Ice

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

SHELLY I.,1

Plaintiff, Case No. 6:25-cv-00524-AP

v. OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

_____________________________

POTTER, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Shelly I. brings this action for judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying her application for disability

insurance benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner erred when (1) the ALJ failed to provide clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, (2) the ALJ found the

medical opinion of Joeth Ryan, PA-C, only partly persuasive, and (3) the ALJ rejected the lay

testimony of Plaintiff’s spouse. Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 14. For the reasons outlined below, the

Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

1 In the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the

last name of the non-governmental party in this case and any immediate family members of that

party.

1 – OPINION AND ORDER

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on August 03, 2023, alleging disability since December

31, 2020. Tr. 18, 212–19. Her claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 113,

119, 127, 131, 135, 139. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ and appeared via telephone

before the Honorable MaryKay Rauenzahn on October 24, 2024. Tr. 142–43, 37–62. After the

hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to November 03, 2022. Tr. 18, 263. In a

written decision dated December 09, 2024, ALJ Rauenzahn determined that Plaintiff was not

disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. 15–36. Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals

Council; the Appeals Council declined. Tr. 207–08, 1–6. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review.

Plaintiff was 44 years old on her amended alleged onset of disability date. See Tr. 28. She

alleges disability due to bipolar 1 disorder, depression, mania, ADHD, fibromyalgia, Barrett’s

esophagus, PTSD, insomnia, morbid obesity, sleep disorder, GERD, migraines, IBS, hematuria,

breathing problems, and shoulder problems. Tr. 65. Plaintiff has at least a high school education

and prior work experience as a caregiver, custodian, housekeeper, and office worker. Tr. 28,

284–85.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court reviews de novo an ALJ’s decision to deny benefits. Obrien v. Bisignano,

142 F.4th 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2025). When there is no legal error, the denial of benefits will only

be overturned if the ALJ’s decision “is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal

quotation and citation omitted). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an

existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the

agency's factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citation omitted).

2 – OPINION AND ORDER

This is not a high bar; substantial evidence is relevant evidence that “a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). The court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the ALJ when the evidence could support either affirming or reversing

the ALJ’s decision. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

A person is disabled when they are unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). When determining whether someone seeking

benefits is disabled, the ALJ applies a “five-step sequential evaluation process.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4). If at any point in the five-step process the ALJ determines that

the person is or is not disabled, the process stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4);

see also Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022).

At the first step the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has performed work at or

above the level of “substantial gainful activity” during the relevant period; if so, they are not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); 416.920(a)(4)(i). The second step focuses on the

claimant’s physical or medical impairment(s); a claimant is not disabled unless they can show a

severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to last at least a year or is expected to result in

death. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the ALJ evaluates

whether the severity of the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the

Commissioner of Social Security. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If any

impairment or combination of impairments is equivalent to one of the listed impairments, the

3 – OPINION AND ORDER

claimant is presumptively disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If not,

the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual

function capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e); 416.920(e). This analysis determines the

most a claimant can do on a sustained basis despite their limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Then, the fourth step requires an analysis of the claimant’s past

work in conjunction with their RFC; if the claimant can still do their past relevant work, they are

not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At the fifth step, the question is

whether given the claimant’s present abilities, there is another type of job they can do; if the

claimant can do another job, they are not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v);

416.920(a)(4)(v). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four of the

sequential analysis, after which the burden shifts to the ALJ to show a claimant can perform any

jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2);

416.960(c)(2).

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff satisfied the first two steps of the analysis. Tr.

20–21. At step three, though, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or

equal one of the impairments listed by the Commissioner. Tr. 21. The ALJ then conducted the

RFC assessment and determined that Plaintiff could perform light work, with the following

additional limitations

[T]he claimant can lift, carry, push and pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently. The claimant can stand and/or walk for approximately six

hours and sit for approximately six hours, in an eight-hour workday. The claimant

cannot climb ladders, ropes and scaffold and can occasionally climb stairs and

ramps. The claimant can occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel and crawl. The

claimant can occasionally reach overhead with the left upper extremity. The

4 – OPINION AND ORDER

claimant can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks.

The claimant can perform only low stress work, which is defined as requiring

only occasional changes in work setting, occasional changes in work duties, no

work on a moving conveyor belt and no work requiring hourly quotas. The

claimant can have no general public contact, occasional work-related coworker

interaction and frequent supervisor interaction. The claimant can have no

exposure to noise greater than at the moderate level and cannot perform work in

near proximity to moving mechanical parts, nor in high, unprotected places, all as

rated by the Selective Characteristics of Occupations of the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (SCO-DOT).

Tr. 23.

At the fifth step, the ALJ determined, with the aid of testimony from the vocational

expert (VE), that Plaintiff could perform their prior work as a housekeeper. Tr. 28. Alternatively,

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform work as a marker (165,000 jobs in the national

economy), routing clerk (123,000 jobs in the national economy), collator operator (31,000 jobs

in the national economy), or any other job suiting Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,

and residual functional capacity. Tr. 29.

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in three ways: (1) rejecting the Plaintiff’s own subjective

symptom testimony; (2) finding the medical opinion of PA-C Ryan only partly persuasive; and

(3) failing to properly consider the lay testimony of Plaintiff’s spouse. Pl.’s Br. 2–3.

I. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for discounting

her subjective symptom testimony. Pl.’s Br. 8–14.

“An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s testimony

regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th

Cir. 2014). The ALJ must first determine “whether the claimant has presented objective medical

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain

5 – OPINION AND ORDER

or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). If this first step is

satisfied, and the ALJ finds no evidence of malingering, the ALJ then must determine the

intensity and persistence of symptoms by considering “all of the available evidence from . . .

medical sources and nonmedical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1); 416.929(c)(1). “[T]he

ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [their] symptoms only by offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15 (emphasis

added) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Specific, clear and convincing reasons are those

which “identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in part because it was inconsistent

with her ability to travel and attend events. Tr. 25. First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s decision to

stop working coincided with the timing she and her husband began traveling in their RV. Tr. 27.

While it is unclear when exactly Plaintiff stopped working as a paid caregiver,2 as of January 12,

2022, therapy notes state she was “looking forward to traveling across US in RV with her

husband hopefully starting in May, excited to see [G]rand [C]anyon and many other places she

has never visited.” Tr. 589. At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she did not begin traveling until

May, but that she set out on the road in February 2022, and “moved to Vancouver for a little

while.” Tr. 44. In April 2024, Plaintiff was looking forward to going to Mount Hood for her

2 At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she performed no work in January 2022. Tr. 43–44.

However, counseling notes from January 12, 2022, state she was still employed as a caregiver,

and had quit only her second job at a gas station because having two jobs was too stressful. Tr.

589.

6 – OPINION AND ORDER

birthday to “enjoy the amenities and time with family.” Tr. 1023, 1028. The ALJ did not err in

finding Plaintiff’s ability to travel inconsistent with her allegations of debilitating mental health

limitations. See Wilson v. Berryhill, 732 Fed. App’x 504, 507 (9th Cir. 2018).

The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff was able to attend a car show, even though she

reported an increase in her symptoms. Tr. 27. The ALJ noted Plaintiff downplayed her ability to

travel, but “the fact that she could attend a car show in August 2024 while reporting an increase

in mental health symptoms shows that even with an increase in symptoms she is not

incapacitated and can still tolerate some public contact.” Tr. 27. Moreover, during that same

period, Plaintiff reported symptoms so extreme that she was “unable to leave her home to walk

her dog” but was planning to go to the races in Boise. Tr. 1145. Although Plaintiff testified that

she attended the car show in 2024 only briefly, and only because she had already paid for the

tickets, this was Plaintiff’s second year attending a car show during the relevant disability period.

Tr. 53.

The ALJ also noted that the objective and other medical evidence in the record did not

support the level of severity of Plaintiff’s symptom allegations. For example, Plaintiff’s migraine

headaches were well controlled with over-the-counter medication. Tr. 1044. And although

Plaintiff experienced mental health ups and downs, on balance, the ALJ concluded there was

insufficient evidence to warrant a finding of disability. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff’s symptoms

waxed and waned throughout the relevant period, but she never required inpatient or emergent

treatment for her psychiatric symptoms. Tr. 27. Additionally, Plaintiff reported her symptoms

improved with traditional counseling therapy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(vii),

416.929(c)(3)(vii) (ALJs may rely on evidence of improvement in considering a claimant’s

7 – OPINION AND ORDER

record). By September 2024, Plaintiff began to report improved symptoms, and by October, her

moods had stabilized.

In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence

in partially rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Because the ALJ provided a reasonable

reading of the record, her decision will not be disturbed.

II. Medical Opinion of Joeth Ryan, PA-C

A medical opinion, in the context of SSA claims, is a statement from a medical source

about what a claimant can still do despite their physical or mental impairment-related limitations.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2); 416.913(a)(2). In deciding whether a claimant is entitled to

benefits, an ALJ must articulate how persuasive they find each of the medical opinions in a

claimant’s file. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b); 416.920c(b). The most important factors in

evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinion evidence are supportability and consistency. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2); 416.920c(b)(2). An ALJ “cannot reject an examining or treating

doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by

substantial evidence.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 739 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Woods, 32

F.4th at 792). Supportability is evaluated based on the “relevant [] objective medical evidence

and supporting explanations presented by a medical source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1);

416.920c(c)(1). As to consistency, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the evidence

from medical and non-medical sources in the record, the more persuasive the medical opinion

will be. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2); 416.920c(c)(2).

On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff’s mental health provider, Joeth Ryan, PA-C, submitted a

medical opinion form in support of Plaintiff’s disability application. Tr. 1183–88. PA-C Ryan

8 – OPINION AND ORDER

stated that she has treated Plaintiff one-to-two times per week since April 2023, specifically

focusing on psychiatric medication management. Tr. 1183. PA-C Ryan opined that Plaintiff’s

symptoms could impair her ability to perform full-time work without special accommodation. Tr.

1184. PA-C Ryan rated Plaintiff as having moderate limitations in her ability to understand,

remember, and carry out simple work-related instructions, and marked limitations regarding

complex instructions. Tr. 1186. PA-C Ryan opined that Plaintiff would be off-task for 10% of a

workday and would likely be absent from work three or more days per month due to her

symptoms of anxiety, panic, and mood dysregulation. Tr. 1188.

The ALJ found PA-C Ryan’s opinion partly persuasive “only to the extent that she finds

no more than moderate limitations in the ability to perform simple and law public work.” Tr. 27

(citing Tr. 1186). The ALJ found the remainder of PA-C Ryan’s opinion unpersuasive. To start,

the ALJ found PA-C Ryan “supports her opinion with very brief explanation of the claimant’s

subjective complaints but the limits she cites are mostly vague and undefined.” Tr. 27. By way of

example, the ALJ cited to Ryan’s statement that Plaintiff could “‘possibly’ experience panic,

anxiety, inattention and mood dysregulation in a simple, low stress job.” Tr. 27. And the ALJ

found PAC-Ryan’s descriptions of Plaintiff’s limitations did not amount to a statement relaying

the most Plaintiff can do despite her impairments. Tr. 27. Finally, the ALJ found PAC-Ryan’s

opinion was “generally inconsistent with her own treatment notes that indicate ‘mood has

stabilized and anxiety has decreased.’” Tr. 27 (citing Tr. 1212).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide substantial evidence to support her

conclusions regarding PA-C Ryan’s medical opinion. Pl.’s Br. 5–8. Plaintiff argues the ALJ

failed to consider the concrete restriction to being off task for 10% of a given workday and

9 – OPINION AND ORDER

would miss three or four workdays per month. Pl.’s Br. 7. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the

single chart note relied on by the ALJ in her consistency analysis does not amount to substantial

evidence.

The Court agrees with the ALJ that limitations predicated with caveats such as “possibly”

are equivocal and therefore not supported. And, although explained with less-than-ideal clarity,

the ALJ’s decision regarding PA-C Ryan is discernible and supported by substantial evidence.

See Triechler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that

even if an ALJ’s decision is explained with “less-than-ideal clarity,” any error is harmless so

long as the agency’s path may be reasonably discerned); see also Waldram v. Kijakazi, No. 22-

35893, 2023 WL 8433769, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023) (no legal error where the ALJ

adequately explained their decision).

The concrete limitations identified by PA-C Ryan, including that Plaintiff would be off

task up to 10% of a workday and would miss multiple workdays per month, were not supported

by the explanation in the opinion. PA-C Ryan does not provide objective evidence to support her

conclusions, nor does she provide explanations that support concrete restrictions proffered.

Instead, the checkbox form supplied by PA-C Ryan merely listed “ADHD, anxiety, mood” as

symptoms that would cause the time off task. Tr. 1188.

Additionally, as the ALJ pointed out, PA-C Ryan’s opinion is largely based on Plaintiff’s

subjective testimony. Tr. 27. Indeed, most of PA-C Ryan’s chart notes indicate Plaintiff’s

appointments are conducted solely by telephone, and symptomatic descriptions are entirely based

on Plaintiff’s reports. See, e.g., Tr. 907, 915, 919, 987, 996, 1011, 1033, 1143, 1151, 1152, 1197.

And, as discussed earlier in this opinion, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s symptom

10 – OPINION AND ORDER

testimony. Thus, the ALJ properly relied on this factor in discounting PA-C Ryan’s opinion. See

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ may reject a treating

physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been

properly discounted as incredible.”) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,

602 (9th Cir. 1999)).

As to whether the ALJ’s conclusion that PA-C Ryan’s opinion was inconsistent with her

treatment notes was supported by substantial evidence, this is a closer call. As Plaintiff points

out, the ALJ provided a reference to a single chart note to support her conclusion. See Pl.’s Br. 7.

But where, as is the case here, the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674-75

(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)). While a single chart

note may not always amount to evidence of inconsistency, in this case, given the proximity in

time between the chart note in question and the medical opinion, the single note is substantial

evidence. The medical opinion was issued two weeks after Plaintiff reported marked

improvement in her symptoms based on her new medication regimen. Tr. 1212. “Substantial

evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla’ and means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, (9th Cir.

2020) (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103) (citation modified)). Considering the ALJ’s decision in

its entirety—which this Court must do—the ALJ provided sufficient evidence to discount PA-C

Ryan’s opinion. See Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting a reviewing

court must consider all pages in an ALJ’s decision).

11 – OPINION AND ORDER

III. Lay Witness Testimony

The ALJ failed to properly consider the lay witness testimony of Plaintiff’s husband

(Justin). Justin provided two identical written statements in support of Plaintiff’s disability

petition. Tr. 291-298; 323-330. He wrote that Plaintiff struggles with pain, anxiety, fatigue, and

memory problems. He wrote that they do everything together, but how much they do depends on

Plaintiff’s mood. Id.

“An ALJ must take into account lay witness testimony as to the claimant's symptoms or

how impairments affect the claimant's ability to work.” Gerde v. Berryhill, 717 F. App’x 674,

677 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)). Here, the

ALJ merely stated that she “reviewed and considered the supportive statements and observations

from the claimant’s spouse . . . concerning her impairments and associated decreased work

capacity when determining the above residual functional capacity.” Tr. 28. This statement

provides no insight as to what degree the ALJ accepted or rejected the lay witness testimony and

is therefore error.

However, this Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s error is harmful and warrants

reversal because the evidence supports the ALJ’s ultimate nondisability determination. See

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that even when the ALJ

commits legal error, a court will “uphold the decision where that error is harmless”) (quoting

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099) (cleaned up). An error is harmless if “it is inconsequential to the

ultimate nondisability determination,” or when, “despite the legal error, the agency's path may

reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Id.

(citation modified). Justin’s testimony describes similar limitations to those identified in

12 – OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s testimony. Thus, although the ALJ failed to provide any insight into how she analyzed

Justin’s testimony, she provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.

Where an ALJ provides “reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness,” the ALJ may rely on

those same reasons “when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” Molina, 674 F.3d

at 1114 (citing Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009)).

In sum, the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled is a reasonable reading of the

record and is supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _2_2_n_d_ day of May, 2026.

/s/Amy E. Potter

Amy E. Potter

United States Magistrate Judge

13 – OPINION AND ORDER