, the

petitioner must “convince the court that a decision to reject [a] plea []

would have been rational under the circumstances.” Diveroli v. United

States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2015). Because AEDPA applies to

this claim, Wigglesworth must show that the postconviction court’s

finding of no prejudice “was so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Mungin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 89 F.4th 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024).

He cannot make the required showing. As explained above,

Wigglesworth faced the possibility of a mandatory life sentence for each

sexual battery count. See Peters, 861 So. 2d at 1237 n.1. The risk of that

outcome was substantial, especially in the light of his admission that he

“rubbed [the younger victim’s] vagina on the outside for five to ten

seconds.” (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, at 154.) At the evidentiary hearing,

Wigglesworth’s girlfriend—the mother of his biological child—testified

that she urged him to plead nolo contendere because she wanted “a

guaranteed day that you come home.” (Id. at 132.) Wigglesworth offered

the same rationale for taking the deal. Asked “why did you plea[d],” he

answered: “Because my family wanted me to be able to come home.” (Id.

at 161–62.) As the postconviction court found, Wigglesworth’s primary

motivation was to avoid spending the rest of his life in prison, which he

accomplished by entering into the plea agreement. A fairminded jurist

could conclude that—in the light of his overriding goal of avoiding a life

sentence—Wigglesworth would have taken the twenty-year offer even if

he had known of his ineligibility for gain time and visitation with his

daughter. Therefore, Wigglesworth cannot show that the finding of no

prejudice “was so obviously wrong that [the] error lies beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Mungin, 89 F.4th at 1317; see

also Orange v. United States, No. 16-12842-A, 2017 WL 5714719, at *4

(11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2017) (defendant “failed to establish prejudice” because

guilty plea allowed him to “avoid[] a life sentence,” and the government’s

case against him was strong); United States v. Miranda-Alfaro, 462 F.

App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2012) (no Strickland prejudice where “plea

bargain lowered [defendant’s] sentence of imprisonment by eight years”).

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute

entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1). Instead, a district court or court of appeals must first issue

a certificate of appealability (COA). Id. “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To obtain a COA, Wigglesworth must show

that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the

underlying claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 478, 484 (2000). Wigglesworth has not made the

requisite showing. Finally, because Wigglesworth is not entitled to a

COA, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

It is therefore ORDERED that Wigglesworth’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, (Doc. 1), is DENIED. The CLERK is directed to enter

judgment against Wigglesworth and in Respondent’s favor and to

CLOSE this case.

ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, on February 20, 2026.

athryn’ Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge

21