Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

EDWARD M., III,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:25-cv-00164

(JGW)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

____________________________________________

J. Gregory Wehrman, U.S. Magistrate Judge,

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

The parties consented in accordance with a standing order to proceed before the

undersigned. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The matter is presently before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on

the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 5,

6.) Upon review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties’ filings,

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on Pleadings (Doc. 5) is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 6) is GRANTED, and the decision of the Commissioner

is AFFIRMED.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of disability

and disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset date of July 17, 2023. (Tr. 77, 174-

80.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 76, 88.) He then

timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 111.) Plaintiff

appeared with counsel for a telephonic hearing before ALJ Stephen Cordovani held on

July 16, 2024. (Tr. 35-75.) On October 22, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision,

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 11-34.) The Appeals Council denied his

request for review, (Tr. 1-6), and Plaintiff timely filed his appeal to this Court.

B. Factual Background1

Plaintiff was born November 1, 1970 and advanced through college. (Tr. 77, 79,

210.) He initially alleged his disabling conditions to include severe anxiety/PTSD (related

to military service), chronic deteriorating arthritis (knees and shoulder), and cataracts.

(Tr. 77.)

At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff indicated that he did not think he could work

a full-time job because “[b]ased on past experiences, with extreme anger levels and

mistrusting of anyone in the workplace, in terms also of the physical layout, the

environment would not allow me to have a work experience that I’d be able to do with any

great proficiency.” (Tr. 59.) He explained further that, with his mental health concerns,

he does “not do well with other people.” (Tr. 53.)

Physically, Plaintiff described that he cannot use the whole left side of his body.

(Id.) He explained that his left shoulder and arm is “basically useless.” (Id.) He elaborated

that he has little abduction and “the pain is excruciating on most days.” (Tr. 54.) He

indicated that he was not able to reach in front or over his head. (Tr. 57.) He described

that he could only lift nominal weight, which he defined as two pounds. (Id.) He explained

1 This recitation of facts primarily includes testimony from the hearing before the ALJ. Other facts will be

developed throughout the opinion as relevant to the Court’s analysis.

that, if he dropped something light, he was able to bend over and retrieve it. (Id.) He

testified he could not effectively work at a computer. (Id.)

Additionally, Plaintiff explained that his knee “falls out periodically,” causing him to

fall down the stairs or when he is walking. (Tr. 54.) He indicated his knee causes him a

lot of pain. (Id.) Plaintiff described that sitting is painful because of his knee, but standing

is “far worse” because his knee may give out. (Id.) He explained that how far he can walk

depends on the day—some days he cannot walk far and others he can walk down the

block. (Tr. 56.) He also noted that he sometimes uses both a brace and a cane, but the

cane is ineffective because of his shoulder. (Id.) He affirmed the brace was helpful. (Id.)

He indicated that any kind of stairs, bending, or stooping was painful and difficult, as his

knee will only bend so far. (Id.) He described he could not squat or crouch at all. (Id.)

Plaintiff explained that, when he experiences excruciating pain from his knee, he utilizes

an ice pack and waits for the pain to subside. (Tr. 55.)

Plaintiff also identified difficulties resulting from bone fragments in his neck, as well

as arthritis. (Tr. 57.) He noted that he was unable to turn his head without pain. (Id.)

These issues also affected his ability to get out of his chair and out of bed. (Tr. 58.)

Plaintiff also described mental health issues, including difficulty with his memory,

indicating that “[i]t’s been slipping.” (Id.) He characterized himself as becoming “pretty

forgetful.” (Id.) He further explained that his pain impacts his focus and concentration,

and he has difficulty finishing tasks. (Id.) He described difficulties with anger issues, but

he indicated that the medication has helped with those issues. (Id.) He indicated he could

not sleep more than a few hours a night. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that he did experience panic attacks, for which he took medication,

and the medication has reduced his panic attacks from four times a week to once a week.

(Tr. 59-60.) He explained that the attacks make him feel like he is having a heart attack

and may last around thirty minutes to an hour, after which they subside, but it takes about

two hours for him to recover from a panic attack. (Tr. 60.) Plaintiff testified that this

medication also eliminated the suicidal ideation he previously experienced. (Tr. 69.)

Additionally, it helped with his anger and anxiety, although he still experiences those

emotions. (Id.)

Plaintiff explained he is not able to deal with the public for any length of time and

generally declines going to places that have crowds. (Tr. 60-61.)

With regard to daily activities, Plaintiff described that his wife does the laundry and

the cooking. (Tr. 44.) He explained that he is not skilled at cooking and cannot help with

the laundry due to issues with his left shoulder. (Tr. 45.) His wife also generally does the

grocery shopping, but he sometimes goes with her. (Id.) Plaintiff has a driver’s license

and can drive himself to his medical appointments on a weekly basis. (Tr. 44.)

Occasionally, he will stop and pick up things when he gets gas. (Tr. 46.) In sum, Plaintiff

does not assist with any household chores, indicating that he cannot do them effectively,

so his wife does them all. (Tr. 61.) He testified that, in a usual day, he watches a lot of

television and may read a bit. (Tr. 62.) Generally, he is able to accomplish most personal

care tasks, but his wife helps occasionally if needed. (Tr. 62-63.) He does struggle with

putting on his shoes and socks, but his wife helps him. (Tr. 63.)

Previously, Plaintiff worked in the Coast Guard, coordinating search and rescue

and managing classified material. (Tr. 46.) He retired after twenty-two years of service.

(Id.) He also worked as a case manager for a program for veterans in danger of becoming

homeless. (Tr. 47.) He ultimately stopped counseling veterans due to his own mental

health concerns, specifically that he was having difficulties with his co-workers and

clients. (Tr. 48.) He also described difficulties with his supervisor at another counseling

job, resulting in his resignation from that position. (Tr. 50.) He indicated he was active in

both the American Legion and VFW boards, attending meetings approximately once a

month. (Tr. 52.)

The ALJ posed several hypotheticals to the vocational expert (VE). First, he asked

her to assume an individual with the same age, education and work experience as

Plaintiff. (Tr. 71.) He further asked her to assume the hypothetical individual:

is capable of a range of only light exertion[al] activity, occasional ramps,

stairs, no ladders, ropes, scaffolds. Frequent balance as that term is defined

in the SCO. Frequent stoop. No kneeling or crawling. Occasional crouch.

Frequent reach with the left non-dominant arm. However, with no reach at

shoulder level or higher with the left non-dominant arm. Frequent handle

left non-dominant hand. No work around hazards, such as unprotected

heights, dangerous moving mechanical parts. . . . Mentally the individual

can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks with

regular levels of supervision. He can maintain attention and concentration

and regular attendance at work for simple, unskilled work. No supervisor

duties. No independent decision-making. No strict production quotas as

you’d see with assembly line work and minimal changes in work routine and

processes. There could be occasional interaction with supervisors and co-

workers but no interaction with the general public. No work-related

interaction with the general public. No team or tandem work.

(Tr. 72.)

The VE identified three potential jobs: marker, 209.587-034;

housekeeping/cleaner, 323.687-014; and routing clerk, 222.687-022. (Id.) Thereafter,

the ALJ specifically inquired into the VE’s opinion and its consistency with the DOT:

Q. To the extent any aspects of the hypothetical are not consistent with

respect to the DOT, we have to focus on the, number one, unilateral upper

extremity limitations and secondly, the plane of reaching, that being no

shoulder level or higher. In additional[] we have issues regarding assembly

line work, team tandem work, durations of interactions, changes, how were

you able to reach your conclusions that these jobs would be available at this

hypothetical?

A. Those issues are based on my training and experience researching jobs

in the labor market.

Q And does that include researching the three jobs you identified?

A Yes.

Q And through that process, you’re familiar with the central functions of

those jobs?

A. Yes.

Q. The DOT is a relatively old document. Are the way the jobs are described

in the DOT any different from how they might be performed in the current

economy?

A. Not these jobs, no.

(Tr. 73.)

C. ALJ’s Decision

Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2026. (Tr. 17.)

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 17, 2023,

the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.). (Tr. 17.)

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease

of the left shoulder; degenerative joint disease of the left knee; degenerative

disc disease of the cervical spine; anxiety disorder; depressive disorder;

obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”); and post-traumatic stress disorder

(“PTSD”) (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). (Tr. 17.)

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and

404.1526). (Tr. 18.)

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) except he can occasionally use occasional ramps and stairs;

never use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently balance as that term is

defined in the SCO; frequently stoop; never kneel; never crawl; occasionally

crouch; frequently reach with his left, non-dominant arm but never reach at

shoulder level or higher with that same arm; frequently handle with his left,

nondominant hand; can never work around hazards such as unprotected

heights or hazardous moving mechanical parts; can understand, remember

and carry out simple instructions and tasks with regular levels of supervision;

can maintain attention and concentration and regular attendance at work for

simple unskilled work; can have no supervisory duties, no independent

decision-making, no strict production quotas as with assembly line work, and

only minimal changes in work routine and processes; can occasionally interact

with supervisors and co-workers but never have work-related interaction with

the general public; and can perform no team or tandem work. (Tr. 19.)

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).

(Tr. 26.)

7. The claimant was born on November 1, 1970 and was 52 years old, which is

defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on the alleged

disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563). (Tr. 27.)

8. The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564). (Tr. 27.)

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding

that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable

job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). (Tr.

27.)

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and

404.1569a). (Tr. 27.)

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, from July 17, 2023, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

(Tr. 28.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining

whether the SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and

were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir.

2012). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 496, 501

(2d Cir. 2009). “To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence

from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also

include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d

Cir. 1988). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the

Commissioner’s determination must be upheld. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d

Cir. 2014). “Where an administrative decision rests on adequate findings sustained by

evidence having rational probative force, the court should not substitute its judgment for

that of the Commissioner.” Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).

B. Standard to Determine Disability

To be disabled under the Social Security Act (Act), a claimant must establish an

inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.

20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The Commissioner must follow a five-step sequential evaluation

to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a).

At step one, the claimant must demonstrate that he is not engaging in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At step two, the claimant must demonstrate that

he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that limits the claimant’s ability

to perform physical or mental work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the

impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a disabling impairment as set forth

in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”), and satisfies the durational

requirement, the claimant is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the

impairment does not meet the criteria of a disabling impairment, the Commissioner

considers whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity (RFC) for the

claimant to return to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant is

unable to return to past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to

demonstrate that the claimant could perform other jobs which exist in significant numbers

in the national economy, based on claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(g).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts two arguments in support of remand. First, he argues that the ALJ

failed to reconcile an inconsistency between the VE testimony and the DOT. (Doc. 5-1

at 11.) Second, he contends that the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence

because it contained contradictory limitations pertaining to interactions with supervisors.

(See id. at 15.)

A. The ALJ Did Not Fail to Reconcile Any Inconsistency Between the VE

Testimony and the DOT.

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in failing to reconcile the inconsistencies

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT as it pertains to reaching. (Doc. 5-1 at 11.)

Plaintiff, relying on Lockwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 914 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2019),

argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently explore the basis for the VE’s testimony or

otherwise “do enough to reconcile” the inconsistency. (Doc. 5-1 at 13.)

As pertinent to this issue, the ALJ’s RFC limited Plaintiff to “frequently reach with

his left, non-dominant arm but never reach at shoulder level or higher with that same arm.”

(Tr. 19.) In response to the hypothetical including this limitation, the VE identified a routing

clerk, marker, and cleaner/housekeeping, all of which require frequent reaching according

to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). See Tr. 72; see also Routing Clerk, DICOT

222.687-022, 1991 WL 672133 (Jan. 1, 2016); Marker, DICOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL

671802 (Jan. 1, 2016); Cleaner, Housekeeping, DICOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783

(Jan. 1, 2016). As the parties acknowledge, the DOT does not differentiate between

reaching in any direction and reaching overhead.

At step five, the Commissioner has the burden to demonstrate that a claimant can

perform other jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy, based on

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). “Work

exists in the national economy when there is a significant number of jobs (in one or more

occupations) having requirements which [Plaintiff is] able to meet with [her] physical or

mental abilities and vocational qualifications.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(b). If the ALJ chooses

to rely on the testimony of a VE at this step five, the ALJ “must be alert to the possibility

of ‘apparent unresolved conflict[s]’ between th[at] testimony and the [DOT].” Lockwood,

914 F.3d at 91 (quoting Social Security Ruling (SSR) 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2

(Dec. 4, 2000)). That is, the ALJ has an “independent, affirmative obligation . . . to

undertake a meaningful investigatory effort to uncover apparent conflicts, beyond merely

asking the [VE] if there is one.” Id. at 94 (internal citation, quotation marks and alterations

omitted). “When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE . . .evidence and

the DOT, the [ALJ] must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on

the VE . . . evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is

disabled.” SSR-004p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2.2 The Second Circuit later found that the

ALJ properly relied on a VE’s testimony after “specifically ask[ing] about both potential

conflicts and the vocational expert provided an explanation that included an analysis

based on his own expertise and labor market surveys he conducted.” Reilly v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 21-8-cv, 2022 WL 803316, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2022).

There is no dispute that the DOT is silent on whether overhead reaching is required

in any of the jobs identified by the VE, as the descriptions include only the term “reaching.”

Defendant appears to concede that this creates an apparent conflict, focusing on the

contention that the ALJ adequately resolved any such conflict through his questioning.

(See Doc. 6-1 at 10-11.)

At the hearing, ALJ Cordovani specifically asked the VE how she reached her

conclusion that these jobs would be available with limitations pertaining to “unilateral

upper extremity limitations and secondly, the plane of reaching, that being no shoulder

2 This Court is aware that on January 6, 2025, the Social Security Administration issued SSR 24-3p,

“rescinding SSR 00-4p and [] no longer require[ing] adjudicators to identify and resolve conflicts between

occupational information provided by [vocational specialists] and [vocational experts] and information in the

[DOT].” SSR 24-3p, available at https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2024-03-di-02.html,

(last visited June 2, 2026). However, this regulation does not apply retroactively. Id. at n.1.

level or higher.” (Tr. 73.) The VE explained that her conclusions as to those limitations

were based on her “training and experience researching jobs in the labor market.” (Id.)

The VE clarified that her research included the three jobs identified and further made her

familiar “with the central functions of those jobs.” (Id.)

This colloquy goes beyond the circumstances before the Second Circuit in

Lockwood. In that case, the only question posed by the ALJ to that VE was whether the

opinion was consistent with the DOT, to which the VE responded it was. Lockwood, 914

F.3d at 93. Here, the ALJ explored the basis for the opinion, confirming that the VE

considered the reaching limitations for the specific positions she opined were available

and that her opinion was sufficiently supported. As the ALJ recognized in his decision:

Although the vocational expert’s testimony is not entirely consistent with the

information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), there

is a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy. The DOT does not directly

address all non-exertional aspects of a potential RFC (i.e., unilateral upper

extremity limits; over shoulder reach; assembly line work; changes; duration

of interactions; team tandem work, etc.). Due to the vocational expert’s

experience, expertise, and reliable testimony at the hearing, however, the

vocational expert’s responses are accepted in accordance with Social

Security Ruling 00-4p. The vocational expert testified that she relied upon

her training and experience researching jobs in labor market, including the

jobs identified and that she was as a result familiar with the essential

functions of the jobs and how they are currently performed. The vocational

expert is well qualified and neither the claimant nor the claimant’s

representative raised any objections to the vocational expert’s testimony or

qualifications.

(Tr. 28.)

Several other decisions have found such an inquiry to be sufficient. See Tammy

W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-990-HKS, 2026 WL 183481, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.

23, 2026) (finding the ALJ fulfilled her duty to resolve the conflict when the VE explained

that her opinion was based on her “education and experience as a rehab counselor and

researcher”); Kathryn D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-31-JJM, 2025 WL 2115487,

at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2025) (finding that the ALJ adequately resolved the inconsistency

with the DOT when the VE’s testimony was based on her “interpretation of the DOT and

[her] training and education and work experience as a vocational rehab counselor and

how [she] would understand those jobs to be performed.”); Barbara W. v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 1:22-cv-575-TPK, 2025 WL 276668, at * 6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2025) (finding

that the ALJ sufficiently resolved the conflict between the DOT and the VE’s testimony

when the ALJ acknowledged the conflict and the expert provided testimony about why he

believed the jobs did not require overhead reaching, which opinion was based on his

experience with the jobs identified); Jetaun C. R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-

1489, 2022 WL 7085513, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2022) (noting that a VE is permitted to

rely on his experience regarding job requirements when the DOT is silent and finding the

ALJ obtained a reasonable explanation to the apparent conflict).

In addition to Lockwood, Plaintiff relies on other decisions within this district, such

as Roderick R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-cv-577-TPK, 2023 WL 3642035, at *1

(W.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023), in support of his position that the ALJ failed to sufficiently

resolve the conflict. The Court finds this case distinguishable because it involved an RFC

that limited the plaintiff to occasional overhead reaching, while the proposed viable jobs

required frequent reaching, and the VE did not explain how those limitations (i.e. frequent

reaching and occasional overhead reaching) could coexist. See id. at *4-5. See also

John C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-00365-JGW, 2024 WL 3759753, at *1

(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2024) (similar). In this case, the ALJ’s RFC included limitations

involving Plaintiff’s left, non-dominant arm, but the permitted interval of reaching was still

“frequent”—which is consistent with the DOT descriptions. (See Tr. 19); see also Routing

Clerk, DICOT 222.687-022, 1991 WL 672133; Marker, DICOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL

671802; Cleaner, Housekeeping, DICOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783.

Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately resolved the apparent conflict

regarding overhead reaching and concludes the ALJ’s step five finding was supported by

substantial evidence.

B. The RFC Was Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff next argues that this matter should be remanded because the ALJ’s RFC

was internally inconsistent, and therefore not supported by substantial evidence.

According to Plaintiff, the inconsistency exists because the ALJ limited Plaintiff to being

able to “remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks with regular levels of

supervision” as well as “occasionally interact with supervisors and co-workers.” (See

Doc. 5-1 at 16-17; Tr. 19.) Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to adequately explain

or support these findings.

A claimant’s RFC is the most he can still do despite his limitations and is based on

all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.945(a)(1), (a)(3);

SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996). The regulations explicitly provide that

the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical

finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022)

(recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”);

see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, at *3

(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021).

Plaintiff appears to argue that he cannot be limited to “regular levels of supervision”

while only “occasionally interact[ing] with supervisors.” But these limitations are not

inconsistent with each other. As Defendant points out, the vocational term “occasionally”

means occurring from very little up to one third of the workday. See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL

31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983). While the term “regular” has no specific vocational meaning,

it generally means “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with

established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline; recurring, attending, or functioning

at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals; . . . normal, standard.” See https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/regular (last visited June 2, 2026). There is nothing to suggest

that “regular supervision” requires more than occasional interaction with a supervisor.

Moreover, in the hypothetical presented to the VE, the ALJ specifically noted the

need for “regular levels of supervision,” as well as “occasional interaction with supervisors

and co-workers.” (Tr. 72.) The VE identified the three jobs in response, confirming that,

in her opinion, Plaintiff could perform these jobs as “regular levels of supervision” with

only “occasional interaction” with a supervisor. (See Tr. 72-73.) And this conclusion

appears consistent with the level of interaction with people contained in the DOT

definition, which assigns a “people” level of interaction as “not significant.” See Routing

Clerk, DICOT 222.687-022, 1991 WL 672133; Marker, DICOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL

671802; Cleaner, Housekeeping, DICOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783.

Finally, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis or explanation supporting his

findings. The ALJ carefully detailed the objective evidence and thoroughly analyzed the

medical opinions in the record.3 (See Tr. 19-26.) He explained the reason for his

3 The Court notes that, despite the existence of six medical opinions in the record, none included disabling

limitations, as recognized by the parties. (See Doc. 5-1 at 10-11; Doc. 6-1 at 5-6.) Indeed, the mental

imposition of social limitations, specifically tying them to Plaintiffs anger issues and

difficulty with interactions. (See Tr. 26) (noting “[t]he claimant's anger is particularly

troubling, which is why interaction with the public is reduced even further than interaction

with supervisors and co-workers. Though the claimant complained of a particular difficulty

with supervisors, records reflect that the claimant's outbursts were controllable,

particularly with more recent medication balancing.”). The Court is able to glean the ALJ’s

reasoning from his analysis and thus finds no error requiring remand.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no basis for remand. ACCORDINGLY, it

is:

ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 5) is

DENIED, and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 6) is

GRANTED.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.

Dated: June 5, 2026 J. Gregory Wehrman j LL.

Rochester, New York HON. J. Gregory Wehrman

United States Magistrate Judge

health impairment experts noted at most mild to moderate limitations in functioning, (see Tr. 83-85, 96-98,

432), and the physical health impairment consultative examining expert identified only “severe limitations”

in reaching up or out with one arm, as well as “limited” activities in bimanual dexterity, (see Tr. 438).

16