In re A.L. and B.L.

FILED

June 1, 2026

C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re A.L. and B.L.

No. 25-437 (Wayne County CC-50-2024-JA-38 and CC-50-2024-JA-39)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Father D.L.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Wayne County’s June 3, 2025, order

terminating his parental rights to A.L. and B.L., arguing that the circuit court erred by adjudicating

him of abusing B.L. and terminating his parental rights to A.L. and B.L.2 Upon our review, we

determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit

court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

In April 2024, the DHS filed a petition alleging that the petitioner sexually abused B.L. in

the family home where A.L. also resided. The DHS further alleged that B.L.’s mother, who was

the petitioner’s wife, contacted law enforcement after B.L. disclosed that the petitioner sexually

abused her. During a forensic interview, the child made disclosures consistent with those she made

to her mother.

On July 10, 2024, the circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing at which B.L.’s forensic

interviewer testified, discussing her credentials and training, and recounted then-five-year-old

B.L.’s disclosures. Specifically, the interviewer explained that she received Child First training for

forensic interviews and participated in continuing education courses, additional training, and peer

review exercises. The interviewer testified to her interview with B.L., which was conducted in a

manner consistent with her training and education. The interviewer explained that while she did

not specifically ask B.L. if she knew the difference between the truth and a lie due to her young

age, she told the child that it was important for her answers to be accurate. B.L.’s mother also

testified that on April 3, 2024, she observed redness on B.L.’s buttocks and the child disclosed that

the petitioner had digitally penetrated her and made her perform sexual acts upon him.

On July 25, 2024, the adjudicatory hearing continued. The petitioner called Dr. Drew

Barzman, whom the court qualified as an expert in the field of forensic psychology, to testify. Dr.

Barzman testified that, because B.L.’s forensic interviewer did not use a technique called

1

The petitioner appears by counsel A. Courtenay Craig. The West Virginia Department of

Human Services (“DHS”) appears by Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant Attorney

General James Wegman. Counsel Raymond A. Nolan appears as the children’s guardian ad litem.

2

We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case.

See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).

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“narrative event practice,” it was “possible that [the interview] could be less reliable.” Dr. Barzman

further testified that while he had never personally conducted a real forensic interview (as opposed

to mock interviews for training purposes), he had reviewed many forensic interviews and testified

as an expert witness in multiple jurisdictions. However, Dr. Barzman agreed that B.L.’s forensic

interviewer did not ask any questions that were suggestive of an answer. The petitioner testified

and denied all allegations of abuse. He opined that his wife fabricated the allegations and coached

the child to falsely accuse him of sexual abuse. In the resulting adjudicatory order, the court found

that B.L.’s forensic interviewer told the child about the importance of providing accurate answers

to the interview questions which demonstrated an appreciation of the requirement that the child be

truthful and that B.L.’s forensic interviewer followed all relevant requirements and protocols. The

court further found that the interview questions were not suggestive, the child’s answers did not

indicate coaching, and the child’s disclosures were credible and stated in language consistent with

a child of her age. Ultimately, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner

sexually abused B.L. in the family home.

In April 2025, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing during which the petitioner

testified that he did not abuse B.L. and expressed his intent to appeal his criminal conviction.3 In

the final dispositional order entered June 3, 2025, the court noted the petitioner’s adjudication for

abusing the children along with his criminal conviction, and found that he could not correct the

circumstances of abuse and neglect within a timely manner. The court further found that the

children’s best interest necessitated termination of the petitioner’s parental rights and, accordingly,

terminated his parental rights to the children. It is from this order that the petitioner appeals.4

On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the

circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Specifically, those factual findings

“shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is

clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn

a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must

affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of

the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196

W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, Syl. Pt. 1, in part. Before this Court, the

petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by adjudicating him of sexually abusing B.L. To

support this argument, the petitioner asserts that the circuit court’s findings of fact are unsupported

3

On March 20, 2025, the petitioner was criminally convicted of eleven felonies relating to

his sexual abuse of B.L.

4

A.L.’s mother’s parental rights were also terminated. B.L.’s nonabusing mother’s parental

rights remain intact, and the permanency plan for both children is to remain with her.

2

by the evidence. In addressing evidentiary challenges, we have explained that the DHS is required

“to prove ‘conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition . . . by clear and convincing

[evidence].’ The statute, however, does not specify any particular manner or mode of testimony or

evidence by which the [DHS] is obligated to meet this burden.” Syl. Pt. 1, In re Joseph A., 199

W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, In re S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d

867 (1981)). “We have also stated that the clear and convincing standard is ‘intermediate, being

more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a

reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.’” In re F.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 546, 759 S.E.2d 769, 777

(2014) (quoting Cramer v. W. Va. Dep’t of Highways, 180 W. Va. 97, 99 n.1, 375 S.E.2d 568, 570

n.1 (1988)). For example, the petitioner argues that B.L.’s forensic interviewer never explicitly

testified that she followed all interview protocols established by her training program and required

by the advocacy center where the interview occurred; thus, the court erred by finding that the

interviewer followed all relevant protocols. This argument is meritless, as B.L.’s forensic

interviewer testified extensively about her education and training, the interview protocols she used,

why she used certain protocols as opposed to others, and B.L.’s interview. The court correctly

found that she followed all relevant requirements and protocols during her interview with B.L., a

finding consistent with the interviewer’s testimony.

In further support of his argument, the petitioner asserts that B.L.’s forensic interview was

not conducted according to “nationally required forensic interview techniques.” However, the

petitioner merely complains that the circuit court rejected Dr. Barzman’s opinion that B.L.’s

forensic interviewer should have asked more questions about the child’s ability to appreciate the

truth and employed “narrative event practice.” It is important to note that Dr. Barzman testified

that it was “possible that [the interview] could be less reliable” due to the interviewer not using

the protocols he endorsed. However, the court found Dr. Barzman’s critique unavailing and

specifically found that the child’s disclosures in her interview were credible. Next, the petitioner

asserts that because B.L.’s physical examination yielded no results of sexual assault, his

adjudication was erroneous. However, an individual may be adjudicated of sexually abusing a

child “notwithstanding the fact that . . . the child may have suffered no apparent physical, mental,

or emotional injury as a result of that conduct.” W. Va. Code § 49-1-201. Further, the petitioner

avers that the child’s statements in her forensic interview were ambiguous and inconsistent,

rendering it impossible to review the record and “find a firm belief [that] anything said in the

forensic interview . . . is credible or reliable.” However, this Court does not “reweigh the evidence

or make credibility determinations.” In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 472, 914 S.E.2d 701, 707 (2025).

Below, the circuit court considered not only the child’s interview but also the testimony of several

witnesses, including testimony from B.L.’s forensic interviewer and Dr. Barzman as discussed

above, and explained its findings in the adjudicatory order. It is clear that the petitioner’s true

objective is for this Court to reweigh the evidence below and permit him to relitigate adjudication,

as he is dissatisfied with the circuit court’s weighing of the evidence and credibility determinations.

We decline to do so, as we will not substitute our own judgement in place of the circuit court’s.

See id. As such, the petitioner is entitled to no relief.

The petitioner also asserts that the circuit court erred by relying solely upon his conviction

and incarceration at disposition. See In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, Syl. Pt. 3

(requiring consideration of certain factors “[w]hen no factors and circumstances other than

incarceration are raised at a disposition hearing . . . with regard to a parent’s ability to remedy the

3

condition of abuse and neglect in the near future”). However, this is not applicable to the matter at

hand because the court’s dispositional order was not based solely on the petitioner’s conviction

and incarceration. According to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(5), there is no reasonable

likelihood conditions of abuse can be corrected when

[t]he abusing parent . . . ha[s] sexually abused or sexually exploited the child, and

the degree of family stress and the potential for further abuse and neglect are so

great as to preclude the use of resources to mitigate or resolve family problems, or

assist the abusing parent or parents in fulfilling their responsibilities to the child.

Here, the record clearly established that the petitioner sexually abused B.L. and that the degree of

family stress and potential for further abuse was so great that it precluded the use of assistive

resources. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not err in finding that the petitioner was unable

to substantially correct the circumstances of abuse in the near future and that the children’s best

interests necessitated termination of his parental rights. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)

(permitting a circuit court to terminate parental rights upon finding no reasonable likelihood

conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and when

necessary for the children’s welfare). As such, the petitioner is entitled to no relief.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its June

3, 2025, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 1, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice C. Haley Bunn

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice Charles S. Trump IV

Justice Thomas H. Ewing

Justice Gerald M. Titus III

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