Shariff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

_______________________________________

ABDUL SHARIFF, DIVINE ALLAH, and

JAMES WEST, individually and on behalf

of all other persons similarly situated,

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

6:05-CV-06504 CJS CDH

v.

GLENN S. GOORD, et al.,

Defendants

_______________________________________

INTRODUCTION

The Court has certified this matter as a class action brought on behalf of

“Plaintiffs and all prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of

Correctional and Community Supervision [“DOCCS”] who suffer from a mobility

disability limiting one or more of the prisoner’s major life activities and that requires

the use of a wheelchair.” (Dkt. 213 at 10). Named Plaintiffs Abdul Shariff, Divine

Allah, and James West (“Plaintiffs”) contend, among other things, that the

defendants (consisting of DOCCS and more than 40 of its individual employees1

1 As the Court noted at the oral argument held in this matter on April 9, 2026,

defendant Lawrence Weingartner had been listed on the docket as appearing pro se

since November 9, 2024. (See Dkt. 265). Defendants’ counsel filed a notice of

appearance on behalf of Mr. Weingartner on April 21, 2026. (Dkt. 266). On that same

day, Defendants’ counsel filed a status report noting that his failure to appear for Mr.

Weingartner upon inheriting this case from former defense counsel (Dkt. 161) was

due to oversight and that his notice of appearance listing the parties “Weingertner”

and “Winegardner” was in fact meant as an appearance on behalf of Mr. Weingartner

(see Dkt. 252 at 1; see also Dkt. 265; Dkt. 267 at 1).

(“Defendants”)) denied them and the other members of the class access to prison

services and proper medical care by forcing them to use improperly sized urinary

catheters and to reuse “disposable, single-use catheters,” which caused urinary-tract

infections (“UTIs”). (Dkt. 84 at ¶ 16; see also Dkt. 254 at 2). Plaintiffs allege claims

pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 84; Dkt.

172).

Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to preclude the report and

testimony of Defendants’ expert, Gabriel Haas, M.D., pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence (“FRE”) 702. (Dkt. 260). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion

is denied.

BACKGROUND

This matter has been referred to the undersigned for all non-dispositive

pretrial proceedings. (Dkt. 258; see also Dkt. 51; Dkt. 214; Dkt. 227). The operative

pleading is the third amended complaint, filed May 29, 2007. (Dkt. 84). The Court

assumes the parties’ familiarity with the extensive factual and procedural

background of this matter for purposes of this Decision and Order. The facts and

procedure salient to the instant motion are summarized below.

On March 21, 2023, Defendants disclosed Dr. Haas as an expert witness

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). (Dkt. 235). The disclosure

attaches four exhibits: (A) a declaration dated December 15, 2005, along with its

exhibits, made by Dr. Haas in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

injunction (the “Haas Report”)2 (see Dkt. 60; Dkt. 235 at 4-8); (B) Dr. Haas’s updated

curriculum vitae; (C) an excerpt from an article posted on the University of California

San Francisco Benioff Children’s Hospital’s website describing the practice of clean

intermittent catheterization (“CIS”) and clean intermittent self-catheterization

(“CISC”); and (D) excerpts from the United Kingdom National Health Service

Foundation Trust Guideline for the Management of Teaching of Clean Intermittent

Self-Catheterisation (the “NHS Guidelines”)3 (Dkt. 235 at 127-31; see Dkt. 262-3 at

16). The Haas Report sets forth Dr. Haas’s expert opinions regarding catheter use

and UTIs. In the Haas Report, Dr. Haas opines that:

[W]hen a medical instrument is labeled single use only . . . [it] is

expected to be packaged sterile and is not expected to be re-sterilized for

re-use as a sterile instrument or in a sterile environment. . . . The re-use

of a sterile disposable single use only [catheter] by a single patient for

non-sterile catheterization after cleaning [with soap and water] and

drying would be consistent with common medical practices. . . . [T]he

most important factor in preventing urinary tract infections is emptying

the bladder . . . before it becomes overstretched [so] there is little chance

of infection.

(Dkt. 235 at 5-6) (quotations omitted). On August 26, 2025, Plaintiffs deposed Dr.

Haas. (Dkt. 262-1 at 2). During this deposition, Dr. Haas described the practice of

CISC and reiterated the Haas Report’s opinions.

The parties previously filed competing motions for summary judgment. (Dkt.

2 Plaintiffs primarily refer to this declaration as Dr. Haas’s expert report and

opinion. (See, e.g., Dkt. 260-3 at 7). Unless otherwise stated, references to the Haas

Report in this Decision and Order include the opinions it provides.

3 A copy of the full NHS Guidelines can be found at Docket No. 242-7.

241; Dkt. 242)4. In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued in part that

there were “two glaring inadequacies” in Dr. Haas’s opinions: (1) that Dr. Haas

referred to only an excerpt from the NHS Guidelines; and (2) that Dr. Haas’s opinions

are inconsistent with the NHS Guidelines. (Dkt. 242-8 at 12).

In a Decision and Order dated April 28, 2025, United States District Judge

Charles J. Siragusa denied the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment.

(Dkt. 254). Judge Siragusa explained that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

“hinged” on the Court precluding the Haas Report. (Id. at 24 n.13). Judge Siragusa

noted that Plaintiffs had not made a proper motion to preclude under FRE 702 and

further concluded that they had not “otherwise shown that preclusion of Haas’s

opinion is warranted.” (Id. at 22). Judge Siragusa considered Plaintiffs’ argument

that the NHS Guidelines contradict the Haas Report, but found that “even assuming

that critique is accurate,” the alleged contradiction “does not show that Haas’s overall

opinion is unreliable.” (Id. at 23). Instead, Judge Siragusa held that “Plaintiffs’

objection goes to the weight, and not the admissibility, of Haas’s report.” (Id.).

On December 2, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion pursuant to FRE 702,

seeking to preclude the Haas Report and Dr. Haas’s expert testimony. (Dkt. 260 at 1;

Dkt. 260-3 at 5, 7). Plaintiffs argue that the Haas Report fails to meet the standard

set forth in FRE 702 because: (1) it contradicts itself and Dr. Haas’s deposition

testimony; (2) the NHS Guidelines contradict the Haas Report; (3) Dr. Haas ignores

4 Plaintiffs’ motion sought “partial summary judgment on their Eighth

Amendment medical claim involving the re-use of improperly sized, single-use

catheters.” (Dkt. 254 at 15).

essential facts such as prison conditions, DOCCS policies regarding catheter reuse,

and Plaintiffs’ medical records showing repeated UTIs; and (4) Dr. Haas has not

personally visited a DOCCS jail cell or conducted a scientific study of catheter use

but has merely “review[ed] a handful of publications.” (Dkt. 260-3 at 5, 15-17). These

flaws, Plaintiffs assert, mean the Haas Report “would not be helpful to the factfinder

and [that it] does not reflect a[n] . . . application of reliable principles and methods.”

(Id. at 14).

On December 30, 2025, Defendants filed their opposition. (Dkt. 262). Plaintiffs

filed a reply on January 13, 2026. (Dkt. 263). The Court held oral argument on April

9, 2026, and reserved decision. (Dkt. 265).

DISCUSSION

I. Scope of Magistrate Judge Authority

While “motions to exclude expert testimony are in the nature of motions

ordinarily made shortly before trial, as motions in limine,” they may also be made in

other contexts. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. AT&T, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 3d 703, 740-41

(S.D.N.Y. 2022). Courts in this Circuit consider motions to exclude expert opinions

and testimony non-dispositive and therefore within a magistrate judge’s authority to

decide under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See, e.g., McDay v. Eckert, No. 1:20-CV-233-

JLS-JJM, 2026 WL 376730, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2026) (“Motions regarding the

admissibility of expert testimony are non-dispositive.”) (citing Lutz v. Kaleida Health,

No. 1:18-CV-01112, 2023 WL 6617737, *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2023)); Baldi-Perry v.

Emerson Elec. Co., No. 1:22-CV-400-JLS-JJM, 2025 WL 601232, at *1 n.2 (W.D.N.Y.

Feb. 25, 2025) (“motions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony are non-

dispositive”); Moreland v. Sportsman’s Guide, Inc., No. 17-CV-1034-LJV, 2024 WL

2826476, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2024) (“As Judge McCarthy correctly observed,

the motion [to preclude expert testimony] is non-dispositive.” (quotation and

alterations omitted)); Woelfle v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., No. 1:18-CV-486, 2023

WL 4407577, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. July 7, 2023) (“A motion to exclude expert testimony is

not a dispositive motion.”); U.S. v. Bon Secours Health Sys., Inc., No. 10 CIV. 9650

(RMB), 2023 WL 1992639, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2023) (“A magistrate judge’s

decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is considered nondispositive of the

litigation.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Some magistrate judges in this Circuit, however, have issued a Report and

Recommendation where precluding an expert’s opinion would necessarily be case-

dispositive. See Bennett v. Target Corp., No. 16-CV-5816-ADS-SIL, 2018 WL 5784354,

at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2018) (“In an abundance of caution, the Court issues the

portion of this decision addressing the parties’ respective motions to preclude expert

testimony on a Report and Recommendation basis even though such motions are

typically considered non-dispositive. Plaintiff here has asserted a claim for defective

design, which, under New York law, requires expert testimony to proceed. Thus, a

decision altogether precluding the expert testimony relied upon by [the plaintiff]

would necessarily be dispositive in nature.”) (internal citations omitted); see also

Hilaire v. DeWalt Indus. Tool Co., 54 F. Supp. 3d 223, 229 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In

the Eastern District of New York, magistrate judges are generally empowered to act

with respect to non-dispositive pretrial matters, such as motions to exclude expert

testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. However, . . . defendant’s

Daubert motion is potentially dispositive, given that a ruling precluding plaintiff’s

only liability expert witness would likely require dismissal of plaintiff’s claim.”)

(internal citations omitted)).

Here, a determination that Dr. Haas’s testimony should be precluded would

not necessarily be case dispositive. This is not a situation in which a defendant has

sought to preclude a plaintiff’s only expert witness with respect to an issue on which

the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and expert testimony is required by law. Even

in the absence of Dr. Haas’s testimony, it would be a question for a trier of fact as to

whether Plaintiffs have proven their theory of the case. Further, the third amended

complaint contains claims in addition to those related to the reuse of urinary

catheters. In particular, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants “failed to make [DOCCS]

facilities accessible to plaintiffs, and have failed to furnish appropriate auxiliary aids

and services where necessary to afford plaintiffs and members of the putative class

the opportunity to participate in the programs, activities, services, benefits and jobs

they offer generally to other non-disabled individuals under defendants’ custody and

control.” (Dkt. 84 at ¶ 153). The third amended complaint identifies numerous alleged

deficiencies in DOCCS’ facilities with respect to access for inmates who are

wheelchair users. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 63-144; see also Dkt. 254 at 2-3). Dr. Haas’s

opinions are unrelated to these claims.

Accordingly, and consistent with the case law set forth above, the Court’s

resolution of the instant motion is set forth in a Decision and Order.

II. Motion to Preclude Dr. Haas’s Report

A. Legal Standard

FRE 702 “governs the admissibility of expert testimony.” In re Pfizer Inc. Sec.

Litig., 819 F.3d 642, 658 (2d Cir. 2016). Pursuant to FRE 702:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise

if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not

that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles

and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

The Supreme Court explained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), that trial courts serve a “gatekeeping” function under FRE

702 and must ensure that proposed expert testimony “rests on a reliable foundation

and is relevant[.]” Id. at 597. Under Daubert and its progeny, “[a] court’s inquiry . . .

focuses on three issues: (i) whether the witness is qualified to be an expert; (ii)

whether the opinion is based upon reliable data and methodology; and (iii) whether

the expert’s testimony on a particular issue will assist the trier of fact.” Pac. Life Ins.

Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 571 F. Supp. 3d 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Nimely

v. City of N.Y., 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005)).

In addition to “these canonical Daubert requirements,” the Court also must

consider the impact of Congress’s 2023 amendment to Rule 702. Connecticut v.

Sandoz, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-00802-MPS, 2025 WL 3226616, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 19,

2025). The 2023 amendment “made clear that: (1) a preponderance of the evidence

standard applies to questions of admissibility under Rule 702; and (2) expert

testimony ‘must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable

application of the expert’s basis and methodology.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702,

Advisory Committee’s Note to 2023 Amendment); see also Suffolk Cnty. Water Auth.

v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 17-CV-6980 (NG) (JRC), 2025 WL 1907206, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

July 10, 2025) (explaining that the 2023 amendment did not impose any new

procedures and that “prior authority construing Rule 702 remains relevant”).

When determining whether an expert applied reliable methodologies, courts

assess several factors. Such factors may include “the theory’s testability, the extent

to which it has been subjected to peer review and publication, the extent to which a

technique is subject to standards controlling the technique’s operation, the known or

potential rate of error, and the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific

community.” United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 330 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotations

omitted). This assessment is flexible and such factors “do not constitute a definitive

checklist or test.” Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 576 (2d Cir. 2017). In

appropriate cases, courts in this Circuit have found that an expert’s background and

experience may serve as a basis to conclude their opinions are based on reliable

methodologies. See, e.g., Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. J.R. Contracting &

Env’t Consulting, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 3d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“The Court finds

that [the plaintiff’s expert]’s opinions, as permitted herein, are based upon sufficient

facts and reliable principles and methods drawn from his background, including

relevant experience. [The plaintiff’s expert] has decades of experience in the

insurance industry. . . . [The plaintiff’s expert]’s opinions regarding industry practice

. . . is based upon that experience.”) (citations omitted).

After determining that an expert is qualified and that their opinion is based

on reliable data and methodology, a court must assess whether the proposed

testimony “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 702; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92 (“Rule 702’s helpfulness

standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a

precondition to admissibility.” (quotation omitted)). “This inquiry looks primarily to

whether the testimony is relevant.” Pac. Life, 571 F. Supp. 3d at 114. Under FRE 401,

evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it

would be without the evidence[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Expert testimony is also subject

to FRE 403, which allows the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “The Rule 403 inquiry is particularly important in the

context of expert testimony, ‘given the unique weight such evidence may have in a

jury’s deliberations.’” Pac. Life, 571 F. Supp. 3d at 114 (quoting Nimely, 414 F.3d at

397).

“Ultimately, the party proffering the expert has the burden to demonstrate by

a preponderance of the evidence that its expert witness satisfies [the FRE 702]

criteria.” Washington v. Kellwood Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 293, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

(quotation and alteration omitted). “[O]nce the court has found it more likely than

not that the admissibility requirement has been met, any attack by the opponent will

go only to the weight of the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note to

2023 Amendment. District courts are afforded “broad discretion” to determine the

admissibility of expert testimony. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042

(2d Cir. 1995).

In this Circuit, “the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than

the rule.” Saxon Glass Techs., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 270, 284 (W.D.N.Y.

2019), aff’d, 824 F. App’x 75 (2d Cir. 2020). Rather than exclusion, “[v]igorous cross-

examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden

of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible

evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Further, in making its inquiry, the Court “must

focus on the principles and methodology employed by the expert, without regard to

the conclusions the expert has reached or the . . . court’s belief as to the correctness

of those conclusions.” Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266

(2d Cir. 2002).

B. Dr. Haas’s Qualifications

Plaintiffs’ motion papers do not argue that Dr. Haas is unqualified to serve as

an expert witness in this case, and during oral argument Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed

that Plaintiffs do not dispute his qualifications. Indeed, Dr. Haas’s updated

curriculum vitae sets forth his extensive qualifications in the field of urology. (See

Dkt. 235 at 66-125).

Dr. Haas received his M.D. from Wayne State University in 1982. (Id. at 68).

He completed residencies in surgery and urology at Henry Ford Hospital and was a

clinical associate in the urology section at the National Cancer Institute. (Id). Dr.

Haas has maintained certification by the American Board of Urology since February

18, 1989, and is licensed in both New York and Michigan. (Id.).

Dr. Haas is currently the Senior Medical Director for Uro-Oncology at Astellas

Pharma Global Development Inc. and a Clinical Professor of Urology at the Loyola

University Stritch School of Medicine. (Id. at 66). He previously served as Professor

and Chairman of the Department of Urology at the State University of New York,

Upstate Medical University from 1995 to 2009. (Id.).

Dr. Haas is the Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Journal of Urology. (Id.). He

has also authored or co-authored scores of articles and book chapters, won awards,

and participated in numerous professional societies and committees in the field of

urology. (Id. at 67-104). During his deposition, Dr. Haas testified that he has

experience working in prison medical facilities, such as in the Marcy Correctional

Facility, and instructed around 100 incarcerated people over the course of 14 years

on how to perform CISC. (Dkt. 262-1 at 25, 34, 52-53; see Dkt. 235 at 6).

These qualifications “suffice to establish the basis for [Dr. Haas’s] specialized

knowledge . . . required to admit his expert testimony under Rule 702.” Rahman v.

Lee, No. 23-CV-5665 (LAP), 2024 WL 4043697, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2024); see also

McCullock, 61 F.3d at 1043 (“[The plaintiff’s expert] is an experienced medical doctor,

who is certified by the American Board of Otolaryngology and has practiced in the

specialty of ears, nose and throat since 1966. We find his background sufficient to

permit his expert testimony on a throat ailment and its causes.”). They also inform

the Court’s inquiry into the reliability of his data and methodology.

Indeed, courts in this Circuit have consistently held that an expert’s

background and experience may serve as a basis to conclude that their opinions are

based on reliable data and methods and thus are admissible under FRE 702. See, e.g.,

Suffolk Cnty., 2025 WL 1907206, at *3 (“To begin with, [the plaintiff’s expert] is

highly qualified to offer his opinions. . . . The more qualified the expert, the more

likely that expert is using reliable methods in a reliable manner.”) (quotations,

alteration, and citation omitted); Mobile Med. Int’l Corp. v. Advanced Mobile Hosp.

Sys., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-231, 2015 WL 778553, at *5 (D. Vt. Feb. 24, 2015) (“[The

plaintiff’s expert] intends to testify about surgical facilities and equipment in use in

the 1980s. . . . The persuasiveness of his conclusions and the weight given thereto are

questions for the trier of fact. . . . His opinions . . . are admissible to the extent they

are based upon his specialized knowledge of the relevant time period[.]”) (citation

omitted). Accordingly, when assessing the admissibility of Dr. Haas’s expert

testimony, the Court has taken into account his extensive qualifications in the field

of urology.

C. Reliability of Dr. Haas’s Data and Methodology

The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ challenges to the reliability of Dr. Haas’s

data and methodology. Plaintiffs contend that the Haas Report is “facially self-

contradictory” on the issue of “whether it is medically acceptable to force Plaintiffs to

reuse single-use catheters.” (Dkt. 260-3 at 14). More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that

Dr. Haas “concedes . . . that a single-use catheter should not be reused” while

simultaneously opining that “[t]he re-use of a sterile disposable single use only

[catheter] by a single patient for non-sterile catheterization after cleaning and drying

would be consistent with common medical practices.” (Id. at 15 (internal quotation

and emphasis omitted)).

The Court disagrees that Dr. Haas has conceded that a catheter labeled

“single-use” cannot safely be reused under appropriate circumstances. Plaintiffs point

to the following language in the Haas Report in support of this argument: “when a

medical instrument is labeled ‘single use only’ that medical instrument is expected to

be packaged sterile and is not expected to be re-sterilized for re-use as a sterile

instrument in a sterile environment.” (Id. (quoting Haas Report ¶ 4)). But this

statement must be read in context. The Haas Report goes on to say, in the next

sentence, that it is “a common medical practice to us a sterile instrument for non-

sterile procedures and to clean the instrument for re-use by the same patient for re-

use in future non-sterile procedures.” (Dkt. 235 at ¶ 4). Dr. Haas expanded on this

opinion at his deposition, explaining that reuse of a catheter is “always in a nonsterile

environment because the catheterization process itself is a nonsterile process” and

“[t]here is no sterilization involved in the procedure of self-catheterization.” (Dkt. 262-

1 at 23). There is no contradiction in Dr. Haas acknowledging on the one hand that a

single-use catheter could not properly be reused for a sterile procedure and opining

on the other hand that it can properly be reused for self-catheterization, which is a

non-sterile procedure.

Further portions of Dr. Haas’s deposition confirm this reading of the cited

portion of the Haas Report. Dr. Haas testified that “[t]he catheters initially are in a

sterile container. . . . Once they are opened, there is no longer any sterilization. The

concept of sterilization no longer applies to either the procedure or the environment

or the site. This is called clean intermittent catheterization . . . [a]nd there is no claim

in the literature that sterility is required even with the catheters that are for single

use.”5 (Id. at 28). Dr. Haas specifically stated that he “would not expect any sterile

procedures . . . to be done in [a prison] cell because that is not a requirement for”

CISC. (Id. at 26). Instead, Dr. Haas opined that the key “requirement is to wash and

5 During his deposition, Dr. Haas also reiterated his opinion that the frequency

of catheterization primarily influences the occurrence of UTIs. (Dkt. 262-1 at 61

(“[W]hat is really important with the emptying of the bladder, regardless of whether

you use the catheter once and throw it away or whether you’re reusing that same

catheter . . . is the frequency to keep the bladder volumes low. And if the inmates do

not catheterize themselves sufficiently . . . then regardless of whether [they] use a

catheter once or more than once, those individuals will be prone to get infections.”)).

cleanse the catheter prior to the next usage.” (Id. at 27). This testimony is fully

consistent with the statement in the Haas Report that a single-use catheter would

not be expected to be re-sterilized and reused in a sterile procedure.

Plaintiffs also argue that Dr. Haas “specifically conceded that a single-use

catheter should not be reused” at his deposition, pointing to the following exchange:

Q. Would you define for me the difference between single-use and

multiple-use catheters?

A. There is -- so the definition lies not in the catheter itself. It lies in the

fact whether a catheter is repeatedly used. A single-use catheter -- in my

understanding, the definition of a single-use catheter is used once and

then no longer used again.

(Dkt. 260-3 at 15 (emphasis omitted); see Dkt. 262-1 at 73-74). Again, the Court

disagrees with Plaintiffs’ reading of Dr. Haas’s testimony. Immediately after the

passage cited by Plaintiffs’ counsel, Dr. Haas went on to testify that “you can have a

catheter used once and throw it away. And then you can have a catheter that is reused

time after time. There may not be any intrinsic differences between the catheters

themselves or it may be an entirely different catheter.” (Dkt. 262-1 at 74). Dr. Haas

further explained that there is no regulation regarding the labeling of a catheter as

“single-use” or “multiple-use.” (Id.). In context, Dr. Haas was not, as Plaintiffs argue,

conceding that a catheter labeled “single-use” could only safely be used one time. He

was opining that there is no consistent structural difference between a catheter

labeled “single-use” and a catheter labeled “multiple-use.”

Plaintiffs go on to argue that “the disconnect in Haas’s opinions and Report

appears to be a result of the fact that Haas’s opinion is not based on a reliable

application of reliable scientific principles and methods” and that Dr. Haas “has not

completed any scientific study of the catheters used or the conditions in which they

were used to inform his opinion” but has instead only “review[ed] a handful of

publications.” (Dkt. 260-3 at 15-16). The Court is unpersuaded by this argument for

multiple reasons. Initially, as explained above, there is no “disconnect” between Dr.

Haas’s opinions and the Haas Report, because the “contradictions” identified by

Plaintiffs are not truly contradictions when read in context.

Further, Dr. Haas was not required to perform a formal study on the catheters

at issue here in order to form a sufficiently reliable opinion. See Amorgianos, 303 F.3d

at 266 (“This is not to suggest that an expert must back his or her opinion with

published studies that unequivocally support his or her conclusions.”); McCullock, 61

F.3d at 1043 (affirming admission of medical expert testimony even where the expert

physician “could not point to a single piece of medical literature” supporting his

opinion); Valentin v. New York City, No. 94 CV 3911 (CLP), 1997 WL 33323099, at

*21 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1997) (“The mere fact that an expert’s opinions are not based

on formal studies does not make the opinions inadmissible.”). Dr. Haas has based his

opinions on his decades of experience as a practicing urologist, which includes having

counseled close to 100 incarcerated individuals regarding self-catheterization. (See

Dkt. 262-1 at 32). The flexible inquiry required under Rule 702 permits expert

witnesses to base their testimony on practical experience. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 3d 314, 341 (N.D.N.Y. 2017). Indeed, “in many

cases, the reliability inquiry may . . . focus upon personal knowledge and experience

of the expert.” Id. (citation omitted).

Dr. Haas has also supplemented his experience as a practicing urologist with

reference to supporting publications, including the NHS Guidelines. However, as

noted above, Plaintiffs argue that the NHS Guidelines actually contradict rather than

support the Haas Report. (Dkt. 260-3 at 8; see Dkt. 235 at 1, 131). Specifically,

Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Haas selectively quotes the NHS Guidelines and ignores

the fact that the NHS Guidelines say that “[s]ingle-use catheters . . . are designed for

single use[.]” (Dkt. 260-3 at 8 (emphasis omitted), 16).

As a preliminary matter, “[u]nder the law of the case doctrine, when a court

has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in

subsequent stages of the same case unless cogent and compelling reasons militate

otherwise.” Allah v. Adams, 573 F. Supp. 3d 904, 910 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (quotations

omitted). Here, Plaintiffs raised the identical argument regarding the NHS

Guidelines in their motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. 242-8 at 12). Judge

Siragusa considered and rejected this argument, finding that “even assuming that

[Plaintiffs’] critique is accurate,” the alleged contradiction “does not show that Haas’s

overall opinion is unreliable.” (Dkt. 254 at 23).

Plaintiffs did not address the law of the case doctrine in their motion papers.

When the Court raised the issue at oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that

the law of the case doctrine would not apply here because Judge Siragusa first held

that Plaintiffs had not made a proper motion to preclude under FRE 702, and that

his discussion of the NHS Guidelines was accordingly dicta. The Court is

unpersuaded by this argument. A review of Judge Siragusa’s Decision and Order

makes clear that, notwithstanding any procedural issues with Plaintiffs’ arguments

regarding the NHS Guidelines, Judge Siragusa considered them on the merits and

found them unavailing. Alternative holdings are not dicta. See Omega SA v. 375

Canal, LLC, 984 F.3d 244, 251 n.4 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[W]here a decision rests on two or

more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum.”) (citation

omitted). Plaintiffs have thus identified no basis to disturb Judge Siragusa’s ruling

that Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the NHS Guidelines go “to the weight, and not

the admissibility, of Haas’s report.” (Dkt. 254 at 22).

Although the law of the case doctrine alone provides an adequate basis to

dispose of Plaintiffs’ NHS Guidelines argument, the Court further notes that there is

no irreconcilable conflict between the NHS Guidelines and Dr. Haas’s opinions. The

NHS Guidelines state that CISC “is a clinically clean procedure undertaken by the

patient” and “is the gold standard in bladder management.” (Dkt. 242-7 at 4). They

go on to say that patients may use various types of catheters to carry out CISC,

including “[s]ingle-use sterile catheters” that are “designed for single use[.]” (Id. at

7). The NHS Guidelines also say that “UTI may develop if the catheter becomes

contaminated or CISC is not frequent enough” and that “[i]f a patient who is self-

catheterizing is admitted to the hospital, they should use a new catheter on each

occasion because of the increased risk of infection.” (Id. at 13-14).

Plaintiffs cite no language in the NHS Guidelines stating that it is not

medically acceptable to reuse catheters labeled single-use. The NHS Guidelines say

only that catheters labeled single-use are “designed” for single-use, which is not

equivalent to a statement that it is medically unacceptable to reuse such catheters.

As Plaintiffs acknowledge in their reply, the label a manufacturer applies to a product

does not necessarily define its medically acceptable use. (See Dkt. 263 at 8-9); see, e.g.,

U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-0704 (ERK), 2009 WL 1456582, at *6

(E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009).

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Haas’s opinion is supported by

sufficiently reliable data and methodology, in accordance with the standard discussed

above. 6 See Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 574 F. Supp. 3d 197,

201 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“In light of the liberal admissibility standards of the [FRE],

exclusion of expert testimony is warranted only when the district court finds serious

flaws in reasoning or methodology. Otherwise, if an expert’s testimony falls within

the range where experts might reasonably differ, the duty of determining the weight

and sufficiency of the evidence on which the expert relied lies with the jury, rather

than the trial court.”) (quotations and citation omitted).

6 The Court draws the same conclusion regarding Dr. Haas’s opinion about the

importance of frequent CISC in preventing UTIs. Plaintiffs did not directly address

this argument in their motion papers. When asked about this opinion during oral

argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel generally asserted that the opinion is incorrect. But

Plaintiffs’ disagreement with Dr. Haas’s opinion is not a basis for preclusion.

D. Factual Basis for the Opinions

Plaintiffs also contend that Dr. Haas’s opinion is “inadmissible under Rule

702(b) because it is not based on sufficient facts and data.” (Dkt. 260-3 at 16). They

argue that Dr. Haas lacks knowledge of key facts, such as what instructions Plaintiffs

received about reusing catheters, first-hand knowledge of the conditions in Plaintiffs’

individual prison cells, and Plaintiffs’ medical records showing chronic UTIs. (See id.

at 10-11, 17).7 Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Haas was required to have this knowledge to

offer a “useful or reliable expert opinion” and that his lack of such knowledge means

his report is not based on any facts, data, or reliable principles and methods. (Id. at

10-12, 17). The Court is unpersuaded by these arguments.

Initially, while Plaintiffs’ argument assumes that these “key facts” are

undisputed, the discussion between the Court and counsel during oral argument

made clear during that at least some are in dispute.8 These disputed facts include

7 Plaintiffs also suggest that Dr. Haas has “never . . . seen or reviewed his own

Expert Disclosure in this case[.]” (Dkt. 260-3 at 11). The conclusion is not borne out

by the record. During his deposition, Dr. Haas exhibited confusion over the form in

which his expert disclosure had been filed with the Court. (See Dkt. 262-1 at 72). Dr.

Haas described it as a “version control problem” and noted that he did not know if

Plaintiffs’ counsel was referring to the same document he was. (Id. at 72-72).

However, Dr. Haas did not indicate that he was not substantively familiar with the

contents of the expert disclosure.

8 Plaintiffs’ theory of the case rests on the belief that their UTIs were caused by

reusing catheters labeled single-use. Plaintiffs contend that if Dr. Haas had reviewed

Plaintiffs medical records, he would have “observed that Plaintiffs suffered from

chronic [UTIs] and other injuries due to DOCCS’ policies of forcing Plaintiffs to reuse

single-use catheters.” (Dkt. 260-3 at 11). But these are disputed fact questions that

must be decided by a jury, not by this Court. Again, the Court’s determination of the

admissibility of Dr. Haas’s expert testimony is distinct from an assessment of the

merits of his conclusions. See Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266.

whether Plaintiffs had the means to perform CISC, such as running hot water, soap,

and a clean place to dry their catheters. During oral argument, Defendants’ counsel

made clear that it is Defendants’ position that Plaintiffs had access to such means.

Dr. Haas is entitled to rely on that contention in forming his opinions. Simmons v.

Garland, No. 21-CV-1728-SJB, 2024 WL 1468239, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2024)

(“An expert is permitted to accept a party’s version of events in drawing conclusions.

If that party’s version of events turns out to be untrue, unreliable, or lacking in

evidentiary basis, then the expert’s opinions fall away. . . . And as for not speaking to

P[laintiff]’s mother or conducting a more thorough investigation, these arguments go

to the weight of [the plaintiff’s expert]’s testimony, not its admissibility. The same is

true for any argument that his testimony was self-contradictory or that his deposition

contradicts his expert report.”) (citations omitted); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.

Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20 CIV. 10832 (AT), 2023 WL 5670711, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

6, 2023) (“Expert witnesses may rely on their party’s facts, even where facts are in

dispute.”).

Moreover, “[u]nlike a fact witness, an expert witness need not have personal

knowledge of the facts of the case, so long as his or her expert opinion is based on

sufficient facts or data and is the product of reliable principles and methods.”

Dorchester Fin. Holdings Corp. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., No. 11-CV-1529 (KMW), 2016 WL

1169508, at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2016) (quotations omitted); see also Walker v.

Schult, 365 F. Supp. 3d 266, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (“However, it has long been accepted

that an expert witness may voice an opinion based on facts concerning the events at

issue in a particular case even if the expert lacks first-hand knowledge of those facts.”)

(quotation and alteration omitted). The fact that Dr. Haas did not personally observe

the prison cells and conditions at issue here does not render his opinions

inadmissible.

Plaintiffs’ arguments also appear to be based on a misapprehension as to the

content of Dr. Haas’s opinions. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Haas “is in no position to

offer any kind of reliable opinion about whether the Plaintiffs and class members

were actually able to safely wash and reuse the catheters at issue in this case.” (Dkt.

260-3 at 17-18). But Dr. Haas has not offered an opinion on whether the specific

Plaintiffs here could safely perform CISC in their cells. He has opined that “a

disposable PVC catheter may be safely re-used by the same patient for weekly

intermittent self-catheterization, provided the patient does not require sterile

catheterization, the catheter is cleaned with soap and water and permitted to dry

after each use and the catheter remains in good condition.” (Dkt. 235 at ¶ 15)

(emphasis added). Of course, it will be the function of the factfinder to determine

whether Dr. Haas’s opinion is applicable to the conditions Plaintiffs actually

experienced while in the custody of DOCCS.

E. Helpfulness to the Trier of Fact

Finally, the Court finds that Dr. Haas’s opinion may be helpful to the factfinder

in this case and that there is no basis for exclusion under FRE 401 or 403. The

disagreement amongst the parties and their experts about the reuse of catheters

labeled single-use, and the technical terminology used to describe catheter use, all

indicate that Dr. Haas’s opinions will be “helpful to the trier of fact because they

relate to a technical, medical issue that would be beyond the ken of a lay person.” In

re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 169 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see United

States v. Delva, No. 12 CR. 802 KBF, 2014 WL 4460360, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,

2014) (“To the extent that medical terminology is offered during trial, [the defendant’s

expert] is an appropriate expert to explain the meaning of that terminology to a jury

of laypersons. There is an obvious value to the jury having an understanding of the

definitions of certain terms not within the typical vocabulary of a layperson.”),

aff’d, 858 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2017).

In sum, and for all the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Dr. Haas

is qualified to serve as an expert in this case and that the Haas Report is based on

appropriately reliable data and methodology and will help the trier of fact in

understanding the evidence in this case. 9 The Court accordingly finds no basis under

FRE 702, Daubert and its progeny, or other relevant Rules and case law to preclude

Dr. Haas’s expert testimony and opinions. Plaintiffs’ motion seeking such relief is

therefore denied.

9 At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel made various arguments regarding the

harm that Named Plaintiffs and the members of the class are alleged to have suffered.

The Court understands the significance of this case to Plaintiffs. But the issue before

the Court at this time is a narrow one that goes only to the question of whether Dr.

Haas’s opinions and testimony should be excluded from a jury’s consideration. The

Court is not called upon to reach any conclusions as to the lawfulness of Defendants’

policies regarding catheter use or Plaintiffs’ ability to safely perform CISC. Those are

issues that are squarely within the province of the factfinder.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to preclude the expert report and

testimony of Dr. Haas (Dkt. 260) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

COLLEEN D. HOLLAND

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: Rochester, New York

June 1, 2026

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