Opinion

Roeber

Court
District Court, N.D. Illinois
Filed
Mar 31, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.8%

noting that one example of purposefully directing activities at the forum state includes causing products to be distributed in the forum state

How later courts described this case

  • noting that one example of purposefully directing activities at the forum state includes causing products to be distributed in the forum state
  • finding purposeful availment based upon defendant’s shipping of product to Illinois, which product was related to the suit because the product allegedly infringed plaintiff’s trademark
  • “[W]e accept as true any facts contained in the defendant’s affidavits that remain unrefuted by the plaintiff.”
  • “[O]nce the defendant has submitted affidavits or other evidence in opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit affirmative evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GARY ROEBER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 25-cv-04908

v. )

) Judge April M. Perry

HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., )

4TH GENERATION DEVELOPMENT )

INC., and KEENAN MANAGEMENT, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Roeber (“Plaintiff”) brought claims of negligence against Defendants Hilton

Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (“Hilton Worldwide”), 4th Generation Development Inc. (“4th

Generation”), and Keenan Management, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). Doc. 38. Defendants

have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Doc. 39, 41. For the reasons set forth

below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.

BACKGROUND

While traveling on Interstate 80, Plaintiff’s wife used his Hilton app to look for a Hilton

hotel where they could stay, ultimately booking a room at a Hampton Inn located in North Platte,

Nebraska. Doc. 38 ¶ 32.1 During their stay at the Hampton Inn, Plaintiff slipped and fell on an

unsecured paver brick in a walkway at the hotel. Id. ¶ 33-34. Plaintiff’s fall resulted in a

fractured hip, hospitalization, and multiple surgeries. Id. ¶ 35.

1 Plaintiff has been a member of Hilton’s rewards program since 2009. Id. ¶ 26.

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff filed suit against Hilton Worldwide, 4th

Generation, and Keenan Management, LLC. Id.2 Hilton Worldwide is a Delaware corporation

with its principal place of business in Virginia. Id. ¶ 5. Hilton Worldwide owns brands including

“Hampton Inn” and its subsidiaries include Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. and

Hilton Franchise Holding, LLC. Id. ¶¶ 5-7.3 4th Generation is a Nebraska corporation with its

principal place of business in Nebraska. Id. ¶ 10. 4th Generation owns, operates, maintains, and

controls the North Platte Hampton Inn. Id. ¶ 9. Finally, Keenan Management, LLC is a Nebraska

limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska. Id. ¶ 11. Keenan

Management, LLC is the property manager of the North Platte Hampton Inn. Id. ¶ 12.

LEGAL STANDARD

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction once it has been

challenged. See N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014). When ruling

on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a court may consider facts in affidavits

submitted by the parties, but a plaintiff is entitled to have factual disputes in those affidavits

resolved in his favor. See Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782-83

(7th Cir. 2003). If a defendant submits evidence “in opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction, the

plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit affirmative evidence supporting the exercise

2 Despite the fact that Plaintiff named Richard Simmons in the prior two complaints and subsequent

filings, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint did not include Richard Simmons in the caption nor was he

named elsewhere in the complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10, all parties must be

named in a complaint's caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. Parties can be dropped from a cause of action

through the filing of an amended complaint that does not name the party. See Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d

851, 858 (7th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the Court concludes that Richard Simmons is no longer a defendant

to this action.

3 The complaint’s caption refers to Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc. and Hilton Franchise

Holding LLC as d/b/a’s of Hilton Worldwide, but the body of the complaint acknowledges that they are

subsidiaries. A subsidiary is its own legal entity, whereas a d/b/a allows a company to operate under a

fictitious name. Neither subsidiary is named as a defendant in this action.

of jurisdiction.” Id. at 783. When a court rules on a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff “need only make out a

prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir.

2002).

A federal court sitting in diversity “has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only if a

court of the state in which it sits would have such jurisdiction.” Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368,

1371 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). The Illinois long-arm statute permits the

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment's

Due Process Clause. See Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 590 (7th Cir. 2021). Under the Due

Process Clause, a court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant

unless the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Kipp v. Ski Enter.

Corp. of Wisc., 783 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). General jurisdiction is “all-purpose” while

specific jurisdiction is case-specific. Id. at 697-98. General personal jurisdiction exists when a

defendant is “at home” in the forum state. Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action

Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2014). Generally, a corporation is “at home” in its

state of incorporation and in its principal place of business. Id. To demonstrate specific

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case that (1) defendants have sufficient

minimum contacts with the forum state such that they have “purposefully availed [themselves] of

the privilege of conducting business in the forum state”; (2) the plaintiff’s injuries arise out of or

relate to defendants’ activities in the forum state; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction over the

defendants “comport[s] with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Lexington

Ins. Co. v. Hotai Ins. Co., Ltd., 938 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2019).

ANALYSIS

I. Hilton Worldwide

Plaintiff argues that this Court has both general and specific jurisdiction over Hilton

Worldwide due to the fact that Hilton is a nationwide company that targets Illinois residents to

stay at its network of Hilton-branded hotels. For the reasons that follow, the Court does not agree

that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated either general or specific personal jurisdiction over

Hilton Worldwide.

Although Hilton is certainly a national brand, Hilton Worldwide has submitted evidence

that it is a holding company with no employees, no properties in Illinois, and no involvement

with the Hampton Inn in North Platte, Nebraska. Doc. 40-1 at 1-2. The complaint seemingly

acknowledges this, alleging that Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc. is the subsidiary of

Hilton Worldwide responsible for licensing, operating, and managing hotels. Doc. 38 ¶ 6. The

complaint further alleges that Hilton Franchise Holding LLC, another subsidiary of Hilton

Worldwide, is responsible for franchising Hampton Inns. Id. ¶ 7. The preliminary question thus

becomes to what extent the Court can consider actions of Hilton Worldwide’s subsidiaries when

deciding whether personal jurisdiction over Hilton Worldwide is appropriate. And the answer is:

based upon the evidence submitted, it cannot.

As a general rule, jurisdiction over a parent company may not be based merely on its

subsidiary's contacts with the forum. Purdue Rsch. Found., 338 F.3d at 788 n.17 (7th Cir. 2003).

Illinois courts recognize two methods by which personal jurisdiction over a subsidiary may be

imputed to the parent company: (1) when the corporate veil has been pierced or (2) when the

parent company substantially controls the activities of its subsidiary doing business in Illinois.

See id.; see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998).

“[W]here corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not dominate the

subsidiary, a parent and a subsidiary are two separate entities and the acts of one cannot be

attributed to the other.” Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World

Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence or argument that the actions of Hilton

Worldwide’s subsidiaries are legally attributable to Hilton Worldwide, instead opting to

continually treat “Hilton” as a monolith. Although the complaint alleges that Hilton Worldwide

owns, operates, maintains, manages and controls hotels throughout the State of Illinois and

requires that franchisees follow specific design and construction standards, these allegations are

not sufficient to refute the affidavit submitted by Hilton Worldwide providing facts to the

contrary, especially in light of the fact that the complaint also acknowledges that it is Hilton

Worldwide’s subsidiaries who are actually responsible for these functions.4 See Purdue Rsch.

Found., 338 F.3d at 783 (“[O]nce the defendant has submitted affidavits or other evidence in

opposition to the exercise of jurisdiction, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit

affirmative evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.”); see also GCIU-Emp. Ret. Fund v.

Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e accept as true any facts

contained in the defendant’s affidavits that remain unrefuted by the plaintiff.”). Plaintiff has not

provided any evidence to show that Hilton Worldwide exerts significant control over any of its

4 Plaintiff acknowledges in its briefing that it is Hilton Worldwide’s subsidiaries that employ workers in

Illinois, pay Illinois taxes, and earn revenue in Illinois. Doc. 46 at 13. Moreover, the website referenced in

the complaint to demonstrate that Hilton Worldwide runs hotels in Illinois,

https://www.hilton.com/en/locations/usa/illinois/, appears by its Site Usage Agreement to be operated by

Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc. not Hilton Worldwide.

subsidiaries or that corporate veil piercing is otherwise appropriate. Therefore, the Court does

not consider allegations in the complaint regarding the owning, operating, and controlling of

hotels in Illinois as activities attributable to Hilton Worldwide.

Without any evidence of employees, properties, or other operations in Illinois, Plaintiff

cannot establish that general jurisdiction over Hilton Worldwide is appropriate here. Hilton

Worldwide is quite simply not “at home” in Illinois based upon the evidence presented. Hilton

Worldwide is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia, and

Plaintiff has not adequately established any “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum

state that are “sufficiently extensive and pervasive,” to support a finding of general jurisdiction.

Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012).

Turning to specific jurisdiction, the Court similarly finds that the allegations in the

complaint are insufficient. The complaint alleges that Hilton Worldwide “advertised extensively

to Illinois residents,” Doc. 38 ¶ 13, but national advertisements are insufficient to demonstrate

purposeful availment of the forum state. See Schoeps v. Sompo Holdings, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 3d

582, 601 (N.D. Ill. 2024), aff'd, 160 F.4th 815 (7th Cir. 2025). Nor is the fact that Hilton

Worldwide ran an interactive booking website sufficient on its own to show purposeful

availment. See Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 802-03. Rather, the defendant must take

additional steps to purposely target the forum state. See Curry v. Revolution Lab'ys, LLC, 949

F.3d 385, 398 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that one example of purposefully directing activities at the

forum state includes causing products to be distributed in the forum state). Although Plaintiff

frequently uses the term “Illinois-directed advertising,” this term is conclusory, and Plaintiff does

not describe any marketing or rewards program designed to specifically target Illinois residents.5

5 Plaintiff asserts in its opposition brief that Hilton (it is unclear which Hilton corporate entity Plaintiff

refers to) “tailors marketing to Illinois consumers through geolocated digital advertising.” Doc. 46 at 5.

There is therefore no evidence of Hilton Worldwide purposefully availing itself of the privilege

of conducting business in Illinois.

Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently shown Illinois-directed advertising, generally, Plaintiff

would also have to allege that his injuries arose out of or related to that advertising for specific

jurisdiction to be appropriate. Here, it seems obvious from the complaint that they did not.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been a Hilton Rewards member since 2009, and while traveling along

Interstate 80 his wife used the Hilton app to book a hotel room in Nebraska. No part of those

allegations makes it appear that any Illinois-targeted conduct by Hilton Worldwide caused

Plaintiff’s wife to log into the Hilton app and book the hotel room at issue in this case. In fact, it

is not even alleged that Plaintiff was in Illinois when the booking was made. Thus, it cannot be

inferred that Plaintiff’s injuries arise out of or relate to Hilton Worldwide’s activities in Illinois

and specific jurisdiction is not proper. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Hotai Ins. Co., Ltd., 938 F.3d

874, 878 (7th Cir. 2019).

This case is distinguishable from those cited by Plaintiff where specific jurisdiction was

found to be appropriate based upon a defendant not only advertising in the forum state, but also

shipping its products into the forum state where the product shipped formed the basis of the

cause of action. See Curry, 949 F.3d at 399 (finding purposeful availment based upon

defendant’s shipping of product to Illinois, which product was related to the suit because the

product allegedly infringed plaintiff’s trademark); Illinois v. Hemi Grp., 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th

There is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. Similarly, there is no evidence to support

Plaintiff’s argument that Hilton uses an “Illinois-facing reservation system,” unless by “Illinois-facing”

Plaintiff means “available via the internet in Illinois.” Doc. 46 at 7. Nor is there any evidence that the

Hilton Honor’s Program is specifically targeted towards Illinois residents. The website cited in the

complaint, https://www.hilton.com/en/hilton-honors/member-benefits/, does not so much as mention

Illinois. Moreover, according to the Hilton Honors Terms & Conditions, linkable from the same site, the

Honors Program is run by yet another corporation not a defendant to this action, Hilton Honors

Worldwide, LLC.

Cir. 2010) (concluding that defendant knowingly did business with Illinois residents when it

shipped its cigarettes to Illinois, and lawsuit arose from one such cigarette shipment); NBA

Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 625 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding specific jurisdiction proper

where infringing product was shipped to Illinois). The Hampton Inn in North Platte, Nebraska,

may have been bookable from anywhere, but it could only be utilized in North Platte, Nebraska,

and customers were expected to come to Nebraska to partake in it. The fact that Plaintiff

happened to be an Illinois resident who booked the hotel is irrelevant from a personal jurisdiction

standpoint. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (holding that the

“unilateral activity” of either the plaintiff or a third party cannot create substantial connection

with the forum state).

In summary: Hilton Worldwide is not legally responsible for the actions of every

corporation that bears the Hilton name, and Plaintiff has not succeeded in demonstrating that

Hilton Worldwide has engaged in any business activity in Illinois. Nor has Plaintiff plausibly

alleged either that Hilton (either Worldwide or otherwise) purposefully availed itself of Illinois

by targeting its advertisements, Honors Program, or booking software directly to Illinois

residents (as opposed to offering nationwide access) or that Plaintiff’s injury arose out of such

targeted marketing. As a result, neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over Hilton

Worldwide is appropriate in this case.

II. 4th Generation and Keenan Management, LLC

Plaintiff’s arguments in support of personal jurisdiction over 4th Generation and Keenan

Management, LLC are even more attenuated, as they are based entirely upon these defendants

having been part of the Hilton “ecosystem.” Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue general

jurisdiction over 4th Generation and Kennan Management, LLC, which is wise, as neither

appears to do any business in Illinois at all. However, Plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction is

appropriate due to Hilton’s “extensive advertising to Illinois residents,” the fact that “hundreds of

Illinois guests” stay at the Hampton Inn in North Platte, Nebraska, and that the hotel is integrated

into the Hilton Honors Program and Hilton centralized booking system. Doc. 45 at 3.

Plaintiff’s arguments for specific jurisdiction over 4th Generation and Keenan

Management, LLC fail for the same reasons as discussed above. Essentially, Plaintiff is

attempting to obtain personal jurisdiction over 4th Generation and Keenan Management, LLC

based upon the actions of an independent corporation (or more likely, several corporations)

which neither controlled. As is discussed above, the actions of one corporation are only

attributable to another corporation when specific criteria are met. None are present here.

Nor can Plaintiff claim specific jurisdiction over 4th Generation and Keenan Management

LLC based on the fact that hundreds of Illinois residents have stayed at their Hampton Inn in the

past three years. The actions of independent third parties do not speak to whether a defendant has

purposefully targeted the Illinois market. See In re Sheehan, 48 F.4th 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2022)

(holding that “specific personal jurisdiction cannot depend solely on the actions of the plaintiff or

third parties”). The Hampton Inn North Platte, Nebraska is located .3 miles from an exit off

Interstate 80, a highway that runs from San Francisco to New Jersey and through both Nebraska

and Illinois.6 It is likely that hundreds of residents of many states have happened to stop at this

Hampton Inn during their travels. This evidences a wise strategic choice of location for the hotel;

it says nothing about whether the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the Illinois

6 The Court may take judicial notice of geographical locations, including the locations of streets and

highways and distance estimates. See Lowrance v. Pflueger, 878 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1989); United

States v. Julius, 14 F.4th 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2021).

market. For these reasons, Plaintiff has also failed to make a prima facie showing of personal

jurisdiction over 4" Generation and Keenan Management LLC.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are granted. Although

Defendants have requested that the dismissal be with prejudice, dismissals for lack of personal

Jurisdiction are without prejudice, given that the Plaintiff is entitled to try and pursue his case in

another venue. See Lauderdale-El v. Indiana Parole Board, 35 F Ath 572, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2022).

Dated: March 31, 2026 _

APRIL M. PERRY

United States District Judge

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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