The opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0253n.06
No. 25-1946
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jun 04, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
)
MARIA SMITH,
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff–Appellant, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, ) OPINION
Defendant–Appellee. )
)
Before: STRANCH, BUSH, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Maria Smith sued her former employer, Michigan Bell
Telephone Company, bringing several claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Michigan Bell moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. We
AFFIRM.
I.
Smith worked for Michigan Bell and had “an extensive leave of absence history.” R. 34-
3, Peck Decl., PageID 630. During her time with Michigan Bell, Smith was subject to a
progressive discipline policy pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
In May 2021, Michigan Bell approved Smith’s request while pregnant to work from home
through her delivery date (approximately the end of August 2021) as an ADA accommodation.
As part of her request, Smith included her physician’s recommendation that she limit her commute
time to less than four hours and work from home to decrease her risk of exposure to the COVID-
No. 25-1946, Smith v. Mich. Bell Telephone Co.
19 virus. Her physician noted that “[by] being pregnant[,] she is more at risk and considered
immune compromised” and that “all pregnant patients are at risk for blood clots.” R. 34-4, Ex. A-
1 to Pratt Decl., PageID 734. But Smith experienced difficulties receiving her work equipment—
she was forced to physically go to the office once to get her computer, some cords had to be mailed
at a later date, and she struggled to log into her computer.
While Smith was in the office retrieving her equipment, a Michigan Bell attendance
manager conducted an “Attendance Action Plan” meeting with Smith to discuss her absences.
During that meeting, Smith was issued an “attendance counseling,” the first step in Michigan
Bell’s progressive discipline process, for unapproved absences in 2020 (August 12 through
December 31) and 2021 (May 25 through June 23). Smith did not receive any further discipline.
Two years later, in February 2023, Smith started a full-time job with the City of
Kalamazoo but did not inform Michigan Bell until she voluntarily resigned from her position at
Michigan Bell in April 2023.
As is relevant here, Smith sued Michigan Bell for discrimination, failure to accommodate,
and retaliation under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to Michigan Bell,
concluding that Smith had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination because
she failed to provide sufficient evidence that she was disabled and that she suffered an adverse
employment action. For similar reasons, the district court also granted summary judgment to
Michigan Bell on Smith’s failure to accommodate and retaliation claims. Smith timely appealed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Newport
Utils., 129 F.4th 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2025).
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No. 25-1946, Smith v. Mich. Bell Telephone Co.
Smith’s discrimination and retaliation claims fail because she has not suffered an adverse
employment action. See Tumbleson v. Lakota Loc. Sch. Dist., No. 25-3548, 2026 WL 1328618,
at *4 (6th Cir. 2026); Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400, 419 (6th Cir. 2021). Smith
voluntarily resigned from Michigan Bell, and to show that her resignation constituted an adverse
employment action she must establish that she was constructively discharged. See Gorbe v. City
of Lathrup Vill., No. 21-1532, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 11685, at *13 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2022)
(order) (citing Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2008)). To
do so, Smith must identify evidence that Michigan Bell deliberately created a working condition
that “a reasonable person would perceive as intolerable,” Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 93 F.4th
360, 373 (6th Cir. 2024)—so much so that a reasonable person in Smith’s shoes would have felt
compelled to quit, Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 303 (6th Cir. 2019).
Smith notes that she lacked necessary equipment to work from home, that she was forced
to come into the office one day to retrieve her equipment, and that Michigan Bell issued a
counseling warning after her extended leaves of absence. That is a far cry from intolerable. As to
her equipment, a reasonable person would not feel compelled to quit her job after—only once—
traveling to retrieve her equipment in order to work from home. By contrast, this court has said
that sexual assault, reduction in salary, and harassment are examples of conditions that would make
a workplace “intolerable.” Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir.
2020).
And as to Smith’s contention that the counseling warning made her workplace intolerable,
“criticism and feedback do not suffice, especially when contained to a few isolated incidents.” Id.
In fact, an employer’s critique specifically about an employee’s attendance is insufficient to
establish constructive discharge. See Plautz v. Potter, 156 F. App’x 812, 818 (6th Cir. 2005).
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No. 25-1946, Smith v. Mich. Bell Telephone Co.
Moreover, Smith seems to continually ignore that her approved accommodation (working from
home during the duration of her pregnancy) “did not encompass the behavior for which she was
disciplined,” which included refusing to “work at all” even before she requested the
accommodation. R. 38, Dist. Ct. Op., PageID 935 (cleaned up).
“Our job is to confirm that [Smith’s] work conditions were indeed hellish, or at least close
to it.” Tchankpa, 951 F.3d at 815. Smith failed to show such conditions, perhaps most aptly
highlighted by the fact that she continued to work for Michigan Bell for two years after the claimed
“intolerable” workplace. See, e.g., Brelsford v. U.S. Foodservice Inc., No. 06-13628, 2007 WL
2902873, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2007) (“[Plaintiff] continued to work for another two months,
which is inconsistent with intolerable working conditions.”); Mills v. Mason Consol. of Sch. Dist.,
No. 07-cv-14648, 2008 WL 4457808, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 30, 2008) (“Plaintiff continued in her
position nearly two months beyond [a meeting] despite her allegation of ‘intolerable’ working
conditions . . . .”). Thus, Smith has not shown that she was constructively discharged. Nor does
the single incident of attendance counseling in 2021, standing alone, constitute an adverse
employment action. See McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2024).
Smith’s failure-to-accommodate claim is unavailing because she has failed to identify
evidence that she was disabled. See Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir.
2020). Under the ADA, a disabled person is one who (1) has “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual,” (2) has “a record of
such impairment,” or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–
(C). Normal pregnancies are not disabilities under the ADA, but pregnancy-related conditions
may qualify as impairments. Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2010).
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No. 25-1946, Smith v. Mich. Bell Telephone Co.
Smith contends that her increased risk of infection to COVID-19 qualifies as an
“impairment” and substantially limited her major life activities during her accommodation period.
Nevertheless, in her documents, her physician notes that Smith’s risk was ordinary for pregnant
women: “With being pregnant she is more at risk and considered immune compromised for
infections . . . all pregnant patients are at risk for blood clots.” R. 35-1, Ex. A to Resp., PageID
880 (emphasis added). Crucially, Smith has not presented evidence of any type of abnormal or
unique pregnancy complication that would render her “disabled” under the ADA. So she has not
carried her burden to show that she was disabled.
For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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