The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
‘GENARO MAMARIL,
*
| Plaintiff,
Vv.
* Civil No. 25-2010-BAH
‘SECRETARY HOWARD LUTNICK,
Defendant.
eo .
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
. MEMORANDUM OPINION .
Plaintiff Genaro Mamaril (“Mamaril” or “Plaintiff’), proceeding pro se, brought suit . .
against Howard Lutnick, United States Secretary of Commerce (“Defendant”), alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. ECF 1. Pending before the Court is Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, ECF 4, along with a supplement thereto, ECF 17. Plaintiff filed oppositions to
the motion and supplement. ECF 7; ECF 18. Defendant did not file any reply. A memorandum
in support of the motion to dismiss is filed at ECF 5, which includes an exhibit, ECF 5-1
(declaration of Kristen M. Gilbert).! The supplement and oppositions also include memoranda of
law. ECF 7; ECF 17; ECF 18. The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing
is necessary. See Loc. R. 105:6 (D. Md. 2025), ‘ Accordingly, for the reasons stated below,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
! The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology CNIST”),
an agency of the United States Department of Commerce, in Gaithersburg, Maryland. ECF 1, at’
-3; see also National Institute of Standards and Technology, https://www.nist.gov/
[https://perma.cc/N82E-CSFE]. Plaintiff alleges that he is “a qualified individual with a disability”
and identifies his disability as “[pJermanent medical condition(s).” ECF 1, at 4-5. Plaintiff:
_ “requested for reasonable accommodation to perform the essential functions of [his] job as
recommended by [his] treatment physician(s).” Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that “[aJs a result,” on
August 19, 2016, “the federal agency placed [him] in anon-duty, non-pay status for over 14 days.”.
Id, at 4-5. Plaintiff then “appealed this constructive suspension and enforced leave to the” Merit
Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). Jd. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that the “MSPB erroneously
determined that [his] appeal was untimely ... which led to [his] forced disability retirement.
circumstances.” Id .
On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. I. A copy of the EEOC decision is attached to the complaint. See id. at 7-11.
Plaintiff received a notice of right to-sue letter on October 7, 2024, id. at 5, and timely filed this
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on November 6,
2024. See id. at 1; see also id. at 9 (providing Plaintiff with 30 calendar days from receipt of the
EEOC decision to file suit ina US. District Court). Plaintiff asserts employment discrimination
claims under Title VIL, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. Jd at 3. .
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for transfer. ECF 4 (motion);
ECF 5 (memorandum in support). Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 7,” and Defendant filed a
? Plaintiffs opposition was not timely filed, but the court considered Plaintiff’s response despite
its untimeliness ve of Plaintiffs pro se status. ECF 10, at 2 n.4.
|
reply, ECF 8. The Eastern District of Virginia granted the request for transfer and Plaintiff’s case
was transferred to this Court in June of 2025. ECF 10, at 4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
“remain[ed] pending for a determination by the transferee court.” ld at 5. Defendant filed a □
‘motion to “establish the time for filing an answer or response” to the complaint. ECF 15. The |
motion was granted, and Defendant’s response was due no later than September 3, 2025. ECF 16,
at 1. In granting the motion, the Court noted that the prior motion to dismiss from the transferor
‘court, ECF 4, was “still pending” and directed “Defendant to address the impact of this pending
motion in the response, including any requests to withdraw or supplement the motion.” Jd.
. Defendant then timely filed a supplement in support of the motion.to dismiss, incorporating
‘by reference the arguments set forth in ECF 4 and including supplemental argument. ECF 17, at
1. Plaintiff argues that “Defendant’s Supplement does not comply with the Court’s clear directive”
because Defendant did not file a new responsive pleading to the complaint in the form of a renewed
motion or answer.’ ECF 18, at 4. But, in accordance with this Court’s order, Defendant addressed
the impact of the pending motion, albeit briefly, by asserting that “[t]he motion to dismiss [at ECF
4} is viable and ready for disposition by this Court because it properly addresses the fatal
deficiencies in Mamaril’s complaint.” ECF 17-1, at2. By “mov[ing] the Court to issue an Order
granting the Defendant’s pending motion to dismiss filed a[t] ECF No. 4 and to permit a brief
supplementation of the pending motion,” id. at 1 (alterations added), Defendant indicated that it
still intended the pending motion to dismiss to serve as Defendant’s operative response to the
3 Although Defendant had already filed a response to the complaint in the form of the pending
motion to dismiss, the Court gave Defendant an additional opportunity to respond, specifically by
‘either supplementing the pending motion or withdrawing it and filing an answer, in recognition
that the pending motion had been filed in Virginia before transfer was granted. If circumstances
had changed such that Defendant no longer wished to litigate its pending motion, the September
3, 2025 deadline was Defendant’s opportunity to indicate that.
complaint for now, along with a supplement. See id. The Court permits the supplement and now
resolves the pending motion to dismiss.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
_ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to “state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legal
conclusions stated in the complaint and “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in-
the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and
considers whether 'the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. Nemet Chevrolet, □
Lid. vy. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009), “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements ofa cause of action[.]’” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App’x 745, 747
(Ath Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). At the same time,
a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiff's]
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.”
Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).
Because Plaintiff brings this suit pro se, the Court must liberally construe his pleadings,
holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This leniency has its limits, though. “A court may not construct the
plaintiffs legal arguments for him, nor is a district court required to recognize ‘obscure or
extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.’” Runge y. Barton, Civ.
No. 6:08-0231-GRA, 2009 WL 3245471, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2009) (first citing Small v. Endicott,
. 4
998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); and then quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277
(4th Cir. 1985)), aff'd, 368 F. App’x 361 (4th Cir. 2010).
WI. ANALYSIS
A. ADA and Title VII
Plaintiff's complaint identifies Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act as the basis
for his employment discrimination claims. ECF‘1, at.3. However, as Defendant correctly
observes, Plaintiff cannot bring an ADA claim because the ADA does not apply to the federal
government or its officials. See Sillah v. Burwell, 244 F. Supp. 3d 499, 513 n.12 (D. Md. 2017)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)q) (specifically excluding the federal government from the ADA’s
coverage)), “The Rehabilitation Act ‘is the exclusive means by which a plaintiff may raise claims
against federal agencies relating to [disability] discrimination.” id. (alteration added) (quoting
Brown v. Henderson, 6 F. App’x 155, 156 (4th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a Title VII claim because disability is not a protected characteristic
‘under Title VII. See ECF 5, at 8 (“[T']Jhe Complaint fails to identify any basis of discrimination
that is prohibited by Title VII.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(a) (prohibiting discrimination
based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”)., .
Perhaps in recognition of these deficiencies, Plaintiff seemingly abandons his ADA and
_ Title VII claims and argues only that he has “establish[ed] violations of the Rehabilitation Act.”
ECF 18, at 3; see also ECF 7, at 3-6 (arguing that Plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim to survive
‘a 12(b)(6) motion but not addressing Defendant’s statutory arguments regarding Title VII and the
ADA). “Failure to respond to an argument made in a dispositive pleading results in a concession
of that claim.” United Supreme Council v. United Supreme Council of Ancient Accepted Scot. Rite
for 33 Degree of Freemasonry, 329 F. Supp. 3d 283, 292 (E.D. Va. 2018). Accordingly, the Court
treats Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendant’s arguments as a concession of his Title VIland =
ADA claims. See Coomes v. Moran, Civ. No. ELH-22-02639, 2025 WL 2106739, at #39 (D. Md,
July 28, 2025) (“I need not spill ink to consider contentions that are waived.”). Any claims brought
under the ADA and Title VII are thus dismissed. The Court turns to the sufficiency of Plaintiff's
claims under the Rehabilitation Act.
B. Rehabilitation Act
1. Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff brings a failure to accommodate claim and alleges that he “requested reasonable
accommodation to perform the essential functions of [his] job as recommended by [his] treatment
physician(s)” and “[a]s a result” was placed “in a non-duty, non-pay status for over 14 days.” ECF
1, at 5.
“The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal. agencies from discriminating against its
employees on the basis of disability.” Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2019)’
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 794). It provides that “[nJo otherwise qualified individual with @ disability in
the United States ... Shall, solely by. reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or’
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Employment
discrimination claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act “are evaluated using the same.
standards as those ‘applied under [Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”
Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(d)). “Of significance here, Title I prohibits employers from ‘discriminat[ing] against a.
qualified individual on the basis of disability’ by ‘not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless [a] covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation'would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.’” Jd. at □□□□□□
14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 121 12(b)(5)(A)).. .
To establish a failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act, “a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) [Jhe was a qualified person with a disability; (2) the employer had notice of
‘the disability; (3) the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the position with a
reasonable accommodation; and (4) the employer nonetheless refused to make the
accommodation.” Hannah P., 916 F.3d at 337. A “qualified individual” is “an individual who,
‘with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C..§ 12111(8). The Rehabilitation Act
adopts the ADA’s definition of disability—“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities ... ; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” Ocampo v. Brennan, Civ. No. CCB-19-2875, 2021 WL
229673, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2021) (quoting 42 USC. § 12102(1)).
“(Mlerely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the □
[Rehabilitation Act].” Linzer v. Leavitt, Civ. No. AW-07-597, 2008 WL 11509695, at *4 (D. Md. □
Feb. 8, 2008) (quoting Jones v. Family Health Centers, Inc., et al., 323 F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (D.
8.C. 2003) (second alteration in Linzer), aff'd, 98 F. App’x 959 (4th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff must
that his “disability “substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.”” /d. (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)). “In order to demonstrate that an impairment is ‘substantially limiting, an ..
individual must show that [Jhe is significantly restricted in performing a major life activity.” Id.
(quoting Pollard v. High’s of Balt, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to sustain a failure to accommodate claim. As
for the first element, Plaintiff alleges that he is “a qualified individual with a disability,” but he
does not provide adequate facts about his disability to state a plausible claim. ECF 1, at 5.
Although Plaintiff states his disability is a “[p]ermanent medical condition,” he does not plead any
details about his medical condition nor does he allege that it limits any major life activities. See
id. at4, While the Court accepts as true Plaintiff? s allegations for purposes of resolving the motion
- to dismiss, “merely parroting the statutory language does not suffice.” Richardson v. Maryland
Transit Admin., Civ. No. RDB-18-0884, 2019 WL 1002597, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2019)
(dismissing failure to accommodate claim because plaintiff failed to “explain how the alleged
disability meets one of the[] criteria” under the Rehabilitation Act); ef Linzer, 2008 WL 11509695,-
at *4 (dismissing failure to accommodate claim where the plaintiff “failed to show that her physical
impairments substantially limit her in a major life activity”). Here, Plaintiff's “conclusory
allegations . . . do not.warrant the inference that [Jhe suffers from a disability.” Richardson, 2019.
WL 1002597, at *7. .
Plaintiff also fails to allege the third element of a failure to accommodate claim. Not only
does the complaint lack any assertion that Plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of
his position with reasonable accommodation, the EEOC decision‘ attached to the complaint
reflects that the exact opposite may have beén true. Specifically, the EEOC decision states that
“the evidence in the record indicated that [Plaintiff] was medically unable to work in any capacity.”
ECF 1, at 8. An inability to perform the essential duties of one’s position is fatal to a failure to
accommodate claim. See Redding y. Noem, 168 F.4th 203, 208 (4th Cir. 2026) (noting that the □
plaintiffs assertion that she was unable to perform the essential duties of her position was “a
‘damaging one”). If Plaintiffs complaint contained factual allegations related to his ability to
* The Court considers the EEOC decision attached to the complaint because Plaintiff explicitly
relies on it in the complaint and no party contests its authenticity. See Higgins v. McDonald, Civ..
No. RDB-25-1695, 2026 WL 111330, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2026).
perform the essential functions of his position at NIST, the Court would take all well-pled facts as.
true at this early stage. But Plaintiff has failed to plead any such facts, and the only evidence he
attaches that arguably relates to this element appears to support the opposite conclusion. □
Plaintiff, however, contends that his reasonable accommodation claim should survive
because NIST failed to conduct an individualized assessment of his ability to perform essential job
functions with reasonable accommodation. ECF 18, at 3. Specifically, he argues that he “alleged
that management placed him on enforced leave and moved to separate him for ‘medical inability’
without ever evaluating whether accommodations would allow continued performance of essential
duties.” id. These allegations, however, do not appear in the complaint. See ECF 1, at 5. Instead,
the complaint vaguely states that the EEOC dismissal left “all Title VIE properly stated claims in
dispute and federal agency claims of inability to perform essential functions with or without
requested reasonable accommodations and/or ‘individualized assessment’ by the federal agency
of any kind.” Jd To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to set forth additional factual allegations in
his opposition brief, a “plaintiff may not cure a defect in a complaint or otherwise amend a
‘complaint by way of his opposition briefing.” Zevere v. Signature Props.; LLC, Civ, No. ELH-
21-1929, 2022 WL 2159837, at *9 (D. Md. June 14, 2022) (collecting cases).
Moreover, Plaintiff argues that “[c]ourts uniformly hold that employers must engage in an
‘interactive process and individualized assessment before concluding that an employee is unfit.”
ECF 18, at 3. But the cases cited by Plaintiff—School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987) and Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)—do not stand for
‘this proposition. See id. The Supreme Court in Arfine considered whether the plaintiff, Arline,
could “be considered a handicapped individual” under the Rehabilitation Act based on her
contagious tuberculosis. 480 U.S. at 279-286. It concluded that “the fact that a person with a
record of physical. impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from
coverage under” the Rehabilitation Act. Jd. at 286. The Supreme Court then remanded to the
district court to “conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact”
regarding whether Arline was “otherwise qualified for the job of elementary schoolteacher.” Jd.
at 287. And although the Court touched on the requirement for reasonable accommodations in a
footnote, see id. at 287 n.17,it did not discuss or address whether an employer is required to engage
in an interactive process or individualized assessment for reasonable accommodations. The same
true of Davis. There, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the Rehabilitation Act “forbids
professional schools from imposing physical qualifications for admission to their clinical training
programs.” Davis, 442 U.S. at 400. Davis did not involve an employer, but rather a nursing
program at a community college, and it does not discuss any “interactive process” involved in a.
request for accommodations. See id. The Court is thus not persuaded by Plaintiff's citation to
these cases. Nevertheless, as stated, the complaint lacks facts regarding any alleged refusal to
engage in an interactive process and, as such, Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim cannot
survive solely on that basis.” . □
As Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain the first and third elements, his
failure to accommodate claim must be dismissed. Cf Richardson, 2019 WL 1002597, at □□□
(dismissing a.failure to accommodate claim because even though the plaintiff alleged that “with
reasonable accommodations and allowances, [she] was capable of performing all essential
Nor could it, since the Fourth Circuit has noted that “an employee cannot base a reasonable □
accommodation claim solely on the allegation that the employer failed to engage in an interactive
process.” Walter v. United Airlines, Inc., 232 F.3d 892, 2000 WL 1587489, at *4 (4th Cir. 2000)
(table) (citing Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)). “Rather, the
employee must demonstrate that the employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process resulted.
in the failure to identify an appropriate accommodation for the disabled employee.” Jd. Such
allegations are not'present in the complaint as pled.
| 10
functions of her job,” the complaint did “not support [the plaintiffs] vague assertions with any
factual content whatsoever”). □□
2. Retaliation
Plaintiff brings a claim of retaliation, ECF 1, at 4, and alleges that “as a result” of his
accommodation request, he was placed “in a non-duty, non-pay status for over 14 days,” id. at 5.
“The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the American[s] with Disabilit[ies] Act’s anti-retaliation
provision, which prohibits ‘discrimination against any individual because she has opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by’ the ADA.” Richardson, 2019 WL 1002597, at *9 (citing 42 U.S.C.
Ԥ 12203(a)). To state a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must allege that 1) he engaged in a protected
activity; 2) Defendant took an adverse action against him; and 3) a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the adverse action. /d. (citing Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am.,
252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001)). Defendant argues that “[e]ven assuming [Plaintiff's]
allegations satisfy the second element of a retaliation claim, the Complaint lacks sufficient factual
content to plausibly establish the remaining elements of a retaliation claim.” ECF 5, at 12. As
Defendant does not advance arguments for dismissal based on the second element, the Court
‘ analyzes Defendant’s arguments regarding the first and third elements of Plaintiff's retaliation
claim.
In general, requesting disability accommodation is a protected activity under the
Rehabilitation Act. ‘See Connelly v. Maryland Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Civ. No, JKB-21-1068, 2021
WL 6000076, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2021) (citing Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 416 (4th Cir.
2021)). However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the first element
because “some courts have found that a ‘request for accommodation that is not reasonable is not
a protected activity.” ECF 5, at 12 (citing Kelley v. Mayorkas, 694 F. Supp. 3d 715, 730 (E.D.
Va. 2023)) (emphasis in ECF 5). But Defendant omits the remaining discussion from Kelley v.
11
Mayorkas, in which the Eastern District of Virginia found that “the proper inquiry is whether a
plaintiff has a ‘reasonable good faith belief that he was entitled to request the reasonable
accommodation he requested’ at the time of the request,” not that a request for accommodation
must be reasonable to qualify as a protected activity. 694 F. Supp. 3d at 730. The court opined:
that “[t]o hold otherwise could have a chilling effect on federal employees’ -accommodation
requests—an employee who needs an accommodation may not request it for fear that they will be
retaliated against without recourse if their request is later found to be unreasonable.” Jd.
Nevertheless, the Court need not wade further into this-issue because the complaint lacks facts to
support a plausible inference of causation.
“A plaintiff may attempt to demonstrate that a protected activity caused an adverse action,
through two routes.” Smith, 12 F.4th at 417 (quoting Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d
111, 123 (4th Cir. 2021)). First, “[a] plaintiff may establish the existence of facts that ‘suggest ]
that the adverse action occurred because of the protected activity.” /d. (quoting Roberts, 998 □□□□□
at 123). Second, “[a] plaintiff may also show that ‘the adverse act bears sufficient temporal
proximity to the protected activity.”” Jd (quoting the same). “The existence of relevant facts
alone, or together with temporal proximity, may be used to establish a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action.” Jd. (quoting the same).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead facts supporting causation. Plaintiff asserts that he was placed
in “a non-duty, non-pay status for over 14 days,” which Plaintiff refers to as a “constructive
suspension,” “{a]s a result” of a request for reasonable accommodations. ECF 1, at 5. Aside from
this conclusory assertion, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to suggest that any “constructive
suspension” occurred because of his request for accommodation. And although he states that he
was “placed on enforced leave for over 14 days” on August 19, 2016, he does not provide any
12
information regarding the timing of his request for accommodation in order for the Court to
reasonably infer causation based on temporal proximity. Cf Jackson v. Maryland Dep't of Com.,
‘Civ. No. JKB-19-1693, 2020 WL 551914, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2020) (finding a plaintiff failed to
plead a retaliation claim because, among other things, she did not “state specifically when
the[ allegedly negative] comments started—making it impossible for the Court to determine
‘whether they began close enough in time to the filing of her complaints to create an inference of
causation”), Accordingly, Plaintiff's retaliation claim is dismissed.
Cc. Leave to Amend |
At the end of his opposition, Plaintiff informally requests leave to amend “should the Court
find any deficiency” with his complaint. ECF 18, at 4. Defendant did not file a reply and therefore
has not set forth any argument in opposition to granting Plaintiff leave to amend.
“As an initial matter, such an informal request does not comport with the Federal Rules or
the Local Rules of this Court.” Woodward v. GEICO Advantage Ins. Co., Civ. No. GLR-21-952,
2022 WL 2953053, at *16 (D, Md. July 25, 2022) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); and then citing
Loc. R. 103.6 (D. Md. 2021)). “A request for a court order must be made by motion,” Fed. R. Civ. .
7(b)(1), and in this district, “a motion requesting leave to file an amended pleading” must
include “‘a clean copy of the amended pleading” and a redlined copy identifying the proposed
amendments, Loc. R. 103.6(a), (c) (D. Md. 2025). Plaintiff does not attach a proposed amended
complaint to his opposition. See ECF 18.
Where a request for leave to amend is made outside the bounds of a formal motion and
without a proposed amended complaint, a court is likely to deny the request as procedurally
improper, See Hall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civ. No. JKB-19-2510, 2020 WL 1452132, □
at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2020) (denying leave to amend as procedurally improper where the pro se
“Tpllaintiff did not file a motion or submit a proposed amended complaint; he merely expressed
13
his wish to amend in his opposition brief”). “Nevertheless, this Court has still granted a request
- for leave to amend made informally.” Glover v. Patterson, Civ. No. BAH-25-1679, 2026 WL
594597, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2026) (citing McCray v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Civ. No. GLR 13-
1518, 2017 WL 11849521, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2017)).
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court “should freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit has
“interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that ‘leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the
amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426-
27 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986).
“There is no question, to be sure, that leave to amend would be futile when an amended complaint
could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lavin v. Safeco Ins. Co, of Am., Civ. No. SAG-22-
1788, 2022 WL 17342051, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2022) (citing U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)). “Yet the Court need not apply the Rule
12(b)(6) standard when determining whether leave to amend would be futile.” Jd. It instead
applies a “much less demanding standard.” Jd, “Leave to amend . . . should only be denied on the:
ground of futility when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.”
Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510.
Although the Court has not yet seen the proposed amended complaint, Defendants set forth.
no opposing argument suggesting that Plaintiffs amended complaint would be “clearly
_ insufficient or frivolous on its face.” See Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510. Given that Defendants do not
oppose amendment, and taking into consideration Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will grant,
leave to amend. See Awah v. Midland Credit Mgmt. of Am., Civ. No. RWT-10-00885, 2010 WL
a, 14
4026098, at *5 (D. Md, Oct. 14, 2010) (“A motion for leave to amend should be liberally granted
to pro se plaintiffs if there are insufficiencies in the pleading, even if the motion for leave does not
offer proposed amendments.”). Plaintiff will be grarited twenty-one (21) days from the date of this
order to file an amended complaint as to his Rehabilitation Act'claims.
CONCLUSION .
For the foregoing reasons, Deferidant’s motion to dismiss, ECF 4, is GRANTED. Plaintiff
is GRANTED twenty-one (21) days to file an amended complaint, or the action will be dismissed
without further notice,
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: April 13.2026 jf
‘ Brendan A. Hurson
United States District J udge □□