The opinion
Steven Hicks v. State of Maryland, No. 634, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Graeff, J.
FOURTH AMENDMENT — REASONABLE SUSPICION — TERRY STOP —
SECOND AMENDMENT — TERRY FRISK
In New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 10 (2022), the United
States Supreme Court substantially changed the legal landscape with its holding that the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect an
individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home. This ruling, among
other things, changes the analysis for whether possession of a gun justifies an investigatory
stop under the Fourth Amendment. Although the Maryland appellate courts have, for
decades, upheld police stops based on reasonable suspicion that a person is in possession
of a gun, after Bruen, carrying a handgun publicly for self-defense is presumptively lawful,
and therefore, mere possession of a concealed firearm, by itself, is not indicative of criminal
activity. The mere possibility that a person with a gun might not have a valid license or
otherwise may be restricted from possessing a gun is not enough to establish reasonable
suspicion for a seizure. The police must have reasonable suspicion that the person is
possessing the gun illegally or otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Because the officers
here stopped appellant based solely on his possession of a gun, without reasonable
suspicion that he was possessing the gun illegally or otherwise involved in criminal
activity, they did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him.
We reject appellant’s claim that, after Bruen, an officer may not conduct a Terry frisk for
officer safety when a suspect lawfully stopped is armed. Because a gun is a dangerous
weapon, officers may frisk a suspect carrying a gun regardless of whether the suspect is
carrying the gun legally or illegally. There is no dispute here that appellant was armed with
a handgun. Had there been a proper stop, the police had reasonable suspicion to frisk
appellant.
The police also exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk by reaching into appellant’s bag and
pockets. A Terry frisk is limited to a pat-down of outer clothing unless the police show that
a pat-down would be insufficient to determine whether a suspect was armed and dangerous.
The State did not make that showing here. Moreover, the State failed to meet its burden of
proving that the plain view and plain feel doctrines applied to justify the seizure of the
drugs and gun. The officer who conducted the pat-down and found the second gun and
drugs did not testify, and there was no evidence regarding what that officer observed in the
bag prior to reaching inside. There also was no testimony that, based on what the officer
felt during the pat-down, it was immediately apparent to him that appellant’s pocket
contained contraband.
The stop and frisk here were unconstitutional. The court erred in denying the motion to
suppress.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 123209008
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 634
September Term, 2024
______________________________________
IN BANC
______________________________________
STEVEN HICKS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Wells, C.J.,
Graeff,
Berger,
Nazarian,
Arthur,
Leahy,
Reed,
Friedman,
Shaw,
Zic,
Ripken,
Tang,
Albright,
Kehoe, S.,
JJ.
______________________________________
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Opinion by Graeff, J.
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Joint Concurring Opinion by Berger, Friedman,
Government Article) this document is authentic.
and Shaw, JJ.
2026.06.04 Concurring Opinion by Nazarian, J.
15:38:59 -04'00' Concurring Opinion by Leahy, J.
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Concurring Opinion by Friedman, J.
______________________________________
Filed: June 4, 2026
Steven Hicks, appellant, was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with
multiple drug and firearm offenses. He filed a motion to suppress the two handguns and
cocaine discovered during a warrantless search of his person and bag. He argued, among
other things, that the officers did not have either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
stop or frisk him because he had a permit to carry the weapons at issue. After the court
denied the motion, appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
firearm with a nexus to a drug trafficking crime. The court sentenced him to five years of
incarceration without the possibility of parole.
On appeal, appellant presents two questions for this Court’s review, 1 which we have
0F
consolidated and rephrased, as follows:
Did the circuit court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence recovered during a warrantless search of his person and
cross-body bag?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
1
Appellant presented the following questions for review:
1. In light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597
U.S. 1 (2022), may police arrest or conduct a Terry stop or pat-down of
an individual based solely on his carrying a holstered handgun where he
immediately asserts that he had a license to carry the gun without first
allowing him to produce the license?
2. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court determines that [appellant] was not
arrested and that a Terry stop and frisk were warranted, (a) did the police
exceed the scope of the pat-down search by putting their hands in
[appellant’s] pockets and his cross-body bag; and (b) did the State present
evidence to justify the search of [appellant’s] pocket and bag without
calling the officers who removed the evidence to testify at the suppression
hearing?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 5, 2023, Detective Mitchell Ramsey, a member of the group violence unit
(“GVU”) of the Baltimore City Police Department, was a passenger in an unmarked vehicle
driven by Detective Alex Rodriguez. As the officers approached the intersection of St.
Charles and Belvedere, Detective Ramsey observed a large group of individuals
congregating. When appellant saw the unmarked vehicle, he turned and began walking
away from the group. Appellant had a satchel positioned across the front portion of his
body. While appellant was walking, Detective Ramsey saw the rear handle of a handgun
in the front right side of appellant’s waistband. The handgun was “physically printing
through the shirt,” meaning that Detective Ramsey could “see the angular shape, the back
portion of an LL line of the rear handle of the handgun” through appellant’s t-shirt.
Detective Ramsey activated his body worn camera, exited his vehicle, and told
appellant to put his hands up. Appellant asked “for what,” then immediately stated that he
had a license. Detective Ramsey told appellant that he was stopping him because he
observed a firearm physically printing in appellant’s waistband, and he placed appellant in
handcuffs. Appellant reiterated that he had a permit for the gun, and asked if he could “pull
out” his license. Detective Ramsey explained that he “had an investigation to conduct.”
The handgun was located in a holster inside of appellant’s waistband. Detective Ramsey
alerted surrounding officers that there was a gun in appellant’s waistband. Another officer,
Detective Rodriguez, removed the gun and handed it to Detective Ramsey, who rendered
it safe by ejecting the magazine and racking the slide of the weapon.
2
At the suppression hearing, Detective Ramsey testified that he then stepped away
from appellant while other officers conducted “a continued weapons pat down of
[appellant’s] person.” During the pat down, officers recovered a second firearm from the
satchel and CDS from appellant’s left pants pocket. Detective Ramsey observed the CDS
recovered and described them as “[s]mall trash cans . . . multicolored trash cans commonly
utilized to package and hold street level cocaine within Baltimore City.”
After discovering the CDS, Detective Ramsey gave appellant his Miranda
warnings. He asked him where his license was located, and appellant replied: “Bro, it’s
right here in my thing. I was going to get it.”
Detective Rodriguez did not testify at the suppression hearing. Instead, the State
introduced Detective Rodriguez’s body camera footage into evidence and played it for the
court. The video shows Detective Rodriguez approaching appellant as Detective Ramsey
detained him and another officer handcuffed him. Appellant asked why they stopped him
and repeatedly stated that he was licensed. Detective Ramsey explained that he stopped
appellant because he saw a firearm in his waistband, and even though appellant said that
he had a license, the police still had to do an investigation. The video shows Detective
Rodriguez removing the firearm, which was located in a holster, from the right side of
appellant’s waistband. Detective Rodriguez put his hand slightly into the satchel, pulled
away the unzipped back pocket, felt the outside of the satchel, and stated that “there’s a
second firearm inside the bag.” Detective Rodriguez removed the satchel and handed it to
Officer David Burch, instructing him to “zip it up, zip it up.” Officer Burch opened the
main compartment of the satchel and looked through it, then handed it to another officer.
3
Detective Rodriguez introduced himself, explained that appellant was being
recorded, and reiterated that the officers stopped appellant because they observed his
firearm printed on his front waistband. 2 While holding onto appellant’s waist and briefly
1F
patting down appellant’s outside right pocket, Detective Rodriguez asked appellant if there
was anything on him that he should know about. Appellant’s response was unintelligible.
Detective Rodriguez briefly felt the outside of appellant’s left pocket and then started to
pull out a plastic baggy from inside appellant’s pocket. He stated that he needed gloves
and then pulled open the pocket to look at the contents again. Detective Ramsey then read
appellant his Miranda rights.
Approximately five minutes later, Detective Rodriguez put on gloves and removed
from appellant’s pockets the plastic baggies, as well as numerous small plastic containers.
He then searched appellant’s entire satchel. The video shows Officer Burch transferring
small plastic containers from the satchel into an evidence bag. 3 2F
On cross-examination, Detective Ramsey testified that the officers were in the
neighborhood for an investigation unrelated to appellant. They observed appellant “blade
his body” and cross directly behind their unmarked vehicle. 4 Appellant did not take off
3F
Appellant told the officers that he had been stopped by a sergeant a week earlier,
2
showed his permit, and was allowed to leave.
3
Appellant continued to question the officer’s actions stating: “Guns are legal.
Aren’t they all supposed to be ‘where’s your ID?’ Ya’ll all grabbing me, going into my
pockets, don’t move, and all this, like, come on.”
4
In a situation where an officer testifies that blading by a suspect was suspicious, it
can be a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. See Booker v. State, 267 Md. App.
4
running when Detective Ramsey told him to stop and put his hands up. Appellant did not
put his hands up, however, and his one hand was in close proximity to where Detective
Ramsey observed the firearm.
Detective Ramsey was aware that people have concealed carry permits in Maryland.
The gun was under appellant’s shirt, in a holster, and not in view. Another gun was
discovered in appellant’s satchel by a different officer.
When stopped, appellant immediately told Detective Ramsey that he had a license.
Detective Ramsey “put [appellant’s] hands behind his back.” Appellant reiterated that he
had a license three times as he was handcuffed and surrounded by four officers. As the
body cam video played, Detective Ramsey identified the officers present at the scene. He
testified that Detective Rodriguez reached into appellant’s satchel with his right hand.
Appellant again asked if he could get his license, but none of the officers responded to his
request. 5 4F
315, 320 (2025) (officer discussed the suspect blading, which he explained as “when a
person will position their body or move their body in a certain way, or the way they are
sitting or standing, or just by covering up an object with a hand” “to conceal an object from
police view,” as a factor in stopping appellant). Here, Detective Ramsey did not even
mention blading in his direct examination as a reason he stopped appellant, and he never
testified regarding what that was or that this was a factor in the decision to stop appellant.
Detective Ramsey’s testimony was that the stop was based on the sighting of the gun, and
the State argued below and on appeal that the stop was reasonable on that ground alone.
The issue presented to us by the parties is whether, after Bruen, the possession of a firearm,
by itself, constitutes reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, and that is the
issue we address.
5
Detective Ramsey was not sure where appellant’s license ultimately was located,
but, based on the video, it appears that the permit was recovered from appellant’s satchel
after Detective Rodriguez removed the satchel during the frisk.
5
Detective Ramsey testified that Detective Rodriguez conducted an initial pat down
of appellant prior to reaching in his pockets and discovering a bag of cocaine. Defense
counsel introduced for identification appellant’s firearm permit, which indicated an
expiration date of February 28, 2026, with no restrictions. The State stipulated that it was
the permit discovered that day.
In argument, the State relied on State v. Sizer, 230 Md. App. 640, 651 (2016), aff’d
on other grounds, 456 Md. 350 (2017), to support its position that “there was a reasonable
articulable suspicion of an armed person” when appellant was detained, and there was “a
reason for the pat down [leading] to the recovery of the first gun.” It argued that the pat
down led to the discovery of the second gun in the satchel, and the continued pat down
after removal of the satchel led to the discovery of CDS. The State asserted that the officers
acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances in handcuffing appellant before
conducting a Terry frisk because appellant’s hand was inches from his gun, and the
officer’s needed “to get control of the situation” before verifying the permit.
Appellant’s counsel began by stating that appellant was in full compliance with
Maryland’s permitting statute when the officers detained him, and the initial question was
whether the circumstances were enough to justify the stop. He argued that, if the court
ruled it was enough to justify a frisk after the decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol
Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), an officer must show that a person is armed and
dangerous, and “armed does not automatically mean dangerous.” Counsel argued that
appellant was not dangerous because when appellant was ordered to stop, he immediately
did so, faced the officers, did not reach for anything, and stated several times that he had a
6
license. He argued that it was incumbent on the officers to verify the license at that point,
but instead, Detective Rodriguez removed appellant’s weapon and started “digging in th[e]
satchel.”
Counsel asserted that, under McDowell v. State, 407 Md. 327 (2009), Detective
Rodriguez was not authorized to pull out the bag of cocaine in appellant’s pockets because
he knew it was not a weapon. He argued that the search was not reasonable, and “at the
very least, the cocaine should be suppressed.” He also noted that Detective Rodriguez was
not called by the State to testify regarding his discovery of the cocaine based on the plain
feel doctrine. 6
5F
In reply, the State noted that only one minute and 40 seconds passed between the
time Detective Rodriguez exited from his vehicle and the time he felt the drugs in
appellant’s pocket. During that 100 seconds, the officers “had not had the opportunity or
the time to verify a permit” because they needed to get control of the situation. The State
did not agree that Detective Rodriguez reached into the bag, and, in any event, it argued
that “there would have been inevitable discovery once [appellant] was placed under arrest
for the drugs.” It asserted that the officers acted reasonably. The State compared stopping
an individual with a suspected concealed weapon to stopping individuals driving cars with
a barely legal window tint, noting that, “[e]ven if they are actually in compliance, there’s
still a reasonableness to investigate.”
6
The prosecutor stated that it did not call Detective Rodriguez to testify because it
believed appellant’s argument would be limited to the permit issue.
7
The court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, finding that the “officers acted
reasonably to protect themselves and to protect the public.” It stated that
you can have 453,000 handgun permits valid, legal; If you walk around the
streets of the United States, not just Maryland, well I can’t say United States,
cause you can do it probably in Texas, but if [you] walk around the streets of
Maryland, Baltimore City with a handgun, a weapon which was clearly
obvious to me when I first saw you, that that’s what was under that T-shirt,
you’re gonna get stopped. That is just the nature of the beast. You can have
all the permits you want, sir. When a police officer sees that you have a gun,
you could’ve been a police officer. It would not matter if they did not know
you. They would have been well within their means to stop you.
Noting that a person could lie about having a permit, or even if the person had a permit,
use the gun to shoot the police or members of the public, the court found that the officers
“were well within their right to stop [appellant] for their safety as well as the safety of the
community at large.”
With regard to the second handgun recovered, the court found that the back zipper
of the satchel was open when Detective Rodriguez removed the first gun from appellant’s
waistband. The court stated: “He stuck his hand in their [sic]. I don’t know what he might
find. I don’t know, maybe ammunition, who knows? But something he saw in there, he
put his hand in, and then he immediately took his hand out, waited and said . . . ‘We got a
firearm inside the bag.’” The court reiterated that the officers would be neglecting their
duties, their own safety, and the safety of the community, if they believed everyone who
claimed they had a license without verification, and explained that:
No reasonable police officer is gonna allow you to go in your pocket and try
to find your license or go in that bag and try to find your license where there
could be another weapon. It doesn’t work like that, sir, that’s not how
officers are trained and that’s not what they should do.
8
The court found that the search of appellant’s pants pocket was reasonable as a frisk to
protect the police and the community.
As indicated, after the court denied the motion to suppress, appellant entered a
conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm with a nexus to a drug trafficking crime.
The court sentenced him to five years of incarceration without the possibility of parole.
This appeal followed. 7 The parties briefed the issues they were presenting to the
6F
Court, and argument ensued before a three-judge panel on February 6, 2026. A majority
of this Court subsequently voted to hear the case in banc, 8 and the Court held an in banc
7F
hearing on March 31, 2026.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is well established:
When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we
are “limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing.” Moats v.
State, 455 Md. 682, 694, 168 A.3d 952 (2017). “We review the evidence and
the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party.” Thornton v. State, 465 Md. 122, 139, 214 A.3d 34 (2019). As a
“mixed question of law and fact[,]” we accept “the hearing court’s finding[s]
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous” but “review the hearing judge’s
legal conclusions de novo[.]” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, we
independently evaluate without deference to the circuit court whether a
police officer’s conduct violated the constitutional rights of the defendant.
Sizer v. State, 465 Md. 350, 362, 174 A.3d 326 (2017).
7
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State agreed to appellant’s release from
incarceration pending appeal.
8
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJ”), § 1-403(c) (2025 Supp.) provides that
“[a] hearing or rehearing before the court in banc may be ordered in any case by a majority
of the incumbent judges of the court.”
9
State v. Smith, 265 Md. App. 91, 101, cert. denied, 491 Md. 639 (2025) (quoting Brown v.
State, 261 Md. App. 83, 93 (2024)). Accord State v. Stone, 493 Md. 78, 96 (2026).
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He makes
several arguments in support of this contention. First, he argues that the stop was
unconstitutional in light of Bruen, asserting that (a) the “encounter was an arrest
unsupported by probable cause” because post-Bruen “knowledge that someone is carrying
a gun cannot generate probable cause that they are doing so illegally”; and (b) even if the
encounter constituted a Terry stop, in light of Bruen the police did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain him. Second, appellant argues that, even if the stop was lawful, the
frisk was not justified because the police lacked reasonable suspicion that he was
dangerous. Finally, appellant argues that, even if the stop and frisk were warranted,
Detective Rodriguez “exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk for weapons by
immediately putting [his] hands into [appellant’s] bag and pockets.” He asserts that the
State failed to present evidence to justify this search under the plain sight and plain feel
doctrines because Detective Rodriguez did not testify.
The State contends that the court correctly denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
It argues that the appellant’s encounter “amounted only to an investigatory detention,” not
an arrest, and the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that appellant carried a
handgun unlawfully. The State asserts that Bruen does not alter the “foundational premise
that, by statute in Maryland” the carrying of a handgun is “presumptively unlawful,” with
certain exceptions, including possessing a permit, and therefore, an officer may detain an
10
individual with a handgun to determine if the individual possesses a valid permit. With
respect to the frisk, the State argues that “a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed is
per se a reasonable suspicion that the person is dangerous, warranting a frisk for weapons.”
Regarding the scope of the frisk, the State contends that appellant did not preserve for
review his claim that the frisk exceeded its proper scope, and in any event, Detective
Rodriguez lawfully seized the handgun and cocaine under the plain sight and plain feel
doctrines.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423, 445 (2022) (quoting
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381-82 (2014)). “Whether a particular warrantless action
on the part of the police is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends on a balance
between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.” Trott v. State, 473 Md. 245, 255 (2021) (quoting
Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 321 (2019)).
As indicated, appellant presents several arguments in support of his contention that
the encounter here was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Because appellant
relies heavily on the decision in Bruen in support of these arguments, we will briefly
discuss that case, and Maryland’s response to it to date, before addressing appellant’s
specific contentions.
11
I.
Legal Background
In Bruen, 597 U.S. at 10, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling that
substantially changed the legal landscape. It held that the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution “protect an individual’s right to carry a
handgun for self-defense outside the home.” The case arose from a challenge to the
constitutionality of New York’s licensing regime, which made it a crime to possess any
firearm without a license, and provided that, to obtain a license to carry a concealed gun,
the applicant must show “proper cause.” Id. at 11. The “proper cause” requirement had
been interpreted to require an applicant to “demonstrate a special need for self-protection
distinguishable from that of the community.” Id. at 12.
The Court stated that, if “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s
conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 24. The Court held
that the plain text of the Second Amendment, which provides that “the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” protects an individual’s right to carry
handguns publicly for self-defense. Id. at 32-33. Based on that plain language, the
government had the burden to justify any regulation on handguns by showing that it was
“consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 33-34. The
Court acknowledged that “the right to keep and bear arms in public has traditionally been
subject to well-defined restrictions governing the intent for which one could carry arms,
the manner of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry
arms.” Id. at 38. It concluded, however, that the “historical record compiled by
12
respondents does not demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of
commonly used firearms for self-defense” or “limiting public carry only to those law-
abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. at 38. Accordingly,
the Court held that New York’s proper cause licensing requirement was unconstitutional.
Id.
Prior to Bruen, states with permitting schemes were either “shall issue” or “may
issue” regimes. Fooks v. State, 490 Md. 458, 479 (2025), cert denied, 2026 WL 490722
(2026). Accord Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13-14. Shall-issue regimes, 43 states in 2022, required
authorities to issue concealed-carry licenses if applicants satisfied certain threshold
requirements. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13. They did not “require applicants to show an atypical
need for armed self-defense” and did not “necessarily prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible
citizens’” from obtaining a permit for public carry. Id. at 13, 38 n.9. Rather, they imposed
“narrow, objective, and definite standards,” such as background checks and firearm safety
courses, to confirm that licensees were, in fact, law-abiding. Id. at 38 n.9 (quoting
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)). “May issue” regimes, by
contrast, which included six states in 2022, including Maryland and New York, required a
special showing of need to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public and gave authorities
“discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies the statutory
13
criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the
relevant license.” Id. at 13-14. 9
8F
Prior to Bruen, Maryland’s “may-issue” licensing regime required applicants for a
permit to carry a handgun to show that they had “good and substantial reason to wear,
carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit [was] necessary as a
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.” In re Rounds, 255 Md. App. 205, 210
(2022) (quoting Md. Ann. Code, Pub. Safety (“PS”) § 5-306(a)(6)(ii)). Maryland courts
had interpreted this requirement to mean that an applicant “must demonstrate having
received actual threats or assaults” to qualify for a permit. Id. at 210-11. After Bruen, this
Court held that the “good and substantial reason” requirement of PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) was
unconstitutional. Id. at 212.
In 2023, the General Assembly amended PS § 5-306 to remove the “good and
substantial reason” requirement, effective October 1, 2023. 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 651. 10 9F
Maryland is now a “shall issue” state, and its citizens are authorized to obtain a concealed
carry permit provided that they are 21 years of age or a member of the uniformed services,
do not have any disqualifying offenses or mental disorders, do not have a substance abuse
disorder, have successfully completed a firearms training course, and “based on an
9
One state, Vermont, had no permit requirement for the concealed carry of guns.
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13 n.1. As discussed, infra, since Bruen was decided, other states now
have no permit requirement for concealed carrying of guns.
10
As indicated, the seizure here took place on July 5, 2023, after Bruen, but prior to
the effective date of the new licensing scheme. Neither party argues that fact is significant
to the resolution of this appeal.
14
investigation . . . ha[ve] not exhibited a propensity for violence or instability that may
reasonably render the person’s possession of a handgun a danger to the person or to
another.” PS § 5-306(a). Applicants must also show that they are “not otherwise prohibited
by State or federal law from purchasing or possessing a handgun.” Id. § 5-306(a)(10)(ii). 11 10F
With this background in mind, we now turn to the issues presented on appeal. 12 11F
II.
Initial Encounter
Appellant first challenges the initial encounter. There are three categories of police-
citizen encounters: an arrest, an investigatory stop, and a consensual encounter. Trott, 473
Md. at 255. An officer is free to ask questions to persons on the street in a consensual
encounter without any suspicion of criminal activity, but in that situation, the person has a
“right to ignore the police and go about his business.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
125 (2000); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
11
In Bruen, Justice Kavanaugh stated in his concurring opinion that “[n]othing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” 597 U.S. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008)).
“Properly interpreted, the Second Amendment allows a ‘variety’ of gun regulations.” Id.
12
Appellant did not challenge the constitutionality of Maryland’s statute in his
initial brief. Although he stated in a footnote in his reply brief that he was adopting
arguments in other cases pending before the Court that the statute was unconstitutional, we
will not address this argument. See Gazunis v. Foster, 400 Md. 541, 554 (2007) (we
generally do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief).
15
Here, the encounter between appellee and the police was not consensual; there is no
dispute that appellant was seized when the police stopped him and placed him in handcuffs.
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (A “seizure” of a person under the Fourth
Amendment occurs when police conduct communicates “to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (a seizure occurs when a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains that person’s freedom to walk away); Norman v. State, 452 Md.
373, 386-87 (a seizure is “any nonconsensual detention”), cert denied, 583 U.S. 829
(2017).
The initial dispute here involves the type of seizure involved and whether it was
justified by the requisite level of suspicion. There are two types of seizures that implicate
the Fourth Amendment: (1) an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause; and (2)
an investigatory stop, or a Terry stop, named after the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Norman,
452 Md. at 387. Accord Kopp v. State, No. 34, Sept. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1469044, at
*6 (Md. May 26, 2026); Trott, 473 Md. at 255-56.
We need not determine here whether the initial encounter constituted an arrest
requiring probable cause. As we shall explain below, we agree with appellant that, even if
the initial encounter was an investigatory stop, a lesser intrusion, it was unconstitutional
because the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop appellant.
16
A.
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
Pursuant to Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, a law enforcement officer may stop an individual
if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity.
Accord Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”). “Generally, an officer has reasonable
suspicion to conduct a stop when there is ‘a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Trott, 473 Md. at 256
(quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014)). The Supreme Court of
Maryland has explained the standard, as follows:
[R]easonable suspicion is a common sense, nontechnical conception that
considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and
prudent people act. While the level of required suspicion is less than that
required by the probable cause standard, reasonable suspicion nevertheless
embraces something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.
Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 543 (2016) (quoting Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 507
(2009)).
The reasonable suspicion standard “does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). There are circumstances
where “wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam). Accord United States v.
Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 2013). An officer may not, however, merely assert
17
that innocent conduct was suspicious. See State v. Stone, 493 Md. at 110. Rather, he or
she “must explain how the observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other
circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting
Crosby, 408 Md. at 508). Accord Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 459 (2013) (officer must
have reasonable suspicion “that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime” to conduct an investigatory stop). An investigatory stop may last
only as long as necessary to confirm or dispel an officer’s suspicions. Elliott v. State, 417
Md. 413, 429 n.3 (2010).
B.
Evidence to Suspect Criminal Activity
Before addressing reasonable suspicion in the context of gun possession, we address
three cases issued by the Supreme Court of Maryland that analyzed whether the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop a person based on conduct or circumstances that could be
criminal in some circumstances, but not criminal in other circumstances. The first case is
State v. Williams, 401 Md. 676 (2007), where the Supreme Court of Maryland considered
whether the police properly stopped a vehicle based on suspicion that the tinting of the
vehicle’s rear window was in violation of the statutory requirement that post-manufacture
window tinting permit light transmittance of at least 35%. The officer testified that he
stopped the vehicle because the window was darker than normal. Id. at 680. The Court
held that this evidence was insufficient to give the officer reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle because the law permitted tinting that blocked 65% of the light, and the officer did
not have reasonable suspicion that the window was not in compliance with the statutory
18
requirement. Id. at 691-92. The Court rejected the State’s argument that any tinted window
could justify a stop, stating that this “would effectively strip away Fourth Amendment
protection for any person driving or owning a car with tinted windows.” Id. at 692. To
justify a stop for a tinting violation based on an officer’s observation, the officer must
credibly articulate why the officer believed the tinting was illegal. Id. See also Turkes v.
State, 199 Md. App 96, 116 (2011) (stop lawful based on officer’s belief that tinting was
in excess of the permissible tint level).
In the second case, In re D.D., 479 Md. 206, 216-17 (2022), the Court addressed
whether the odor of marijuana, by itself, provided reasonable suspicion justifying an
investigatory detention. Id. at 216. Although prior cases had held that it did, see e.g.
Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 409 (2017), in D.D. the Court was required to address,
similar to this case, the impact of a change in the law on the reasonable suspicion analysis.
In re D.D., 479 Md. at 215. Prior to 2014, marijuana possession in any amount was illegal.
Id. at 224. In 2014, the General Assembly decriminalized possession of less than 10 grams
of marijuana. Id. at 215. Possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana remained a civil
offense, however, punishable by fines and other remedies, and therefore, it was still illegal.
Id.
In addressing the issue, the Court began by noting that it held in Lewis v. State, 470
Md. 1, 27 (2020), that the odor of marijuana on a person, by itself, did not provide probable
cause to believe that the person was in possession of a criminal amount of the drug to
authorize an arrest of the person. In re D.D., 479 Md. at 215. In declining to extend its
holding in Lewis to Terry stops, the Court noted that the encounter with D.D. was different,
19
and “the limited nature of a brief investigative stop does not demand a standard as stringent
as probable cause.” Id. at 230 (quoting Crosby, 408 Md. at 506). Although the odor of
marijuana does not reveal the quantity of marijuana potentially held by a person, and
therefore, it did not give the police probable cause to arrest, the odor was not irrelevant
because it provided evidence of a crime. Id. at 234-35. The Court recognized that there
could be innocent reasons that a person smelled of marijuana, but it noted that innocent
conduct can amount to reasonable suspicion. Id. at 235. It held that, “although the quantum
of evidence that the odor of marijuana provides is insufficient to justify an arrest based on
the probable cause standard, it meets the reasonable suspicion standard necessary to justify
a brief investigatory detention.” Id.
In reaching its decision that the odor of marijuana gave the police reasonable
suspicion to stop a person, the Court stated that it declined to “significantly hamper the
legitimate investigation of criminal activity in Maryland.” Id. at 238. It stated that “law
enforcement officers do not need to rule out innocent explanations for suspicious conduct
before conducting a Terry stop,” and “[g]iven the important governmental interest in
detecting, preventing, and prosecuting crime, the Fourth Amendment allows a brief seizure,
based on reasonable suspicion, to attempt to determine whether criminal activity is afoot.”
Id.
The Court acknowledged that, in some instances, an individual may be stopped
based on non-criminal behavior, stating:
When a police officer smells marijuana on someone, it is certainly the case
that the person may possess less than 10 grams of marijuana or they may
possess no marijuana at all. But it also is possible that the person is presently
20
in possession of 10 or more grams of marijuana. Under [the defendant’s]
reasoning, police officers would be powerless to conduct a brief investigatory
detention to try to determine which category the person is in. That is not
what the Fourth Amendment requires. To the contrary, the odor of marijuana
permits an officer to briefly detain an individual to investigate whether that
person has committed a criminal offense.
Id. 13
12F
In the third case, Stone, 493 Md. at 130, the Supreme Court of Maryland, in a 4-3
decision, held that its “holding in D.D. and discussion of the reasonable suspicion standard
was tied to the unique situation posed by the odor of marijuana.” In Stone, the Court
addressed whether an officer’s observation of the defendant manipulating a mobile phone
while his vehicle was in motion constituted reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.
Id. at 96. In holding that it did not, the Court noted that it is illegal, while operating a motor
vehicle, to use a device for certain purposes, such as texting, but it is permissible to use a
In 2022, after the decision in In re D.D., 479 Md. 206 (2022), Maryland voters
13
approved a constitutional amendment permitting the use and possession of cannabis by an
individual 21 years of age or older. See Kelly v. State, 262 Md. App. 295, 305 (2024). That
same year, the General Assembly enacted legislation legalizing the use and possession of
a “personal use amount” of cannabis. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) §§ 5-601, 5-101
(2025 Supp.). The General Assembly then enacted section 1-211 of the Criminal Procedure
Article, which prohibits law enforcement from stopping or searching a person based solely
on the odor of marijuana. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. (“CP”) § 1-211 (2025 Repl. Vol.).
The legislature’s decision to prohibit by statute stops based solely on the odor of marijuana
may have “effectively overruled” or “superseded” the decision in D.D., see State v. Stone,
493 Md. 78, 133(2026); Cutchember v. State, 493 Md. 187, 195 (2026). As the dissent in
Stone noted, however, the General Assembly does not have the authority to overrule the
“Court’s decisions on constitutional matters,” and the legislature’s policy decision to
prohibit by statute investigatory stops based solely on the odor of marijuana does not have
any effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at *33 (Gould, J., dissenting). Accord
York v. City of Burlington, 225 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (rejecting argument
that arrest in violation of state law necessarily implicated violation of Fourth Amendment
rights).
21
device for other purposes, such as contacting a 9-1-1 system. Id. at 84. The Court held
that, although the defendant “may have been engaged in conduct that was indicative of
either lawful or unlawful activity,” the officers did not identify any facts to support the
determination that “there was an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that he had
committed or was committing a traffic violation.” Id. at 126. It stated that, “where conduct
observed by a police officer is consistent with” lawful or unlawful activity, the police are
justified in conducting an investigatory stop only if they are “able to credibly identify
specific facts, not applicable to a substantial portion of the general law-abiding public,
‘which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’” reasonably establish that
a crime is occurring. Id. at 87.
In distinguishing D.D., the Court stated that D.D. did not “stand for the proposition
that any time officers observe that a person has engaged in behavior that appears to be
either completely innocent or innocuous conduct that could be indicative of lawful or
unlawful behavior, officers have reasonable suspicion to stop the person to resolve any
ambiguity as to the type of conduct the person has engaged in.” Id. at 129. As indicated,
the Court stated that its holding in D.D. addressed the unique situation posed by marijuana
odor, which “remained indicative of criminal behavior,” but the “premise of an
investigatory stop being generally permissible to clarify any ambiguity with respect to a
police officer’s observations as to whether a person is or is not engaged in unlawful activity
was not discussed or even mentioned in D.D.” Id. at 131. With that background in mind,
we address reasonable suspicion in the context of possession of a gun.
22
C.
Reasonable Suspicion Based on Gun Possession
To determine whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that a
person was involved in criminal activity, we must look to the law alleged to be implicated.
Section 4-203(a)(1) of the Criminal Law Article states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person may not:
(i) wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about
the person;
(ii) wear, carry, or knowingly transport a handgun, whether concealed or open,
in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used by the public,
highway, waterway, or airway of the State;
(iii) violate item (i) or (ii) . . . while on public school property in the State;
(iv) violate item (i) or (ii) . . . with the deliberate purpose of injuring or killing
another person; or
(v) violate item (i) or (ii) . . . with a handgun loaded with ammunition.
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 4-203(a)(1) (2025 Supp.). There are, however,
numerous circumstances where handgun possession is not illegal, and those circumstances
are set forth in CR § 4-203(b). 14 The relevant circumstance here is “the wearing, carrying,
13F
14
CR § 4-203(b) provides that § 4-203(a) does not prohibit wearing, carrying, or
transporting of a handgun (1) in relation to the official duties of law enforcement,
correctional officers, or members of the armed forces; (2) for permit holders; (3) while in
transport to a retailer, repair shop, or between residences; (4) in connection with an
organized military or sport shooting event, target practice, or certain state-sponsored
classes; (5) by a gun collector to an exhibition; (6) at an individual’s privately-owned or
leased residence or business; (7) by an authorized supervisory employee; (8) for use as a
distress signal on waterways; or (9) during surrender pursuant to court order.
23
or transporting of a handgun by a person to whom a permit . . . has been issued.” CR § 4-
203(b)(2).
Here, the police stopped appellant when Detective Ramsey saw a gun “printing” on
appellant’s shirt. A police stop based on reasonable suspicion that a person is in possession
of a gun has consistently been upheld by the Maryland appellate courts as a proper Terry
stop. See State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 463, 469 (1997) (investigatory detention permissible
where officer observed the defendant place an object believed to be a handgun in the back
waistband of his pants); Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 434 (1990) (stop and frisk was
constitutionally permissibly because officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion that
defendant was unlawfully carrying a handgun based on a reliable tip); Allen v. State, 85
Md. App. 657, 667-68 (investigatory stop permissible where officer had reasonable
articulable suspicion that defendant was armed based on a tip and that the area was a known
high crime area), cert. denied, 323 Md. 1 (1991). See also Russell v. State, 138 Md. App.
638, 653 (2001) (officer had reasonable suspicion to continue detention after traffic stop
based on concealment of suspected handgun in defendant’s pocket), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 368 Md. 43 (2002).
At the time these decisions were issued, Maryland had a “may issue” licensing
scheme. In re Rounds, 255 Md. App. at 210. To prove the crime of wear, carry, or transport
a handgun, the State merely had to prove possession of a gun, and the defendant had the
option to raise, as “an affirmative defense to the ‘wearing, carrying or transporting’ of a
handgun prohibition,” that the defendant had a permit. See Brogden v. State, 384 Md. 631,
642-44 (2005).
24
Prior to Bruen, other courts held that, when it was presumptively unlawful under
state law to carry a firearm, with exceptions including when an individual had a permit, a
police officer with reasonable suspicion to believe that a person had a gun could conduct a
Terry stop to determine the legality of the gun possession. For example, in United States
v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 488 (10th Cir. 2013), the court held that an officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant based on the officer’s observation of
a handgun tucked in the defendant’s waistband at a convenience store. The court held that,
because New Mexico’s statute provided that carrying a concealed weapon was
presumptively unlawful, subject to exceptions including possession of a handgun license,
the officer could detain the defendant based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Id. at 489. It concluded that the exceptions in the law did not negate the officer’s
“reasonable suspicion that [the defendant’s] possession of a concealed handgun was
unlawful.” Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374, 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 562
U.S. 1015 (2010), the court held that, under Delaware law, “carrying a concealed handgun
is a crime to which possessing a valid license is an affirmative defense, and an officer can
presume a subject’s possession is not lawful until proven otherwise.” The court stated that
“it is presumed in Delaware that concealed handgun bearers are violating the law,” and that
“[a] suspect might later offer a license as an affirmative defense does not affect” the
reasonable suspicion analysis under Terry. Id. at 379. Accord United States v. Pope, 910
F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 2018) (reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk defendant with
handgun in waistband because, under Iowa law, it is “presumptively criminal” to carry a
25
concealed weapon “until the suspect comes forward with a permit”), cert. denied, 589 U.S.
931 (2019); United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (concealed
handgun established reasonable suspicion where permit was affirmative defense to crime
of handgun possession under Florida law).
Appellant contends, however, that this analysis changed after Bruen, where the
United States Supreme Court held that gun possession is not only lawful, but it is a
protected constitutional right. Appellant argues that, post-Bruen, gun possession “can no
longer, on its own as in this case, constitute reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot.” He
asserts that “what constitutes reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity must
necessarily change as the law changes what conduct is illegal.” Appellant argues that the
police here did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him when he was “merely walking
up the street in broad daylight with a concealed firearm,” which is “broadly permissible
under Maryland’s ‘shall-issue’ licensing regime.”
The State contends that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop of appellant. It argues that the analysis of whether reasonable suspicion
to believe a person is in possession of a gun justifies an investigatory stop depends on “each
State’s substantive criminal law, not Bruen.” 15
14F
15
We agree with the State to some extent, i.e., that the substantive criminal law in
each state is important to the Fourth Amendment analysis. In states where it is lawful to
carry a firearm without a permit, either openly or concealed, courts have held that a Terry
stop based on mere possession of a firearm is not lawful. For example, in United States v.
Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013), where North Carolina permitted individuals to
openly carry firearms without a permit, N.C. Gen. State § 14-415.11, the court held that
“the exercise of this right, without more, cannot justify an investigatory detention.” Other
26
The State argued in its brief that Bruen did not alter the Fourth Amendment analysis
in Maryland because, in this State, unlike other states, carrying a handgun is presumptively
unlawful and becomes lawful only under certain exceptions, including possession of a
permit. The State asserts that presumptions governing the legality of handgun possession
“turn on each State’s substantive criminal law, not Bruen.” It contends that, under the legal
standard for reasonable suspicion, “an officer need not know that a suspect carrying a
handgun doesn’t possess a valid permit to investigate that very fact.”
As appellant notes, “post-Bruen, jurisprudence on the intersection of the Second and
Fourth Amendment protections is in its infancy.” Nevertheless, reported opinions that have
addressed the issue presented here post-Bruen, and have analyzed Bruen in a holding
regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion, have concluded, as appellant argues, that
possession of a gun, without more, does not provide reasonable suspicion authorizing a
stop. 16
15F
courts similarly have held that when a state has a permitless carry law, a Terry stop is not
permitted based on mere possession of a firearm. For example, in Northrup v. City of
Toledo Police Department, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (6th Cir. 2015), the Court held that,
because Ohio did not regulate the open carry of firearms under Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9.68(C)(1), officers had no reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the
openly visible handgun holstered on his hip. Similarly, based on Arizona law that allowed
individuals to carry firearms openly or concealed without a permit, see Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-3102, the court in State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 411 (Ariz. 2014), held that the
State did not present evidence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify a seizure based solely on the defendant’s admission that he had a weapon.
The analysis is different in Maryland because it is a crime to possess a gun without a
license.
As appellant notes, at least one state took this position pre-Bruen. In
16
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 936-37 (Pa.), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1117 (2019),
27
For example, in United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647, 655-56 (5th Cir. 2025), the
court addressed a Terry stop in the context of Louisiana’s law, which, similar to Maryland,
prohibited possession of a concealed firearm, but the prohibition did not apply to a person
with a valid permit. The court rejected the district court’s determination that this statute
made possession of a firearm presumptively unlawful, justifying a Terry stop for anyone
carrying a firearm. Id. at 656. It reasoned that a per se presumption of illegality was
inconsistent with the Constitution’s history and tradition, inconsistent with the Terry
doctrine, which requires individualized suspicion and does not include a firearm exception,
and inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment generally, which does not allow for
suspicionless searches to combat general crime. Id. at 656-57. It noted that a “mere
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a police officer may not infer criminal activity
merely from a person’s possession of a concealed firearm, which was legal with a permit
under 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 6105-06. The court held that, “[u]nless a police officer has prior
knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted to carry a concealed firearm, and
absent articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a firearm is being used or
intended to be used in a criminal matter, there simply is no justification for the conclusion
that the mere possession of a firearm, where it lawfully may be carried, is alone suggestive
of criminal activity.” Id. at 937. The court stated: “When many people are licensed to do
something, and violate no law by doing that thing, common sense dictates that the police
officer cannot assume that any given person doing it is breaking the law. Absent some
other circumstances giving rise to a suspicion of criminality, a seizure upon that basis alone
is unreasonable.” Id. at 945. See also United States v. Willy, 40 F.4th 1074, 1080 (9th Cir.
2022) (concluding, one month after Bruen but without citing that case, that because
Washington allowed open carry and was a “shall issue” state for a concealed carry permit,
possession of a gun did not support a Terry stop).
28
possibility of unlawful use of a gun is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.” Id.
at 657 (quoting United States v. Watson, 900 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2018)). 17 16F
The court said that a “per se presumption of illegality would have untenable
consequences in other areas.” Id. at 658. It compared gun licenses to driver’s licenses,
noting that “driving a car without a license is unlawful in every State,” yet the United States
Supreme Court had held that stopping a vehicle to verify compliance with license and
registration requirements, without “articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered,” violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). 18 The court stated that “officers
17F
cannot assume that citizens engaging in an activity subject to licensing are unlicensed.” Id.
Citing Bruen, the court stated that “the Constitution’s prohibition on presuming
illegality should be stronger for gun owners than for car drivers” because the right to carry
17
The court rejected the holding of some courts, and the position advocated by the
State here, that a presumption of illegality could be inferred in states where a permit to
carry was an affirmative defense at trial. United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647, 655-56
(5th Cir. 2025). It noted that the issue of who had the burden to prove a particular element
was a matter of state trial procedure, not Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 657-58. See
also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 943-44 (Pa.), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1117
(2019) (rejecting argument that seizure is permissible if a license is an affirmative defense
as opposed to an element of the offense, stating that, although the legislature can define the
elements of a crime, it cannot limit the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
18
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court held that, except in situations where there was “reasonable suspicion that a motorist
is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant
is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining
the driver in order to check the driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
29
a handgun is protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 659. Regardless
of how a state’s permitting scheme was set up, possession of a gun was “presumptively
lawful, nationwide,” and police could not rely on a presumption that carrying a firearm was
unlawful to justify a Terry stop. Id. 19
18F
Similarly, in People v. Dorsey, 266 N.E.3d 1209, 1219 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025), the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that “the mere possibility that anyone with a gun might not
have a valid license is not enough to justify” a Terry stop. The court concluded that, in a
jurisdiction such as Illinois, where “carrying a firearm in public is permitted with a
license,” an individual’s possession of a gun alone “is nothing more than the exercise of a
protected constitutional right [and] cannot automatically subject a citizen to police
detention.” Id. at 1218-19. It noted that officers could, in a consensual encounter, verify
the status of a citizen’s licensure. Id. at 1219. Alternatively, they could conduct an
investigatory stop if there were specific and articulable reasons to believe the citizen did
not have a valid license or was “otherwise implicated in imminent criminal activity.” Id.
The “mere possibility that anyone with a gun might not have a valid license,” however,
was not enough to justify a seizure. Id. For that, the police had to have specific and
articulable reasons to believe that this person, observed in these circumstances, did not
have a valid license – or that he was “otherwise implicated in imminent criminal activity.”
Id. Accord United States v. Jones, 708 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1375 (N. D. Ill. 2023) (mere
19
The court ultimately upheld the Terry stop based on the totality of the
circumstances, including the defendant’s involvement with a fugitive and his proximity to
known criminal activity. Id. at 660.
30
possession of handgun, without further evidence of criminality, is not enough to show
reasonable suspicion).
In United States v. Daniels, 101 F.4th 770, 778 (10th Cir. 2024), the Tenth Circuit
held that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based solely on
an anonymous tip that three men had guns and looked like they were “getting ready to do
something.” Noting that the tip did not allege any criminal activity or dangerous behavior,
the court stated that, “if we are to take seriously the normative thrust of . . . [Bruen], then
we cannot look with suspicion on citizens presumably exercising their Second Amendment
rights in a lawful way.” Id. at 778. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court
held the officer’s detention of the defendant was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 784.
To be sure, there have been a few courts that have stated in reported opinions after
Bruen that the police have the authority to stop a person to investigate whether the
individual with a handgun has a lawful permit. Those statements, however, in the cases
cited to us, have been made either in dicta, without analysis, or without citation to Bruen.
For example, in United States v. Libertad, 681 F. Supp. 3d 102, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y.
2023), aff’d on other grounds, United States v. Vereen, 152 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2025), the
court noted that courts had “long affirmed that reasonable suspicion that a person is
carrying a gun suffices to support a brief Terry stop.” The court initially acknowledged
that, post-Bruen, it was “hard to say that suspicion or even knowledge that someone is
carrying a gun constitutes suspicion or knowledge of criminal activity.” Id. at 116. It then
stated that this specific question was not before the court because the stop there occurred
31
prior to Bruen, when New York still had a highly restrictive licensing scheme limiting a
person’s ability to obtain a license to carry a firearm outside the home. Id. The court held
that, because the stop was prior to Bruen, there was reasonable suspicion of unlawful
activity. Id. Nevertheless, the court went on to state, in dicta, that it doubted that, even
after Bruen, the police could not stop someone carrying a gun and verify that the person
was doing so lawfully. Id. at 116-17.
In United States v. Homer, 715 F. Supp. 3d. 413, 421 (E.D.N.Y.), reconsideration
denied in relevant part, 2024 WL 1533919 (2024), the court held that there was no
probable cause to arrest a defendant who officers observed sitting in a vehicle known to
be used for gang activity and placing a handgun in his pants pocket without “firearm
discipline.” The court noted that, under the stricken “proper cause licensing regime” prior
to Bruen, where it was difficult to obtain a firearm license, it was reasonable for the police
to believe that a person in possession of a gun was committing a crime. Id. at 419. After
Bruen, however, the New York legislature amended the firearm licensing regime to make
gun licenses for firearms “significantly more accessible.” Id. At that point, the “licensing
exception that police could have reasonably disregarded before Bruen was substantially
broadened so that police can no longer reasonably assess whether a person was committing
a crime without taking the exception into account.” Id. The court held that, to establish
probable cause after Bruen, the police “must point to facts in the lead up to the arrest that
indicate to the arresting officer, based on his experience and expertise, that [the defendant]
did not have a license to carry the firearm.” Id. at 420.
32
The court went on to note, however, in dicta, that the officers had other options after
Bruen. It stated, without analysis, that “[e]ven after Bruen, police officers have reasonable
suspicion to justify a Terry stop when seeing someone they suspect has a gun.” Id. at 422.
The court stated that the officer could have stopped Homer and “conducted a Terry frisk to
remove the gun while they determined, after running [a] license check, whether there was
probable cause to arrest [the defendant].” Id. It stated that a Terry stop provides the police
“the tools to ensure that they protect the right of the public to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures while preventing the unlawful possession and carrying of firearms.”
Id. 20
19F
We have carefully reviewed the cases in other jurisdictions, the holding in Bruen,
597 U.S. at 17, 32 that the Constitution “presumptively protects” gun possession, and the
decisions by the Maryland Supreme Court in Stone, 493 Md. at 88, and Williams, 401 Md.
at 692. Based on this review, we hold that, post-Bruen, reasonable suspicion to believe
that a person is carrying a gun, by itself, no longer justifies a Terry stop.
Our colleagues filing concurrences have discussed the danger posed by guns. Hicks
v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, No. 634, Sept. Term 2024 (filed June 4, 2026) (Berger,
On motion for reconsideration, the court declined to reconsider its opinion based
20
on an affidavit that showed that the number of concealed carry licenses did not
meaningfully increase between the date of the Bruen decision and the date of Homer’s
arrest eight months later. United States v. Homer, No. 23-CR-86, 2024 WL 1533919, at
*10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2024), appeal withdrawn, 2024 WL 4556459 (2d Cir. 2024). In
addition to the Government’s failure to timely present the affidavit, the court noted that the
probable cause inquiry was “incapable of precise definition or quantification into
percentages,” and reducing the probable cause determination to an exact formulaic
equation was not permitted. Id. at *11 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371
(2003)).
33
Friedman, and Shaw, JJ., concurring), slip op. at 12-13 n.6, 26-28 (Joint Concurring
Opinion); Hicks v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, No. 634, Sept. Term 2024 (filed June 4, 2026)
(Leahy, J., concurring), slip op. at 12 (Leahy Concurring Opinion). We agree that guns
can be dangerous, a concern echoed by the United States Supreme Court when Terry was
decided in 1968. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (concealed weapons
can “create an immediate and severe danger for the public”).
Since the time of Terry, however, there have been major changes in the law with
respect to possession of firearms. In 1968, when Terry was decided, the law of Ohio, the
state at issue in Terry, made it a crime to possess a concealed firearm, with an exception
only for law enforcement. Id. at 4 n.1. Thus, it was probable that a person on the street
who was not in law enforcement was committing a crime if they possessed a gun in public.
Similarly, in Maryland at the time, the possession of a dangerous weapon concealed or
openly with the intent to injure was a crime, with exceptions for officers of the government
and persons carrying weapons “as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”
Md. Code, Art. 27, § 36(a) & (b) (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.). See State v. Crawford, 308 Md.
683, 693 (1987).
States subsequently created more exceptions to the crime of possession of a gun,
including for those who obtained licenses. Maryland added that exception in 1969. Md.
Code, Art. 27, § 36(a) & (b) (1957, 1969 Cum. Supp.). 21 Based on this statutory scheme,
20F
21
In 1972, the General Assembly enacted more stringent regulation of handguns
based on the large increase in crimes committed with handguns. State v. Crawford, 308
Md. 683, 693-94 (1987).
34
possession of a handgun was presumptively illegal, and having a permit was an affirmative
defense. See Brogden, 384 Md. at 642-43. Accordingly, the Maryland appellate courts
consistently held that reasonable suspicion that a person was in possession of a concealed
weapon justified an investigatory stop.
In Bruen, however, the United States Supreme Court changed the legal landscape.
After Bruen, carrying a handgun publicly for self-defense is presumptively lawful. See
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 32 (where Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s
conduct, such as carrying a handgun publicly for self-defense, “the Constitution
presumptively protects that conduct”); Wilson, 143 F.4th at 659 (after Bruen, possession
of a gun is “presumptively lawful nationwide”); see also Commonwealth v. Guardado, 206
N.E. 3d 512, 522 (Mass.) (indicating that a statute that presumes criminality from
constitutionally protected conduct is unconstitutional), vacated in part on other grounds,
220 N.E. 3d 102 (2023), cert denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024); Higbie v. James, 795
F.Supp.3d 307, 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[R]egardless of how States’ permitting schemes
are set up, keeping and bearing arms is presumptively lawful nationwide.”) (quoting
Wilson, 143 F.4th at 659). Without a presumption of illegality, mere possession of a
handgun is not, by itself, indicative of criminal activity that justifies an investigatory stop.
To be sure, this holding is a big change in the law. Arguably, it is not a positive
change, to the extent that it limits the ability of the police to thwart danger to the public. 22
21F
22
As we explain below, however, and as Judge Nazarian further explains in his
concurring opinion, see Hicks v. State, Md. App. No.634, Sept. Term 2024 (filed
June 4, 2026) (Nazarian, J., concurring), slip op. at 2-5, the practical effect of the opinion
35
Nevertheless, our holding that mere possession of a handgun, by itself, does not
provide reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop is, in our view, compelled by Bruen.
And it is consistent with the Supreme Court of Maryland’s holding in Stone that, “where
conduct observed by a police officer is consistent with” lawful or unlawful activity, the
police are justified in conducting an investigatory stop only if they are “able to credibly
identify specific facts, not applicable to a substantial portion of the general law-abiding
public, ‘which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’” reasonably
establish that a crime is occurring. Stone, 493 Md. at 87 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
Accord Williams, 401 Md. at 692 (to justify a stop for illegal window tinting, the officer
must credibly articulate why the officer believed the tinting was illegal). See also Prouse,
440 U.S. at 663 (unless there is a particularized suspicion that a driver is unlicensed,
officers are prohibited from stopping drivers solely to ensure compliance with licensing
and registration laws).
Our holding does not, however, leave the police powerless. As indicated, the police
are permitted to engage in a consensual encounter with an individual; they can approach
someone and ask if they have a license. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J. concurring)
(“There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets.”).
may not be as far-reaching as some predict. It does require, however, that the police
identify factors that indicate that the person is possessing a firearm illegally before
conducting a Terry stop.
36
Moreover, if there are circumstances, in addition to the possession of a firearm, that
give the police reason to suspect that the person is possessing the gun illegally, or otherwise
is involved with criminal activity, the police lawfully can stop the person. The mere
possibility, however, that a person with a gun might not have a valid license, or may
otherwise be restricted from possessing a gun, is not enough, by itself, to justify a seizure.
To justify a stop based on possession of a gun, the police must have reasonable suspicion
that the person is possessing the gun illegally. 23
22F
In this case, the police did not testify that they believed that appellant was possessing
the gun illegally, and no argument was made to the suppression court to that effect. The
case was presented below as a stop justified solely on the possession of a gun, and it was
presented in the briefs on appeal the same way. That is the argument that we have
addressed, and it is the basis for our conclusion that the stop was unconstitutional.
23
As provided in Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (“PS”) § 5-133(b) (2025 Supp.), a
person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) has been convicted of a
disqualifying crime; (2) has been convicted of a common law crime and received a term of
imprisonment of more than 2 years; (3) has been convicted of impermissibly providing
access of a loaded firearm to a minor; (4) is on probation after conviction of a crime
punishable by 1 year or more, for violation a protective order, or for driving while impaired;
(5) is a fugitive; (6) is a habitual drunkard; (7) is addicted to a controlled dangerous
substance or is a habitual user; (8) suffers from certain mental disorders and has a history
of violent behavior against another person; (9) has been found incompetent to stand trial;
(10) has been found not criminally responsible; (11) has been voluntarily admitted for more
than 30 days or to a mental health facility; (12) has been involuntarily committed to a
mental health facility; (13) is under the protection of a court-appointed guardian unrelated
to a physical disability; (14) is subject to a civil protective order; or (15) is under the age
of 30 and has been adjudicated delinquent for an act that would be a disqualifying crime if
committed by an adult. With certain exceptions, a person under the age of 21 may not
possess a regulated firearm. PS § 5-133(d).
37
D.
Concurring Opinions
The Joint Concurring Opinion asserts that the Court should not consider the issue
presented below and in the briefs to this Court because the State could have argued other
reasons that the police had reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop. We have several
responses to this assertion.
Initially, we note that the decision to address grounds not raised below is, as the
Joint Concurring Opinion acknowledges, a discretionary decision. See State v. Bell, 334
Md. 178, 187-88 (1994). We decline to exercise our discretion here. The parties on appeal
addressed this case as presenting the question whether Bruen changed the conclusion
reached in Maryland in previous cases, i.e., that possession of a gun, by itself, provided
reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. This is an important issue that needs to be
resolved; we have had several other cases, in addition to this one, that have raised the issue.
The issue will continue to present itself, and the police need to know what they are
permitted to do under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, a majority of the Court voted to
take the unusual step of hearing this issue in banc. 24 One could wonder why we would do
23F
that and then decline to consider the issue.
Moreover, even if we were inclined to avoid the issue raised below and in the briefs
on appeal, which we are not, we are not convinced that the record was developed
24
The last time this Court heard a case in banc was 14 years ago. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Ford, 204 Md. App. 1 (2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 433 Md. 426 (2013).
38
sufficiently to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Although we will not discuss
each fact listed by the concurrences, we note that we have already discussed the blading
testimony, supra at pp. 4-5, n.4. To the extent that there is a suggestion that a gun alone
gives rise to reasonable suspicion or diminishes the quantum of other factors needed for
reasonable suspicion, we note that the United States Supreme Court has rejected “a public
safety and firearm exception to Terry’s reasonable suspicion analysis.” United States v.
Mitchell, 796 F. Supp.3d 1357 (2025) (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
Possession of gun, after Bruen, justifies a Terry stop only if there is reasonable suspicion
that the gun is being possessed illegally or the person is otherwise engaged in criminal
activity.
Although there may be an argument in a future case that a stop is justified based on
PS § 5-307(b)(1), which requires that a person with a permit carry the gun concealed, this
argument was not raised in this case by the parties below or on appeal, presumably because
the statute was not effective until October 1, 2023, after the July 5, 2023 stop here. If the
statute is raised as a justification for a stop in a future case, the issue of what constitutes a
violation of that statute, including the exception for a momentary and inadvertent exposure
of the imprint of a handgun, see PS § 5-307(b)(2), can be litigated. That, however, is not
an issue presented here, and it is not, in our view, a reason not to address the issue that was
presented.
39
E.
Conclusion
In sum, Bruen substantially changed the legal landscape in holding that a person has
a protected right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home. Although the
Maryland appellate courts have, for decades, upheld police stops based on reasonable
suspicion that a person is in possession of a gun, after Bruen, carrying a handgun publicly
for self-defense is presumptively lawful, and therefore, mere possession of a concealed
firearm, by itself, is not indicative of criminal activity. The mere possibility that a person
with a gun might not have a valid license or otherwise may be restricted from possessing a
gun is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a seizure. The police must have
reasonable suspicion that the person is possessing the gun illegally or otherwise engaged
in criminal activity. Because the officers here stopped appellant based solely on his
possession of a gun, without reasonable suspicion that he was possessing the gun illegally
or otherwise involved in criminal activity, they did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
him. 25
24F The stop, therefore, violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizures.
The concurring opinions discuss Maryland’s policy decisions to protect the public
25
from the threat of handguns, as well as the provisions of CR § 4-206(a)(1)(i)-(ii), which
authorizes an officer “to both stop and conduct a limited frisk of a person when the police
officer ‘reasonably believes that’ the person ‘may be wearing, carrying, or transporting a
handgun’ and that ‘because the person possesses a handgun, the person is or presently may
be dangerous to the officer or to others.’ CR § 4-206(a)(1)(i)-(ii).” Joint Concurring
Opinion at 26-27; Leahy Concurring Opinion at 4-7. As the dissent in Stone explained,
however, the legislature’s policy decisions regarding appropriate police conduct does not
have any effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. State v. Stone, 493 Md. 78, 140-41
(2026) (Gould, J., dissenting).
40
III.
Terry Frisk
Because there is an argument that there were sufficient facts to support a stop, and
neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court of Maryland have weighed
in on the requirements for the police to stop a person possessing a gun after Bruen, we will
go on to address the propriety of the frisk. As an alternate holding, we hold that, even if
the stop was reasonable, the frisk was improper.
Appellant makes two arguments in support of his contention that the frisk was
improper. First, he argues that the frisk was improper at its inception because there was no
reason to believe that he was dangerous. Second, he asserts that the police exceeded the
scope of a proper frisk. As explained below, we disagree with the first argument but agree
with the second argument.
A.
Armed and Dangerous
Appellant contends that the court erred in finding that the frisk was justified because
the police lacked reasonable suspicion that appellant was dangerous. He asserts that
presuming a suspect is dangerous “from the exercise of a protected right and lawful activity
is illogical and inconsistent with Bruen,” and there were no other circumstances indicating
that he was dangerous. Appellant notes that the record shows that he was compliant with
the officers’ orders, never reached for his gun, did not act suspiciously, and offered to show
the officers his permit.
41
The State contends that the “same reasonable suspicion that justified the
investigatory stop also justified the frisk.” It argues that the “absence of affirmative
testimony about the officers’ subjective concern for their safety [did not] invalidate the
frisk” because the “‘armed and dangerous’ standard is unitary,” and “reasonable suspicion
that a person is armed is per se a reasonable suspicion that the person is dangerous,
warranting a frisk for weapons.”
“During a Terry stop, for the sake of the safety of the law enforcement officer and
others, a law enforcement officer may frisk a person who the law enforcement officer has
reason to believe is armed and dangerous.” Norman, 452 Md. at 387. The purpose of a
Terry frisk is to protect “the officer making the stop.” Smith, 265 Md. App. at 103 (quoting
Lockard v. State, 247 Md. App. 90, 102 (2020)). Accord Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 368
(2010) (purpose of Terry frisk is to “protect the police officer and bystanders from harm
by checking for weapons”); Ames v. State, 231 Md. App. 662, 674 (2017) (purpose of Terry
frisk is to assure officers “that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 23). As the State correctly notes, the test “is objective: the validity of the stop or frisk is
not determined by the subjective or articulated reasons of the officer; rather, the validity of
the stop or frisk is determined by whether the record discloses articulable objective facts
42
to support the stop or frisk.” In re D.D., 479 Md. at 243 (quoting Sellman v. State, 449
Md. 526, 542 (2016)). 26
25F
The United States Supreme Court has treated the Terry “armed and dangerous” test
as a unitary standard, which links the terms armed and dangerous and permits a frisk when
a person is armed. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (“[A] reasonably prudent man would have
been warranted in believing petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer’s
safety.”) (emphasis added); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (per
curiam) (bulge in jacket permitted officer to conclude that defendant “was armed and thus
posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer”) (emphasis added).
At least one federal circuit court has interpreted Terry and Mimms as “deliberately
link[ing] ‘armed’ and ‘dangerous,’ recognizing that the frisks in those cases were lawful
because the stops were valid and the officer reasonably believed that the person stopped
‘was armed and thus’ dangerous.” United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc). The Robinson court noted that “[i]t was thus [defendant’s] status of being
armed during a forced police encounter . . . that posed the danger justifying the frisk.” Id.
But cf. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dept., 785 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (6th Cir. 2015)
(Terry requires a finding that an individual is “armed and dangerous” before a stop and
26
Although the test is objective, Officer Ramsey specifically testified regarding
concerns for safety, stating that appellant’s hands were secured “[p]rimarily because,
obviously, training, officer safety, if I can secure his hands, he can’t get to the firearm in
his waistband.” He also testified that, when he asked appellant to raise his arms, appellant
“didn’t raise them” and appellant’s “right hand [wa]s in close proximity to where [he]
observed the firearm.”
43
frisk is permitted, and allowing Terry stops and searches based solely on possession of a
handgun “would effectively eliminate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed
persons,” particularly in states that have “decided its citizens may be entrusted with
firearms on public streets”). Accord State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014) (Terry
“involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be ‘armed and presently dangerous’”).
Appellant contends, however, that this line of reasoning does not survive post-
Bruen. He asserts that “[p]resuming danger[ ] from the exercise of a protected right and a
lawful activity is illogical and inconsistent with Bruen.” We disagree.
To be sure, after Bruen, there undoubtedly are more people in Maryland with
permits to carry a concealed handgun. Nevertheless, Bruen did not indicate that a
constitutional right to bear arms changes the Fourth Amendment law that, when the police
stop a person believed to be armed, they can conduct a brief frisk for their safety. The
United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that a frisk might not
be warranted if the suspect is carrying the gun legally. In Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, the
Court explained:
[A] frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or
not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law. So long
as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe
that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search
limited in scope to this protective purpose.[ 27]
26F
27
In Connecticut, the state where the stop occurred, citizens were permitted to carry
weapons, openly or concealed, if they had a permit. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44
Accord Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983) (Supreme Court has “expressly
rejected the view that the validity of a Terry [frisk] depends on whether the weapon is
possessed in accordance with state law”).
Here, the circuit court, in rejecting appellant’s argument, relied on the risk to police
officers. It stated that officers cannot “risk their safety and . . . the safety of others in the
community” based on an individual’s unconfirmed declaration that he has a permit for a
weapon. Moreover, even with a permit, an individual with a weapon can still pose a danger
to the police, himself, and the public in general because, at any moment, an armed person
could “just start shooting everyone.”
This Court similarly stated, in Sizer, 230 Md. App. at 651, that, because a Terry
frisk is predicated on “an officer’s fear for his own safety when confronting a suspect who
the officer reasonably believes may be armed or dangerous[, a] suspect with a licensed
handgun is just as dangerously armed as is a suspect with an unlicensed handgun.” Id. at
651. We further explained:
Licensed handguns shoot bullets that are just as deadly as are those from
unlicensed handguns. A permit to carry a handgun would no more vitiate the
need for a frisk than would the suspect’s promise not to shoot anybody with
it. Even if the stopee had his permit to carry a handgun pinned to the front of
his shirt and even if the officer read it before conducting the frisk, that would
in no way eliminate or even diminish the need for the frisk. Indeed, it would
enhance the need. Per se illegality is simply not a requirement for the
reasonable articulable suspicion to support a Terry frisk.
Id.
The Supreme Court of Maryland agreed that, after an officer has been informed that
a suspect is armed with a weapon, there is reasonable suspicion to frisk him. Sizer, 456
45
Md. at 374. Other courts similarly agree that a gun is a “dangerous weapon,” and officers
are permitted to frisk armed suspects regardless of the potential legality of the possession
“to pursue their investigation without fear of violence.” Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 491 (“We
will not deny an officer making a lawful investigatory stop the ability to protect himself
from an armed suspect whose propensities are unknown.”); Robinson, 846 F.3d at 701
(“[T]he legality of the frisk does not depend on the illegality of the firearm’s possession.”).
Nothing in Bruen changes the rationale of these cases, which hold that an officer
may conduct a limited Terry frisk for officer safety when a suspect is armed. Here, there
is no dispute that appellant was armed with a handgun, which the officers observed printing
in his waistband. If there had been a proper stop, the police had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a brief frisk for weapons.
B.
Scope of Frisk
Appellant contends, however, that even if a frisk was justified, Detective Rodriguez
exceeded the scope of the pat-down by putting his hands in appellant’s pockets and cross-
body bag. He contends that these actions exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk.
Appellant asserts that the State could not satisfy its burden of proof under the plain view
and plain feel doctrines because Detective Rodriguez was not called to testify. The State
disagrees. 28 It contends that the court’s findings that Detective Rodriguez lawfully seized
27F
28
The State contends that appellant did not preserve his challenge to the frisk,
asserting that appellant did not raise the scope of the frisk as an issue at the suppression
hearing. Based on the record, we conclude that appellant sufficiently raised the issue that
46
the second handgun and the cocaine through the plain sight and plain feel doctrines was
supported by the body-worn camera footage. 29 2 F
A Terry frisk “‘is limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing’ and its purpose is ‘not
to discover evidence of a crime, but rather to protect the police officer and bystanders from
harm by checking for weapons.’” Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 543 (2016) (quoting
Bailey, 412 Md. at 368). Accord McDowell v. State, 407 Md. 327, 338 (2009) (officer can
pat down bags to determine presence of weapon); Jordan v. State, 72 Md. App. 528, 536-
37 (1987) (pat down of bag reasonable where officer believed it contained a gun). An
officer “may not exceed the limited scope of a patdown for weapons to search for
contraband.” Bailey, 412 Md. at 369. “General exploratory searches are not permitted
[pursuant to Terry], and police officer must distinguish between the need to protect
themselves and the desire to uncover incriminating evidence.” Id. (quoting In re David S.,
367 Md. at 545).
Here, the police exceeded the scope of a limited pat-down. The State does not argue
to the contrary. Detective Rodriguez reached into appellant’s bag and pulled out the gun,
the officers exceeded the scope of their authority by searching appellant instead of patting
him down.
29
The State also relies on the statement of probable cause. Although that was shown
to the trial judge, it was not admitted into evidence. Appellant contends, and the record
appears to confirm, that it was shown to the judge early in the proceeding in the context of
potentially reaching a plea. Because the statement of probable cause was not admitted into
evidence, we will not consider it. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 457 (2012)
(appellate review of a suppression motion “is limited to the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing”); Hicks v. State, 268 Md. App. 1, 7 n.1 (2025) (declining to consider
written impoundment policy not admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing).
47
and he reached into appellant’s pocket and pulled out the cocaine. “[A] more intrusive
Terry frisk may be constitutionally permissible in the rare instance where a police officer
is unable to perform an effective pat-down.” State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 466 (1997).
Thus, in Adams, 407 U.S. at 144-45, where the officer had information that appellant had
a gun concealed at his waist and asked the suspect to open the car door, but Adams instead
lowered the window, the officer was unable to conduct a pat-down, and it was reasonable
for the officer to reach into the car and seize the gun from Adams’ waistband to ensure his
safety. Smith, 345 Md. at 466.
As the Supreme Court of Maryland has explained:
When a container is subjected to a more intrusive search in lieu of a pat-
down, the State can sustain its burden of proof that the search was reasonable
either by having the officer explain why it was necessary to conduct that
search or by demonstrating from the container itself that a pat-down would
not have revealed the presence or absence of a weapon.
McDowell, 407 Md. at 341. In that case, the Court held that the search of a bag was
unreasonable where the officer “offered no explanation for why a pat-down would not have
sufficed.” Id. Similarly, here, there was no testimony that a pat down of the bag and the
pocket was not sufficient to determine if appellant was armed and dangerous.
The State argues that Detective Rodriguez “lawfully seized the second handgun in
[appellant]’s ‘open’ satchel through the plain-sight doctrine, and the cocaine in his front
pants pocket through the ‘plain feel’ doctrine, respectively.” The plain view doctrine
requires three elements to be met: “(1) the officer must be lawfully ‘at the place from
which the evidence could be plainly viewed’; (2) the ‘incriminating character’ of the item
in question must be ‘immediately apparent’; and (3) the officer ‘must also have a lawful
48
right of access to the object itself.’” McCraken v. State, 429 Md. 507, 516 (2012) (quoting
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)). “Immediately apparent” means an
officer, upon observing the item, has probable cause to believe the “item in question is
evidence of a crime or is contraband.” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323
(1987)).
The rationale of the plain view doctrine applies equally to situations where law
enforcement “discovers contraband or evidence of a crime through a sense of touch.” Id.
The Court has explained the plain feel doctrine, as follows:
[I]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and
feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately
apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that
already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is
contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same
practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.
Id. at 517 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993)).
The State bears the burden of proving all three elements of the plain view/plain feel
doctrine. Coomes v. State, 74 Md. App. 377, 387, cert. denied, 313 Md. 8 (1988). Accord
Martin v. State, 267 Md. App. 556, 594 (2025). “[I]f, upon our independent constitutional
reflective review of the evidence . . . we determine that the State failed to prove any one of
the . . . requirements of the plain view doctrine, reversal of the denial of the motion to
suppress is mandated.” Coomes, 74 Md. App. at 387-88.
In Coomes, 74 Md. App. at 384, the defendant was convicted of drug offenses after
the police, executing a search warrant that authorized a search of Coomes’ home for a black
handgun, found drugs. The State argued that the seizure was justified under the plain view
49
doctrine. Id. at 384-85. Because the officers who seized the items did not testify, and the
officer who did testify was unable to testify that the items were found in plain view, the
State could not rely on the plain view doctrine. Id. at 388-89. Moreover, “there was no
evidence produced from which the court could have concluded that the seizing officers, by
reason of their training and experience, had probable cause to believe that the items seized
were marijuana and paraphernalia,” and therefore, there was no evidence that it was
“readily apparent” to the officers that the items were contraband. Id. at 389-90.
Accordingly, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable
cause based on the plain view doctrine. Id. at 389. See also United States v. Kiyuyung,
171 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d. 1999) (government did not meet burden under plain view doctrine
where officer who discovered gun in plain view did not testify); United States v. Davis,
565 F. Supp. 2d 841, 870 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (government did not establish that the drugs
pulled out from appellant’s pockets were properly seized under the plain feel doctrine).
Here, Detective Ramsey was the only witness for the State. He testified that he did
not personally perform “any kind of pat down,” did not find the second gun, and did not
feel the “trash cans” in appellant’s left pocket. Rather, he testified that “[o]nce it was
recovered, yes, I saw the CDS.” Detective Rodriguez, who conducted the pat down and
found the second gun and the cocaine, did not testify.
The circuit court stated that Detective Rodriguez saw something in appellant’s open
bag, “put his hand in, and then he immediately took his hand out, waited, and said we got
a weapon . . . ‘We got a firearm inside the bag.’” Detective Rodriguez, however, did not
50
testify to that effect, and there was no evidence regarding what, if anything, Detective
Rodriguez observed in the bag prior to reaching into it and then taking the gun. 30
29F
Similarly, there was not sufficient evidence that the drugs pulled out from
appellant’s pockets were properly seized under the plain feel doctrine. To be sure, the
body-worn camera footage shows Detective Rodriguez patting down appellant. There was
no testimony, however, that based on what Detective Rodriguez felt during this pat-down,
he knew that there were illegal drugs contained therein. The State failed to show, as was
its burden, that, based on a limited pat-down frisk, it was immediately apparent to Detective
Rodriguez that the pocket contained contraband.
Based on the record here, the State failed to meet its burden of proving the plain
view and plain feel doctrines applied to justify the seizure of the drugs and the gun in the
satchel. The court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the CDS and the second
handgun discovered during the frisk.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
30
The State asserts that the court’s findings are supported by the body-worn camera
footage. It provides no specific cite to the footage, however, and our review of the footage
does not indicate what exactly Detective Rodriguez saw in the open pocket of the satchel.
The video does not sustain the State’s burden of proof here.
51
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 123209008
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 634
September Term, 2024
_________________________________
IN BANC
_________________________________
STEVEN HICKS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_________________________________
Wells, C.J.,
Graeff,
Berger,
Nazarian,
Arthur,
Leahy,
Reed,
Friedman,
Shaw,
Zic,
Ripken,
Tang,
Albright,
Kehoe, S.,
JJ.
_________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Berger, J.,
Friedman, J., and Shaw, J.
_________________________________
Filed: June 4, 2026
We concur in the judgment that the frisk exceeded constitutional limits and that the
motion to suppress should have been granted. We write separately, with respect for our
colleagues in the majority, because we would have reached that conclusion by a different
and shorter path—one that did not require engaging the Second Amendment at all.
The majority’s analysis moves through a long sequence of difficult questions. We
see each of those questions differently, and at each stage, our reading would have resolved
the case without going further. We set out those disagreements in order, from the narrowest
ground to the broadest, in the hope that the progression itself illuminates why we think the
constitutional question was never necessary.
We begin with a review of the record under the correct standard. The majority
applies a standard of review we cannot join, and applying what we believe to be the right
one reveals three additional facts that, considered together with the visible imprint of the
weapon, establish reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. That would
have ended the case.
If the majority is right about the standard of review, or if the additional facts are not
enough, we would then address Bruen. The language in Bruen on which the majority relies
is, in our reading, dicta. We do not think Bruen disturbed Maryland’s established Terry
stop framework, and we would not have reached the Second Amendment on that basis.
If the majority is right that Bruen applies as it holds, we would explain why brief
stops to verify permit status and to protect officer safety while doing so, remain permissible
under the Fourth Amendment. And if that analysis is also mistaken, Maryland’s statutory
scheme—which continues to treat public handgun carry as presumptively unlawful, with
the permit functioning as an affirmative defense—would support the stop under existing
law.
All of which brings us to the point of agreement: the frisk went too far. Whatever
justified the stop, the search that followed exceeded the limits the Fourth Amendment
imposes. That conclusion was available at the outset, without any of the analysis the
majority undertakes. We would have stopped there.
I.
A. Totality of the Circumstances: Standard of Review
The suppression record contains additional facts—undisputed and legally
significant—that independently establish reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances. To explain why we may consider them, we turn first to the standard of
review, which both authorizes our consideration of the full record and tells us how to read
it when the suppression court’s findings are incomplete.
We respectfully disagree with the majority that the visibility of Hicks’s handgun is
the only fact that we may consider in determining whether the police had reasonable
suspicion to stop him. The majority considers the gun and omits three additional facts in
the suppression record: (1) Hicks walked away from police upon seeing the unmarked
police vehicle; (2) he bladed his body as he crossed behind the unmarked vehicle; and
(3) his hand was in close proximity to the handgun when officers approached. In addition,
the majority omits relevant context: the officers’ awareness of a recent homicide in the
area. The majority concludes that because the State argued before the suppression court
2
that the stop was permitted on the basis of the gun alone, these additional circumstances
are unavailable as a basis for affirmance. Majority Opinion at 38.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Davis
v. State, 426 Md. 211, 219 (2012). Our review “is limited to the record developed at the
suppression hearing.” Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682, 694 (2017). Although we accept the
suppression court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, where “a party has
raised a constitutional challenge to a search or seizure, we must make an independent
constitutional evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts
and circumstances of the case.” Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 14-15 (2016) (citing State v.
Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002)) (emphasis added). Grant requires us to apply the law
to the full factual record before the suppression court.
The question at a suppression hearing is not the officers’ subjective beliefs at the
moment they initiated the stop. Instead, the reasonable suspicion standard is objective.
Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 112 (2003) (Raker, J., concurring) (“The reasonable,
articulable suspicion standard is an objective standard, not a subjective one, and does not
hinge upon the subjective belief of an officer.”). The question is whether the articulable
facts known to the officers would lead a reasonable person to believe the stop was justified.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (“it is imperative that the facts be judged against
an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or search” create reasonable suspicion); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 384 (1999). The
officers’ state of mind—their hunches, assumptions, personal understanding of the law—
3
is beside the point. This is not a technicality. The objectivity of the standard is what gives
the Fourth Amendment its content. A rule keyed to the officers’ subjective understanding
would provide no meaningful check on police conduct, because it would allow the legality
of a stop to turn on whatever the officer happened to think, reasonable or not.
We acknowledge that before the suppression court, the parties focused their
arguments on the officers’ observation of Hicks’s visible carry of a handgun, and the circuit
court, in turn, rested its reasonable suspicion ruling on that same observation. But in our
independent constitutional evaluation of the case, we should not be foreclosed from
considering additional facts presented to the suppression court that neither the parties nor
the suppression court expressly relied upon. Indeed, our cases recognize that, so long as
the suppression record contains sufficient evidence to do so, we have discretion to affirm
the suppression court’s decision on an alternate basis. Martin v. State, 267 Md. App. 556,
574 (2025) (citing Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 103 (2008); Powell v. State, 139 Md. App.
582, 589-90 (2001)). We do not interpret the State’s focus on Hicks’s issue as a waiver of
other issues.
Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., writing for this Court in Morris v. State, articulated
what he called a “supplemental rule of interpretation”: where the suppression court’s fact-
finding is ambiguous, incomplete, or nonexistent on a particular point, the appellate court
does not treat that silence as rejection; rather, it fills that gap by crediting, from among the
facts in the suppression record, the version of events most favorable to the prevailing party.
153 Md. App. 480, 489-90 (2003); see also Turkes v. State, 199 Md. App. 96, 113 (2011);
4
State v. Funkhouser, 140 Md. App. 696, 704 (2001); Charity v. State, 132 Md. App. 598,
606 (2000).
The Supreme Court of Maryland, presented with the question in Grant, declined to
formally adopt the Morris framework, but left its status at this Court undisturbed. 1 The 30F
Supreme Court has never restricted this Court’s application of the Morris rule. 449 Md. at
31 n.8; see, e.g., State v. Ofori, 170 Md. App. 211, 216-18, cert. denied, 396 Md. 13 (2006)
(where the suppression court “raced straight to its unadorned constitutional conclusion,”
this Court applied the supplemental rule and credited the State as prevailing party). 2
31F
Our cases also reflect the Morris principle without calling it the supplemental rule,
and caution that the facts may not be in dispute and must be adequately shown in the record.
See Sutton v. FedFirst Fin. Corp., 226 Md. App. 46, 74 (2015) (stating that this Court may
1
At oral argument, Hicks’s counsel suggested that the Supreme Court rejected the
supplemental rule in Brown v. State, 452 Md. 196 (2017). But the Supreme Court did not
address the rule in Brown because the issue was moot. Id. at 208. There, the suppression
court had failed to make any findings of fact about whether the defendant was in custody
before receiving Miranda warnings, and the case turned on the admissibility of statements
he made before receiving his Miranda rights. Id. at 200, 207-08. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the suppression court to make findings regarding whether the
defendant was in custody during the relevant timeframe, id., at 207-08, and then
incorporated and considered the suppression court’s supplemental findings of fact in its
opinion. Id. at 203-08. In the instant case, there is no need to remand to the suppression
court because the court did make a finding: the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Hicks after observing the imprint of a handgun in his waistband.
2
The Supreme Court of Maryland itself has affirmed on grounds broader than those
relied upon by the courts below. For example, in Thomas v. State, the suppression court
rested its custody finding solely “on the bases that Thomas was at the police station and
that he later confessed.” 429 Md. 246, 261 (2012). Rather than confine its analysis to those
factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from
Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression
court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62.
5
“affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even
one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”)
(quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v.
State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citations omitted) (“Where, however, there is no
dispute regarding the relevant facts, or if the trial court’s resolution of an essential fact is
implicit in its ruling, then no express findings are necessary.”). Grant requires us to
consider the full record; Morris tells us how to read it when the suppression court’s findings
are incomplete. Both principles apply here.
The majority contends that the State did not rely on the additional facts below and
did not develop them as independent bases for the stop. 3 We acknowledge the point but
32F
reach a different conclusion. No case limits this Court to considering only the facts counsel
raised in argument before the suppression court. And even treating consideration of the
additional facts as a supplemental argument—rather than an independent basis for
affirmance—our decisional law permits us to consider more detailed arguments than those
previously offered by the parties. See Est. of Brown v. Ward, 261 Md. App. 385, 442-43
(2024); Schiff v. State, 254 Md. App. 509, 528 (2022) (citations omitted).
As noted, appellate courts have discretion to affirm on alternate grounds, and we
would exercise that discretion here. In State v. Bell, the Supreme Court of Maryland
3
Prior to closing arguments, defense counsel did not raise the argument that law
enforcement’s observation of a person openly carrying a handgun no longer establishes
reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop after Bruen. The State’s focus on the gun
imprint as a factual predicate to support the subject Terry stop, therefore, was not
unreasonable. See Leahy, J. Concurring Opinion, at 15 n.14.
6
clarified that such discretion is not a mandate “that an appellate court must examine new,
alternative grounds for upholding a trial court’s decision”; rather, “it may do so if it deems
such review appropriate.” 334 Md. 178, 187-88 (1994) (citing Robeson v. State, 285 Md.
498, 501-04 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980)). We would deem it appropriate.
The only limitation on that discretion arises when one party’s failure to raise an argument
below prejudices the other party. That concern is not present here, especially where the
defense raised its Bruen argument after the State put on its case. See Bell, 334 Md. at 191
(declining to address the State’s argument first raised on appeal because the omission was
prejudicial to the defendant at trial).
In this case, the State was responding below and on appeal to Hicks’s
gun-plus-zero-factors argument to defeat his suppression motion under Bruen.
Accordingly, this case is not a good vehicle to consider consequential issues involving the
viability of Maryland’s handgun licensing laws under this intersection of the Second and
Fourth Amendments that Hicks proposes. 4 Even if the State and the suppression court did
33F
4
The historical development and practical operation of Maryland’s handgun
licensing regime make it even more difficult to determine whether Maryland has, in
substance, regulated concealed carry, open carry, or a hybrid of the two. Historical sources
trace the divergence between open-carry and concealed-carry regimes to
nineteenth-century regulatory traditions. Early American jurisdictions generally tolerated
the open wearing of arms—often associated with militia service and frontier norms—while
treating concealed weapons as uniquely dangerous because they facilitated surprise attacks,
dueling, and interpersonal violence. See, e.g., Bruen, 597 U.S. at 47-48, 53-54 (identifying
that prohibitions on concealed carry, but not on open carry, were common in the early
United States); Saul Cornell, The Persistence of Common Law Limits on Armed Travel in
the Early Republic: Surety and Affray Laws in Historical Context, 78 SMU L. REV. 343,
358 (2025); Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home:
History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 20-27, 40 n.213
7
not rely on all the facts in the record, the facts are the facts—they remain part of the record
and must be considered in our independent constitutional appraisal. Doing so allows us to
resolve this case on narrower ground: whether the stop and frisk of Hicks was permissible
under Terry, without reaching the broader constitutional questions Hicks urges upon us.
See 392 U.S. at 21-22. Courts do not decide constitutional questions unnecessarily. See
(2012). Many Southern and Western states therefore adopted statutes permitting open carry
while prohibiting concealed carry, but eventually permitted both forms of carry. Maryland
initially followed this national norm, but then diverged. Beginning in the late nineteenth
century, Maryland prohibited concealed carry but permitted open carry so long as the
carrier did not do so with the intent to cause harm. 1886 Md. Laws ch. 375. But in 1972,
Maryland adopted a licensing model that set it apart from the majority of states. Maryland
conditioned public carry on individualized authorization. See 1972 Md. Laws ch. 13.
Absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, Maryland’s regulatory agencies and courts
have consistently interpreted the permit as authorizing only concealed carry, reflecting a
longstanding legislative judgment that visible weapons in public pose heightened risks to
public order and law-enforcement operations. See McCloud v. Dep’t of State Police,
Handgun Permit Rev. Bd., 426 Md. 473, 476, 485 (2012); Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100,
105-06 (1978) (referring to the permit regime as a concealed carry permit). This scheme is
familiar to some of our sister states. See, e.g., Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra
Incognita” of Concealed Carry Laws, U. ILL. L. REV. 910, 926 (2015) (states such as
Illinois and New York prohibit open carry but permit concealed carry). Thus, Maryland’s
handgun permitting regime, as interpreted by our regulatory agencies and courts,
demonstrates a long-standing tradition of treating concealment as the required mode of
civilian carry and views visible weapons—including printing—as inconsistent with the
authorization granted by the handgun carry permit. The laws and regulations governing
these permits, however, did not clearly distinguish between open and concealed carry. 1972
Md. Laws ch. 13, 42 (“Nothing in this section shall prevent the wearing, carrying, or
transporting of a handgun by any person to whom a permit to wear, carry, or transport any
such weapon has been issued under Section 36E.”). That ambiguity has now been
eliminated. In 2023, the General Assembly adopted PS § 5-307, which—effective October
1, 2023, too late to apply to Hicks—codified Maryland as a concealed-carry jurisdiction
by requiring that any handgun carried under a permit be carried “in a concealed manner.”
This statutory clarification also materially reduces the stakes of resolving the constitutional
question on Hicks’s facts: because visible printing would now constitute improper carry,
PS § 5-307(b)(1), the factual scenario presented in this case cannot recur under the current
statute, diminishing any need for a constitutional holding directed at that now-superseded
ambiguity.
8
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Maryland State Bd. of Elections v. Ambridge, 489 Md. 404, 456 (2025); Sumpter v.
Sumpter, 436 Md. 74, 91-92 (2013) (citations omitted).
We, therefore, turn to the facts as the suppression record presents them—the facts
the State did not develop below, but which were before the suppression court and thus are
now before us.
B. The Totality of the Circumstances: Handgun Plus Three Additional Facts
As we explained above, the Morris supplemental rule permits us to credit the
version of the undisputed facts most favorable to the prevailing party. Morris, 153 Md.
App. at 489-90. Our duty to make our own constitutional appraisal of the stop and frisk
requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances in evidence, not merely the subset
the suppression court expressly addressed or on which the State’s argument focused. See
Grant, 449 Md. at 14-15.
Applying that standard, the record contains three factors, each well-recognized by
courts as potentially contributing to reasonable suspicion. Together with the officers’
awareness of a recent homicide in the area, the handgun visible to ordinary observation,
plus the three additional factors, establish reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances. Those three factors are: (1) Hicks’s movement away upon spotting the
police vehicle; (2) his blading maneuver; and (3) the proximity of his hand to the firearm.
The officers’ awareness of a recent homicide in the area, while not a behavioral factor,
provides relevant context for assessing the officers’ observations. And critically, these
observations occurred after the officers saw a handgun visible to ordinary observation.
9
Walking away. When Hicks saw the unmarked police vehicle, he turned and began
walking away from the group. 5 We treat this factor with care. Courts have recognized that
34F
movement away upon noticing police may, in some circumstances, contribute to a
reasonable suspicion analysis. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000). But
walking away is not flight, and it is not inherently suspicious. There are many reasons—
entirely innocent, entirely understandable—why a person might choose to disengage from
an encounter with an unmarked police vehicle. We do not rest heavily on this factor. We
note it only because it is in the record, it is part of the totality, and—combined with
everything else the officers observed—it must be part of the calculus.
Blading. As the police officers drove alongside Hicks, he bladed his body—turning
sideways and crossing directly behind the unmarked vehicle. Detective Ramsey identified
this in his testimony but did not elaborate on its significance. The State did not develop the
point. Nevertheless, the blading appears momentarily through the side-view mirror of the
police vehicle which was captured on the body-worn camera footage, and its significance
is supplied by the objective record and the law rather than by the officer’s explanation.
5
The fact that the police vehicle was unmarked does not change our analysis.
Although Hicks, had he been unaware that the unmarked vehicle was in fact a police
vehicle, may have had no reason to walk away that would be indicative of criminal activity,
a mere possibility of non-criminal activity does not negate his walking away as a factor.
Indeed, the totality of the circumstances test assesses whether factors, which may appear
non-criminal in isolation, combine to generate reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S.119, 125 (2000). Moreover, we cannot question what Hicks might have known.
The Terry inquiry does not address the subjective beliefs of the person stopped. It begins
and ends as an objective inquiry into the facts and circumstances known to the officer. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. The officers observed Hicks walk away from their unmarked
vehicle, which, in combination with the other factors, aroused their reasonable suspicion.
10
Courts have recognized that blading—positioning or moving the body to conceal an object
from police view—is a factor that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion calculus,
particularly when observed by a trained officer in conjunction with other indicators of
armed carry. Booker v. State, 267 Md. App. 315, 330 (2025) (citing Reid v. State, 428 Md.
289, 320 (2012) (Harrell, J., dissenting)) (discussing significance of “blading”). Detective
Ramsey was a member of the Group Violence Unit. Whatever his testimony did not supply,
the body-worn camera footage does.
Hand proximity. When Detective Ramsey approached, Hicks’s right hand was in
close proximity to the location of the handgun in his waistband. The U.S. Supreme Court
has long recognized that a suspect’s positioning of a hand near a suspected weapon is a
factor bearing on reasonable suspicion. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
Maryland courts have similarly treated hand proximity to a suspected weapon as an
articulable fact supporting reasonable suspicion. See Booker, 267 Md. App. at 328; In re
Jeremy P., 197 Md. App. 1, 13-14 (2011). Detective Ramsey testified to this specifically,
and the body-worn camera footage corroborates it. Hicks’s other hand held a cellphone—
leaving one hand unaccounted for and in the immediate vicinity of the firearm.
Considered in isolation, each of these factors is consistent with innocent behavior.
A person may walk away from police without consciousness of guilt. A person may blade
their body for any number of reasons. A person’s hand may drift near their waist without a
sinister purpose. Terry does not require that any single factor be dispositive, or that
innocent explanations be ruled out before a stop may proceed. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125;
In re D.D., 479 Md. 206, 235 (2022). What Terry requires is that the police officer be able
11
to point to specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
* * *
The majority holds that the stop was unlawful because the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion. We disagree. The totality of the circumstances was more than sufficient. 6 The
35F
6
Courts have identified a wide range of factors that may contribute to reasonable
articulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, each of which describes
conduct that is independently lawful. Physical indicators include a bulge in clothing
consistent with a weapon, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977); concealment
of an object in a pocket or waistband, United States v. Dameron, 103 F.4th 467, 468-69
(7th Cir. 2024); unnatural hand postures suggesting a reflexive adjustment of an object,
United States v. Weaver, 9 F.4th 129, 147 (2d Cir. 2021); and hand postures inside a pocket
suggesting that an object was “cupped,” United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir.
2008). Behavioral indicators include unprovoked flight upon seeing police, Wardlow, 528
U.S. at 124; nervous or evasive conduct, id.; “blading” or turning the body to shield an
object from view, Booker, 267 Md. App. at 320, 330; walking away from a group or
changing direction upon noticing police, United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 495
(5th Cir. 2020); reaching toward or keeping a hand near a waistband, In re Jeremy P., 197
Md. App. at 18-19; bending unnaturally to reach into an open bag large enough to contain
a weapon, McDowell v. State, 407 Md. 327, 338 (2009); the “target glance,” characterized
by a quick look at an area containing contraband or weapons, United States v. Pavao, 134
F.4th 649, 652 (1st Cir. 2025); “mechanical” or forced civility, such as unnatural waving
or forced friendliness, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002); repetitive pacing
on a sidewalk, Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 28; prolonged staring into a store window, id.; vague
or contradictory travel narratives, United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir.
2010); and appearing to be out of place or wearing attire inappropriate to the weather,
United States v. Scott, 816 F. App’x 732, 737 (3d Cir. 2020). Tipster information includes
a reliable tip that a person is carrying a gun, Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 436 (1990); an
anonymous 911 call with sufficient corroboration, Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393,
398 (2014); a wanted flyer issued on reasonable suspicion, United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 232 (1985); and resemblance to a recent crime suspect, Cartnail v. State, 359
Md. 272, 297-94 (2000). Contextual factors include presence in a known high-crime area,
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; presence at a location known for drug trafficking, Allen v. State,
85 Md. App. 657, 667-68 (1991); time of day, particularly late night or early morning
hours, Cartnail, 359 Md. at 295-96; proximity to a recently reported crime scene, Stokes v.
State, 362 Md. 407, 417 (2001); and prior criminal history or active supervision status
12
police officers saw a visible handgun, a person who walked away upon eye contact with
the unmarked police vehicle, bladed his body as they drew close, and held his free hand
near the firearm—all against the backdrop of their awareness of a recent homicide in the
area. In our view, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Hicks.
Section II addresses a separate and independent disagreement: even accepting the
majority’s premise that the gun is the only permissible consideration, we disagree with the
majority’s constitutional analysis.
II.
Even if we agreed with the majority that the handgun is the only factor that we can
consider here for the stop, we disagree with the majority’s holding that the stop was
unconstitutional. The majority holds that the stop that produced the contraband at issue was
unconstitutional in light of Bruen because Hicks was carrying a handgun pursuant to a valid
permit. We disagree, because the language in Bruen on which the majority relies is dicta,
and Terry remains binding law that we are not free to disregard.
known to the police officer, United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2004).
Police officer experience and training—including familiarity with the neighborhood and
recognition of conduct consistent with known criminal patterns—independently contribute
to the calculus. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989); United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Each of these factors describes conduct that is entirely lawful in
isolation. Every factor on this list is not merely lawful—it is necessarily lawful. If any of
these acts were themselves criminal, there would be no need for a Terry stop—the police
officer would have probable cause to arrest. The reasonable suspicion inquiry exists
precisely because the conduct observed is lawful but suspicious. That is the situation here.
If gun possession is to be distinguished from the factors on this list, the distinction cuts the
wrong way for the majority: a handgun is the one item on this list that is designed for
lethality and capable of being turned to that purpose in an instant. That characteristic is
precisely what Terry’s frisk authority was designed to address. It is a reason for more
deference to the police officer’s safety judgment, not less.
13
Bruen’s holding is narrow, though its consequences were not. The U.S. Supreme
Court struck down New York’s proper-cause requirement for public handgun carry
licenses, concluding that the Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens
to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 9-11. The reach
of that holding was immediate and significant—Maryland’s own permit statute, which
imposed a similar showing-of-need requirement, fell along with New York’s as a direct
consequence. The General Assembly subsequently replaced the permit statute with one that
did not demand the applicant’s assertion of a special need. 7 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 651.
36F
Bruen’s holding thus did substantial work without this Court holding that it alters Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The broader language about the nature and scope of public
handgun carry rights—the language the majority now treats as restructuring Fourth
Amendment stop-and-frisk doctrine—was not necessary to accomplish any of that. It is
dicta. We are bound by the Supreme Court’s holdings. We are not bound by its dicta, and
we should be especially reluctant to treat dicta as controlling when doing so requires us to
override an established doctrine like Terry that the Supreme Court itself has never
questioned.
Bruen was written with considerable rhetorical ambition, repeatedly invoking the
image of the law-abiding citizen exercising a fundamental right and deploying expansive
language about the scope of the right to public handgun carrying that went well beyond
7
The statutory amendments to Maryland’s wear and carry permit regime did not
take effect until October 1, 2023. Hicks was arrested in July 2023. This temporal gap is
irrelevant because, as we discuss infra, Maryland abandoned the substantial need
requirement in its permitting scheme in 2022, immediately following Bruen.
14
what the New York licensing question required. Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, was necessary to the majority and cautioned against overbroad
readings of Bruen—writing that licensing regulations, like the one police enforced when
they stopped Hicks, remain enforceable. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S.
680 (2024), echoed Justice Kavanaugh’s caution and reflected a measured pulling back
from some of the exuberance in Bruen’s majority opinion. Rahimi clarified that the Bruen
test was not meant to trap the law “in amber,” softened the historical analogy requirement
from “distinctly similar” to “relevantly similar,” and stepped back from the “responsible
citizen” framing that Bruen had employed freely—acknowledging that the term had not
been carefully defined and did not do the constitutional work that Bruen had suggested.
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691-92. Eight of nine Justices joined Rahimi, a breadth of agreement
that suggests Bruen’s most expansive readings—readings which Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurrence had already cautioned against—had not commanded a durable majority even
within the Court that decided it. The Supreme Court of Maryland reached a similar
conclusion in Fooks v. State, 490 Md. 458 (2025), which described Rahimi as having
“refocused” the Bruen test on principles rather than on the search for specific historical
analogues. Fooks, 490 Md. at 487 n.12. That the majority here reaches for Bruen’s most
expansive language—language that Rahimi itself moderated—to override a fifty-year-old
Fourth Amendment holding is reason enough for caution.
15
That Bruen’s holding is narrow has not been a controversial proposition in this State.
The Supreme Court of Maryland recently examined Bruen’s scope in Fooks, and
characterized Bruen’s own assurances about shall-issue licensing regimes as dicta—
language that was not necessary to the Court’s disposition of the New York licensing
question before it. Fooks, 490 Md. at 493. What was true of Bruen’s assurances about
licensing is equally true of its broader language about the right to public carrying of a
handgun. As Justice Biran observed in dissent in Fooks, “a formula repeated in dictum but
never the basis for judgment is not owed stare decisis weight.” Id. at 550 (Biran, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
At bottom, Bruen is a case about handgun permit laws, not about the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court in Bruen never mentioned the issue presented here. Its
holding addressed whether New York could condition the issuance of handgun carry
permits on a showing of special need for self-defense. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 9. It said nothing
about whether the Fourth Amendment permits a Terry stop of a person observed carrying
a handgun. In this Fourth Amendment case, Bruen compels nothing.
Most critically, the General Assembly agrees with our view. After Bruen, the
General Assembly received advice from the Attorney General on Bruen’s limited reach
and acted as if the rest of the licensing scheme remains in force.
To situate the State’s post-Bruen actions, we begin with the statutory architecture
that existed before Bruen and continues to exist today. Maryland has, for decades,
employed a stable two-part structure: a general prohibition on carrying handguns in public,
16
and a permitting system that creates narrow exceptions to that prohibition. That framework
is the backdrop against which the General Assembly, the Governor, and the Attorney
General evaluated Bruen and determined what the decision required—and what it did not.
The scheme is constructed as follows. Maryland’s criminal law establishes a general
prohibition on wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. MD. CODE, CRIMINAL LAW
(“CR”) § 4‑203 (“a person may not wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed
or open, on or about the person”). The statute then enumerates exceptions—one of which
is possession of a valid wear‑and‑carry permit. CR § 4‑203(b). A separate provision enables
police to conduct Terry-style stop-and-frisks to ensure compliance with the permit
requirement. CR § 4-206. Possession of a handgun permit does not confer a right to carry;
it excepts the permit holder from the general prohibition.
The General Assembly codified an express statement of its legislative intent in
CR § 4-202:
The General Assembly finds that:
(1) the number of violent crimes committed in the State has increased
alarmingly in recent years;
(2) a high percentage of violent crimes committed in the State involves
the use of handguns;
(3) the result is a substantial increase in the number of deaths and injuries
largely traceable to the carrying of handguns in public places by
criminals;
(4) current law has not been effective in curbing the more frequent use of
handguns in committing crime; and
17
(5) additional regulations on the wearing, carrying, and transporting of
handguns are necessary to preserve the peace and tranquility of the
State and to protect the rights and liberties of the public. 8
37F
We are bound by the unambiguous, codified findings of the General Assembly: this
permit scheme is necessary to protect the public from the “alarming,” deadly threat posed
by handguns. 9
38F
The permit scheme is set out in Title 5, Subtitle 3 of the Public Safety Article. To
obtain a permit, an applicant applies to the State Police (PS § 5‑304) and must satisfy
statutory eligibility and training requirements (PS § 5‑306). Historically, one of those
requirements was that the applicant demonstrate a “good and substantial reason” to carry a
handgun—defined to include a finding that the permit was “necessary as a reasonable
precaution against apprehended danger.” 2013 Md. Laws Ch. 427, PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii)
(repealed 2023); 2003 Md. Laws Ch. 5, PS § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (amended 2013); 1972 Md.
Laws Ch. 13, Art. 27 § 36E(a)(6) (repealed 2003). That requirement gave the State Police
8
This kind of statute, “a rarely used express statement of legislative intent,” is
enacted “to underscore the importance” of the law and serves as the clearest possible
instruction from the legislature to courts on how to implement it. Wash. Gas Light Co. v.
Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 460 Md. 667, 671 (2018) (holding that the General Assembly’s
codified intent must be considered in construing the statute).
9
The General Assembly’s findings remain current. Maryland had the 11th highest
gun homicide rate in the country in 2023, with 39% of all gun homicides concentrated in
Baltimore City alone. Baltimore also experiences hundreds of nonfatal shootings each year,
reflecting a broader pattern of firearm violence beyond fatal incidents. CTR. FOR GUN
VIOLENCE SOLUTIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, State Gun
Violence Data: Maryland (2023), https://perma.cc/48YX-N5CL; MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
Firearm Violence Data Dashboard (2025), https://perma.cc/6DDX-4RWU. If it is a
relevant consideration after Bruen, the State of Maryland has an interest in combatting
handgun violence to protect the public.
18
broad discretion to deny permits to applicants who could not articulate a particularized
need beyond the general desire for self‑defense shared by the public at large, and it
functioned in practice to confine permits to certain classes: security professionals, persons
who could document specific threats, and the like. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865,
879 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming constitutionality of Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason
permit scheme before Bruen).
The Bruen decision invalidated the kind of discretionary “good cause” requirement
found in PS § 5-306 as inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 32.
Maryland’s response was immediate. Governor Larry Hogan directed the State Police to
suspend enforcement of the good‑and‑substantial‑reason requirement. The Office of the
Attorney General then issued an advice letter to the State Police’s Licensing Division
confirming that the good‑and‑substantial‑reason requirement was “now clearly
unconstitutional” and that the Department “may not continue to enforce” it. Letter from
Patrick B. Hughes, Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice, Office of the Attorney General, to
Captain Andrew J. Rossignol, Commander, Licensing Division, Maryland Department of
State Police 1 (July 6, 2022) (“July 6 Letter”) [attached as the Appendix to this opinion].
The July 6 Letter was equally clear, however, about what Bruen did not disturb. The
letter stated that “it remains illegal for an individual to carry, wear, or transport a handgun
in public in Maryland without a permit,” citing CR § 4‑203 directly. Id. at 2. In a footnote,
the letter advised that “Bruen does not seem to impose any blanket prohibition on the
criminal prosecution of individuals who carry handguns without a permit.” Id. at 5 n.2. On
severability, the letter concluded that the unconstitutional requirement could be severed
19
from the remainder of the statute and that the General Assembly would not have intended
the permit scheme to fall with it. Id. at 5.
When the General Assembly acted in 2023, it did so against the backdrop of this
legal advice. 10 By deleting the good‑and‑substantial‑reason requirement from PS § 5‑306
39F
and substituting a set of objective disqualifiers, House Bill 824 converted Maryland to a
shall‑issue regime in which the Secretary must issue a permit to any applicant who satisfies
the statutory criteria. In the same enactment, the legislature amended CR § 4‑203 directly,
increasing the maximum penalty for a first‑offense violation from three to five years’
imprisonment. See 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 651 (HB 824); CR § 4‑203(c)(2)(i). 11 Amending
40F
the criminal prohibition and reenacting the permit requirement in the same bill—while
removing only the unconstitutional clause—reflects a legislative judgment that the
underlying prohibition remained valid and operative. 12 Before Governor Wes Moore
41F
10
The judiciary had little occasion to weigh in during this period. The only reported
appellate decision was a narrow administrative appeal in which the Appellate Court of
Maryland applied Bruen to a permit-denial case and held only that the “good and
substantial reason” clause could no longer be enforced, without addressing CR § 4-203 or
the broader statutory framework. Matter of Rounds, 255 Md. App. 205, 212 (2022).
11
The legislative history of HB 824 and SB 1 of the 2023 session are not part of the
record in this case, but that does not preclude us from addressing it. First, legislative
histories are not adjudicative facts and are always subject to appellate analysis. Second, it
is not our fault that the constitutionality of existing Maryland law was not briefed.
12
Maryland law affords duly enacted statutes a strong presumption of
constitutionality, grounded in separation-of-powers principles and the judiciary’s respect
for the coordinate branches. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard Cty., 480 Md. 631,
645 (2022) (“The separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers across the three
government branches is guaranteed under Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights. Thus, the
statues enacted by the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutionally valid.”)
(cleaned up); Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 426 (2007). A challenger must rebut that
20
signed the bill into law, Attorney General Anthony Brown advised him that HB 824 was
“legally sufficient and is not clearly unconstitutional” and that it “sets forth objective
standards and imposes minimal administrative burdens” consistent with Bruen and the
historical tradition of firearms regulation. Letter from Anthony G. Brown, Attorney
General, to Governor Wes Moore (May 5, 2023), https://perma.cc/K3BZ-4LZE. 13 42F
The upshot is that Maryland’s post‑Bruen regime reflects a deliberate legislative
judgment at every step. The General Assembly eliminated what the Constitution required
it to eliminate, retained and reenacted the permit requirement, amended and strengthened
presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mahai v. State, 474 Md. 648, 664 (2021);
Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 427 (1978) (citations omitted). Under
Maryland’s reenactment rule, when the General Assembly repeals and reenacts a statutory
provision without material change, it is presumed to adopt existing judicial constructions
of that provision. See Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210 (1981) (reenactment without
material change signals legislative adoption of prior judicial interpretation); Harbor Island
Marina, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Calvert Cty., 286 Md. 303, 322 (1979); Harden v.
Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 406-07 (1976) (“The General Assembly is presumed
to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and
existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute.”). The General Assembly’s 2023
repeal and reenactment of CR § 4-203 through HB 824 reinforces the presumption of
constitutionality, as it revisited this statute with full awareness of the constitutional
landscape and still specifically chose to reenact it.
13
During the same session, the General Assembly substantially expanded the
locations in which even permit holders are prohibited from carrying handguns. 2023 Md.
Laws Ch. 680 (SB 1); PS § 5-307. Senate Bill 1—enacted as the “Gun Safety Act of
2023”—designated a broad range of “sensitive places” where public carry is prohibited
regardless of permit status, including schools, government buildings, healthcare facilities,
public transit, and other high-risk public venues. The Act also adopted a default rule
prohibiting carry on private property without the owner’s express consent and added new
disqualifiers. In the same session, the General Assembly enacted HB 824, 2023 Md. Laws
Ch. 651, which strengthened Maryland’s training, background-check, and renewal
requirements for permit holders. Taken together, SB 1 and HB 824 reflect the General
Assembly’s continuing effort to regulate the public carrying of firearms to the full extent
permitted by the Second Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
21
the general prohibition, and did so with legal advice in hand opining that the prohibition
remained constitutionally sound. The Attorney General, the General Assembly, and the
Governor all proceeded on the same understanding: that Bruen changed the standard for
issuance of a permit and nothing more. It did not disturb the prohibition on carrying a
handgun without a permit. It did not render CR § 4‑203 unconstitutional. Nor did it alter
the corresponding Fourth Amendment consequences. The prohibition on carrying a
handgun without a permit authorizes a Terry stop to investigate permit status. See Leahy,
J. Concurring Opinion at 7-10. Once a handgun is confirmed or reasonably suspected, a
protective frisk follows.
We must uphold the stops that Terry authorizes because, unlike Bruen, Terry is not
dicta. It is a holding of the U.S. Supreme Court, reaffirmed repeatedly over more than five
decades, and it remains good law. Nothing in Bruen purports to overrule it. The majority
relies on United States v. Wilson, 143 F.4th 647 (5th Cir. 2025), but Wilson is not binding
here, and we do not find it persuasive. The Fifth Circuit in Wilson did exactly what an
intermediate appellate court should not do—it treated Bruen dicta as having restructured
the Terry doctrine on its own authority. See 143 F.4th at 659. We are no more free to do
that than the Fifth Circuit was, and the methodology is unsound regardless of the result it
produces. The Seventh Circuit recently confronted similar facts and wisely declined to
resolve what it called the “sure-to-come challenging questions about how Second
Amendment standards after Heller and Bruen interact with applications of Terry,” leaving
that question for the U.S. Supreme Court. United States v. Dameron, 103 F.4th 467, 469
22
(7th Cir. 2024). In our view, that is the correct approach for an intermediate court and it is
the approach we would take here.
We address those grounds in the alternative. Even if Bruen’s broader language were
controlling—a proposition we reject—the stop and frisk was independently justified on
two grounds that Bruen itself does not disturb.
III.
Even if Bruen’s broader language has the force the majority attributes to it, the stop
and frisk was justified on two independent grounds. First, existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine—grounded in police officer safety and the realities of Maryland’s permit
verification regime—authorized the frisk regardless of what Bruen says about the right to
carry handguns. Second, possession of a concealed handgun in Maryland provides
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