OLCOTT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAD OLCOTT,

Case No. 23–cv–21551–ESK–SAK

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

WIN WASTE INNOVATIONS,

Defendant.

KIEL, U.S.D.J.

Defendant Win Waste Innovations (WWI) fired plaintiff Chad Olcott

because he failed to comply with safety rules and policies. There are no

material factual disputes. Olcott concedes that the record supports WWI’s

finding that he committed a high risk violation by entering a confined space

without a hole watch. He fails to point to any evidence that he was fired

because of his injury or retaliated against for requesting accommodations and

filing a workers’ compensation claim. Summary judgment in favor of WWI will

be entered.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Olcott was hired by WWI in July 2021 as a Class I Mechanic at its

Westville, New Jersey waste-to-energy facility. (ECF No. 53–4 (Saenz Decl.)2

¶¶1, 2; ECF No. 53–6 (Olcott Dep. Tr.) p. 11.3) As a Class I Mechanic, Olcott

performed maintenance and repair work on industrial equipment and reported

directly to maintenance manager Paul Curcio. (Saenz Decl. ¶4; Olcott Dep. Tr.

p. 11; ECF No. 53–5 (Saenz Dep. Tr) p. 10.) Ludwig Saenz was the plant

manager. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 6.)

WWI maintains safety policies and protocols. (ECF No. 53–7 (Jones Dep.

Tr.) pp. 78, 79.) Employees are required to wear personal protective equipment

1 WWI submitted a statement of material facts, to which Olcott filed a responsive

statement. While these statements of facts cite to the record, the fact section of the

parties’ briefs do not. This increased the Court’s burden. See Globespanvirata v.

Texas Instrument, No. 03–2854, 2005 WL 3077915, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov.15, 2005) (noting

that the purpose of a statement of material fact is to “clarify the issues for the Court,

not to increase the burden before it”). Also, Olcott’s legal argument has facts that are

not in his responsive statement of material facts or fact section of his opposition brief.

2 Olcott states he “is unable to concede or dispute” facts asserted in Saenz’s

declaration because it is an “unsworn declaration.” (See generally 54–1.) Local Civil

Rule 56.1(a) requires a responsive statement of material facts responding to each

paragraph of the movant’s statement, “and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in

dispute and citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with

the motion.” “[A]ny statement, or portion thereof, that is not clearly denied—in

substance, not merely with the label ‘disputed’—and with a proper citation to the record

in a responsive [Local Civil] Rule 56.1 statement is deemed admitted.” Juster

Acquisition Co. LLC v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. 12–03427, 2014 WL 268652, at

*1 n.1 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (providing that, if a party

fails to properly address an assertion of fact, a court may provide the party an

opportunity to properly address the fact, consider the fact undisputed, grant summary

judgment, or issue any other appropriate order). The Saenz declaration has the

correct jurat, see 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and Olcott failed to substantively dispute the facts

in Saenz’s declaration. Thus, the facts in Saenz’s declaration are deemed admitted.

3 Citations to pages of deposition transcripts are to the ECF page numbers, not

to the page numbers of the transcripts.

(PPE), such as earplugs. (Id. pp. 80, 81.) Pursuant to its Confined Space

Policy, WWI also requires all employees to obtain an entry permit before

entering a confined space. (Id. pp. 79, 80.) The permit provides that a

designated hole watch supervise and sign employees in and out each time they

enter and exit a confined space. (Id.) A violation of the Confined Space Policy

permits WWI to terminate an employee on the first offense. (Id.)

Olcott violated both policies. On July 7, 2022, WWI’s safety manager

observed Olcott working without earplugs. (Id. p. 71; Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 13–

15; ECF No. 59 p. 54 (July 2022 Progressive Discipline Form).) Olcott testified

that his earplugs were in his pocket, but he chose not to wear them because of

a medical condition. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 13, 14.) Olcott never sought an

accommodation for this condition, but “absolutely 100 percent agree[s] that [he]

should [have] be[en] written up for” this incident. (Id.) Olcott inserted his

earplugs at the safety manager’s instruction but was “written up” for the same

violation on July 16, 2022. (Id. pp. 13, 14; Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 45; July 2022

Progressive Discipline Form.) Olcott claims that the second incident was

accidental because his right earplug fell out when he was exiting a confined

space. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 13, 14.) Olcott was observed violating the PPE

policy on multiple occasions beyond these two incidents. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 45.)

On July 17, 2022, Olcott received a written warning for his repeated failure to

wear earplugs. (July 2022 Progressive Discipline Form.) The written

warning indicates that Olcott’s failure to remediate his behavior would result

in further discipline, including termination. (Id.) After receiving the written

warning, Olcott complied with the PPE policy. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 45.)

On September 23, 2022, Saenz initiated an investigation into an incident

in which Olcott allegedly sustained a shoulder injury. (Id. p. 25; Olcott Dep.

Tr. p. 17.) On that day, Olcott and Christoper Liwock, were assigned to repair

the incline and tail of a conveyor. (Olcott Dep. Tr. p. 18.) Joseph Wall was

assigned as the designated hole watch (Id. p. 25; ECF No. 53–10 (Wall Dep.

Tr.) pp. 9, 10.) Although Liwock observed Olcott to be physically okay, Olcott

indicated to Liwock and Curcio at the end of this shift that his shoulder was

“starting to bother [him] quite significantly.” (Liwock Dep. Tr. p. 12; Olcott

Dep. Tr. pp. 27, 28.) After speaking with Saenz about his injury, Saenz sent

Olcott home to rest his shoulder. (Olcott Dep. Tr. p. 28.) Although Saenz did

not say he doubted Olcott’s injury claim, Olcott alleges that he could infer from

Saenz’s attitude that Saenz did not believe him. (Id. p. 58.)

When Olcott returned to work on September 26, 2022, he was referred to

a workers’ compensation physician, who ordered Olcott to get an MRI. (Olcott

Dep. Tr. pp. 32, 33.) Saenz testified that he instructed Olcott that rather than

“do things on his own,” he should work with WWI’s safety manager and

company nurse to coordinate his medical care. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 38.)

Consistent with the physician’s examination, Saenz approved Olcott’s request

for light duty through September 30, 2022. (Id. p. 34; Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 26,

39, 6.) Olcott was allowed to remain on the clock while attending his MRI

appointment, and Curcio approved his request to clock out for the remainder of

the day. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 36, 59.)

On September 29, 2022, Olcott was prescribed physical therapy and

provided Saenz with his paperwork. (Id. pp. 37, 38.) Olcott’s intention was to

start physical therapy immediately so he could return to work as fast as possible

but Saenz told him that he would have to wait “until corporate approves it.”

(Id. pp. 37–39.) That same day, Saenz spoke with Wall and Liwcok about the

repair of the conveyor’s tail to understand how Olcott was injured. (Saenz

Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 50, 51.) Saenz learned that Liwock and Wall were not “really

present at the time of incident” and Wall was not hole watching. (Id. p. 29.)

When Olcott had entered the confined space at the conveyor’s tail, Liwock and

Wall were on the ground, off of the conveyor. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 20, 21.)

Liwock and Wall told Saenz that they became aware that Olcott entered the

confined space only after Olcott exited the space and announced that he

repositioned the chain at the conveyor’s tail. (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall

Dep. Tr. p. 9.) Wall provided Saenz with a written statement that same day

and Liwock provided his on October 4, 2022.4 (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall

Dep. Tr. p. 9; ECF No. 59 p. 4 (Wall Statement); Liwock Dep. Tr. p. 41; ECF No.

59 p. 6 (Liwock Statement).) Their written statements were consistent with

what they had told Saenz. (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall Dep. Tr. p. 9; Wall

Statement; Liwock Statement.) Saenz submitted the written statements to

human resources. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 29.)

Based on these discussions and nobody telling him otherwise, Saenz

determined that Olcott violated the Confined Space Policy. (Saenz Dep. Tr.

pp. 30, 40.) Given this high-risk offense and Olcott’s prior disciplinary history,

Saenz recommended to human resources that Olcott be terminated. (Id. p. 40.)

Human resources accepted Saenz’s recommendation and Olcott was fired on

September 30, 2022. (Id.; ECF No. 59 p.2 (September 2022 Progressive

Discipline Form).) Thereafter, Olcott used his workers’ compensation benefits

to attend physical therapy. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 38 51.)

Olcott concedes that Wall and Liwock’s statements support Saenz’s

conclusion that he entered a confined space without a hole watch. (Olcott Dep.

Tr. pp. 21, 31; Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 44.) But Olcott asserts that he did in fact tell

Wall before entering the confined space at the conveyor’s tail, and that Wall

affirmatively permitted him to enter the space. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 21, 31.)

4 Liwock submitted his written statement after Olcott’s termination, but Saenz

explained that “[t]he written statements were to confirm and put everything on paper

that this is really, in fact, what took place.” (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 30, 31.) Saenz had

enough information without Liwock’s written statement to determine that Olcott

violated the Confined Space Policy. (Id.)

Olcott, thus, believes that WWI used his shoulder injury as a pretext to

terminate him. (See generally ECF No. 1–1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 26–30.)

Wall maintains that Olcott failed to comply with the Confined Space Policy

(see Wall Dep. Tr. pp. 9, 13), but Liwock testified at his deposition that he lied

to Saenz (Liwock Dep. Tr. pp. 9–11). Contrary to his verbal and written

statements, Liwock testified that he remembers Olcott calling out to Wall and

“pointing and using the physical arm and finger motion to tell [them] … [he’s]

going in.” (Id. p. 11.) Wall acknowledged Olcott and gave him affirmative

permission to enter the confined space. (Id.) Liwock explained that he can

now tell the truth because he no longer works for WWI and does not fear that

telling the truth will put his livelihood in jeopardy. (Id. pp. 41, 42.)5

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Olcott commenced this New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD)

action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on September 13, 2023. (See

generally Compl.) Olcott’s six-count complaint raises claims against WWI for

disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. (Id. pp. 6–

10.) Olcott also seeks equitable relief6 and common law relief pursuant to

Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) for workers’

5 No testimony was elicited at Liwock’s deposition about whether he told Saenz

that he had lied. Liwock testified that his only statement to Saenz about this incident

was untrue and that he feared retaliation. It can therefore be reasonably inferred

that Liwock did not tell Saenz the truth, and Saenz had only Wall’s statement and

Liwock’s allegedly untruthful statement to rely on when recommending that Olcott be

fired. (See Liwock Dep. Tr. p. 41.)

6 A prayer for equitable relief is not an independent claim. Since such relief falls

within the other claims, I will not address Olcott’s request for equitable relief

separately. See Riconda v. US Foods, Inc., No. 19–01111, 2019 WL 4254389, at *1

(D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2019).

compensation retaliation. (Id. pp. 8–10.) On October 27, 2023, WWI removed

this action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) The parties proceeded with discovery,

and pursuant to the Court’s briefing schedule, WWI moved for summary

judgment on March 14, 2025. (ECF Nos. 44, 46.) I ordered the parties to

mediation, pending which the March 2025 motion for summary judgment was

administratively terminated. (ECF No. 48.) Mediation was unsuccessful.

(ECF No. 49). WWI filed the Motion on June 25, 2025. (ECF Nos. 53, 53–1

(Mov. Br.).) Olcott filed an opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 54–2 (Opp’n Br.)),

in response to which WWI filed a reply (ECF No. 61.) In further support of his

opposition, Olcott filed a letter objecting to the reply (ECF No. 62), to which WWI

filed a response (ECF No. 63). I directed the parties to refrain from filing

further submissions relating to the Motion. (ECF No. 64.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it will “affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A dispute is genuine if a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id. The movant “bears the burden of demonstrating the

absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental

Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). The party may satisfy its burden by

“produc[ing] evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”

or “by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the movant makes this showing, the

nonmovant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must “point to

concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element

of his case.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).

The Court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and decide the truth, but to

determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In

making that decision, “[a]ll facts and inferences are construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party,” and credibility determinations are for the

fact finder. Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998); Big

Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. NJLAD

“The NJLAD prohibits ‘any unlawful discrimination against any person

because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful

employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the

disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment.’”

Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 278 (D.N.J. 2018) (quoting N.J.S.A. § 10:5–

4.1)). “The NJLAD is a remedial statute ‘deserving of a liberal construction,’

and the statutory definition a disability is very broad in scope.” Fitzgerald v.

Shore Mem’l Hosp., 92 F. Supp. 3d 214, 236 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Clowes v.

Terminix Intern., Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 802 (N.J. 1988)). “New Jersey courts

interpreting the statute have repeatedly emphasized that the NJLAD’s

definition of ‘disability’ is not restricted to ‘severe’ or ‘immutable’ disabilities.”

Id. Thus, “conditions that are ‘demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by

accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques’ have been accepted as

disabilities under the [NJ]LAD.” Id. (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace,

966 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D.N.J.1997)).

While “[t]he elements of an NJLAD claim vary based on the cause of action

alleged,” NJLAD claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden-shifting framework. Rich, 294 F. Supp. at 278–79.

“Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing

a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.” Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P., 331 F.

App’x 932, 937 (3d Cir. 2009). “If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of

production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employer’s action.” Id. “Once the employer meets its relatively

light burden, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff, who must show

by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason is

pretextual.” Id. To demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff:

generally must submit evidence which: (1) casts sufficient doubt

upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so

that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a

fabrication; or (2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination

was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the

adverse employment action.

Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir.1994)).

1. Disability Discrimination

“[T]to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the

NJLAD,” Olcott must demonstrate that he (1) “was handicapped or disabled

within the meaning of the statute”; (2) “was qualified to perform the essential

functions of the position of employment, with or without accommodation”; (3)

“suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap or disability”;

and (4) was replaced by “another to perform the same work after plaintiff had

been removed from the position.” Rich, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 278 (quoting Victor

v. State, 952 A.2d 493, 501 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d as modified, 4

A.3d 126 (N.J. 2010)). Here, only the fourth element is disputed.7

7 WWI states a different standard for a prima facie showing of disability

discrimination under the NJLAD. (Mov. Br. p. 22.) While the first three elements

are the same and are not in dispute, WWI indicates as to the fourth element that Olcott

must establish that the adverse employment action he suffered gives rise to an

Olcott recognizes that he must demonstrate that after his termination,

WWI sought or hired a similarly qualified person to perform his role. (Opp’n

Br. pp. 6, 7.) Olcott’s failure to make such a showing justifies granting the

Motion as to this count. See Haines, 2023 WL 5623363, at *6 (granting the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s NJLAD

disability discrimination claim because the plaintiff failed to establish that the

defendant “sought a similarly qualified individual to replace [him] after his

termination”). The Complaint is devoid of any such allegation, and the record

makes no mention of whether Olcott’s job responsibilities were subsumed by

other employees or a replacement was hired.

Instead of addressing the fourth element, Olcott jumps to the conclusion

that his termination was pretextual. (See Opp’n Br. pp. 8–14.) He suggests

that because the first two elements of the prima facie standard are satisfied,

the burden shifts to WWI under McDonnel Douglas to provide a non-

discriminatory reason for his termination. (Id.) The McDonnell Douglas

inference of discrimination. (Id. pp. 22, 23 (first citing Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

636 F. App’x 831, 848 (3d Cir. 2016)). Consistent with the standard provided here,

Tourtellotte, like the majority of courts within this district, apply the standard set forth

by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Victor. See Tourtellotte, 636 F. App’x at 848

(stating that the fourth element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination

requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that his or her employer sought and/or filled that

position with a similarly-qualified person); see also Haines v. Takeda Pharms. USA,

Inc., No. 20–04336, 2023 WL 5623363, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2023) (noting that prior

to Victor, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division had held that “the

appropriate fourth element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case [for NJLAD discrimination]

require[d] a showing that the challenged employment decision … [gave] rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination” (quoting Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Schs.,

733 A.2d 571, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999))). Although courts may apply the

inference of discrimination element in limited situations, see Fitzgerald v. Glenn Ins.,

Inc., No. 20–14891, 2023 WL 2728818, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2023), I find that the

appropriate standard to apply to a discriminatory discharge claim is set forth in Victor

and noted above.

framework cannot proceed until all four elements of the prima facie case are

satisfied. Tourtellotte, 636 F. App’x at 848.

Even if Olcott could make a prima facie showing, the claim would still fail

because WWI offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

Olcott. (See September 2022 Progressive Discipline Form.) A violation of the

Confined Space Policy is grounds for termination. (Jones Dep. Tr. pp. 79, 80.)

The undisputed facts establish that WWI and Saenz believed Olcott entered a

confined space without a hole watch. (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall Dep. Tr.

p. 9; Liwock Statement; Wall Statement.) While Olcott points to evidence

suggesting that his termination was based on false information (Liwock Dep.

Tr. pp. 9–11), “it does not matter whether an employer was mistaken about what

an employee did to justify his termination.” Haines, 2023 WL 5623363, at *6

n.7; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that “to discredit

the employer’s proffered reason ... [a] plaintiff cannot simply show that the

employer’s decision was wrong or even mistaken, since the factual dispute at

issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether

the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent”); Kwiatkowski v. Merrill

Lynch, 2008 WL 3875417, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (applying the

rule in Fuentes to NJLAD discrimination claim). There is no evidence that

Saenz knew Liwock had lied to him. (Liwock Dep. Tr. pp. 9–11.) Saenz’s

recommendation to human resources to fire Olcott was based on the statements

Wall and Liwock provided to him at the time of the incident. (Saenz Dep. Tr.

pp. 29, 30, 40.) Since there is no evidence in the record showing that WWI did

not have an honest belief that he violated the Confined Space Policy, Olcott

cannot meet his burden of showing pretext.

2. Failure to Accommodate

To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must first satisfy

the prima facie elements of a disability discrimination claim. Tourtellotte, 636

F. App’x at 849. The plaintiff must then establish the following elements “to

show that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process:” (1) the

employer knew of the plaintiff’s disability; (2) the plaintiff requested disability

accommodations or assistance; (3) the employer made no good faith effort to

assist; and (4) that plaintiff “could have been reasonably accommodated but for

the employer’s lack of good faith.” Id. (quoting Victor, 4 A.3d at 145). “Once

a request for accommodation is made, both parties have a duty to assist in the

search for an appropriate reasonable accommodation.” Id. But “New Jersey

law places the duty on the employee to initiate a request for an accommodation.”

Fitzgerald, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 238. “Although there is no specific formula and

the request need not formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable

accommodation,’ the plaintiff must ‘nonetheless make clear that the employee

wants assistance for his or her disability.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville

Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999)); Linton v. L’Oreal USA, 2009 WL

838766 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2009) (“Something more is required of an employee ...

than merely apprising her employer that she is still injured to start the

interactive process for seeking an accommodation; the employee must arguably

seek assistance to survive summary judgment.”).

Olcott concedes that WWI initially provided reasonable accommodations

by assigning him to light duty work. (Opp’n Br. p. 21.) Yet, he takes issues

with WWI not following the “problem-solving approach” required in 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.9 and having effectively rescinded his accommodation by firing him.

(Id. pp. 21, 22.) Considering Olcott failed to make a prima facie showing of his

disability discrimination claim, see supra pp. 9–11, Olcott’s failure to

accommodate claim also fails. See Tourtellotte, 636 F. App’x at 849.

3. Retaliation

Olcott argues that WWI fired him because he asked for a reasonable

accommodation and/or sought workers’ compensation benefits. “Retaliation

claims under the NJLAD require the plaintiff to “demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that” (1) the plaintiff “engaged in protected

activity—here, a request for a reasonable accommodation”; (2) the plaintiff

“suffered an adverse action”; and (3) “a causal connection exists between the

protected activity and the adverse action.” Fitzgerald, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 239.

Olcott presents only conjecture and no evidence to establish a causal

connection between his termination and his seeking of accommodations or

workers’ compensation benefits. Although Olcott was fired shortly after

injuring himself, there is no dispute that Olcott was fired because of his

disciplinary history and failure to comply with WWI’s Confined Space Policy.

See supra pp. 9–11.

B. Workers’ Compensation Retaliation

Pursuant to Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., “New Jersey recognizes

a common law claim for retaliatory discharge when an employee is discharged

contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” Morris v. Siemens Components,

Inc., 928 F. Supp. 486, 492 (D.N.J. 1996). “[T]he discharge of an employee in

retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim has been found to fall within

a ‘Pierce-type’ claim.” Id. “[T]o establish a prima facie case for retaliatory

discharge, the employee must prove that: (1) he or she attempted to make a

claim for workers’ compensation benefits; and (2) he or she was discharged for

making that claim” Id. If both elements are satisfied, the burden shifts to

the defendant under the McDonnell Douglas framework “to articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge.” Id. “Ultimately,

the plaintiff must show that the defendant's proffered reasons for the discharge

are not worthy of belief and that the defendant acted with the intent to retaliate

unlawfully.” Id. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on such a

claim if the defendant “can demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff is unable to

establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge; or (2) if plaintiff can

establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff cannot produce sufficient evidence of

pretext to rebut the defendant's asserted legitimate reason for discharge.” Id.

This claim, which largely mirrors Olcott’s NJLAD retaliation claim, fails for the

same reasons as Olcott’s other claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel

EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 11, 2026