United States v. Richardson Dangleben, Jr.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

Nos. 25-2807, 25-2916

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant

v.

RICHARDSON DANGLEBEN, JR.,

a/k/a Richard Dangleben, Jr.

____________

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands

(D.C. No. 3:23-cr-00072-001)

District Judge: Honorable Robert A. Molloy

____________

Argued December 9, 2025

Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 1, 2026)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves two unrelated questions of first

impression. First, can a district court set and enforce a deadline

by which the Government must give notice of its intent to seek

the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)? We hold that it

can. Second, are Virgin Islands territorial offenses predicate

“crime[s] of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)? We

hold that they are.

I

A

Richardson Dangleben, Jr. was charged in Virgin

Islands Superior Court for first-degree murder and for using a

firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. Dangleben

was granted pretrial release provided that he not possess any

firearms, ammunition, or dangerous weapons.

The decision to release Dangleben before trial proved

fatal. Just four months after he was charged with first-degree

murder, Dangleben engaged in a shootout with police on St.

Thomas. Dangleben was shot several times but survived.

Virgin Islands Detective Delberth Phipps, Jr. was not so

fortunate. He suffered a single gunshot wound and died about

an hour later. Inside Dangleben’s car, law enforcement found

a loaded handgun, ammunition, and 300 grams of marijuana.

2

B

On October 13, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted

Dangleben. As relevant here, Count One charged him with

using a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in death,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Because the underlying

alleged felony was murder, Dangleben was eligible for the

federal death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Counts Two and

Three charged him with using a firearm in furtherance of a

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As

required by § 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1), the Government also

charged Dangleben with several predicate crimes of violence

stemming from his alleged killing of Detective Phipps and

shootout with another officer. All of these predicate crimes of

violence were Virgin Islands territorial crimes, including

another first-degree murder charge.

1

After Dangleben was indicted, the Federal Public

Defender asked an Assistant United States Attorney assigned

to the case whether he would seek the death penalty. The

AUSA responded that the office “would not be recommending

the death penalty” to the Attorney General. Dist. Ct. Dkt.

No. 146-1, at 2–3 (emphasis added). In reliance on that

response, Dangleben did not then exercise his right to the

“prompt[]” appointment of two attorneys, at least one of whom

“shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.” See 18

U.S.C. § 3005. Both parties understood, however, that the

Attorney General—not the local U.S. Attorney’s Office—had

the ultimate authority to decide whether the Government

would seek the death penalty.

3

At a status conference on November 8, 2023, the

District Court asked the Government whether it intended to

seek the death penalty and, if so, when it would file a notice of

intent as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593. 1 The AUSA responded

that the “final decision is going to be coming from

Washington” but he was “confident” that the Government

would have “an answer” within 60 days. Supp. App. 4–5.

Dangleben then asked the Court to set a 60-day deadline for

the Government to decide whether “to file any 3593 Notice.”

Supp. App. 11. Describing that deadline as “[e]minently

reasonable,” the AUSA “join[ed] in that request. Id.

Given the parties’ agreement, the District Court ordered

the Government to “file any notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3593(a) no later than January 12, 2024.” Dist. Ct. Dkt.

No. 35. The parties then filed a joint proposed scheduling order

that included, among other things, an October 2024 (or later)

trial date. The Court adopted the jointly proposed dates and

reset trial for October 28, 2024.

1

In cases with capital-eligible charges where “the

[G]overnment believes that the circumstances of the offense

are such that a sentence of death is justified,” § 3593(a)

requires the Government to “file with the court” at “a

reasonable time before the trial” “a notice” that states (1) “the

[G]overnment believes that the circumstances of the offense

are such that, if the defendant is convicted, a sentence of death

is justified under this chapter and that the [G]overnment will

seek the sentence of death”; and (2) sets “forth the aggravating

factor or factors that the [G]overnment, if the defendant is

convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death.”

18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1)–(2).

4

On the day its “seek” decision was due, the Government

asked for more time. The AUSA explained that his

“unfamiliarity with the Capital Case review process led [him]

to believe that this issue could be addressed more

expeditiously.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 40, at 1. Counsel apologized

and told the District Court that he had “requested that the

process be expedited and, in any event, will file any notice by

no later than February 12.” Id. While noting that the

Government had “acquiesce[d] to the January 12, 2024 notice

deadline, which had the practical effect of ratifying the

reasonableness of the deadline imposed,” the Court gave the

Government its extra month. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 46, at 5

(citation modified). But the Court warned that no further

extension would “be entertained absent exigent circumstances

and supporting evidence.” Id.

On February 7, 2024, the Government filed a notice

with the District Court that the United States “will not seek the

death penalty for Richardson Dangleben, Jr.” Dist. Ct. Dkt.

No. 47 (emphasis added). Given this filing, Dangleben again

had no reason to exercise his right to learned counsel. Over the

next several months, both sides sought and received various

extensions for pretrial matters, and the Court said that it would

reschedule trial after it held an omnibus motions hearing.

A little more than a year after it had represented to the

Court that it would not seek the death penalty, on February 12,

2025, the Government moved to stay proceedings for 120 days

“to review [its] no-seek decision in this capital-eligible case.”

5

App. 85. 2 Given the Government’s indication that it was

reevaluating its seek determination, Dangleben requested

appointment of learned counsel. “As a practical matter,”

Dangleben argued, the Government’s motion has “returned

this arguably capital-eligible case to square one.” Dist. Ct. Dkt.

No. 129, at 6 (footnote omitted). “Notwithstanding” his

objection to the Government’s stay request, Dangleben

requested a “brief delay” to give learned counsel 15 days after

appointment to “familiarize herself with the case sufficiently”

2

On January 20, 2025, almost a year after the Government

filed its notice stating that it would not seek the death penalty,

President Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Restoring

the Death Penalty and Protecting Public Safety.” Exec. Order.

No. 14,164, 90 Fed. Reg. 8463 (Jan. 20, 2025). The Executive

Order directed the Attorney General, “where consistent with

applicable law,” to “seek the death penalty regardless of other

factors for every federal capital crime involving” the “murder

of a law-enforcement officer.” Id. About two weeks later, on

February 5, the Attorney General issued a memorandum titled

“Reviving the Federal Death Penalty and Lifting the

Moratorium on Federal Executions.” App. 87. That memo

directed the Attorney General’s Capital Review Committee “to

review no-seek decisions in all pending capital-eligible cases”

that were charged during the previous Administration and

determine “whether additional capital charges are

appropriate.” App. 89. The memo further stated that, “[a]bsent

significant mitigating circumstances, federal prosecutors are

expected to seek the death penalty in cases involving the

murder of a law-enforcement officer,” App. 88, and

“[p]articular attention shall be paid” to “capital crimes

committed” “within the federal special maritime and territorial

jurisdictions.” App. 89.

6

to address the Government’s motion. Id. at 8 (emphasis

omitted).

Twelve days after the Government’s motion to stay the

proceedings, the District Court appointed learned counsel.

Dangleben’s original counsel filed a declaration stating that he

would not have moved to extend the deadlines for motions and

expert disclosures—which had the practical effect of delaying

the October 2024 trial date—“[h]ad [he] thought that

continuing those deadlines could lead to reversal of the no-seek

notice.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 146-1, at 6. The declaration also

stated that, because “[a]t no time between February 7, 2024 and

January 19, 2025 did [G]overnment counsel communicate any

intent to seek the death penalty,” Dangleben’s counsel had not

requested learned counsel or pursued any mitigation

investigation. Id. at 6–7.

In mid-April, the Government filed a superseding

indictment that added the eligibility factors under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3591(a), as well as two aggravating factors necessary to

impose capital punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). The

Government also added a federal predicate to Count One. By

this point, the District Court still had not set a new trial date.

On May 16, 2025, the District Court denied the

Government’s stay request. United States v. Dangleben, 2025

WL 1423842, at *1 (D.V.I. May 16, 2025). Then, five days

later, the Government filed a notice to seek the death penalty

for Count One. Dangleben moved to strike the seek notice.

The District Court granted Dangleben’s motion to strike

the Government’s seek notice for five reasons. United States v.

Dangleben, 2025 WL 2647195, at *8 (D.V.I. Sept. 15, 2025).

Relevant here, the Government’s seek notice violated the

7

Court-ordered deadline. Id. at *3–4. “The Government,” the

Court explained, “cannot dispute that the Court and the parties

proceeded for over twelve months under the impression that

the Government would not be seeking the death penalty.” Id.

at *3. Although § 3593 “is silent regarding any notice to be

filed by the [G]overnment in the event it elects not to seek the

death penalty,” the Court reasoned that its inherent power to

control its own docket extended to “setting and enforcing

deadlines, including a deadline for filing a Section 3593

notice.” Id. Because the Government filed its seek notice “well

over a year after the Court-extended deadline of February 12,

2024,” the notice “clearly violate[d]” that deadline. Id.

2

Separate and apart from the weighty issue of the death

penalty, Dangleben moved to dismiss Counts One, Two, and

Three of the Superseding Indictment, arguing that only federal

crimes, not territorial offenses, can be “crime[s] of violence”

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The Government countered

that territorial crimes of violence can qualify as § 924(c)

predicates because the District Court of the Virgin Islands has

jurisdiction over certain territorial offenses under 48 U.S.C.

§ 1612(c), so those offenses “may be prosecuted in a court of

the United States” as § 924(c) requires.

The District Court agreed with Dangleben. According

to the Court, “Virgin Islands offenses cannot support a charge

under Section 924(c).” United States v. Dangleben, 2025 WL

2724050, at *7 (D.V.I. Sept. 25, 2025). Because Counts Two

and Three alleged only territorial predicate offenses, those

Counts had to be dismissed. Count One, however, alleged

territorial and federal predicate offenses, so it “remain[ed] a

8

viable offense” even after the territorial predicates were

stricken. Id.

The Court recognized that the District Court of the

Virgin Islands “is considered a ‘court of the United States’ for

purposes of Title 18.” Id. at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 23). And

under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), “the District Court of the Virgin

Islands has concurrent jurisdiction over local Virgin Islands

offenses if those offenses arise out of the same transaction as a

federal offense.” Id. So “the plain and unambiguous language

of Section 924(c),” the Court recognized, “would allow Virgin

Islands felony offenses to serve as predicate offenses in cases

prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.” Id.

Despite the statute’s text, the Court refused to apply it

as written. According to the Court, it would be “absurd” for

“Virgin Islands defendants” to be “prosecuted under a version

of a federal offense not available in any other federal court”

and “subjected to harsher punishment.” Id. at *5. The

Government’s pursuit of the death penalty here “highlight[ed]”

the absurdity, the Court thought, because it would be

“nonsensical, oxymoronic, and certainly inconsistent” that “a

Virgin Islands defendant could be subject to the death penalty

in federal court for committing a Virgin Islands crime when the

laws of the Virgin Islands do not allow for the penalty of

death.” Id.

The District Court also supposed that the “policy

reasons” behind § 924(c) and § 1612(c) “support[] a finding of

legal absurdity and disregarding the plain language.” Id. at *6.

“Congress passed Section 924(c),” the Court suggested, “to

prevent the carrying and use of firearms in the commission of

federal felonies,” whereas Congress passed § 1612(c) for the

“wholly unrelated” purpose of obviating the need to try “in

9

different courts aspects of the same offenses or closely related

offenses.” Id. (citations omitted). So the Court concluded that

“[t]here is no indication that Congress enacted Section 1612(c)

for the purpose of allowing local Virgin Islands offenses to

serve as predicate offenses under Section 924(c).” Id.

II 3

The Government timely appealed the District Court’s

order granting the motion to strike the seek notice and its order

dismissing several counts in the indictment. We consolidated

the appeals and begin with the question of our jurisdiction.

“In general,” the Government “may appeal in a criminal

case only as permitted by the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3731, which limits appeals to cases involving the dismissal

of charges, suppression or exclusion of evidence, return of

seized property, or release of a defendant.” United States v.

Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 392 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).

“[D]ismissal of the death penalty notice” is, “in effect, a partial

dismissal of the charge,” so its appeal falls within § 3731.

United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d

on other grounds, 536 U.S. 862 (2002). Accord United States

v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.

Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2001); United

States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1993).

We join the chorus now and hold that § 3731 authorizes

the Government to appeal an order that strikes a notice of intent

to seek the death penalty. As the Fifth Circuit explained long

3

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231

and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), (c).

10

ago, an order striking the death penalty “[is] in every practical

way as much of an alteration from the grand jury’s charge as

the striking of predicate acts” because it “remove[s] a discrete

basis of criminal liability.” Woolard, 981 F.2d at 757. Or, as

the First Circuit put it, “[b]y striking a statutorily authorized

penalty, the district court effectively dismissed a significant

portion of the counts against the defendants” and “[t]he order

appealed from has significant consequences for the trial of the

case,” which are “every bit as important as the consequences

from striking a count in an indictment.” Acosta-Martinez, 252

F.3d at 16. Those consequences include, for example, that a

capital defendant is entitled to extra peremptory challenges,

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(1), and to two attorneys, at least one of

whom is learned in capital cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3005. See Cheely,

36 F.3d at 1441; Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 17. And a capital

defendant has the right to bifurcated jury proceedings in the

guilt and penalty phases. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). For its part, the

Government may seek a death qualified jury. See Uttecht v.

Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007); White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. 73,

77 (2015) (per curiam).

We also have collateral order jurisdiction over the

District Court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. First, the

District Court’s order “conclusively determine[d] the disputed

question”: whether this case can proceed as a capital case. Geo

Grp., Inc. v. Menocal, 146 S. Ct. 774, 781 (2026) (citation

omitted). Second, the order “resolve[d] an important issue

completely separate from the merits,” id. (citation omitted),

because it did not resolve “whether or not the accused is guilty

of the offense charged,” Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,

659 (1977). In arguing that the Government cannot seek the

death penalty here, Dangleben “makes no challenge

whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him.” Id.

11

“Rather, he is contesting the very authority of the Government

to hale him into court to face trial on the charge against him.”

Id. Third, the District Court’s order is “effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Geo Grp., 146

S. Ct. at 781 (citation omitted). If Dangleben is convicted on

Count One after a non-capital trial, the Double Jeopardy

Clause would bar the Government from retrying him for the

capital version of that crime, see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,

165–66 (1977), unless Dangleben obtained reversal on grounds

other than sufficiency of the evidence. See Burks v. United

States, 437 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1978). Dangleben concedes as

much. So a seek order “involve[s] a right that would be

irretrievably lost absent an immediate appeal.” Geo Grp., 146

S. Ct. at 783 (citation omitted).

III

Having established our jurisdiction, we turn to the

District Court’s order striking the Government’s death penalty

notice under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(1).

A

If the Government wishes to pursue the death penalty

for a capital-eligible offense, it must file a notice that it “will

seek the sentence of death” at “a reasonable time before the

trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). The Government is not statutorily

required to state that it will not seek the death penalty. But what

if a court orders the Government to file a seek notice and the

Government represents to the court that it will not seek the

death penalty? Common sense, fair play, and basic criminal

procedure all require that the court can enforce the

Government’s promise.

12

The Government disagrees, contending that the District

Court violated § 3593(a) because the statute requires only that

a death notice be filed “a reasonable time before the trial.”

Gov’t Br. 36 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)). But as the

Government also acknowledges: “district courts have the

inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms

with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of

cases.” Gov’t Br. 35 (quoting Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47

(2016)). For that reason, “we accord district courts great

deference with regard to matters of case management.” Drippe

v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010). Yet that

inherent authority “cannot contradict any express rule or

statute” and “must be a reasonable response to the problems

and needs confronting the court’s fair administration of

justice.” Dietz, 579 U.S. at 45–46 (citation modified).

Mindful of the black-letter law just noted, we first

consider whether § 3593(a) precludes or otherwise displaces a

district court’s inherent power to set a deadline by which the

Government must notice if it will seek the death penalty. It

does not. Recall that § 3593(a) directs the Government to file

a seek notice “a reasonable time before the trial.” What

constitutes a “reasonable time” will vary from case to case and

is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. So we

hold that § 3593(a) does not displace a district court’s inherent

power to manage its cases to ensure a just and fair resolution.

In fact, the requirement that the Government file a seek notice

within “a reasonable time” will sometimes require the district

court to police that line. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).

Setting a seek deadline is sensible for at least three

reasons. First, it allows the court to manage the case fairly and

efficiently from start to finish. Second, it helps counsel litigate

the case effectively. Third, it ensures that defendants’ rights are

13

protected. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005 (authorizing learned

counsel), 3599(a) (authorizing counsel, investigative, and

expert services for indigent defendants).

Apart from those considerations, consider the practical

effect of the Government’s position. If the Government had

carte blanche to revoke its no-seek decisions, defense counsel

would have to make decisions about staffing, discovery, and

trial strategy as if the case would have a guilt and a penalty

phase even after the Government affirmed that it was not

seeking the death penalty. The waste of time and expense in

those circumstances is obvious.

All these reasons apply in this case. Dangleben sought,

and the Court granted, various extensions for pretrial matters.

Yet he would not have done so “[h]ad [he] thought that

continuing those deadlines could lead to reversal of the no-seek

notice.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 146-1, at 6. And given the

Government’s no-seek representation, Dangleben had no

reason to exercise his right to learned counsel or prepare for his

mitigation hearing. For the same reasons a court can generally

set and enforce deadlines, it was not unreasonable—not an

abuse of discretion—for the District Court to hold to that

deadline in this case. See United States v. Wright, 913 F.3d 364,

369 (3d Cir. 2019).

The Government argues that even if the District Court

had the power we just described, its February 2024 deadline

was no longer “reasonable” because it was tied to a trial date

that did not hold. But the parties always knew that the seek

decision and trial date were connected, either because a seek

notice would mean the need for more time to prepare for a

capital trial, or because a no-seek notice would result in an

earlier trial. At the November 8, 2023 status conference, the

14

Court set the original January 2024 seek deadline. The parties

then submitted a joint proposed scheduling order with a trial

date and other pretrial deadlines, “[p]resuming” that the

Government “does not provide notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3593(a).” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 37, at 2; see also id. at n.2

(“These dates all presume that the [G]overnment does not

provide section 3593(a) notice.”). But the order stated: “[i]f the

[G]overnment does provide notice” by the deadline, “all dates

will need to be revisited.” Id. at n.2. The Government’s own

statements and representations buttress our conclusion that the

District Court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the

February 12, 2024 seek deadline.

B

None of the Government’s remaining counterarguments

persuades. To begin, the Government does not point us to any

authority suggesting that district courts may not set and enforce

seek deadlines. As the District Court for the Virgin Islands has

observed, it is “not unusual for courts to set Section 3593

Notice deadlines even in the absence of a concrete trial date.”

United States v. Cole, 799 F. Supp. 3d 438, 450 n.9 (D.V.I.

2025); see also, e.g., United States v. Meehan, 2026 WL

447431, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2026); United States v.

Suarez, 801 F. Supp. 3d 872, 876–80 (N.D. Cal. 2025); United

States v. Rivas-Moreiera, 2023 WL 11960650, at *1–2 (E.D.

Tex. Oct. 7, 2023).

The Government also contends that the District Court’s

seek deadline impeded the Executive’s “exclusive authority

and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”

Gov’t Br. 37 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,

693 (1974)). We agree that “the Executive Branch has ‘broad

discretion as to whom to prosecute,’” and that “this discretion

15

‘rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute

is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.’” Wright, 913 F.3d

at 373 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08

(1985)). But the District Court here understood and respected

the Government’s prerogative to pursue the death penalty.

During a status conference some four months after

Dangleben’s initial appearance, the Court solicited the

Government’s view as to “the timeframe” for a seek notice.

Dist Ct. Dkt. No. 46, at 2. The Government represented that 60

more days to issue a notice was “[e]minently reasonable,”

Supp. App. 11, and the Court set a deadline of January 12,

2024. The Court then granted—over a defense objection—the

Government’s request for an extension of that deadline to

February 12, 2024, due to what the AUSA admitted was his

misunderstanding of the “complex nature of the Justice

Department protocol” regarding the decision to seek the death

penalty. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 46, at 2, 5. At no time did the Court

attempt to review the Government’s death penalty decision or

to interfere with its decisionmaking process. The Court

“simply set a reasonable deadline regarding an important issue

and expected compliance with that deadline.” United States v.

Spurlock, 782 F. Supp. 3d 987, 1007 (D. Nev. 2025), appeal

dismissed, 2025 WL 2319947 (9th Cir. June 11, 2025).

So the issue is not, as the Government frames it,

“whether to seek the death penalty” falls within the purview of

the Executive Branch; it does. Gov’t Br. 28 (citation omitted).

Instead, the issue is whether courts have the right to manage

their cases; they do. Cf. United States v. Slone, 969 F. Supp. 2d

830, 832, 835–38 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s

request to set a deadline involving part of DOJ’s internal Death

Penalty Protocol, but indicating that it could set a seek

16

deadline, which directly affects “the Court’s administrative

concerns”).

The Government suggests it can contravene a district

court’s order setting or enforcing a seek deadline because its

seek reversal is analogous to a superseding indictment. To be

sure, a prosecutor’s “initial decision should not freeze future

conduct,” because courts cannot “presume that every case is

complete at the time an initial charge is filed.” United States v.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 & n.14 (1982). But analogizing a

superseding indictment to the Government’s attempt to

contravene its representation to the Court that it would not seek

the death penalty a year after the Court’s deadline overlooks

the differences between an ordinary and a capital trial. This is

particularly so here, where the Court set a seek deadline at

Dangleben’s request that the Government joined.

The Government also attempts to analogize its seek

reversal to a case where new evidence compels a change in

position. This analogy is a nonstarter because Dangleben’s

case does not involve new evidence. As the District Court

explained, the Government’s about-face was not “based on

new information that wasn’t previously available to the

Government,” and there were no “significant case-related

developments” between the no-seek and death notices.

Dangleben, 2025 WL 2647195, at *2. As the Government

candidly admitted, its reversal of position stemmed from its

“fail[ure] to properly evaluate the appropriate penalty based on

the available evidence.” Gov’t Br. 38.

To sum up: The Government is correct that it retains

“discretion to evaluate the appropriate charges based on known

facts.” Reply Br. 7–8. But it is equally true that the Government

cannot usurp the Court’s case-management function. On the

17

facts of this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion

when it struck the Government’s very belated (and

contradictory) notice to seek the death penalty. 4

IV

We next turn to whether Virgin Islands territorial

offenses can qualify as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A). We review this question of statutory

interpretation de novo. United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160,

162 (3d Cir. 2020).

A

Section 924(c) punishes “any person who, during and in

relation to any crime of violence . . . for which the person may

be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a

firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a

firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). To qualify as a § 924(c)

predicate, a Virgin Islands territorial offense must be a

(1) “crime of violence” that (2) can be “prosecuted in a court

of the United States.” Section 924(j) “raise[s] the ceiling of

punishments § 924 authorize[s],” Barrett v. United States, 146

4

We need not, and do not, address whether the Government’s

attempted seek notice complies with § 3593(a)’s requirement

that such notices be filed a “reasonable time” before trial;

whether the Government’s attempted seek notice is an

“amendment” to its earlier no-seek decision that requires

“good cause” under § 3593(a) and, if so, whether the

Government can make that showing; or whether permitting the

Government to seek the death penalty after it told Dangleben

it would not violates Dangleben’s Fifth Amendment

procedural due process rights.

18

S. Ct. 482, 490 (2026), and permits the Government to seek the

death penalty when a defendant, “in the course of a violation

of [§ 924(c)], causes the death of a person through the use of a

firearm” and “the killing is a murder,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1).

Because § 924(j) refers to § 924(c), the “crime[s] of violence”

that qualify as predicate offenses under § 924(c) also qualify

for § 924(j).

The first requirement is satisfied here. Section 924(c)

defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense that is a felony

and . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person or property of another.”

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The definition of a “crime of

violence” is not limited to federal offenses but applies to any

“felony” that has the required elements. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

Many territorial offenses so qualify, including several of which

Dangleben stands accused—a point he does not contest.

The second requirement is also satisfied. “[E]xcept

where otherwise expressly provided,” Congress has specified

that “the term ‘court of the United States’ includes” “the

District Court of the Virgin Islands.” 18 U.S.C. § 23. 5 And

territorial Virgin Islands offenses may be prosecuted in the

District Court of the Virgin Islands because Congress has

granted that court “concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of

5

The District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands is not

an Article III court. United States v. Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 70

(3d Cir. 2013). Its jurisdiction flows from Article IV, which

empowers Congress to regulate the territories of the United

States. U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3 cl. 2. Still, Congress has chosen

to define “court of the United States” to include this territorial

court. 18 U.S.C. § 23.

19

the Virgin Islands . . . over those offenses against the criminal

laws of the Virgin Islands . . . which are of the same or similar

character or part of, or based on, the same act or transaction”

that constitutes an offense against federal law. 48 U.S.C.

§ 1612(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3231. So the District Court of the

Virgin Islands has “jurisdiction over charges alleging local

crimes that are related to federal crimes.” United States v.

Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 71 (3d Cir. 2013).

As the District Court recognized, “reading these federal

statutes together, it would appear that, in the context of the

allegations in this case, the plain and unambiguous language of

Section 924(c), [along with] Section 1612(c), would allow

Virgin Islands felony offenses to serve as predicate offenses in

cases prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.”

Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *4; see also United States v.

Hodge, 2016 WL 8730657, at *5 (D.V.I. Apr. 15, 2016)

(Virgin Islands territorial offenses can be § 924(c) predicates),

aff’d in part and vacated in part 870 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2017).

We agree and hold that § 924(c)’s text applies to territorial

offenses that can be prosecuted in the District Court of the

Virgin Islands.

B

The District Court should have stopped when it

concluded that “the plain and unambiguous” text would allow

Virgin Islands felony offenses to serve as predicate offenses in

cases prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.

Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *4. “If the words of a statute

are unambiguous,” then the “first step of the interpretive

inquiry is [the] last.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 13 (2019).

Instead, the District Court “disregard[ed] the plain language”

because it perceived that reading would lead to a “result that

20

no rational legislature could have intended” and the “policy

reasons behind the enactment of Sections 924(c) and 1612(c)

support[]” that departure from the text. Dangleben, 2025 WL

2724050, at *5–6 (citation modified). Neither rationale

supports a holding contrary to the text’s ordinary meaning.

The District Court set the bar for absurdity too low. A

“result that may seem odd is not absurd,” Cochise Consultancy,

Inc. v. United States ex. rel Hunt, 587 U.S. 262, 271 (2019)

(citation modified), and “does not include substantive errors

arising from a drafter’s failure to appreciate the effect of certain

provisions,” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 238 (2012). And “[a]s long

as Congress could have any conceivable justification for a

result—even if the result carries negative consequences—that

result cannot be absurd.” Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc., 954 F.3d

582, 588 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc); see also Scalia & Garner,

Reading Law, at 237 (cautioning that “absurdity can be a

slippery slope” and “can lead to judicial revision of public and

private texts to make them (in the judges’ view) more

reasonable.”). “Anything more would threaten the separation

of powers, undermine fair notice, and risk upsetting hard-

earned legislative compromises.” Yellen v. Confederated

Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 594 U.S. 338, 381 n.3 (2021)

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). As these authorities suggest, the

District Court erred when it applied the absurdity doctrine.

For starters, territories are not states. Congress has

plenary power over the territories, so some differential

treatment between the two is to be expected. “[A]s a United

States territory, the U.S. Virgin Islands does not have

independent sovereignty but derives such powers as its

[G]overnment possesses directly from congressional grant

under article IV, section 3 of the federal Constitution.” United

21

States v. Hodge, 870 F.3d 184, 195 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation

modified). Given that backdrop, there is nothing absurd about

allowing § 924(c) charges to be premised on Virgin Islands

territorial crimes of violence that already may be prosecuted in

the District of the Virgin Islands, a federal court. 48 U.S.C.

§ 1612(c). One “conceivable justification” for this result,

Riccio, 954 F.3d at 588, is that Congress wanted to deter and

punish the violent use of firearms in the Virgin Islands by

extending the enhanced punishments in § 924(c) and § 924(j)

to all offenses over which the District of the Virgin Islands has

jurisdiction—territorial and federal.

Similarly, it is not absurd that applying § 924(c) as

written in this context “allows federal death penalty

prosecutions for wholly local offenses.” Dangleben Br. 45.

Again, Congress has established a unique jurisdiction for the

District of the Virgin Islands. And it is not “nonsensical,”

Riccio, 954 F.3d at 588 (citation modified), that certain

territorial offenses, prosecutable in “a court of the United

States” as stand-alone crimes, can also trigger separate federal

liability—especially given Congress’s expansive authority

over territories. Cf. Hodge, 870 F.3d at 194–95. Finally, the

District Court erred when it deemed relevant the fact that the

Virgin Islands does not impose the death penalty for territorial

crimes. The federal government can seek the death penalty for

federal crimes committed even in states that have abolished it.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see United States v. Gabrion, 719

F.3d 511, 521–24 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 6

6

The Government’s reading is more rational. Dangleben’s

atextual reading reaches all § 924(c) prosecutions, not just the

22

It was also error to conclude that “policy reasons”

support “a finding of legal absurdity and disregarding the plain

language.” Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *6. According to

the Court, “[o]ne of the explicit purposes in creating the

concurrent jurisdiction statute was ‘to obviate the need for

trying in different courts aspects of the same offenses or closely

related offenses.’” Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *6

(quoting Gillette, 738 F.3d at 71). It reasoned: “[t]here is no

indication that Congress enacted Section 1612(c) for the

purpose of allowing local Virgin Islands offenses to serve as

predicate offenses under Section 924(c).” Id. But even if

“Congress passed Section 1612(c) for a purpose wholly

unrelated to . . . Section 924(c),” id., we must follow the text.

See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d

248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) (When “the statutory language is

unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose

or legislative history, because [the Court] operate[s] under the

assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language

accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (citation

modified)). For “if Congress has made a choice of language

which fairly brings a given situation within a statute,” Riva v.

Mitchell, 460 F.2d 1121, 1124 (3d Cir. 1972) (citation

omitted)—as it did in both § 924(c) and § 1612(c)—“a statute

is not to be confined to the particular applications contemplated

by the legislators,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,

315 (1980) (citation modified). In sum, the District Court’s

small fraction that are capital-eligible under § 924(j). If

Dangleben were right, no territorial crimes of violence could

serve as predicates for routine § 924(c) prosecutions. That

approach disregards the meaningful differences between

territories and states.

23

purposivist arguments fail on their own terms, and cannot

supplant the text of § 924(c) and § 1612(c).

C

We acknowledge that two judges in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia have, contrary to the

conclusion we reach today, held that local D.C. offenses cannot

serve as § 924(c) predicates. See United States v. Brown, 58 F.

Supp. 3d 115, 118–31 (D.D.C. 2014); United States v. Mejia,

657 F. Supp. 3d 123, 134 (D.D.C. 2023). The District of

Columbia is on similar footing to the Virgin Islands in this

context because its federal district court also exercises

jurisdiction over local offenses related to violations of federal

law. See D.C. Code § 11-502(3). Brown resorted to legislative

history after finding ambiguous the phrase “may be prosecuted

in a court of the United States.” 58 F. Supp. 3d at 121–22

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). Brown further explained that,

“[t]aken most literally (and broadly), the phrase could

encompass any crime of violence that may—i.e., can

possibly—be prosecuted in a federal district court.” Id. at 122.

The court also reasoned that “the language could be read more

narrowly (and perhaps more naturally) as simply meaning

federal offenses—i.e., only crimes of violence that themselves

may be prosecuted in federal court directly because such court

has original jurisdiction over them, a universe limited to

federal, U.S. Code offenses.” Id.

In our view, Brown’s analysis is unpersuasive because

it “manufacture[d] ambiguity where none exists.” United

States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). In so doing, Brown

failed to recognize that § 924(c)(1)(A)’s “most literal[]”

meaning is also its “more natural[]” one. Id. The District Court

here rightly concluded that Brown’s reading was

24

“unpersuasive” because it “requires the insertion of the word

‘federal’ to modify the word ‘offense’ in defining the term

‘crime of violence’” and “significantly modifies the plain

language of the statute.” Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050, at *4

n.7.

Also, the evidence Brown examined to purportedly

divine Congress’s intent does not hold up. The District Court

relied on the same evidence, which Dangleben reiterates on

appeal: (1) the legislative history of § 924(c); (2) how other

courts have interpreted § 924(c). But we have no need to resort

to legislative history when the statute’s meaning is clear. Est.

of Arrington v. Michael, 738 F.3d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 2013); see

also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011)

(“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is

meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”). And although

Brown claimed that other courts had interpreted the phrase

“‘crime . . . for which [the defendant] may be prosecuted in a

court of the United States’ to mean a federal crime,” 58 F.

Supp. 3d at 127–28 (collecting cases), these cases either made

that remark in passing or resorted to legislative history to

support their conclusion.

D

Dangleben’s remaining counterarguments fail. First, he

contends that we should adopt his reading of § 924(c) on

constitutional-avoidance grounds. “[W]hen presented with two

‘fair alternatives,’” this canon counsels courts to “adopt[] the

narrower construction of a criminal statute to avoid having to

hold it unconstitutional if it were construed more broadly.”

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 463 (2019). But the

canon “has no application in the absence of statutory

ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.,

25

532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001). Contra Dangleben, the same is true

for the rule of lenity. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Colon,

62 F.4th 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2023). As we have explained,

§ 924(c) is unambiguous.

Dangleben next contends that the Government’s

§ 924(c) reading creates “vagueness problems.” Dangleben Br.

49–50. He argues that a “layperson” would not know § 924(c)

“applies differently in the Virgin Islands than elsewhere.”

Dangleben Br. 50. But the vagueness doctrine applies only

where “a criminal law [is] so vague that it fails to give ordinary

people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless

that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States,

576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). Here, the relevant statutes give

straightforward notice that the District Court of the Virgin

Islands is a “court of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 23. So a

defendant can be charged in that court for “offenses against the

criminal laws of the Virgin Islands . . . which are of the same

or similar character or part of, or based on, the same act or

transaction or two or more acts or transactions connected

together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan” as

a violation of the United States Code. 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), (c).

Nor may he use or carry a firearm during and in relation to “any

crime of violence . . . for which [he] may be prosecuted in a

court of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). There is

no vagueness here. As the District Court recognized, “the plain

and unambiguous language of Section 924(c)” applies to

territorial crimes of violence. Dangleben, 2025 WL 2724050,

at *4.

***

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District

Court’s order granting the motion to strike the death penalty

26

and will reverse and remand its order dismissing Count Two,

Count Three, and three predicate offenses from Count One,

with instructions to reinstate those charges.

Adam F. Sleeper [Argued]

Office of United States Attorney

District of the Virgin Islands

William A. Glaser [Argued]

Criminal Division

United States Department of Justice

Counsel for Appellant

Matthew A. Campbell [Argued]

Office of Federal Public Defender

Aren K. Adjoian

Brett G. Sweitzer

Katherine C. Thompson

Federal Community Defender Office

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Allison F. Miller

Law Office of Allison Ferber Miller

Counsel for Appellee

Renee Pietropaolo

Elisa A. Long

National Association of Federal Public Defenders

27

Amicus in Support of Appellee

28