Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HABAS SINAI VE TIBBI GAZLAR )

ISTIHSAL A.S., )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 2:19-608

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge

)

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY & )

KNOWLEDGE COMPANY, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

On March 11, 2026, Defendant International Technology & Knowledge Co., Inc.

(“Intekno”) filed what it has titled a “Motion in Limine to Clarify Summary Judgment Ruling”

(ECF No. 162). In this motion, Intekno contends that the Court erred in finding that a contract was

formed between it and Plaintiff Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Istihsal A.S. (“Habas”).

As Intekno notes, the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) that governs

this dispute requires a “meeting of the minds,” Kumpers Composites GmbH & CoKG v. TPI

Composites Inc., 2025 WL 603734, at *22 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2025), including as to the identity of

the goods. Intekno contends that there was no meeting of the minds because it was offering to sell

“GrafTech graphite electrodes” but Habas was interested in buying “anyone-but-China

manufactured graphite electrodes.”

Intekno further argues that the Court erred in saying that it did not “conclusively support”

its contention that GrafTech (the proposed manufacturer of the goods) had to approve the order

because the motion for summary judgment was filed by Habas. As a result, Intekno argues, it did

not have the burden of proof on any issue.

In its brief in opposition (ECF No. 173), Habas contends that what Intekno has submitted

is neither a motion in limine nor a motion for clarification. Rather, it argues that Intekno is actually

seeking reconsideration of the Court’s January 29, 2025 summary judgment opinion holding that

Habas had demonstrated the existence of a contract with Intekno. As a result, Intekno’s motion is

untimely, having been filed fourteen months after the Court’s summary judgment decision.

Moreover, Habas contends that Intekno simply argues that the Court “misunderstood” Habas’

argument and then offers a new theory about the parties’ disagreement regarding the identity of

the goods which it never raised before. “Motions for reconsideration may not be used as a means

to argue new facts or issues that inexcusably were not presented to the court in the matter

previously decided.” Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 3d 319, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

Further, Habas argues, Intekno fails to cite any change in controlling law or any new

evidence nor does it point to the existence of any manifest injustice. “To attempt to relitigate an

issue that the Court has already decided in its summary judgment opinion through a pretrial in

limine motion is improper.” Campmor, Inc. v. Brulant, LLC, 2013 WL 12147616, at *8 (D.N.J.

Apr. 30, 2013). See also Martsolf v. Brown, 457 F. App’x 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Because it

asked the District Court to reverse its summary judgment ruling, Plaintiff’s motion in limine is

properly construed as a motion for reconsideration” and it was properly denied because it did not

meet the requirements of that kind of motion, both because it was untimely and because it did not

state an appropriate ground for reconsideration).

In addition, Habas argues that Intekno’s motion cannot be construed as seeking

clarification because it does not ask the Court to “clarify” anything but instead, seeks to alter the

decision. See Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 651, 656 (E.D.

Pa. 2015) (citing Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1993), for the proposition

that, in determining the nature of a motion, a court must “look beyond [a] motion’s caption to its

substance,” and then construing a motion for clarification as a motion for reconsideration).

In its opinion denying Habas’ motion for summary judgment, the Court held that Habas

has identified all the elements necessary to establish that a contract was formed for the sale of

graphite electrodes. (ECF No. 133 at 19-21.) Therefore, the existence of a contract for the sale of

graphite electrodes is resolved and is the law of the case. In its opinion, the Court also concluded

that there are material issues of fact about the parties’ expectations and understanding about

GrafTech’s role that will govern whether its manufacture and supply to Intekno was a condition

precedent to Intekno’s obligation to supply electrodes to Habas. (Id. at 21-22.) In the same vein,

the opinion noted that there are disputed issues of material fact about whether Intekno breached its

contractual responsibilities or alternatively, Habas excused Intekno from performance of the

contract. (Id. at 24.) These factual issues remain to be resolved at trial.

Despite the caption, Intekno’s motion does not seek clarification of any prior ruling other

than a single matter that will be addressed below. Rather, Intekno asks the Court to reconsider its

summary judgment decision. This request is not only untimely, but it improperly raises an

argument not previously raised. The Court’s conclusion that a contract was formed between the

parties is the law of the case and Intekno cites no extraordinary circumstances requiring the

revisiting of this decision. See In re Jamuna Real Est., LLC, 392 B.R. 149, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.

2008) (law of the case “applies equally to factual findings and ‘[i]f an attempt is made to press the

same fact issue for a second time on an unchanged record, law-of-the-case reluctance approaches

maximum force.’”) (citation omitted).

Finally, Intekno argues that the Court did not address its argument that Habas had originally

argued that its contract was formed with a related entity, Teknoloji Transfer, and that it only

belatedly switched to saying it contracted with Intekno after Teknoloji Transfer was dismissed

from the case. Instead, the Court noted the issue “can be addressed at trial.” According to Intekno,

however, it is difficult to understand how this issue can be addressed at trial given the Court’s

ruling that a contract was formed between Habas and Intekno. On this issue, the Court agrees that

some clarification is warranted.

As a review of the record reveals, the original Complaint filed by Habas brought claims

against Intekno and Intekno Teknoloji Transfer Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.(sometimes referred to

hereafter as “Inkekno Turkey.”) The Complaint collectively references both parties as “Intekno”

throughout, alleging that “Intekno” entered into a contract with Habas and breached that contract.

Habas subsequently filed an Amended Complaint that added Halil Kulluk as a defendant and in its

allegations regarding the contract, continued to collectively refer to the other two Defendants as

“Intekno.” Notably, however, the Amended Complaint also references “the material terms of the

Contract as between Habas and Intekno (U.S.),” the current defendant. (ECF No. 13 ¶ 39.) Intekno

Teknoloji Transfer Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. and Kullik were subsequently dismissed from the case.

In its subsequent response to Habas’ Concise Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 128),

Intekno admitted that Intekno Turkey is its agent (id. ¶ 4) and that Intekno, through its agent,

Intekno Turkey, contacted Habas offering to sell it graphite electrodes. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Based on these facts, Intekno’s position that Habas originally asserted that its contract was

only with Intekno Turkey is not accurate, nor is it accurate that Habas changed its story to claim

that it entered into a contract with Intekno only after Inkekno Turkey was dismissed from this case.

The original Complaint lumped the two entities together, and the Amended Complaint was filed

prior to the dismissal of Intekno Turkey. And among other things, Habas alleges in the Amended

Complaint that the contract was between Habas and Intekno (U.S.) (the present defendant).

“A motion for clarification is available for parties to ask a court to explain or clarify

something ambiguous or vague about a court’s decision, not to alter or amend it.” Solid State

Chemicals Ltd. v. Ashland LLC, 2022 WL 2116655, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2022) (citation

omitted). Under all of the facts asserted here, the Court believes that the footnote in the summary

judgment opinion (ECF No. 133 at 20 n.13) requires a further explanation. While Intekno

theoretically could address at trial changes to the claims of Habas as alleged in the Complaint and

Amended Complaint, its description of these revisions is inaccurate. Moreover, the relevance of

changes to the claims asserted by Habas is questionable at best, particularly given Intekno’s

admission that Intekno Turkey was acting as its agent in negotiations with Habas. Therefore, while

Intekno’s request for clarification is granted, it may not solicit or present evidence or testimony at

trial that is based on inaccurate representations of the pleadings filed or positions taken by Habas.

At the same time, Intekno may, if it chooses to do so, present relevant evidence at trial regarding

any actual inconsistencies in Habas’ pleadings or positions taken in this case.

Therefore, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s “Motion in Limine to Clarify Summary

Judgment Ruling” (ECF No. 162) is GRANTED to the extent that it sought a clarification of the

Court’s footnote and is otherwise DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 27th day of May, 2026.

/s/ Patricia L. Dodge

PATRICIA L. DODGE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE