The opinion
2026 IL App (4th) 251098-U
NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under
June 2, 2026
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-1098
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
JERRY BOLLIN, Individually and as Cotrustee and ) Appeal from the
Beneficiary of the Arden L. Bollin Trust, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Hancock County
v. ) No. 22CH1
NANCY COREY, Individually and as Beneficiary of the )
Arden L. Bollin Trust, JUDY GOOD, Individually and as )
Cotrustee and Beneficiary of the Arden L. Bollin Trust, )
LOREN BOLLIN, KENDALL BOLLIN, CLAYTON )
BOLLIN, UNKNOWN OWNERS, UNKNOWN )
CLAIMANTS, AND UNKNOWN PARTIES, )
Defendants )
(Nancy Corey, Defendant-Appellant; Judy Good, )
Defendant-Appellee). )
) Honorable
) James Standard,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Grischow and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Because defendant-appellant failed to meet her burden of establishing the appellate
court’s jurisdiction, the appellate court dismissed her appeal.
¶2 On March 14, 2025, the trial court entered an order pursuant to section 17-105 of
the Partition Act (735 ILCS 5/17-105 (West 2024)). On April 14, 2025, defendant-appellant Nancy
Corey, individually and as a beneficiary of the Arden L. Bollin Trust, filed a motion to reconsider,
asking the court to vacate its order or, in the alternative, stay the case pending appeal and enter an
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) finding. On September 9, 2025, the court
denied Corey’s motion to reconsider and her request for a stay. In addition, the court did not
provide Corey with a Rule 304(a) finding. Corey appeals, arguing the court erred (1) because it
did not follow the law when it entered a judgment of partition and appointed a commissioner,
(2) as matter of law by having an evidentiary hearing on the commissioner’s report, and (3) by
approving and adopting the commissioner’s report and ordering the property at issue sold. We
dismiss this appeal because Corey failed to meet her burden of establishing this court’s jurisdiction.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 6, 2022, plaintiff-appellee Jerry Bollin, individually and as cotrustee
and beneficiary of the Arden L. Bollin Trust, filed a complaint for partition pursuant to section
17-101 of the Partition Act (735 ILCS 5/17-101 (West 2022)). The partition action involved six
tracts of land.
¶5 On February 2, 2022, defendant-appellee Judy Good filed an answer to the
complaint and a countercomplaint. On February 23, 2022, Corey filed her answer to Jerry’s
complaint and a six-count counterclaim. On March 16, 2022, Corey filed an answer to Good’s
countercomplaint. On April 21, 2022, Good filed a motion to strike count IV of Corey’s
counterclaim. On July 22, 2022, Corey filed an amended version of count IV of her counterclaim,
which was directed at Good.
¶6 On August 17, 2022, Good filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss the amended
count IV of Corey’s counterclaim (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2022)). She also filed a motion for
sanctions against Corey. On October 18, 2022, Jerry filed a motion to dismiss counts I, II, III, and
VI of Corey’s counterclaims against him under both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 619 (West 2022)). According to Jerry’s motion, those counts should
have been dismissed because they did not affirmatively allege ultimate facts that would have
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constituted a claim in opposition to his partition action. Jerry also argued the first three counts of
Corey’s counterclaim were barred by res judicata and an agreed order entered in Henry County
case No. 19-P-96, on January 14, 2020.
¶7 On October 26, 2022, the trial court dismissed count IV of Corey’s counterclaim,
which was directed at Good, without prejudice. On December 5, 2022, Corey filed a response to
Jerry’s motion to dismiss, asking that the motion be denied.
¶8 We note that on July 27, 2023, Corey filed a motion to reconsider or for clarification
of an order entered on July 13, 2023, which referenced a hearing on February 23, 2023. However,
neither an order dated July 13, 2023, nor a transcript from a hearing on February 23, 2023, is
contained in the record before this court.
¶9 On August 24, 2023, Corey filed an amended counterclaim. Corey indicated she
was realleging counts I, II, III, IV, and VI—adding additional years of rent and other allegations
to preserve for review the trial court’s prior dismissal of these counts. Corey indicated count V of
the amended counterclaim was aimed at parties who had not appeared in the case. Further, Corey
indicated she was adding new counts to the counterclaim as well—counts VII, VIII, and IX.
¶ 10 On September 7, 2023, Jerry filed a second motion to dismiss Corey’s
counterclaims and a second motion for sanctions against Corey and her attorneys. Jerry argued
counts I, II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX were substantially insufficient in law because the counts
did not present a claim in opposition to his partition claims and could not be pled as an alternative
cause of action. In addition, once again, Jerry argued counts I, II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX of
Corey’s counterclaim were barred by res judicata and the January 14, 2020, agreed order in case
No. 19-P-96.
¶ 11 On September 8, 2023, Good filed a second motion to dismiss Corey’s amended
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counterclaim and a second motion for sanctions.
¶ 12 On September 22, 2023, Corey filed a response to the motions to dismiss her
amended counterclaim.
¶ 13 On November 14, 2023, Good filed a motion asking the trial court to appoint a
special commissioner.
¶ 14 On December 5, 2023, Corey filed a response to the motion to request a special
commissioner, asserting the trial court had to “wait until the initial phase of the case concludes,
concerning the rights of any interested parties,” before a commissioner could be appointed.
¶ 15 At a hearing on December 14, 2023, the trial court stated it was granting both
motions to dismiss on res judicata grounds. However, the court later specified “the claims prior to
January 14, 2020, [were] barred with prejudice,” thereby suggesting the claims related to what
happened after January 14, 2020, could be amended and refiled. The court denied the request for
sanctions against Corey and her attorneys. Turning to the motion to appoint a special
commissioner, the court indicated it was going to enter the order that had been submitted, which
stated:
“All parties who have filed an appearance in this action through their
attorneys have agreed to the appointment of a special commissioner in the
above-entitled action.
Jarad Royer of Compeer Financial is appointed commissioner and directed
to examine the premises, make a finding of whether or not the land is subject to
physical division without manifest prejudice to the rights of the parties, if so, report
how the division can be made, employ a surveyor as necessary to carry out or assist
in the division of the property, or in the alternative, report to this Court that physical
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division is not feasible.
The parties further agree that pursuant to the statute the fees and expenses
of the commissioner and surveyors the commissioner may employ shall be taxed as
costs in the proceeding.”
¶ 16 On August 22, 2024, Corey filed objections to the commissioner’s report.
¶ 17 At a hearing on March 4, 2025, the trial court asked if anyone had any comment on
the effect of the December 14, 2023, order. Corey’s attorney responded Corey’s objection to the
commissioner’s report and a motion for joinder were pending. The attorney also indicated Corey
did not want the property sold. With regard to the order entered on December 14, 2023, Corey’s
attorney indicated Corey had objected to the appointment of a commissioner, counsel’s signature
was not on the order, and counsel did not know how the court came to the conclusion Corey agreed
to everything in the order. According to Corey’s attorney, at most, he and Corey indicated they
were okay with the individual the court had chosen to be the commissioner.
¶ 18 Jarad Royer, who prepared the commissioner’s report, then testified. According to
Royer, the total appraised value for all the properties was $5.169 million. After determining the
total value, he examined whether the property could be divided into three equal portions. He opined
the property could not be equitably and physically divided. After listening to Royer’s testimony,
the trial court determined the testimony established the commissioner’s report should be accepted.
¶ 19 On either March 14 or 16, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment order pursuant
to section 17-105 of the Partition Act (735 ILCS 5/17-105 (West 2024)). The court found:
“(a) the rights, titles and interest of all the parties in the action are as follows:
the subject property is titled with an undivided 1/2 vested interest in Jerry Bollin,
Judy Good, and Nancy Corey and an undivided 1/2 vested interest [in] the Arden
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Bollin Trust with the beneficiaries of that Trust being Jerry Bollin, Judy Good and
Nancy Corey in equal shares. Loren Bollin, Kendall Bollin, Clayton Bollin and
Logan Bollin are all tenants on the subject property;
(b) the subject property or any part thereof cannot be divided or partitioned
among the parties without manifest prejudice to the parties in interest;
(c) While the subject property may qualify to be partitioned under the
Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (735 ILCS 75/1), Jerry Bollin, Judy Good,
and Nancy Corey agreed and affirmed that they elected to proceed under the
Partition Act (735 ILCS 5/17-105) rather than under the Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act (755 ILCS 75/1)[ ](See this Court’s Order of March 7, 2025[)];
(d) the subject property, not being susceptible to division should be sold at
public sale in such manner and upon such terms and notice of sale as the Court
directs;
(e) the Court having found that the subject property should be sold, finds
the value of the property to be five million one hundred sixty nine thousand dollars
($5,169,000.00).”
The court then ordered the subject property to be sold and indicated no sale would be approved for
less than two-thirds of the total valuation of the subject property.
¶ 20 On April 14, 2025, Corey filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the trial court’s
order. Assuming, arguendo, the court denied her motion to reconsider, Corey asked the court to
enter a Rule 304(a) finding allowing for an immediate appeal. Corey noted our supreme court’s
opinion in Schuck v. Schuck, 413 Ill. 390 (1952), could support the immediate appealability of the
trial court’s ruling as a final and appealable order. However, Corey’s motion then stated:
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“20. The next aspect of this Motion involves what occurs if the motion to
reconsider itself is denied. Can Corey appeal without a Rule 304(a) certification
that there is no just cause or reason to delay enforcement of or appeal from the
March 14, 2025[,] order. [Schuck] was a partition case. The court entered a decree
declaring the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant to equal one-half undivided
interests and ordered partition. No appeal was taken. Then the order was issued to
sell the property. Again, no appeal was filed. When the Supreme Court ruled, it
held the initial orders were final and appealable. The losing party could not wait to
only appeal from the order confirming the sale. Standing alone, this would seem to
mean Corey can and in fact must appeal the latest orders. But it is not that simple,
for two reasons.
21. Under Rule 304 (a), even final and appealable orders are not appealable
if there has been no final determination of all claims involving all parties. Corey’s
amended counterclaims were dismissed but without prejudice. The argument made
by [Jerry] was that they needed to be addressed only upon a wrap-up of the entire
case. And this Court has noted that an accounting still needs to be performed and
shared in this case with a to be set time period for any objections to be filed and
resolved by the Court. It clearly appears that the recent orders, which may be
otherwise considered appealable if there were no other claims left in the case, are
not appealable without the required Rule 304 (a) verbiage.
22. In addition, Corey wonders about the continued vitality of Schruck [sic]
in light of more recent precedent in the somewhat similar context of mortgage
foreclosures. In such cases, the overall procedure is somewhat similar. The plaintiff
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gets a judgment of foreclosure and order for sale. Ultimately, any sale is confirmed
by the court in a subsequent order. Which of these orders is appealable at all and
how does Rule 304 (a) enter the equation?
23. A judgment of foreclosure entered before confirmation of the sale is not
final and appealable without Rule 304 (a) certification. EMC Mortgage Corp. v.
Kemp, 2012 IL 113419; In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542 (1989).
Therefore, the lack of Rule 304 (a) certification language made the judgment of
foreclosure there not final or appealable. Under the Rule, it remained modifiable
and could not be appealed. The appeal had to await an order confirming the sale or
include the [Rule] 304 (a) wording.
24. There may be a distinction between foreclosures and partitions, but
Corey does not want to take the chance that any emergent appeal she would take
now is subject to the Appellate Court determining it lacks jurisdiction. The simple
answer is to certify the orders for immediate appeal under Rule 304 (a). The rule
says such language can be part of any order denying a motion to reconsider the
previous order or be by separate order.”
Corey also asked for a stay of the judgment pending her appeal.
¶ 21 On May 5, 2025, Jerry and Good filed a joint motion for a court-ordered judicial
settlement conference. At a hearing on May 21, 2025, the trial court granted the request for a
settlement conference and directed the parties to participate. The settlement conference was held,
but the parties did not reach an agreement.
¶ 22 On July 3, 2025, Good filed a response to Corey’s motion to reconsider and vacate,
asking the trial court to deny Corey’s motion. Good argued the court committed no error in entering
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the judgment of partition and ordering the sale of the property. Further, Good asked the court not
to enter a Rule 304(a) finding and not to stay the court’s judgment.
¶ 23 On September 9, 2025, the trial court entered the following order: “After due
consideration by the Court, the motion of Nancy Corey to reconsider and vacate, or in the
alternative for stay, is hereby denied.” The court’s order did not include a Rule 304(a) finding.
¶ 24 Thereafter, on October 9, 2025, Corey filed this appeal.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 Before addressing any of the substantive issues Corey raises on appeal, this court
must first consider whether she has established that we have jurisdiction. Jerry and Good argue
this appeal should be dismissed because this court lacks jurisdiction.
¶ 27 In Shared Imaging, LLC v. Hamer, 2017 IL App (1st) 152817, ¶ 19, the First
District stated appellants have the burden of establishing appellate jurisdiction. We agree.
¶ 28 In a case being appealed to the appellate court, pursuant to the requirements found
in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(4)(ii) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), an appellant is required to include
a statement of jurisdiction in her appellant’s brief, comprised of
“a brief, but precise statement or explanation under the heading ‘Jurisdiction’ of the
basis for appeal including the supreme court rule or other law which confers
jurisdiction upon the reviewing court; the facts of the case which bring it within
this rule or other law; and the date that the order being appealed was entered and
any other facts which are necessary to demonstrate that the appeal is timely. In
appeals from a judgment as to all the claims and all the parties, the statement shall
demonstrate the disposition of all claims and all parties. All facts recited in this
statement shall be supported by page references to the record on appeal.”
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¶ 29 In Corey’s appellant’s brief, her jurisdictional statement indicated the trial court
“had previously entered interlocutory rulings directing the appointment of a commissioner and
setting an evidentiary hearing” to determine whether to approve the commissioner’s report. Then,
on March 14, 2025, the court “entered a judgment of partition, approved the commissioner’s
report, and ordered the property sold.” On April 14, 2025, Corey filed a motion to reconsider,
which the court denied on September 9, 2025. On October 9, 2025, she filed her notice of appeal.
According to Corey, “The appeal is brought pursuant to [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule 301 [(eff.
Feb. 1, 1994)] and [Schuck], which held that a party cannot wait for the order confirming the sale
to appeal from the order approving the commissioner’s report and directing the sale of the
property.”
¶ 30 In her reply brief, when responding to Good and Jerry’s argument this court lacks
jurisdiction, Corey fell back on our supreme court’s decision in Schuck, which she argued
established the trial court’s orders constituted final judgments, but she provided no further
argument as to why this court has jurisdiction.
¶ 31 Regardless of whether the order or orders Corey is challenging are final judgments,
Rule 304(a) does not allow the appellate court to immediately review all orders that constitute final
judgments. According to Rule 304(a):
“If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal
may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that
there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” Ill. S. Ct.
R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
Good and Jerry argue outstanding claims are still at issue in the trial court in this case. Therefore,
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according to them, this court does not have jurisdiction.
¶ 32 In her briefs to this court, Corey fails to address Rule 304(a)’s impact on this court’s
jurisdiction. Instead, she simply points to our supreme court’s decision in Schuck.
¶ 33 This is not a situation where Good and Jerry surprised Corey with their
jurisdictional challenge. In the trial court, Corey was clearly aware this court might not have
jurisdiction over this appeal if the trial court did not issue a Rule 304(a) finding. In her motion to
reconsider, Corey recognized her reliance on Schuck as establishing this court’s jurisdiction was
questionable because of Rule 304(a). According to her motion:
“Under Rule 304 (a), even final and appealable orders are not appealable if there
has been no final determination of all claims involving all parties. Corey’s amended
counterclaims were dismissed but without prejudice. The argument made by [Jerry]
was that they needed to be addressed only upon a wrap-up of the entire case. And
this Court has noted that an accounting still needs to be performed and shared in
this case with a to be set time period for any objections to be filed and resolved by
the Court. It clearly appears that the recent orders, which may be otherwise
considered appealable if there were no other claims left in the case, are not
appealable without the required Rule 304 (a) verbiage.”
In addition, Corey questioned “the continued vitality of Schruck [sic] in light of more recent
precedent in the somewhat similar context of mortgage foreclosures.”
¶ 34 However, even though Corey clearly believed this court’s jurisdiction was
questionable without a Rule 304(a) finding, she failed to provide this court with any kind of sound
argument why this court has jurisdiction over this appeal. Instead, she simply relied on
jurisdictional arguments that she argued were questionable in the trial court without providing this
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court any explanation for the change in her position. If a basis for this court’s jurisdiction exists,
Corey failed to provide that basis to this court. As a result, she failed to meet her burden of
establishing our jurisdiction, and we dismiss her appeal.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we dismiss Corey’s appeal because she failed to meet her
burden of establishing this court’s jurisdiction over this appeal.
¶ 37 Appeal dismissed.
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