Jordan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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:

VICTOR JORDAN,

:

Plaintiff, :

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

– against – ORDER

:

24-CV-6969 (AMD) (PCG)

THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF :

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; THE UNITED

:

FEDERATION OF TEACHERS; THE

TEACHER’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM; and :

SANDRA MARCH, in her individual capacity and

:

official capacity as UFT Representative,

:

Defendants. :

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ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:

On October 2, 2024, the plaintiff filed this act:i on alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.

:

§§ 1981 and 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the Truth in Lending Act § 15

U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the New York City

Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-101 et

seq., § 8-107(15), and § 8-502 et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law

(“NYSHRL”), New York State Executive Law § 296 et seq. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court are

the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) As explained below, the Court grants the motions.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

a. 1984 – 2011: DOE Employment

The plaintiff began working for the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) in

1984. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6.) On February 1, 1985, the plaintiff became a full-time high school

mathematics teacher at Erasmus Hall High School in Flatbush, Brooklyn, and subsequently

“received excellent classroom observations” from the Principal and Assistant Principal. (Id.

¶¶ 5–7, 15.) The plaintiff was “very active in” the United Federation of Teachers (“UFT”). (Id.

¶ 11.) In early 1990, the plaintiff was elected Co-Chair of the Black & Latino Caucus in the

UFT Delegate Assembly (the “Black and Latino Caucus” or “Caucus”). (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) The

plaintiff says that in this position he had a duty to “call out” the UFT when it “had a blind spot to

[ ] areas of concern to minority teachers,” and “to encourage [ ] UFT to provide the same degree

of care and representation to its [B]lack and Latino members as [it] was providing to its

Caucasian members.” (Id. ¶ 13.)

The plaintiff alleges the DOE and UFT “did not welcome” his participation in the Black

and Latino Caucus, and discriminated and retaliated against him. (Id. ¶ 14.) “As a result” of

being “the only African American Member of the Black [and] Latino Caucus at Erasmus Hall

High School,” “the Assistant Principal and the Principal began to harass” him, gave him

“unsatisfactory observation” classroom reports, and gave him fewer opportunities “to earn

additional compensation” that “he was qualified to receive based on his seniority.” (Id. ¶¶ 14–

17.)

The plaintiff “filed a grievance against the Erasmus Hall High School Administration” at

an unspecified date, “which did not stop the bias and discriminatory treatment received.” (Id.

¶ 18.) In 1994, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the DOE with the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), but the discrimination continued, and he

“became the only teacher in the Math Department who received unsatisfactory observation

reports.” (Id. ¶¶ 19, 35.) The plaintiff alleges “[u]pon information and belief” that “the UFT did

not provide him with the same representation at the grievance hearing as it provided to

Caucasian teachers because the UFT did not approve of his involvement with the Black and

Latino Caucus as an African American in the Delegate Assembly of the UFT.” (Id. ¶ 20.) He

says that his “depression and anxiety were in large part caused” by this “disparate treatment.”

(Id. ¶ 21.)

In the spring of 1994, the plaintiff suffered a “line of duty injury to his back . . . from a

fall at work,” which he alleges, without further detail, was “in part caused by him being

subjected to disparate treatment and harassment in the workplace.” (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.) After “a

number of months” struggling with pain and side effects from pain medication, he applied for a

disability retirement, which the Teachers’ Retirement System (“TRS”) denied on June 8, 1998.

(Id. ¶¶ 27–28.)

In January 2010, following “an extended medical leave,” the plaintiff “accepted a

teaching position at W.E.B. DuBois Academic High School.” (Id. ¶ 29.) However, on the first

day of classes, “he was informed” by the DOE’s Human Resources Department that he was not

approved for the position. (Id.) The plaintiff called the UFT “to help him to resolve the matter,”

but the UFT “refuse[d] to provide any assistance.” (Id.)

b. 2011 – Approximately 2017: Early Retirement and Pension Award

The plaintiff alleges that in June 2011, he was “forced to file for early retirement because

the defendants would not allow him to return to his job.” (Id. ¶ 30.) After “almost six years,”

the TRS processed his retirement application and awarded him a pension of $268.50 per month.

(Id. ¶¶ 30–31.) The plaintiff alleges that the pension awarded includes: (1) an “annual Loan

Reduction of $2,866.16 each year;” (2) the “annual Early retirement reduction of $3,231.96;”

and (3) the “annual Retirement option reduction of $345.87.” (Id. ¶ 33.) The plaintiff was

dissatisfied with the pension, and contacted defendant Sandra March, the UFT Trustee on the

TRS Board, who “showed no interest in helping the plaintiff to resolve the matter and failed to

even acknowledge the plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 32.) The plaintiff alleges that UFT and Sandra March

did not help him challenge the award to “retaliate against the plaintiff for his involvement, as an

African American teacher, in the Black & Latino Caucus of the UFT Delegate Assembly and for

filing an EEOC complaint [in 1994].” (Id. ¶¶ 34–35.)

c. Post-2011 Retirement Allegations

On April 18, 2022, the DOE’s Office of Teacher Recruitment and Quality confirmed that

the plaintiff’s high school mathematics teaching license was valid to teach in New York City

public schools. (Id. ¶ 38.) On August 10, 2022, the plaintiff interviewed for and “was

nominated” for a high school mathematics teaching position at Bronx Metropolitan High School,

but DOE’s Director of Human Resources, Yissel Martinez, “rejected [his] application even

though” he had a valid license to teach in the City. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40.) Similarly, on August 31,

2022, the plaintiff interviewed for and “was again nominated” for a high school mathematics

teaching position at Bronx Wings Academy High School. (Id. ¶ 41.) Once again, the DOE’s

Director of Human Resources denied the application even though the plaintiff had a valid

teaching license. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42.) The plaintiff alleges that these job rejections were “specifically

intended to harass and annoy plaintiff,” and “deprive” him of “his dignity, health, livelihood,

professional reputation, and ultimately his employment.” (Id ¶ 43.) The plaintiff contacted

Miriam Quiles of the UFT “for help to get [his] job back, but once again the defendants

discriminated, retaliated and obfuscated and did nothing to help the plaintiff to get his job back”

in “retaliation” for his participation in the Black and Latino Caucus of the UFT in the 1990s. (Id.

¶¶ 44–45.)

The plaintiff alleges that the UFT continues to retaliate against him for filing EEOC

complaints in 1994 and 2024. (Id. ¶ 35.) He does not attach either complaint or describe the

contents of the complaints. He claims that the UFT made “unauthorized change[s]” to his

address “to prevent him from receiving a ballot to vote in a number of competitive union

elections,” and failed to send him email notices of the UFT’s Retired Teachers Chapter’s

meetings. (Id. ¶¶ 35–36.)

d. Claims For Relief

The plaintiff claims that the defendants — the DOE and TRS (the “City Defendants”),

and the UFT and Sandra March (the “Union Defendants”) — engaged in “discriminatory

conduct” and “willfully and intentionally subjected plaintiff to unlawful retaliation for his

opposition to, his reporting of, and complaints about race discrimination against him.” (See, e.g.,

id. ¶¶ 48, 51.) The plaintiff brings claims for: discrimination under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983

(First Cause of Action), retaliation under Title VII (Second Cause of Action), retaliation under

the NYSHRL and NYCHRL (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action), discrimination for

disabilities under the ADA and NYSHRL (Sixth Cause of Action), retaliation for reporting

discrimination under the ADA (Seventh Cause of Action), violation of the Truth in Lending Act

(TILA) related to his pension award (Eighth Cause of Action), imposition of an unconscionable

pension contract (Ninth Cause of Action), and violation of the First Amendment (Tenth Cause of

Action).1 (Id. ¶¶ 47–77.)

Procedural Background

On July 3, 2024, the EEOC issued the plaintiff a right to sue letter, advising him that a

“lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice.” (ECF No. 18-3 at 1

(emphasis in original).)2 The plaintiff filed this action on October 2, 2024 for violations of Title

VII, the NYCHRL, the NYSHRL, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Truth in Lending Act,

and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1.)3 The plaintiff is

seeking compensatory damages of at least $1,000,000, “punitive and/or liquidat[ed] damages” of

at least $1,000,000, and attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 14.) He sought leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), which the Court granted (ECF Order dated Oct. 15, 2024).

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on February 14, 2025. (ECF Nos. 17,

18.) The Court directed the plaintiff to respond by March 14, 2025 (ECF Order dated Feb. 14,

2025), but granted his motion for an extension of time to March 31, 2025, in part to enable him

to retain counsel (ECF No. 19; ECF Order dated Feb. 24, 2025).

On March 11, 2025, the plaintiff moved to recuse the Court (ECF No. 20), a motion that

the Court denied the next day (ECF Order dated Mar. 12, 2025). In that order, the Court

reminded the plaintiff that his response was due on March 31, 2025. (Id.) The plaintiff filed a

“notice of Interlocutory Appeal” of the order on March 25, 2025 (ECF No. 21), and on March

27, 2025 — four days before his response was due — the plaintiff asked the Court to “stay the

1 The complaint describes this as the “Ninth” cause of action, but it is the tenth cause of action listed.

2 The City Defendants attached this letter to their motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 18-3.)

3 The plaintiff also filed a motion for an order to show cause, a temporary restraining order, and a

preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3), which the Court denied because the plaintiff did not show

irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits (see ECF No. 5).

proceedings” until the Second Circuit resolved his appeal (ECF No. 22).4 The Court denied the

stay, but sua sponte extended his time to respond to April 21, 2025. (ECF Order dated Mar. 31,

2025.)

The plaintiff did not respond to the motions or otherwise contact the Court. In a May 7,

2025 order, the Court noted that the plaintiff had not responded despite multiple extensions, so

the Court considered the motions fully briefed. (ECF Order dated May 7, 2025.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible ‘when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d

Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, a complaint that includes only “labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A complaint fails to state a claim “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his complaint liberally and

evaluates it by “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Ceara v.

Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)),

and interprets it to raise “the strongest arguments” that it suggests, Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local

40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d

4 The Second Circuit affirmed the Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief,

denied his petition for a writ of mandamus instructing the Court to grant his motion for recusal, and

dismissed the appeal. (See ECF Nos. 25-1, 26–28.)

471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006)) (cleaned up); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)

(noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint

liberally”) (citations omitted).

While the plaintiff did not oppose the defendants’ motions, “failure to oppose a 12(b)(6)

motion alone cannot justify dismissal of a complaint.” LaFargue v. River Cafe Co., No. 12-CV-

5336, 2015 WL 1469544, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (citing McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d

321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000)). In deciding an unopposed motion to dismiss, a court may “assume the

truth of a [complaint]’s factual allegations and test only its legal sufficiency.” Id. (quoting

McCall, 232 F.3d at 322). A court may also examine “any written instrument attached to [the

complaint] as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”

Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Section 1981 and 1983 Claims (First Cause of Action)

Section 1983 provides in relevant part that “[e]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating

federal rights,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979), such as those in Section 1981

or the First or Fourteenth Amendments. “Thus, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must allege (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and its laws, and (2) that the deprivation was ‘committed by a person acting under

the color of state law.’” Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

(quoting Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)) (citations omitted).

Section 1981 provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right in

every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of

all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white

citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “The rights protected by [Section 1981] are protected against

impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.”

42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). A plaintiff claiming a violation of Section 1981 related to employment

must allege “(1) that []he is a member of a protected class; (2) that []he was qualified for

employment in the position; (3) that []he suffered an adverse employment action; and, in

addition, []he has (4) some minimal evidence suggesting an inference that the employer acted

with discriminatory motivation.” Kiseleva v. Greenspan, 755 F. Supp. 3d 367, 377 (S.D.N.Y.

2024) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2015)). “[Section]

1981 does not provide a separate private right of action against state actors,” therefore a claim

for a violation of Section 1981 against a municipality can be brought only under Section 1983.

Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 2018).

a. Statute of Limitations

“The statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983 in New

York is three years.” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). All defendants argue “any claims [brought under Sections 1981 or 1983]

accruing prior to October 1, 2021,” three years prior to the filing of the complaint, are time-

barred. (ECF No. 18-4 at 13; ECF No. 17-2 at 15–17.)

The plaintiff alleges discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occurred before

October 1, 2021, including discrimination and retaliation based on race and disability in the

1990s through his pension award in 2017. Those claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims of discrete violations that occurred before October

1, 2021, including the “unsatisfactory” performance reviews and fewer opportunities “to earn

additional compensation” in the 1990s, the alleged “forced . . . early retirement” in 2011, and the

2017 pension award.

However, under the “continuing violation” exception to the statute of limitations, “the

existence of [ ] a continuing discriminatory practice or policy may delay the commencement of

the statute of limitations period ‘until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of it.’” Harris v.

City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d

1330, 1333 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). To the extent that

the complaint alleges “continuing violation[s],” the latest-in-time allegations concern the

plaintiff’s job applications in 2022, so the Court also analyzes the merits of the plaintiff’s First

Cause of Action related to these more recent allegations below.

b. City Defendants

The plaintiff brings a claim for “unlawful race discrimination” under Sections 1981 and

1983 against the City Defendants in his First Cause of Action. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 47–51

(capitalization altered).) Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method

for vindicating federal rights” found elsewhere, such as in Section 1981. Baker, 443 U.S. at 144

n.3; Duplan, 888 F.3d at 619 (Section 1983 is “the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the

rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state governmental units.” (quoting Jett v. Dallas Independent

School District, 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989)) (emphasis in Duplan)). Accordingly, interpreting the

pro se plaintiff’s complaint to raise “the strongest arguments” that it suggests, Fowlkes, 790 F.3d

at 387 (citation omitted), the Court construes the plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for “unlawful

race discrimination” against the City Defendants as a Section 1983 claim for violations of

Section 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

To hold a municipality liable under Section 1983, “a plaintiff is required to plead and

prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected

to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir.

2020) (quoting Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted)) (citing cases); see also Friend v. Gasparino, 61 F.4th 77, 93 (2d

Cir. 2023). The City Defendants argue that the plaintiff has not pled Monell liability because he

“fails to articulate how any [City] practices violated his Constitutional right to due process,” and

“fails to adequately allege a municipal policy or custom resulted in any deprivation of his rights.”

(ECF No. 18-4 at 17 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).)

The plaintiff makes vague and general claims that the City Defendants “discriminated

against him because of his race” and “subjected [him] to unlawful retaliation” and “race

discrimination.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 48–49.) The plaintiff does not, however, identify

“an[y] official policy or custom” adopted by the DOE or the TRS that would give rise to

municipal liability under Section 1983. Lucente, 980 F.3d at 297 (citation omitted) (cleaned up);

see also Agosto v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[A]

plaintiff must identify a municipal policy to prevail on a Monell claim.”) (citation omitted). Nor

does the plaintiff allege any facts suggesting a “persistent and widespread practice” by the City

Defendants’ employees — the only allegations in the complaint are about the plaintiff. Lucente,

980 F.3d at 297–98 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These allegations are

insufficient to plead municipal liability. See Mule v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 797 F.

Supp. 3d 9, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (dismissing Section 1983 claim against the DOE under Monell

due to the absence of the “execution of a government’s policy or custom”) (citing Monell, 436 at

694; Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 873–74 (2d Cir. 2022)).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the First Cause of Action as to the City Defendants.

c. Union Defendants

The plaintiff also brings a claim for “unlawful race discrimination” under Sections 1981

and 1983 against the Union Defendants in his First Cause of Action. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 47–51

(capitalization altered).)5 The Union Defendants argue that they “are not state actors for the

purposes of § 1983 liability.” (ECF No. 17-2 at 16–17.) “In order to state a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private party acting under

color of state law.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing

Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1992)). “[A] private actor acts under

color of state law when the private actor ‘is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or

its agents,’” which requires that the private actor and the state “share some common goal to

violate the plaintiff’s rights.” Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 324). “Labor unions . . . generally are not state actors.” Ciambriello,

292 F.3d at 323 (citation omitted). And, apart from a conclusory assertion that “the defendants

were acting ‘under color of state law,’” the plaintiff “does not argue otherwise.” (ECF No. 1

¶ 50.) Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323. Such “a formulaic recitation of the elements” of Section

5 To the extent the plaintiff claims the Union Defendants breached the duty of fair representation under

the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

claim because the plaintiff was a public employee. See Ford v. D.C. 37 Union Loc. 1549, 579 F.3d 187,

188 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “[a]s the language of the LMRA makes plain, public employees are not

covered by that statute;” citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), which exempts from the definition of employer “any

State or political subdivision thereof;” and collecting cases).

1983 “will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff therefore does not state a Section

1983 claim against the Union Defendants.

As for the Section 1981 claim against the Union Defendants, “a plaintiff . . . must show:

(1) that [he] is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by

the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerning one of activities enumerated in § 1981.”

Staten v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 734, 740

(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Lauture v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 261 (2d

Cir. 2000)), aff’d, 736 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir. 2018). “[U]nder Section 1981, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege that ‘but for race, [he] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected

right. . . . ‘[I]t is insufficient to merely plead that race was a motivating factor in the

discriminatory action.’” Iodice v. Archcare at Terence Cardinal Cooke Health Care Ctr., No.

20-CV-4217, 2022 WL 4124795, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2022) (quoting Comcast Corp. v.

Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020); then quoting Brown v.

Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 19-CV-11474, 2021 WL 1163797, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021)).

The Union Defendants say that the plaintiff’s allegations are “conclusory” and do not

state a plausible claim for relief. (ECF No. 17-2 at 11–13.) As an initial matter, it is not clear

which “one of [the] activities enumerated in § 1981” form the basis of the plaintiff’s Section

1981 claim against the UFT. Staten, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 740 (citation and subsequent history

omitted). The only claims about UFT within the statute of limitations for a Section 1981 claim

are that “[o]n September 8, 2022, Plaintiff [ ] contacted Miriam Quiles of the UFT for help to get

[his] job back,” after the DOE declined to hire him for two different positions in August 2022,

“but once again the defendants discriminated, retaliated and obfuscated and did nothing to help

the plaintiff to get his job back.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 44.) The plaintiff does not explain how this is a

violation of his Section 1981 right “to make and enforce contracts, . . . includ[ing] the making,

performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,

privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship,” nor does he specify a contract

or a contractual relationship that the Union Defendants have violated. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(b).

Finally, as to discriminatory intent, the plaintiff alleges only that “[o]n information and belief, [ ]

UFT’s inconsistent and discriminatory application of teacher certification rules are intentional

retaliation against plaintiff[’]s participation in the Black & Latino Caucus of the UFT as an

African American teacher.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 45.) The plaintiff does not identify the “certification

rules” at issue, but regardless, it is well established that the “naked allegation” that the

defendants “selectively enforced the [ ] rules” against the plaintiff “because [he] [is] [B]lack [ ] is

too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss.” Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir.

1988) (citing Martin v. New York State Dep’t of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1978))

(citation modified).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims —

his First Cause of Action — in their entirety.

Title VII and ADA Claims (Second, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action)

For a Title VII claim in New York to be timely, the “plaintiff generally must file a charge

of discrimination with the EEOC ‘within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred,’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), and must then file an action in

federal court within 90 days of receiving a right-to sue letter from the agency, id. § 2000e-

5(f)(1).” Duplan, 888 F.3d at 621–22. Similarly, a plaintiff must present ADA claims to the

EEOC, or an analogous state or local agency, within 300 days of the acts being challenged as

unlawful, and a plaintiff must commence a lawsuit related to those claims within 90 days of

receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See Hogan v. Mahabir, No. 22-CV-7858, 2023

WL 3628554, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2023); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a). “Although the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense that must be

raised in the answer, a statute of limitations defense may be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if

the defense appears on the face of the complaint.” Hogan, 2023 WL 3628554, at *5 (quoting

Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. BioHealth Labs., Inc., 988 F.3d 127, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2021)).

The plaintiff alleges that he filed an EEOC complaint “in 1994” and again “in 2024.”

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 35.) The defendants argue that “[t]o the extent Plaintiff claims discrete

discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring prior to 300 days before 2024, such claims under the

ADA and Title VII are time-barred.” (ECF No. 18-4 at 13; see also ECF No. 17-2 at 19.) The

City Defendants also attached to their motion to dismiss a right to sue letter that the EEOC sent

the plaintiff, dated July 3, 2024. (ECF No. 18-3.) The plaintiff’s latest-in-time allegations are

from August 2022, when the DOE declined to hire him for two different jobs. (ECF No. 1

¶¶ 39–42.) It is not clear when the plaintiff filed the EEOC complaint in 2024, or what he

alleged in the EEOC complaint. In any event, to be timely, the plaintiff would have had to file

his complaint 300 days from August 2022, which would have been in June 2023. He filed the

EEOC complaint in 2024, well beyond 300 days. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s August 2022

claims, as well as his claims about conduct before August 2022, are untimely.6

The Court dismisses the plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims — his Second and Sixth

Causes of Action — in their entirety. The Court also dismisses his Seventh Cause of Action to

the extent that it alleges an ADA claim.

6 To the extent that the plaintiff alleges continuing violations related to UFT mailings and emails, those

allegations are discussed below in Section VI.

Rehabilitation Act Claim (Seventh Cause of Action)

In his Rehabilitation Act claim, the plaintiff alleges “unlawful retaliation” and

“discriminatory conduct” related to his “complaints about disability discrimination against him.”

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 66–68.) “To establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination under the

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) []he is disabled within the meaning of the Act;

(2) []he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of h[is] job, with or without

reasonable accommodation; (3) []he suffered an adverse employment action due solely to h[is]

disability; and (4) h[is] employer receives federal financial assistance.” Adams v. New York

State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 23-CV-5524, 2025 WL 1677347, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

June 13, 2025) (citing Henry v. McDonald, 531 F. Supp. 3d 573, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). As relevant here, to allege that he has a disability under the

Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must establish that he suffers from “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). A

plaintiff may also meet the statutory definition of “disability” if he has “a record of such an

impairment” or, if he is “regarded as having such an impairment;” the plaintiff must “establish[]

that he . . . has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or

perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to

limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), (3)(A).

“Rehabilitation Act Claims in New York are governed by New York’s three-year statute

of limitations governing personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).” Piazza v. Florida

Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 669, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted). Therefore,

as with the plaintiff’s Section 1981 and 1983 claims, the only facts alleged within the statute of

limitations are from August 2022, when the DOE declined to hire the plaintiff for two different

teaching jobs. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 39–42.)

As an initial matter, the plaintiff has not alleged a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

He alleges a “line of duty injury to his back” in the spring of 1994, then describes “an extended

medical leave” that occurred sometime before January 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 29.) The plaintiff

does not allege any facts suggesting that he was still injured in August 2022, let alone that the

injury “substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see

Henry, 531 F. Supp. 3d at 588 (dismissing Rehabilitation Act claims where the plaintiff claimed

“he suffers from depression, stress, migraines, and headaches,” but “d[id] not identify any major

life activity that is impaired by these conditions”). Nor does he allege that he is “regarded as

having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), (3)(A).

Additionally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff does not allege a sufficient causal

relationship between his alleged disability and any adverse employment action. (ECF No. 18-4

at 19–20; ECF No. 17-2 at 19–20.) The plaintiff “must show that [his] disability was a ‘but-for

cause’” of an adverse employment action but “need not show that it was the ‘sole cause.’”

Adams, 2025 WL 1677347, at *5 (quoting Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 341). The plaintiff “has a de

minimis burden to produce direct or circumstantial evidence that would lead a reasonable fact-

finder to conclude that [the adverse employment action] occurred under circumstances giving

rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id. (quoting Kleyman v. SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr., No.

18-CV-3137, 2020 WL 5645218, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020)). The plaintiff does not

allege a causal relationship between his back injury in 1994 and any adverse employment action

in August 2022 — he does not even allege that the defendants were aware of his 1994 injury in

August 2022. For this additional reason, the Court dismisses the Rehabilitation Act claim.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action in its entirety.

Truth in Lending Act Claim (Eighth Cause of Action)

The plaintiff’s claim under the Truth in Lending Act relates solely to the TRS’s pension

award in approximately 2017. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 33, 69–71.) The Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on monetary damages claims for private

actions. In re Residential Cap., LLC, 513 B.R. 856, 867 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (first citing 15

U.S.C. § 1640(e); and then citing Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 785 F.Supp.2d 269, 285

(S.D.N.Y.2011)). “[A]lleged continuing failure to provide TILA disclosures is not a ‘continuing

violation’ for purposes of the one-year statute of limitations.” Van Pier v. Long Island Sav.

Bank, F.S.B., 20 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (collecting cases). “[T]he plain language

of Section 1640(e) and the cases interpreting that statute indicate that, where a damages claim

under TILA is time-barred, the Court is prohibited from” addressing the merits of the claim.

McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., No. 04-CV-1101, 2007 WL 2702348, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.

12, 2007). Because the plaintiff filed this action on October 2, 2024, seven years after 2017, this

claim is also time-barred.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act claim — his Eighth

Cause of Action — in its entirety.

First Amendment Claim (Tenth Cause of Action)

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, the plaintiff must allege, “(1) that the

speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the

plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse

action.” Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The plaintiff

“has the initial burden of showing that an improper motive played a substantial part in

defendant’s action.” Id. at 288 (first citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429

U.S. 274, 287 (1977); and then citing Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 1994)).

The Union Defendants argue, in part, that the complaint “is devoid of specific allegations

establishing a causal connection between any of [the plaintiff’s] conduct and adverse actions

suffered at the hands of Union Defendants.” (ECF No. 17-2 at 21–22.) The City Defendants did

not brief this claim.

a. City Defendants

A First Amendment retaliation claim against a municipality is brought under Section

1983. See, e.g., Agosto, 982 F.3d at 97; Mule, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 43. The Court therefore

construes the First Amendment allegations against the City Defendants as a claim brought under

Section 1983 for a violation of the First Amendment. See Fowlkes, 790 F.3d at 387 (citation

omitted). As with the Section 1983 claim discussed in Section I.b, the plaintiff does not identify

any policy, practice, or custom giving rise to the First Amendment claim as required under

Monell. See 436 U.S. at 694. These allegations are insufficient to plead a First Amendment

claim against a municipality. See Mule, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (dismissing First Amendment

retaliation claims against the DOE under Monell due to the absence of the “execution of a

government’s policy or custom”) (first citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; and then citing Anilao, 27

F.4th at 873–74).

Additionally, as described in Section 1.a, any Section 1983 claim for First Amendment

retaliation based on conduct that occurred more than three years before this action was filed is

barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79

(2d Cir. 2002) (three-year statute of limitations applies to claims arising in New York under

42 U.S.C. § 1983). Moreover, each of the allegedly retaliatory events was a discrete action, not

an “ongoing policy” of retaliation. See Harris, 186 F.3d at 250; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of

discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate

actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’”).

b. Union Defendants

Assuming that the plaintiff can bring a First Amendment action against the Union

Defendants, the Court agrees with the Union Defendants that the complaint lacks any facts

establishing “a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Scott,

344 F.3d at 287. The plaintiff makes only vague and conclusory allegations, and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 76–77.)

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim — his Tenth

Cause of Action — in its entirety.

UFT Mailing and Email Allegations

The plaintiff asserts that on unspecified dates, the Union Defendants engaged in “racial

discriminatory and retaliatory behavior” by changing his address without authorization and

neglecting to provide him with notices of meetings. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 35–36, 44.) It is not clear

from the complaint which claims these allegations fall under but, as explained above, these

allegations are conclusory and do not state a claim.

Remaining State and City Law Claims

“[A] district court ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455

F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The Court dismisses all the

federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, and declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state and municipal law claims — his Third, Fourth,

Fifth, and Ninth Causes of Action — alleging violations of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, and an

unconscionable pension contract. See Kolari, 455 F.3d at 123 (“Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims

were eliminated on a motion to dismiss, prior to the investment of significant judicial resources,

and we can discern no extraordinary inconvenience or inequity occasioned by permitting the

claims to be refiled in state court where they will be afforded a ‘surer-footed reading of

applicable law.’” (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))).

Leave to Amend

The plaintiff has not requested leave to amend, but in light of the plaintiff’s pro se status,

the Court addresses it sua sponte. Although leave to amend a complaint should be freely given

“when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and courts should generally grant pro se

plaintiffs leave to amend “at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any

indication that a valid claim might be stated,” Clarke v. Leading Hotels of the World, Ltd., No.

15-CV-8, 2015 WL 6686568, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2015) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav.

Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)), “it is

within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to amend.” Broidy Cap.

Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98,

105 (2d Cir. 2018)). First, leave to amend is not warranted when the “problem with [the

plaintiff’s] cause[] of action is substantive” and “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v.

Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). As explained above, the “problem with” nearly all

of the plaintiff’s allegations “is substantive” because they are time-barred, so “[r]epleading

would . . . be futile.” Id. Second, the plaintiff did not oppose the defendants’ motions to dismiss

— despite numerous extensions of time and reminders — and has not requested leave to amend.

Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred, the Court denies leave

to amend because the plaintiff did not respond to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and has not

“engage[d]” with their arguments. Abreu v. Fairway Mkt. LLC, No. 17-CV-9532, 2018 WL

3579107, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2018) (denying leave to amend because “failure to

meaningfully engage with the [d]efendants’ arguments amounts to a waiver of [the plaintiff’s]

opportunity to respond”) (citing Felske v. Hirschmann, No. 10-CV-8899, 2012 WL 716632, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012)); see also Clarke, 2015 WL 6686568, at *5 (denying leave to amend

sua sponte in part because the plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s federal

claims are granted, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state and

city law claims. The plaintiff’s complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment dismissing the case and close the

case.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

_s_/A__n_n_ M__. _D_o_n_n_e_ll_y____________

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

February 24, 2026