Com. v. Cephas, R.

J-S15020-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

RODERICK CEPHAS :

:

Appellant : No. 1208 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001889-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 4, 2026

Roderick Cephas (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of one count each of third-degree murder,

persons not to possess firearms, and carrying a firearm on public streets in

Philadelphia.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts as follows:

On August 24, 2022, at approximately 7:45 p.m., [Appellant] and

his friend[,] Shawn Lloyd [(Lloyd),] went to Sunrise Deli, located

at 2901 North 27th Street in North Philadelphia, to purchase beer

and cigarettes. N.T., 11/21/24, at 38, 40-42; N.T., 11/22/24, at

27-30, 46; Commonwealth Exhibit C-21 (Video Compilation).

Upon leaving the deli, [Appellant] and Lloyd came into contact

with the decedent, Nyher Griffin [(Griffin or the decedent)], as

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6108.

J-S15020-26

well [as] Griffin’s cousin, Imani.2 N.T., 11/21/24, at 40-42, 106;

N.T., 11/22/24, at 31-33; Commonwealth Exhibit C-21 (Video

Compilation). At some point during their interaction, Griffin

slapped [Appellant] across the face[,] before the four people

parted ways. N.T., 11/21/24, at 108-09; N.T., 11/22/24, at 19,

35-37.

Around this same time, Griffin called Dwayne Burden

[(Burden)], a cousin of both [Appellant] and Griffin. N.T.,

11/21/24, at 101, 105, 128. After speaking with Griffin, Burden

drove to the intersection of Taney and Cambridge Streets in North

Philadelphia, picked up Griffin, and [drove] to 2823 North 26th

Street, [which was the] house where [Appellant] was living at the

time. Id. at 105-07, 133. According to Burden, the pair went to

the house because the property was a family home that originally

belonged to Burden’s grandmother, and once Burden found out

[Appellant] was staying at the home, Burden wanted to get

information from [Appellant] about buying the property back. Id.

at 101-05, 114.

Upon arriving at the 2800 block of 26th Street at

approximately 8:20 p.m., Burden saw [Appellant] standing on the

sidewalk outside the front of the home. Id. at 108. Burden then

double-parked his vehicle, a red Kia, on the street in front of the

home, and Griffin exited from the passenger side of the Kia. Id.

As soon as Griffin exited the Kia and began to walk around the

back of the car, Burden immediately heard [Appellant] yell “why

you slap me,” followed by the sound of multiple gunshots. Id. at

108-09. At that time, Burden looked into his driver-side mirror

and saw Griffin fall to the ground and try to crawl back to the Kia.

Id. at 110. As Griffin was on the ground, [Appellant] came from

behind Griffin, stood over … him, and shot him multiple times. Id.

[Appellant] then pointed his gun at Burden’s car, at which point

Burden drove off[. Burden] return[ed] less than a minute later to

pick up Griffin and take him to Temple University Hospital. Id. at

110-12.

Upon arrival at [the hospital], police helped Burden transfer

Griffin, who was suffering from multiple gunshot wounds, from the

back of the Kia into the hospital. Id. at 6. Griffin was pronounced

dead at approximately 9[:00] p.m. Id. at 8, 27. Philadelphia

Assistant Medical Examiner Dr. Hannah Kastenbaum [(Dr.

____________________________________________

2 Imani’s last name is not included in the trial transcript.

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Kastenbaum)] determined that Griffin’s cause of death was

multiple gunshot wounds, and the manner of death was homicide.

Id. at 17. [Appellant] was prohibited from possessing a firearm

on the date of the murder due to a previous conviction for

aggravated assault. N.T., 11/25/24, at 16-17; Commonwealth

Exhibit C-34 (Certified Court Document).

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 3-4 (some record citations modified; original

footnote omitted; one footnote added).

The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with the above

offenses, as well as one count of possessing an instrument of crime (PIC). 3

The matter proceeded to a jury trial on November 21-25, 2024. Pertinently,

Appellant testified that he shot Griffin in self-defense. At the trial’s conclusion,

the jury convicted Appellant of the above offenses and acquitted him of PIC.

The trial court ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI)

report and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

On January 31, 2025, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of

27 to 54 years’ imprisonment, including 20 to 40 years for third-degree

murder; a consecutive term of 7 to 14 years for persons not to possess

firearms; and a concurrent term of 1½ to 3 years for carrying a firearm on

public streets in Philadelphia. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion,

which the trial court denied.

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).

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Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following questions for our

review:

1. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence

where the Commonwealth’s case rested entirely on the testimony

of a single, repeatedly-impeached eyewitness whose account was

inconsistent, implausible, and contradicted by the video and

physical evidence, and where Appellant’s testimony that he acted

in self-defense was corroborated by the video and surrounding

circumstances[?]

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

improper opinion testimony from the lead detective who told the

jury there was “no evidence” of another gun and thereby

conveyed his personal belief that Appellant was lying, in violation

of Pa.R.E. 608 and long-settled case law prohibiting credibility

opinions by police witnesses[?]

3. Whether the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive and

unreasonable sentence by imposing consecutive[,] standard-

range terms totaling twenty-seven to fifty-four years’

imprisonment, which could effectively be a life sentence for a

forty-eight-year-old defendant, without articulating any

individualized rationale, by double-counting prior convictions, and

by failing to meaningfully consider the mitigating evidence

presented[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.

In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his

post-sentence motion for a new trial, which asserted the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence. See id. at 25-35.4 Appellant asserts “the

____________________________________________

4 Appellant’s weight argument focuses on his third-degree murder conviction.

See Appellant’s Brief at 25-35. He presents no argument that the guilty

verdicts on the two firearm charges were against the weight of the evidence.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Commonwealth’s case depended entirely on the testimony of Burden,” but

“Burden’s testimony was objectively false.” Id. at 27. Appellant notes Burden

“was serving a sentence for the crimen falsi offense of felony robbery at the

time of [Appellant’s] trial.” Id. According to Appellant, Burden “had somehow

received an incredibly lenient sentence” for his robbery conviction, and

therefore had “every incentive to testify favorably for the Commonwealth even

if the Commonwealth had not explicitly promised him anything.” Id.

Appellant maintains that Burden’s “story made no sense” and “was

obviously absurd.” Id. at 27, 28. Appellant claims Burden “was obviously

lying” when he testified that he drove with Griffin to Appellant’s residence in

order to discuss with Appellant the purchase of the residence. Id. at 28.

Appellant argues that, given the confrontation between Appellant and Griffin

at the deli, “it does not require much of a guess to figure out why [Burden

drove to Appellant’s residence] after receiving a phone call from [Griffin].” Id.

Appellant also identifies purported inconsistencies and contradictions in

Burden’s testimony. Appellant argues Burden testified at Appellant’s

preliminary hearing that he had not seen a gun during the incident; whereas

Burden testified at trial that after he heard gunshots, he saw Appellant with a

____________________________________________

See generally id. The trial court treated Appellant’s weight claim as

challenging only his third-degree murder conviction. See Trial Court Opinion,

7/18/25, at 11. To the extent Appellant’s weight claim purports to challenge

the firearm convictions, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi,

Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884-85 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that where an

appellant fails to develop an argument on appeal, the issue is waived).

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gun. Id. at 27; see also N.T., 11/21/24, at 136-37.5 Appellant also contrasts

Burden’s testimony that Griffin’s cousin, Imani, rode with Burden and Griffin

to the hospital after the shooting, Appellant’s Brief at 28, with the testimony

of Officer Gregory Giacomelli (Officer Giacomelli), asserting the officer

“confirmed that there was definitely no female passenger” in the vehicle with

Burden and Griffin upon their arrival at the hospital. Id. at 7-8 (citing N.T.,

11/21/24, at 10).6

Finally, Appellant argues that he “testified credibly and far more

consistently with the evidence that he acted in self-defense.” Id. at 29.

Relying on his own trial testimony, Appellant maintains he “was attacked by

[Griffin,] who was high on meth, at the [deli] for no reason.” Id. “Instead of

retaliating,” Appellant “went home and sat on his own steps.” Id. Appellant

contends Griffin “called for backup … in the form of Burden,” and Griffin then

“rode with Burden to Appellant’s house to kill him.” Id. Appellant asserts the

video evidence “did not show what actually happened,” but it nevertheless

____________________________________________

5In his own trial testimony, Appellant agreed he had a gun at the time in

question. See N.T., 11/22/24, at 40-41.

6 Contrary to Appellant’s characterization, Officer Giacomelli did not testify

that there was “definitely” no female passenger. Asked how many people

were in the vehicle, Officer Giacomelli testified, “I remember it was the male

driver and I remember the male in the backseat.” N.T., 11/21/24, at 10.

Asked whether there was a female passenger, Officer Giacomelli responded,

“I don’t believe so. I don’t remember.” Id. The Commonwealth notes that

Appellant himself testified there was a woman in Burden’s vehicle (“the same

one from earlier”) when Burden returned to the scene of the shooting to pick

up Griffin. Commonwealth Brief at 11 (quoting N.T., 11/22/24, at 45).

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confirmed that Burden and Griffin went to Appellant’s residence after “some

kind of earlier incident” between Appellant and Griffin. Id. at 29-30.

Appellant argues his own testimony was therefore “far more consistent with

the other evidence than the testimony of Burden.” Id. at 29.

Appellant maintains the trial court erred when, in rejecting his weight

claim, it determined the jury was free to believe Burden and disbelieve

Appellant. Id. at 33. Appellant argues “the jury’s verdict rested entirely on

testimony that no reasonable fact-finder could credit,” and “the trial court’s

conclusion that the verdict does not shock its conscience cannot be reconciled

with the record and [Burden’s] preposterous testimony.” Id. at 34-35.

Our standard of review of a weight claim is well settled:

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is

not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal

weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview

is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court

abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock

its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists

of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review

of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the

weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 580 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted).

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When a weight challenge “is predicated on the credibility of trial

testimony, [appellate] review of the trial court’s decision is extremely limited.

Generally, unless the evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make

any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not

cognizable on appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Kling, 351 A.3d 1274,

1290 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Wright, 314 A.3d 515, 524 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[I]n order for a defendant to

prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so

tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the

court.”). “Any conflicts in the evidence or contradictions in testimony are

exclusively for the fact-finder to resolve.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244

A.3d 1261, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

Further,

[b]ecause the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination [as to whether]

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d

1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Where issues of credibility and weight of the

evidence are concerned, it is not the function of the appellate court to

substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court.”).

“One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the

lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of

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the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Weitzel, 304 A.3d 1219, 1227 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

Instantly, in connection with its analysis of Appellant’s weight claim, the

trial court detailed the evidence adduced at trial as follows:

While [Appellant] testified at trial that he acted in self-defense,

see N.T., 11/22/24, at 25-55, the Commonwealth presented

compelling evidence that [Appellant] murdered the unarmed

decedent, Griffin. Specifically, the Commonwealth presented the

testimony of eyewitness [] Burden.

Burden testified that, on the night of the murder, he

received a call from his cousin, [] Griffin, at approximately 7:45

p.m. N.T., 11/21/24, at 101, 105, 128. Burden stated that he

was in Center City when he received Griffin’s call, and drove up to

see Griffin in North Philadelphia in response to the call. Id. at

105-06. Burden drove to the intersection of Cambridge and Taney

Streets in North Philadelphia, at which point he saw Griffin and

Burden’s other cousin, Imani. Id. at 106. According to Burden,

Griffin got into the passenger seat of Burden’s car, and the pair

drove around the corner to the family house where [Appellant]

was living, that is, 2823 North 26th Street. Id. at 106-07, 129-

30. Burden testified that [Appellant] was also his cousin, and that

[Burden] and Griffin went to the house because the property was

a family home, owned at that time by Burden’s aunts, and that

Burden wanted to buy the home. Id. at 101-05, 114, 130-31.

Burden stated that when he and Griffin pulled on to the 2800

block of North 26th Street, [Appellant] was standing in front of

the family home on the sidewalk. Id. at 108. Burden stopped his

car and double-parked between the family home and the house

next door, at which point Griffin got out of the car and began to

walk behind it. Id. at 107-08. Burden testified that, almost

immediately after Griffin exited the car, Burden heard [Appellant]

yell “why you slap me,” followed by the sound of gunfire. Id. at

108-09. Burden, still in the Kia, looked out his driver’s side

window and saw Griffin fall to the ground. Id. at 110. Burden

stated that he saw Griffin attempting to crawl back to the Kia,

when [Appellant] came from behind Griffin, stood over … [Griffin],

and shot him multiple times. Id. Burden testified at that point,

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[Appellant] pointed the gun at [Burden’s] car, and Burden drove

off. Id.

Burden testified that he drove back to the intersection of

Taney and Cambridge Streets to pick up Imani for help. Id. at

110-11. The pair then drove directly back to 2823 North 26th

Street, put Griffin in the Kia, and drove to Temple [University]

Hospital. Id. at 111-12. Burden testified that he did not see

Griffin with a firearm on the night of the murder, and that

[Burden] himself did not have a firearm that night. Id. at 112-

13.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 6-8 (some record citations modified; footnote

omitted).

The trial court determined Burden’s testimony was corroborated by

substantial evidence, summarized as follows:

Burden’s testimony was corroborated by Ring camera footage that

was collected from a neighboring house at 2821 North 26th Street.

Specifically, the Ring camera showed Griffin lying in the street in

front of [Appellant’s] house, still moving and yelling “I’m sorry,”

as well as [Appellant] walking behind Burden’s car and pointing a

gun at the car as it drove away. Id. at 41-45, 122;

Commonwealth Exhibit C-21 (Compilation Video). The video also

showed that, immediately following the shooting, [Appellant]

could be heard telling neighbors to “cut the fucking cameras off,”

which was compelling evidence of [Appellant’s] consciousness of

guilt. N.T., 11/22/24, at 11; Commonwealth Exhibit C-21

(Compilation Video).

Additionally, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of

Philadelphia Police Officers [] Giacomelli and Gregory Yatcilla

[(Officer Yatcilla]), as well as Detective Derrick Venson

[(Detective Venson)]. Officer Giacomelli testified that, after

receiving notice of a 911 call regarding the instant murder, he

responded to Temple University Hospital. N.T., 11/21/24, at 5-6.

Soon after Officer Giacomelli arrived at [the hospital], Burden and

Griffin arrived in the red Kia, and Griffin was taken inside the

hospital. Id. at 6. According to Officer Giacomelli, Burden was

cooperative with police, gave police consent to search his vehicle,

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and no firearms were recovered from the red Kia, Burden, or

Griffin. Id. at 6-7.

[] Officer Yatcilla testified that he collected four, nine-

millimeter fired cartridge casings from the crime scene, all of

which were found in the area where Griffin was shot multiple

times, that is, on the street in front of 2823 North 26th Street.

Id. at 76-77. Officer Yatcilla further testified that since the

casings were all found together, it is likely that the bullets were

fired from the same gun. Id. at 77-78, 95.

Detective Venson testified that no firearms were ever

recovered in the course of the investigation, and that there was

no evidence to support that there was another firearm at the crime

scene during the murder[,] other than the gun with which

[Appellant] killed Griffin. N.T., 11/22/24, at 11-12, 62.

Finally, … Dr. Kastenbaum testified that she conducted an

autopsy of Griffin, and that she observed that Griffin had suffered

from five gunshot wounds: one to the left forearm, one to the right

upper chest, one to the back of the neck, one to the right lower

back, and right upper back. N.T., 11/21/24, at 17-18. She further

testified that the gunshot wounds to [Griffin’s] right upper back,

right lower back, and the back of [Griffin’s] neck were entrance

wounds, indicating that Griffin was shot from behind at some

point. Id. at 21, 26-27, 32; Commonwealth Exhibits C-32S, C-

32U, and C-32W (Autopsy Photos).

All of this evidence established that [Appellant] intentionally

shot Griffin, who was unarmed and, at one point, crawling away

from [Appellant], after [Appellant had been] slapped by Griffin

during a separate incident outside of Sunrise Deli, which occurred

about 30 minutes before.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 8-9 (some record citations modified).

The trial court also summarized Appellant’s own testimony:

[Appellant] testified at trial that he acted in self-defense.

Specifically, [Appellant] testified that during his interaction with

Griffin outside of Sunrise Deli, Griffin threatened to kill [Appellant]

and slapped him across the face with a gun. N.T., 11/22/24, at

34-35. [Appellant] stated that, at that time, Griffin had two guns,

one of which [Appellant] was able to take from Griffin, and the

other of which “flew out [of Griffin’s] hand” and slid down the

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sidewalk when Griffin hit [Appellant] with it. Id. at 36-38;

Commonwealth Exhibit C-21 (Video Compilation). [Appellant]

stated that, after being hit, he ran away from Griffin with one of

the guns, did not attempt to pick up the second gun, and went

home. N.T., 11/22/24, at 37-38.

[Appellant] further testified that, shortly after this

altercation, he was sitting on the steps outside of his home with

the gun he had taken from Griffin, when Griffin and Burden arrived

on his block. Id. at 38-40, 43. He stated that, as soon as Griffin

and Burden arrived, Griffin got out of the car, tried to hide behind

the parked cars on the street, and pointed a gun at [Appellant],

at which point [Appellant] shot Griffin multiple times. Id. at 40.

[Appellant] testified that after he shot Griffin, Griffin crawled on

the ground trying to get his gun back, at which point [Appellant]

picked up the second gun, that is, the gun that Griffin arrived with.

Id. at 40-41. [Appellant] stated that, after picking up the second

gun, he pointed one of the guns at Burden’s car, and Burden drove

away. Id. [Appellant] testified that he then put both of the guns

inside his house,7 and left the scene at some point after Burden

returned to pick up Griffin. Id. at 40-45.

[Appellant’s] testimony was the only evidence presented at

trial suggesting that he acted in self-defense, and it was refuted

by the Commonwealth’s evidence described above. In particular,

there was no evidence of more than one firearm at the crime

scene. In addition, [Dr. Kastenbaum’s] testimony corroborates

Burden’s account that Griffin was shot in the back while crawling

away from [Appellant]. Moreover, rather than claiming self-

defense and contacting the police, [Appellant] fled the scene. See

id. at 49-50, 53-54.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 9-10 (some record citations modified;

footnote added).

In rejecting Appellant’s weight claim, the trial court set forth the

following analysis and conclusion:

____________________________________________

7 Although Appellant’s self-defense claim rested heavily on his assertion that

two guns were involved, he never produced either gun. See N.T., 11/22/24,

at 44, 53-54, 62.

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It is true that Burden had an admissible crimen falsi conviction for

robbery when he testified at [Appellant’s] trial. N.T., 11/21/24,

at 98[; see also Calisto v. Rodgers, 271 A.3d 877, 885 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (“Robbery … [is] considered crimen falsi and

convictions for [robbery] are admissible for impeachment

purposes”).] It is also true that Officer [] Giacomelli testified that

only Burden and Griffin were in Burden’s car when Burden arrived

at Temple [University] Hospital, whereas Burden testified that he

arrived at [the h]ospital with both Griffin and his cousin, Imani.

N.T., 11/21/24, at 5-6, 9-10, 126. In addition, Burden testified

at [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing that he had never seen

[Appellant] with a gun, while at trial he said that although he had

not initially seen [Appellant] with a gun, he saw [Appellant] with

a gun[,] standing over Griffin[,] after the first round of gunshots

were fired. Id. at 135-37. None of this impeachment evidence

rendered Burden to be an incredible witness.

Moreover, credibility determinations are solely within the

province of the fact-finder, and a court may not reweigh the

evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the [fact-]finder….

Commonwealth v Taylor, 63 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 2013).

[During] cross-examination of Burden, defense counsel

highlighted Burden’s robbery conviction, his resulting potential

bias in favor of the Commonwealth, and the purported

inconsistencies between his preliminary hearing testimony and

trial testimony[. T]he jury nonetheless accepted Burden’s version

of events. See N.T., 11/21/24, at 125-42. Moreover, the

Commonwealth presented the testimony of Assistant District

Attorney Kolleen McMullen, who testified that Burden did not

receive any benefit with regard to his robbery case in exchange

for [his testimony at Appellant’s] trial[.] See id. at 143-46. [The

Commonwealth also presented] evidence that [Burden had]

already [been] sentenced for his robbery charge prior to his

testimony at [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing, thereby

undermining [Appellant’s] claim that Burden was a biased witness.

Id. at 100.

Additionally, as noted above, Burden’s testimony was

corroborated by the Ring camera video, ballistic evidence, and

[Dr. Kastenbaum’s] report, none of which Burden had access to

at the time he gave his statement to police. N.T., 11/21/24, at

113-14; N.T., 11/22/24, at 6-8. Despite [Appellant’s] assertion

that his version of events was “far more consistent with the other

evidence,” [Appellant’s] testimony was the only evidence at trial

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supporting his self-defense claim, and the jury was free to reject

his testimony.

Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial fully supported

the jury’s conviction for third-degree murder, and did not shock

the conscience of the [trial c]ourt. See Commonwealth v.

Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545-46 (Pa. Super. 2015). No relief is

due.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 12-13 (some citations modified).

We agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion. We reiterate

that appellate review of weight challenges “predicated on the credibility of trial

testimony … is extremely limited,” Kling, 351 A.3d at 1290, and “[a]ny

conflicts in the evidence or contradictions in testimony are exclusively for the

fact-finder to resolve.” Wallace, 244 A.3d at 1276. Our review of the record

confirms that the purported inconsistencies and contradictions in Burden’s

testimony were well within the province of the jury to resolve. We discern no

abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its rejection of Appellant’s weight claim.

Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting

certain rebuttal testimony from Detective Venson, 8 which Appellant contends

constituted improper opinion testimony. See Appellant’s Brief at 35-42.

Specifically, Appellant argues Detective Venson opined that an object

Appellant could be seen picking up in Ring video footage was not a gun. Id.

at 38. The footage in question depicted the immediate aftermath of the

____________________________________________

8 After Appellant testified at trial, the Commonwealth recalled Detective

Venson to testify in rebuttal. See N.T., 11/22/24, at 59-65.

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shooting. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-21. Appellant had testified the object

he picked up was the second gun he claimed Griffin had pointed at him upon

Griffin’s arrival outside Appellant’s residence. See N.T., 11/22/24, at 40-41.

We set forth the at-issue portion of Detective Venson’s testimony in full:

[The Commonwealth:] Okay. Now I’m drawing your attention to

[Exhibit] C-21, which I have on the screen, this Ring camera

footage at 10 minutes and 40 seconds.

(Whereupon, Exhibit C-21 was played in the courtroom.)

….

[The Commonwealth:] Now, this point I’m pausing at 11 minutes

and 11 seconds. … Do you see [Appellant] on the screen who just

bent down?

[Detective Venson:] Yes.

[The Commonwealth:] Let me ask you, during the course of your

investigation as you’re going through the video footage and

working with [the] crime scene, was it your belief that there were

any other firearms out there that night besides what [Appellant]

held or what the person on the screen has?

[Defense counsel:] Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained as to form.

[The Commonwealth:] Did you find any other firearms out

there or any evidence to support there was another firearm

besides the one that the individual on the screen had?

[Detective Venson:] No.

[Defense counsel:] Objection.

THE COURT: I’ll allow that.

[Detective Venson:] No.

(Whereupon, Exhibit C-21 was played in the courtroom.)

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[The Commonwealth:] And you reviewed this video during your

investigation, correct?

[Detective Venson:] Yes.

[The Commonwealth:] Okay. And in reviewing this video, was

there anything about this portion that we just watched—

which I have paused at 11 minutes and 15 seconds—that

made you believe that there was a firearm that had been

picked up by the individual?

[Defense counsel:] Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained. … That’s argument. You can make

argument to the jury based on the video. So can you—

[The Commonwealth:] Understood, your Honor.

N.T., 11/22/24, at 60-63 (emphasis added).

Appellant asserts the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s

second objection and thereby permitting Detective Venson to testify that he

did not find “any evidence to support [that] there was another firearm[.]” Id.

at 62; see also Appellant’s Brief at 38. Appellant maintains that, via this

testimony, Detective Venson improperly opined on what the video did or did

not show, and also improperly opined on the credibility of Appellant’s

testimony that the object was a gun. Id. at 38, 40-41. Appellant asserts the

Commonwealth “introduced what was in essence ‘expert’ testimony that an

experienced homicide detective was able to tell that the object was not a gun

and therefore [Appellant] was lying.” Id. at 38-39. Appellant argues the trial

court should have sustained the objection because “[t]he jury was equally

well-equipped to determine the facts[,] as [Detective Venson] had no special

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knowledge which would allow him to identify a gun on a video or determine

whether Appellant had testified credibly[.]” Id. at 41.

The Commonwealth counters that, when the prosecutor specifically

asked whether Detective Venson believed the object in the video was a gun,

the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection. Commonwealth Brief at

15. The Commonwealth argues, “Detective Venson did not testify that

[Appellant] was lying, but rather that there was no evidence of another firearm

discovered through the course of the detective’s investigation.” Id. (emphasis

in original). The Commonwealth maintains Detective Venson did not give

expert opinion testimony or comment on Appellant’s credibility, but rather

testified only regarding his own observations “about the evidence at the crime

scene.” Id. at 16.

We observe the following standard of review:

The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the

trial court, and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed

on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of

discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment,

but rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that

overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised

is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,

bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 352 A.3d 1035, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation

omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 provides as follows:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form

of an opinion is limited to one that is:

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(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to

determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701; see also Commonwealth v. T.B., 232 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (“Fact testimony may include opinion or inferences so long as

those opinions or inferences are rationally based on the witness’s perceptions

and helpful to a clear understanding of his or her testimony”).

Further, Rule 702 provides that a witness

who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or

otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;

(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine a fact in issue; and

(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant

field.

Pa.R.E. 702. “Under longstanding Pennsylvania precedent pertaining to jury

trials, … determining witness credibility is exclusively the function of jurors,

and expert witnesses are specifically prohibited from invading this province.”

Commonwealth v. Maconeghy, 171 A.3d 707, 712 (Pa. 2017).

Instantly, the trial court determined the record is clear “that Detective

Venson was not permitted to state an opinion as to whether the object that

[Appellant] picked up in the Ring camera video was a firearm.” Trial Court

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Opinion, 7/18/25, at 15. The trial court observed that, “[w]hen the

Commonwealth specifically asked Detective Venson whether he believed

[Appellant] had picked up a firearm based on his review of the Ring camera

video, defense counsel objected, and the [trial c]ourt sustained the objection.”

Id. (citing N.T., 11/22/24, at 62-63). The trial court concluded Appellant’s

“claim is baseless, and no relief is due.” Id.

We agree with the trial court. Detective Venson did not specifically opine

as to whether the object in the video was a gun. We further agree with the

Commonwealth that Detective Venson offered no opinion as to Appellant’s

credibility. Rather, Detective Venson testified only that he did not find “any

evidence to support [that] there was another firearm besides the one that”

Appellant used to shoot Griffin. N.T., 11/22/24, at 62. To the extent this

testimony implied Detective Venson’s belief that the video alone did not

amount to “evidence” of a second gun, we observe that, elsewhere in his brief,

Appellant concedes that “[i]t was not actually possible to tell [from the video]

whether the object that fell to the sidewalk was a gun or a phone….”

Appellant’s Brief at 29. Thus, Detective Venson’s testimony did not invade

the jury’s province to (1) determine, based on the jury’s own observation of

the video, whether the object was a gun; or (2) determine the credibility of

Appellant’s testimony that the object was a gun. We therefore discern no

abuse of discretion in admission of Detective Venson’s testimony. Appellant’s

second issue merits no relief.

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In his third and final issue, Appellant argues the trial court imposed a

manifestly excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 42-48.

Preliminarily, we observe “[t]here is no automatic right of appeal from

the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Glawinski, 310

A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). An appellant challenging

the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction

by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code.

Id. (citation omitted). Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal,

preserved the issue in his post-sentence motion, and included the required

Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 20-22.

We next consider whether Appellant presents a substantial question. “A

substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. McLendon, 293 A.3d 658, 670 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quotation marks

omitted). In determining whether a substantial question exists, we do not

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examine the merits of whether the sentence is actually excessive.

Rather, we look to whether the appellant has forwarded a

plausible argument that the sentence, when it is within the

guideline ranges, is clearly unreasonable. Concomitantly, the

substantial question determination does not require the court to

decide the merits of whether the sentence is clearly unreasonable.

Glawinski, 310 A.3d at 325 (citation omitted).

Instantly, Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement asserts the trial court

imposed an excessive sentence and failed to consider mitigating factors. See

Appellant’s Brief at 21. This Court has held that “an excessive sentence

claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider

mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v.

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted).

We therefore conclude Appellant has raised a substantial question, and we will

review the merits of his claim.

Appellant argues the trial court imposed a “manifestly excessive”

sentence and failed to “meaningfully consider the statutory factors or

Appellant’s mitigation [evidence.]” Appellant’s Brief at 43. Appellant

maintains the trial court gave “no weight” to mitigating factors, id. at 45,

including Appellant’s age (48 years old), the age of his prior convictions, his

employment status, community and family support, childhood trauma, and

“serious physical and mental health problems, including hypertension, chronic

pain from multiple gunshot wounds, and PTSD.” Id. at 44; see also id.

(stating Appellant was shot seven times in 1995). Appellant also argues that

“even if the jury disbelieved Appellant’s claim of complete self-defense,” the

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trial court should have considered Appellant’s version of events, in which

Griffin and Burden provoked the fatal confrontation. Id. at 46-47.

Additionally, Appellant maintains the trial court “relied heavily on

Appellant’s prior record score, thereby improperly double-counting his prior

record score.” Id. at 46 (citing Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721,

732 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating that “when fashioning a sentence, a

sentencing court may not ‘double count’ factors already taken into account in

the [S]entencing [G]uidelines.”)). Appellant further asserts the trial court

provided no on-the-record reason for its decision to impose consecutive

sentences for third-degree murder and persons not to possess firearms. Id.

Finally, Appellant maintains the aggregate minimum sentence of 27 years’

imprisonment “could easily be an effective life sentence,” based on Appellant’s

age and medical problems. Id. at 48.

The Commonwealth counters that the trial court had the benefit of a

PSI, and must therefore be presumed to have “properly considered and

weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s sentence.”

Commonwealth Brief at 19 (quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652,

663 (Pa. Super. 2013)). The Commonwealth asserts Appellant does not claim

the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, “but rather that the court

weighed those factors in a manner inconsistent with his wishes.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2014)). The

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Commonwealth emphasizes that the trial court imposed standard-range

sentences for each of Appellant’s convictions. Id. at 21-22.

The standard of review we observe “when reviewing the discretionary

aspects of sentencing is very narrow.” Commonwealth v. King, 182 A.3d

449, 454 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or

arrived [at] a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Torres, 303 A.3d 1058, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

“In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony … the

court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time

of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence

imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The Sentencing Code requires the trial

court to

follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call

for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public,

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of

the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of

the defendant.

Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d 1087, 1094 (Pa. Super.

2022) (stating “the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record,

age, personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.” (citation

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omitted)). “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court is required to

consider the sentence ranges set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines, but it is

not bound by the Sentencing Guidelines.” Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210

A.3d 316, 320 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and brackets omitted).

Additionally,

[w]here the sentencing court had the benefit of a [PSI], we can

assume the sentencing court “was aware of relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988); see

also Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 368 (Pa. Super.

2005) (stating if sentencing court has benefit of PSI, law expects

court was aware of relevant information regarding defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with any

mitigating factors). Further, where a sentence is within the

standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views

the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

See Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa.

Super. 1995) (stating combination of PSI and standard range

sentence, absent more, cannot be considered excessive or

unreasonable).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

modified; emphasis added).

Finally, we observe that

Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose

its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences

being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.

An appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” on his multiple

convictions by the imposition of concurrent sentences.

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citation and brackets omitted).

Instantly, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that

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in fashioning the appropriate sentence, the court explicitly

considered the following: the Sentencing Guidelines; everything

presented during the history of [Appellant’s] case; [Appellant’s

PSI] report and mental health evaluation; everything submitted

during [Appellant’s] sentencing hearing; the statements made

[during the hearing] on behalf of [Appellant] and on behalf of the

decedent; [Appellant’s] allocution; [Appellant’s] rehabilitative

needs; the need for the protection of the public; and the gravity

of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the

community. N.T., 1/31/2025, at 37-39. In addition, the court

delineated and weighed both the mitigating and aggravating

factors in the case. Id. at 39.

While [Appellant] argues that the court erred in sentencing

him to an “excessive” aggregate sentence of 27 to 54 years’

incarceration, this argument is meritless. [Each] of the sentences

imposed by the court … were standard-range sentences. Although

the court did run the 7-to-14-year sentence [for] possession of a

firearm by a prohibited person [] consecutive to the murder

sentence, as the court explained during [Appellant’s] sentencing

hearing, this was not a “mainstream” third-degree murder case.

N.T., 1/31/25, at 39. [Appellant] shot the decedent five times,

including four times in vital parts of his body, with a firearm he

was prohibited from carrying. Id. Additionally, as the court noted

during [the] sentencing [hearing, Appellant’s] history of violence,

which included a previous [first-degree felony] conviction for …

aggravated assault, also served as an aggravating factor

underlying the court’s decision to give [Appellant] a consecutive

sentence. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 16-17 (some record citations, capitalization,

and punctuation modified; footnote omitted); see also id. at 17 n.7

(describing in detail the Sentencing Guideline ranges for each of Appellant’s

convictions).

Our review of the record confirms the trial court had the benefit of a PSI

and considered all relevant sentencing factors in fashioning Appellant’s

sentence. Because the trial court imposed standard-range sentences, its

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consideration of Appellant’s prior criminal record did not, contrary to

Appellant’s assertion, constitute “double counting” of that record. Appellant’s

Brief at 46; see also Commonwealth v. Messmer, 863 A.2d 567, 573 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (explaining that, in “justifying an upward departure” from the

Sentencing Guidelines, trial courts “may not include those [factors] already

taken into account in the [G]uidelines calculations.” (emphasis added)).

Rather, in imposing standard-range sentences, the trial court properly

acknowledged a factor that informed the Sentencing Guidelines’ formulation

of the standard ranges. Finally, the trial court had ample discretion to impose

consecutive sentences, and Appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” on

his multiple convictions. Lawrence, 313 A.3d at 286. We discern no abuse

of the trial court’s sentencing discretion in imposing Appellant’s standard-

range sentences. See Moury, 992 A.2d at 171. Accordingly, Appellant’s third

and final issue merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 6/4/2026

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