“Courts may scour pro se pleadings in 2 search for a legal argument, but they cannot excuse a litigant’s failure to bring a claim entitled to legal remedy.”
How later courts described this case
- “Courts may scour pro se pleadings in 2 search for a legal argument, but they cannot excuse a litigant’s failure to bring a claim entitled to legal remedy.”
- “A court may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears in doubt.”
- holding that the Court “has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code”
- holding that a plaintiff’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 26-774
(Filed: June 3, 2026)
(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
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TONY LAMAR CARD, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SOMERS, Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff, Tony Lamar Card, filed a complaint in this Court on May 26, 2026,
vaguely alleging that state law enforcement and judicial officials unlawfully evicted him from
his home and stole his personal property. ECF No. 1 at 2. As explained below, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims; therefore, it must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”).
BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2026, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint and an application to
proceed in forma pauperis in this Court. ECF Nos. 1, 2. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
“[t]here has been a falsified document created that has a judge[’]s name[,] but not signed by a
judge, stealing my home.” ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]wo armed men
threaten[ed] to shoot me if I go home,” and that these men stole Plaintiff’s belongings. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that he has tried to contact “the judge listed on [the] falsified document the claim
is about, sheriff, court clerk, and prosecuting attorney,” but that these individuals “all refuse to
respond.” Id. at 1.
In support of his claims, Plaintiff attaches a self-authored “Notice of Lien Against Pierce
County Superior Court,” which, as far as the Court can discern, details Plaintiff’s legal theory of
his case; copies of the documents posted on his front door, including notices of eviction and
trespass; invoices documenting delivery of mail to various recipients; a “declaration of
forfeiture”; and a certification that Plaintiff’s “Notice of Lien” was notarized. See generally ECF
No. 1-2. As relief, Plaintiff seeks the “arrests of all found guilty,” as well as
$500,000,000,000.00 in “restitution” for “everything being stolen,” “the stress of losing
everything [he] own[s],” and “the stress of hiding from the sheriff[’]s department.” ECF No. 1 at
3; ECF No. 1-1 at 1 (listing the “Amount Claimed”).
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The Court has an obligation to ensure that it has jurisdiction over all claims before it and
must dismiss claims that fall outside its jurisdiction either through a party’s motion or sua
sponte. RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see, e.g., St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United
States, 916 F.3d 987, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“It is well settled that . . . the court must address
jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention,
whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the case.” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 496 (2016))); Arctic
Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“A court may and should
raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears in doubt.”).
This Court, like all federal courts, is one of limited jurisdiction. Under the Tucker Act’s
jurisdictional grant, the Court of Federal Claims may only “render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act “does not, of itself, create a substantive right enforceable
against the United States.” Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing
Ferreiro v. United States, 501 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Rather, to state a claim within
this Court’s jurisdiction, “a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that
creates the right to money damages”—one that is “money-mandating.” Fisher v. United States,
402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Accordingly, a plaintiff must plausibly allege jurisdictional facts to show that his or her
claim falls within the Court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (holding that a plaintiff’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). Although the “court accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all
reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor,” Silver Buckle Mines, Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed.
Cl. 786, 791 (2014), this tenet “is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s
elements, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s
framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S at 664.
Importantly, the Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to pro se litigants. See, e.g., Steffen v.
United States, 995 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Courts may scour pro se pleadings in
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search for a legal argument, but they cannot excuse a litigant’s failure to bring a claim entitled to
legal remedy.”); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1359 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk,
J., concurring in part) (“[A] pro se litigant cannot rely on conclusory allegations.”). Thus,
although a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a pro se plaintiff still “bears
the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence,” Taylor v. United States,
303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942)).
Stated differently, “the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does
not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.” Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed.
Cl. 249, 253 (2007) (citing Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction and must be dismissed
under RCFC 12(h)(3). From what the Court can surmise, Plaintiff alleges, albeit vaguely, that
state law enforcement and judicial officials unlawfully evicted him from his home and stole his
property. See ECF No. 1 at 1–2. As an initial matter, all claims against an individual, even
against an individual acting in his official capacity as a federal government official, are beyond
the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction. See Gulley v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 405, 412–13
(2020) (“Claims against individuals—even in their official capacity as government officials—fall
outside of this Court’s jurisdiction, as this Court only possesses jurisdiction to decide suits
against the United States.” (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941))). As
such, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against “the judge . . . , sheriff, court clerk, and
prosecuting attorney.” See ECF No. 1 at 1.
This leaves the Court to consider any remaining claims against the United States, over
which Plaintiff likewise fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The closest Plaintiff comes
to attempting to allege a claim against a federal entity is his assertion that he previously “tried to
file a claim with [t]he United States District Court [sic] Western District of Washington” but that
“they refuse[d] to respond.” Id. That alleged lack of response, however, is explained by the
“vexatious litigant bar order” entered against Plaintiff by the United States District Court of the
Western District of Washington on June 5, 2025. See Card v. Brown, No. 25-CV-5213-DGE
(W.D. Wash. June 5, 2025), ECF No. 11; see also Card v. Brown, No. 3:25-CV-05218-TMC,
2025 WL 1384810, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2025) (finding that Plaintiff “has filed at least 22
cases in this District since August 2023,” twenty-one of which “have already been dismissed as
duplicative, frivolous, or otherwise without merit”). In any event, Plaintiff’s claim against the
district court would not support jurisdiction in this Court. Portnov v. United States, No. 17-
672C, 2017 WL 2295001, at *3 (Fed. Cl. May 25, 2017), aff’d, 739 F. App’x 613 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (construing claims against the “federal judiciary” as against “individual federal judicial
officers” which falls outside of this Court’s jurisdiction).
At bottom, Plaintiff seeks the “arrests of all found guilty,” ECF No. 1 at 3, and monetary
relief totaling $500,000,000,000.00, ECF No. 1-1 at 1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to order
arrests or otherwise grant criminal relief. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Court “has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under
the federal criminal code”). Moreover, Plaintiff identifies no money-mandating constitutional
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provision, statute, regulation, or other source of law entitling him to monetary relief. Instead,
Plaintiff alleges only that he is owed “restitution” for “everything being stolen,” “the stress of
losing everything [he] own[s],” and “the stress of hiding from the sheriff[’]s department.” ECF
No. 1 at 3. But this Court’s jurisdiction expressly excludes claims sounding in tort, see 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and such conclusory allegations do not satisfy the pleading standards of
Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiff essentially pleads neither claims against the United States nor
claims that fall within this Court’s jurisdiction even if they were pled against the United States.
Accordingly, all claims against the federal government must be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Plaintiff’s claims are not against the United States and, therefore, are beyond
the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction. In addition, even if Plaintiff had raised claims against the
United States, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege facts or identify any source of law that provides
a legal remedy permitted by this Court. Accordingly, the case is DISMISSED pursuant to
RCFC 12(h)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter JUDGMENT accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Zachary N. Somers
ZACHARY N. SOMERS
Judge
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