Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:23-cv-433-WWB-MCR

TROYZ TOWING AND STORAGE,

INC.,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the two-day, non-jury trial that commenced on

February 24, 2025, on Plaintiff J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.’s (“J.B. Hunt”) claims against

Defendant Troyz Towing and Storage, Inc. (“Troyz Towing”).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“In an action tried on the facts without a jury[,] . . . the court must find the facts

specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and

conclusions . . . may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the

court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). “The burden of proof in civil cases is the same regardless

of whether the finder of fact is a judge in a bench trial or a jury.” Men of Destiny Ministries,

Inc. v. Osceola Cnty., No. 6:06-cv-624-Orl, 2006 WL 3219321, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6,

2006). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,

each element of its claim. Id. “A ‘preponderance of the evidence’ . . . means an amount

of evidence that is enough to persuade [the trier of fact] that the Plaintiff’s claim is more

likely true than not true.” Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) of the Eleventh Circuit,

Basic Instruction No. 3.7.1.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

This case arises from a dispute regarding Troyz Towing’s towing, storage, and sale

of a trailer leased by J.B. Hunt. J.B. Hunt is a motor carrier and freight broker. (Doc. 9,

¶ 2; Doc. 14, ¶ 2). It 2014, J.B. Hunt entered into an Equipment Lease Agreement with

Bowman Trailer Leasing, LLC (“Bowman”). (Doc. 56-4 at 1). Pursuant to the lease

agreement, J.B. Hunt leased a 2020 Hyundai trailer and maintained a right to possess

the trailer, which J.B. used for business. (Doc. 58 at 61:2–6, 129:1–4, 157:14–17,

187:10–13). J.B. Hunt subsequently contracted with an independent motor carrier,

allowing the carrier to haul J.B. Hunt loads using the trailer. (Id. at 161:17–18, 163:2–5).

Unbeknownst to J.B. Hunt, the motor carrier abandoned the trailer at a service station.

(Id. at 134:1–4, 163:3–5; see also Doc. 56-2 at 26).

On July 12, 2022, Troyz Towing towed the trailer from the service station. (Doc.

34 at 7). Decals of J.B. Hunt’s identification, cell phone number, and e-mail, as well as

Bowman’s identification and cell phone number, were visibly displayed on the back of the

trailer. (Doc. 56-13 at 24–29). Pursuant to the requirements of section 713.78, Florida

Statutes, which governs liens for recovering, towing, or storing vehicles, Troyz Towing’s

corporate representative, Nicole Bostick, testified that Troyz Towing searched the vehicle

identification number (“VIN”) through a third-party database, Auto Data Direct. (Doc. 58

at 29:25–30:11); see also Fla. Stat § 713.78(4)(a).1 The VIN search did not reveal any

information, which Bostick admits frequently occurs with trailers. (Id. at 91:1–12 (“Trailers

1 The Court looks to the 2022 version of the Florida Statutes, which governed the

parties at the time of their conduct.

never pull up anything[.]”)). Notably, Troyz Towing did not run the license plate through

the system. (Id. at 54:14–55:1). J.B. Hunt’s corporate representative, Benjamin Warren,

testified that J.B. Hunt did not receive any communication—certified mail, phone call, or

e-mail—from Troyz Towing. (Id. at 133:20–23).2 Instead, on July 15, 2022, Troyz Towing

mailed a “good faith” letter to the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in which it certified that “a

physical search” of the trailer did not reveal any owner, insurer, or lienholder information.

(Doc. 56-21 at 1); see also Fla. Stat. § 713.78(4)(e) (listing actions that must be taken to

constitute a “good faith effort”).

Nonetheless, on July 26, Mr. Warren located the trailer through its GPS device and

called Troyz Towing at its phone number listed on Google. (Doc. 58 at 128:12–21).

During the call with Ms. Creamer, Mr. Warren confirmed the trailer’s identification and

stated J.B. Hunt’s intent to retrieve it. (Id. at 134:1–11). To release the trailer, Troyz

Towing required a hold harmless agreement and payment for towage and storage. (Id.

at 134:12–17). Mr. Warren stated that J.B. Hunt could pay only by “comchek”3 and

therefore required Troyz Towing’s tax identification number. (Id. at 134:20–22). Ms.

Creamer did not have the tax identification number but said she would obtain it from Mrs.

Bostick. (Id. at 136:2–5). E-mails immediately following the phone call reflect Mr. Warren

and Ms. Creamer’s communications regarding the hold harmless agreement, request for

2 Mr. Warren’s account of the parties’ communications regarding the trailer’s

release diametrically opposes that of Mrs. Bostick and Troyz Towing’s administrative

assistant, Joy Creamer. Because the Court does not credit Mrs. Bostick and Ms.

Creamer’s testimony, it adopts Mr. Warren’s account of events regarding their

communications.

3 According to Mr. Warren, a “comchek” is similar to a personal check but requires

an express code, such as a tax identification number, to issue payment and is often used

by transportation and motor carriers. (Id. at 134:25–135:8).

the tax identification number to make payment, and J.B. Hunt’s request for the invoice,

which totaled $2,440.00. (Doc. 56-11 at 7–11).

On August 18, J.B. Hunt mailed Troyz Towing all the necessary paperwork. (Doc.

58 at 85:21–22, 144:4–8). Despite Mr. Warren’s repeated attempts to obtain the tax

identification to finalize the trailer’s release with payment over the next several weeks,

Troyz Towing did not provide it. (Id. at 147:3–24, 182:24–183:3). Rather, without J.B.

Hunt’s knowledge, Troyz Towing set the trailer for auction. (Id. at 147:25–148:11). The

trailer was auctioned to a third party on August 24, but it was only in September, when

Mr. Warren called again to obtain the tax identification number, that J.B. Hunt learned of

the sale. (Id. at 80:3–8, 148:13–21). Due to the sale, J.B. Hunt could not complete a load

with a customer and had to continue its monthly lease payments for the trailer, as well as

purchase the trailer from Bowman for $33,920.00 pursuant to their contract. (Id. at 150:6–

8, 151:8–152:7).

J.B. Hunt seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees

against Troyz Towing for Fraud (Count I), Conversion (Count II), Replevin (Count IV), and

Unjust Enrichment (Count V).4 (See generally Doc. 9).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As an initial matter, Troyz Towing claims this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

because the amount in controversy is not met. “The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different

4 J.B. Hunt has withdrawn its claim for tortious interference with a business

relationship. (See Doc. 50 at 1).

States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In determining the amount in controversy, the relevant

question is whether the plaintiff seeks damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit, not

whether the plaintiff will actually recover sufficient damages. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza

II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 751 (11th Cir. 2010).

Troyz Towing argues that because J.B. Hunt did not own the trailer, its value

should not be considered. However, “under Florida law, a lienholder is considered to be

the ‘owner’ of property for the purposes of conversion if he has the present right to

possession.” Beach Cmty. Bank v. Disposal Servs., LLC, 199 So. 3d 1132, 1134 (Fla.

1st DCA 2016) (citing Bel-Bel Int’l Corp. v. Cmty. Bank of Homestead, 162 F.3d 1101,

1108 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thus, the trailer’s value, alleged in the Amended Complaint at

approximately $45,000.00, is sufficiently placed in controversy. (Doc. 9, ¶¶ 8–9).

J.B. Hunt additionally alleged a daily cost of $225.00 in consequential damages

for the trailer’s lost profits, which totaled $61,650.00 at the time of filing. (Id. ¶ 26); see

also Orlando Health, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1302 (M.D. Fla.

2025) (explaining that loss of use, rental expenses, and lost profits are consequential

damages under Florida law); Marlin VI Princess Deep Sea Fishing, LLC v. N. Assurance

Co. of Am., No. 8:13-cv-01812, 2013 WL 5920269, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013)

(considering consequential damages in determining the amount in controversy).

Accordingly, these sums alone exceed the amount in controversy.

A. Conversion

J.B. Hunt alleges that Troyz Towing converted the trailer when it withheld and sold

the vehicle. “Under Florida law, the elements of conversion are (1) an act of dominion

wrongfully asserted; (2) over another’s property; and (3) inconsistent with his ownership

therein.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Creative Ent., LLC, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241

(M.D. Fla. 2013) (quotation omitted).

It is undisputed that Troyz Towing rightfully gained possession when the service

station instructed Troyz Towing to remove the abandoned trailer from its property. See

Fla. Stat. § 715.07(2) (2022). But the right is not absolute: “[w]hen a defendant rightfully

acquires possession of a plaintiff’s property, an action for conversion may arise out of the

plaintiff’s demand for its return and the defendant’s refusal to surrender it.” United States

v. Bailey, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1275 (M.D. Fla. 2003); see also Joseph v. Chanin, 940

So. 2d 483, 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Based on the parties’ agreement, J.B. Hunt had a right to reclaim the trailer upon

payment. To tender payment, J.B. Hunt repeatedly attempted to obtain Troyz Towing’s

tax identification number. (Doc. 58 at 147:3–18, 182:24–183:3). In failing to provide the

number, Troyz Towing refused to accept payment and thereby wrongfully deprived J.B.

Hunt of its possessory interest in the trailer. See Marine Transp. Servs. Sea-Barge Grp.,

Inc. v. Python High Performance Marine Corp., 16 F.3d 1133, 1140 (11th Cir. 1994)

(holding that a cargo transporter converted a purchaser’s property when the purchaser

presented payment for release of the contracted cargo and the transporter refused to

accept the check); Beach Cmty. Bank, 199 So. 3d at 1135 (holding that the plaintiff

properly alleged that the defendant converted the bank’s collateral interest in property by

failing to comply with the bank’s lawful demand for the property’s return).

Additionally, Troyz Towing also wrongfully deprived J.B. Hunt of its possessory

interest when it auctioned the trailer because the sale violated section 713.78. First, the

statute authorizes the public sale of vehicles “for which reasonable charges for recovery,

towing, or storing remain unpaid.” Fla. Stat. § 713.78(6). There was no right to auction

the trailer as “unpaid” because, as already explained, Troyz Towing impeded J.B. Hunt’s

active efforts to make payment.

Second, Troyz Towing failed to provide the requisite notice of the trailer’s sale.

Fla. Stat. § 713.78(6) (“The notice [of sale] must be sent to the owner of the vehicle or

vessel and the person having the recorded lien on the vehicle or vessel at the address

shown on the records of the registering agency at least 30 days before the sale of the

vehicle or vessel.”). Even if the Court credited Mrs. Bostick’s testimony that the database

search of the trailer’s VIN did not produce J.B. Hunt or Bowman’s information, their

information was clearly displayed on the outside of the trailer. (Doc. 56-13 at 24–29).

Still, Troyz Towing did not contact J.B. Hunt. (Doc. 58 at 133:20–23).

Finally, Troyz Towing did not wait fifty days from the date the trailer was first stored

before selling it. See Fla. Stat. § 713.78(6) (“[The vehicle] may be sold by the owner or

operator of the storage space for such towing or storage charge . . . 50 days after the

vehicle or vessel is stored by the lienor if the vehicle or vessel is 3 years of age or less.”).

With a manufacture date of September 2019 and the sale occurring in August 2022, the

trailer was less than three years old. (Doc. 58 at 80:3–8, 146:25–147:2). However, only

forty-three days passed from the trailer’s storage on July 12, 2022, to its sale on August

24, 2022.

Florida courts strictly adhere to section 713.78’s requirements. See, e.g., Save A

Lot Car Rental, Inc. v. Tri J. Co. Towing & Recovery, 325 So. 3d 285, 289 (Fla. 2d DCA

2021) (“Because [the defendant] did not comply with the notice requirements of section

713.78, it was improper for it to sell [the plaintiff’s] vehicle.”); Dowell v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 269 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“The notice requirements of

[section 713.78] are not discretionary; nor are they a technicality. Based on the plain

language of the statute, timely notice is mandatory and serves several essential

purposes.”); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sw. Transp., Inc., 668 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1996) (holding that a towing company must forfeit its storage charges because it did

not use good faith best efforts to comply with section 713.78’s notice requirements).

Troyz Towing violated these requirements and consequently converted the trailer.

Troyz Towing claims the doctrine of unclean hands bars recovery because J.B.

Hunt did not pay the towing and storage fee. However, the doctrine is premised on a

finding that the lack of payment was J.B. Hunt’s fault. See Calloway v. Partners Nat’l

Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 450–51 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[T]o successfully avail itself of the

doctrine of unclean hands, . . . the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff’s

wrongdoing is directly related to the claim against which it is asserted.” (emphasis

added)). As previously explained, Troyz Towing impeded J.B. Hunt’s payment attempts

and, therefore, the unclean hands defense fails. For the same reason, Troyz Towing’s

assertion that J.B. Hunt failed to mitigate its damages when it failed to pay the towing and

storage fees also fails. (See Doc. 59 at 161:11–17). Therefore, the Court finds in favor

of Plaintiff as to Count II.

B. Fraudulent Misrepresentation

J.B. Hunt asks this Court to find Troyz Towing liable for fraudulent

misrepresentation based upon Troyz Towing’s statement that it would release the trailer

upon payment and the company’s subsequent failure to do so. “A fraudulent

misrepresentation claim under Florida law has four elements: ‘(1) a false statement

concerning a material fact; (2) the representor’s knowledge that the representation is

false; (3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and (4)

consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.’” Harris v. Jayo

(In re Harris), 3 F.4th 1339, 1349 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d

102, 105 (Fla. 2010)).

As previously stated, evidence introduced at trial displays that J.B. Hunt diligently

sought to obtain Troyz Towing’s tax identification number to provide payment. Troyz

Towing did not object to providing the number and represented for an extended period of

time that it was actively working to provide the information. (Doc. 56-11 at 8; Doc. 58 at

136:2–5, 147:11–16). Meanwhile, the company set and sold the trailer at auction. In

doing so, Troyz Towing not only made a false statement, but a false omission by failing

to provide notice of the auction under section 713.78(6). See Wurtzebach v. Flooring

Depot FTL, Inc., 384 So. 3d 251, 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (explaining that under a

common law fraud claim, “a defendant ma[kes] a material false statement or omission

directly to the plaintiff” (emphasis added) (quoting Gulf Coast Produce, Inc. v. Am.

Growers, Inc., No. 07-80633-CIV, 2008 WL 660100, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2008))).

On these facts, the Court reasonably infers that Troyz Towing knew it would not

provide J.B. Hunt with the tax identification number and furthermore intended to induce

J.B. Hunt to rely on its representations to prevent J.B. Hunt from obtaining the trailer

before its auction. See Fifth Episcopal Dist. Dev., Inc. v. Associated Bldg. Servs., Inc.,

No. 2:16-CV-213, 2018 WL 9943828, at *4 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2018) (inferring that the

defendant, despite his representations otherwise, knew he and his company were not

licensed to do business in the state and that defendant intended to induce plaintiff to hire

his company with such representations). As a result, J.B. Hunt was deprived of its

leasehold interest in the trailer.

In its defense, Troyz Towing argues that the independent motor carrier’s

abandonment of the trailer was an intervening or superseding cause of J.B. Hunt’s

damages. The Court finds no reason why the abandonment precludes J.B. Hunt from

pursuing claims against Troyz Towing for its conduct, and Troyz Towing fails to expound

upon its defense in its argument for a directed verdict and its proposed findings of fact

and conclusions of law. Troyz Towing also argues that the motor carrier is an

indispensable party to this action. However, similar to the intervening or superseding

cause defense, how the trailer ended up abandoned has no relevance to Troyz Towing’s

conduct after it rightfully gained possession of the trailer. The Court can provide full relief

to the existing parties and proceed without impeding the motor carrier’s interests or

exposing either existing party to multiple or inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a)(1). Accordingly, both defenses fail, and the Court finds in favor of Plaintiff with

respect to Count I.

C. Replevin

In its Amended Complaint, J.B. Hunt sought a Writ of Replevin for the trailer’s

return. (Doc. 9, ¶ 55). At trial, however, J.B. Hunt conceded that recovery of the trailer

is not permitted because Troyz Towing no longer possesses the trailer; instead, J.B. Hunt

seeks damages under the replevin statute, arguing that it is entitled to the trailer’s fair

market value in lieu of the trailer itself. (Doc. 58 at 204:25–205:12).

“Any person whose personal property is wrongfully detained by any other person

or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover said personal property and any damages

sustained by reason of the wrongful taking or detention as herein provided.” Fla. Stat.

§ 78.01 (2022). “However, an action for replevin is primarily possessory in nature, and

the damages set forth in the statute refer to those incurred as a consequence of the

unlawful detention, as opposed to the value of the property itself.” Idoni v. Ungurean, No.

6:14-CV-102-Orl, 2014 WL 12614498, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2014) (collecting cases);

see also Textron Fin. Corp. v. Unique Marine, Inc., No. 08-10082-CIV, 2008 WL 4716965,

at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2008) (“[A writ of replevin] is not designed ‘for the purpose of

recovering the amount which might be found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff

on account, but to recover the property in dispute.’” (quoting Future Tech Int’l, Inc. v. Tae

Il Media, Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 1538, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1996))). Neither in its argument

opposing Troyz Towing’s Motion for Directed Verdict nor in its proposed findings of facts

and conclusions of law does J.B. Hunt cite any authority reflecting otherwise. Because

Troyz Towing no longer possesses the trailer and replevin does not provide recovery for

the trailer’s value, J.B. Hunt’s replevin claim fails.

D. Unjust Enrichment

J.B. Hunt next claims Troyz Towing was unjustly enriched when it sold the trailer

and retained the proceeds. “A claim for unjust enrichment has three elements: (1) the

plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant voluntarily accepted

and retained that benefit; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable

for the defendants to retain it without paying the value thereof.” Virgilio v. Ryland Grp.,

Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Winter Park,

887 So. 2d 1237, 1241 n.4 (Fla. 2004)). Importantly, to satisfy the first element, “[t]he

plaintiff must directly confer a benefit to the defendant.” Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812,

818 (Fla. 2017) (emphasis added).

Upon review, the Court concludes that J.B. Hunt fails on its unjust enrichment

claim. At trial, J.B. Hunt presented no evidence that it directly conferred a benefit upon

Troyz Towing. “[A] party is not directly benefited by the plaintiff when the only benefit it

received was for performing a service for a different party under a different, albeit arguable

related, contract.” Coffey v. WCW & Air, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-90, 2018 WL 4154256, at *9

(N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2018) (citing Virgilio, 680 F.3d at 1337). This is not to say a direct

benefit cannot pass through an intermediary. See Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,

No. 11-21233-CIV, 2011 WL 4368980, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2011). Still, where an

intermediary is involved, the defendant must have “directly profited from and [been]

involved in depriving the plaintiff of the benefit at issue.” Garcia v. Character Techs., Inc.,

785 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1184–85 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (quoting Coffey, 2018 WL 4154256, at

*9).

For example, the Williams court held that the presence of an intermediary did not

interrupt a benefit from being conferred. Williams, 2011 WL 4368980, at *9–10. There,

homeowners challenging an excessively priced forced-placed insurance policy asserted

a claim for unjust enrichment against the insurance broker and the bank imposing the

insurance policy. Id. at *1, 8. While the bank and insurance broker only received

commission or kickbacks from the premium payments made to the insurance company,

the payments passed through the insurance company to the bank and insurance broker.

Id. at *9. Neither had direct contact with the homeowners, but the defendants nonetheless

received a direct benefit. Id.

Distinctly, here, the third-party purchaser of the trailer conferred the benefit—

payment—upon Troyz Towing. J.B. Hunt’s execution of the hold harmless and

agreement to issue payment, although related to the trailer, is separate from the third

party’s performance of its contract with Troyz Towing. The benefit did not pass from J.B.

Hunt through the third-party; rather, the parties maintained separate agreements requiring

separate performance. J.B. Hunt’s conferral of a benefit to support a claim for unjust

enrichment is too tangential and thus its claims for unjust enrichment fails.

E. Damages

J.B. Hunt seeks actual damages in the trailer’s fair market value, consequential

damages for lost profits, punitive damages, pre-judgment interest, and attorney’s fees.

Upon review, J.B. Hunt is entitled to actual damages, punitive damages, pre-judgment

interest, and attorney’s fees and costs.

J.B. Hunt argues that it is entitled to the fair market value of the trailer, which the

parties have stipulated to, as actual damages. However, J.B. Hunt did not own the trailer

but had, instead, a leasehold interest in the property. Ordinarily, the proper measure of

damages where a plaintiff has only a leasehold interest in the converted property is the

fair market value of the leasehold interest. Fletcher v. Dees, 134 So. 234, 235 (Fla. 1931)

(holding that “one who has a special interest can only recover the value of his special

interest in the property”); Page v. Matthews, 386 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (“It

is also well settled that one who has a special interest in personal property can only

recover in a conversion action the value of his interest in the property.”).5 At trial, J.B.

5 The Fourth District Court of Appeal recently discussed the applicability of the

“stranger” rule in Florida, which “allows special interest holders to recover the full value

of the property but only in cases where the holder of such limited or qualified interest is

Hunt offered testimony that it was able to negotiate a buyout of the remainder of its lease

agreement with Bowman for a total of $32,920.00. (Doc. 58 at 151:8–152:7, 171:11–13).

The Court finds that this is a reasonable representation of the value of J.B. Hunt’s interest

in the property and will award J.B. Hunt the same.6

With respect to J.B. Hunt’s request for an award of $225.00 in daily lost profits, the

Court finds it is not warranted here. While pleaded in the Amended Complaint, J.B. Hunt

did not present evidence establishing this amount at trial and thus fails to satisfy its

burden.

As to punitive damages, courts typically award such damages “where there is

some evidence in the record of actual malice or reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights

by the defendant in asserting dominion over the plaintiff’s property—as this proof places

the case squarely under the intentional tort-malice rule in which punitive damages are

recoverable.” Ciamar Marcy, Inc. v. Monteiro Da Costa, 508 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1987) (collecting cases).

Having found that Troyz Towing made fraudulent misrepresentations and failed to

comply with several statutory requirements, the conduct demonstrates a disregard for

state law and J.B. Hunt’s rights, thereby warranting an award of punitive damages in the

also liable to a person owning a superior or remainder interest.” Hollywood Imps. Ltd.,

Inc. v. Nationwide Fin. Servs., LLC, 360 So. 3d 759, 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (citing First

Tenn. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Graphic Arts Ctr., Inc., 859 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Mo. Ct. App.

1993)). However, the Fourth District held that the rule did not apply in the case before it

and this Court has not located any legal authority applying the rule in Florida. Id. at 763.

As such, the Court declines to apply it in this case absent more clear authority from the

state courts.

6 J.B. Hunt is not entitled to monetary damages for each claim. See Coton v.

Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“[A]

plaintiff may not recover damages twice for the same injury simply because she has two

legal theories.”).

amount of $20,000.00. See Ensley v. Gene’s Wrecker Serv., Inc., No. 3:16cv713, 2019

WL 1063392, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2019) (awarding punitive damages for conversion

where defendant sold plaintiff’s vehicle and did not provide requisite notice of the vehicle’s

storage and sale), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1059689 (N.D. Fla.

Mar. 6, 2019); Pinnacle Fin. Grp., Inc. v. TriStar Acceptance, LLC, No. 16-62169-CIV,

2017 WL 7355331, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2017) (awarding punitive damages where

defendant converted plaintiff’s property despite knowing it had no right to the property),

report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 7362290 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2017).

Next, J.B. Hunt is entitled to pre-judgment interest. See Fattorusso v. M/V

WANDERER II, No. 2:10-cv-201-FtM, 2012 WL 3143843, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2012)

(“The proper measure of damages for conversion is the fair or reasonable market value

at the time and place of the conversion, plus prejudgment interest.”). Because the parties

have not specially contracted for the rate of interest, section 55.03, Florida Statutes,

applies. See TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1303 (S.D.

Fla. 2016) (“In the absence of a special contract for the rate, the applicable rate of interest

is generally stated in Florida Statute Section 55.03.” (quotation omitted)). Pre-judgment

interest is accrued from the date of the conversion until the judgment. See Fattorusso,

2012 WL 3143843, at *2. Conversion occurs “at the time the [defendant] refused to return

the [plaintiff’s] property when [it] was requested to do so.” Gillette v. Stapleton, 336 So.

2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In this case, that date is unclear because Troyz

Towing misrepresented for a period of time that it would provide the tax identification

number. Because J.B. Hunt does not proffer a date for which the conversion first occurred

and it is unclear from the record, the Court dates pre-judgment interest to accrue from the

date on which Troyz Towing sold the trailer, August 24, 2022.

Lastly, the parties dispute whether J.B. Hunt is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

J.B. Hunt argues that section 713.78(6), Florida Statutes provides for attorney’s fees and

costs in favor of the prevailing party. Troyz Towing claims the statute limits such awards

to actions filed in county court.

Section 713.78(6) provides in pertinent part:

The owner or lienholder may file a complaint after the vehicle or vessel has

been sold in the county court of the county in which it is stored. Upon

determining the respective rights of the parties, the court may award

damages, attorney fees, and costs in favor of the prevailing party.

Troyz Towing’s argument that the right to attorney’s fees under this subsection is

restricted to actions filed in county court is undermined by the statute’s permissive

language, “may.” See Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Badger Acquisition of Tampa LLC, 983

So. 2d 1175, 1181 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“When interpreting a statute, ‘shall’ is

generally read as being mandatory while ‘may’ suggests a permissive term.”). Section

713.78(6) “simply permits an owner to file a complaint in the county court, not . . . that an

owner may file a complaint only in the county court.” Fla. Keys Towing, Inc. v. CarMax

Auto Superstores, Inc., 406 So. 3d 1096, 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); see also Mirra v.

Junior’s Tow & Storage, LLC, No. 20-20036-CIV, 2020 WL 13389752, at *2 (S.D. Fla.

Nov. 17, 2020) (awarding attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 713.78(5)(c),

which contains the same language regarding filing in county court), report and

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 13389744 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2020). Accordingly,

J.B. Hunt is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be determined in

accordance with Local Rule 7.01.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.,

and against Troyz Towing and Storage, Inc., as to Count I and Count II of

the Amended Complaint in the sum of $52,920.00 plus pre-judgment

interest.

2. The Clerk is further directed to enter judgment in favor of Troyz Towing and

Storage, Inc., and against J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., providing that J.B. Hunt

Transport Inc. shall take nothing as to Count IV and Count V of the

Amended Complaint.

3. Defendant Troyz Towing and Storage, Inc.’s Oral Motion for Directed

Verdict (Doc. 52) and Renewed Oral Motion for Directed Verdict (Doc. 54)

are DENIED.

4. The parties shall confer in a good-faith effort to resolve the reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs and shall notify the Court if an agreement has

been reached. If the parties cannot agree on the amount, then Plaintiff shall

file a motion in accordance with Local Rule 7.01 on or before March 10,

2026.

5. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on February 19, 2026.

WENDY W.B

UNITED STATES T JUDG

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

18